Evaluation of a task performance resource constraint model to assess the impact of offshore emergency management on risk reduction by Lyons, Melinda
Cranfie 
U 
ld 
NIVERSITY 
Melinda Lyons 
Evaluation of a Task Performance Resource 
Constraint Model to Assess the Impact of 
Offshore Emergency Management on Risk 
Reduction 
SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING 
SCIENCE 
Ph. D. Thesis 
Cran field UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND 
MANUFACTURING SCIENCE 
Ph. D. Thesis 
Academic Year of Submission 2000. 
Melinda Lyons 
Evaluation of a Task Performance Resource 
Constraint Model to Assess the Impact of 
Offshore Emergency Management on Risk 
Reduction 
Supervisor: Professor J. E. Strutt 
Date of Presentation: May 2000 
ABSTRACT 
In this age of safety awareness, technological emergencies still happen, 
occasionally with catastrophic results. Often human intervention is the only way of 
averting disaster. Ensuring that the chosen emergency managers are competent requires a 
combination of training and assessment. However, assessment currently relies on expert 
judgement of behaviour as opposed to its impact on outcome, therefore it would be 
difficult to incorporate such data into formal Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA). 
Although there is, as yet, no suitable alternative to expert judgement, there is a 
need for methods of quantifying the impact of emergency management on risk reduction 
in accident and incidents. 
The Task Performance Resource Constraint (TPRC) model is capable of 
representing the critical factors. It calculates probability of task success with respect to 
time based on uncertainties associated with the task and resource variables. The results 
can then be used to assess the management performance based on the physical outcome 
in the emergency, thereby providing a measure of the impact of emergency management 
on risk with a high degree of objectivity. 
Data obtained from training exercises for offshore and onshore emergency 
management were measured and successfully used with the TPRC model. The resulting 
probability of success functions also demonstrated a high level of external validity when 
used with improvements in emergency management or design changes or real data from 
the Piper Alpha disaster. It also appeared to have more external validity than other 
HRQ/QRA techniques as it uses physical data that are a greater influence on outcome 
than psychological changes - though this could be because the current HRA/QRA 
techniques view human unreliability as probability of error rather than probability of 
failure. The simulation data were also used to build up distributions of timings for simple 
emergency management tasks. Using additional theoretical data, this demonstrated the 
model's potential for assessing the probability of success for novel situations and future 
designs. 
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Human Error Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
Human Error Probability 
HLO - Helicopter Landing Officer - 
HRA -* Human Reliability Assessment 
HRMS - Human Reliability Management System 
HRQ - Human Reliability Quantification 
HSC - Health and Safety Commission 
HSE - Health and Safety Executive 
HV - High voltage 
HVAC - Heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
IDLH - Immediate danger to life and health 
INPO - Institute of Nuclear Power Operators 
JHEDI - Justification of Human Error Data Information 
LC50 - Lethal Concentration for 50% Percent 
LCLo - Lethal Concentration Low 
LV - Low voltage 
MAC - Manual activated alarm 
MOB - Man overboard 
NDM - Naturalistic decision making 
NDT - Non-destructive testing 
NIOSH - National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
NPD - Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
NPP - Nuclear Power Plant 
NUTEC - Norwegian Underwater Technology Centre 
02 - Oxygen 
OCTO - Operational Command and Training Organisation 
OHRA - Offshore Hazard and Risk Analysis 
OIM - Offshore Installation Manager 
OPITO - Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation 
OSD - Offshore Safety Division (of the HSE) 
PAPA - Prepare to abandon platform 
PARLOC - Pipeline and Riser Loss of Containment 
PC - Personal computer 
PDF - Probability Density Function 
PFEER - Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response 
Regulations (1988) 
PHECA - Potential Human Error Causes Analysis . 
POB - Personnel / People on Board 
PPE - Personal protective equipment 
PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PREDICT - Procedure to Review and Evaluate Dependency in Complex 
Technologies 
PSA - Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
PSF - Performance shaping factors 
PTSD - Post-traumatic stress disorder 
QRA - Quantitative Risk Assessment 
QUA - Quantitative Uncertainty Assessment 
RIDDOR - -Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences 
Regulations (1995) 
RMV - 
RO - 
RODOS - 
RO-RO - 
RPD - 
SADCAR - 
SAINT - 
SAM - 
SBV - 
SCUBA - 
SHERPA - 
SLIM-MAUD - 
SOT 
SRK 
STEL 
TEMPSC 
TESEO 
TGU 
THERP 
TR 
TRM 
TPRC 
TSR / TSH 
UKOOA 
VDU 
WPAM 
WT 
Respiratory Minute Volume 
Radio operator 
Real-time Online DecisiOn Support system 
Roll-on roll-off (ferry) 
Recognition primed decision (model) 
Situation Awareness Decision Communication And Response 
System Analysis of Integrated Networks of Tasks 
System Action Management 
Standby vessel 
Self- contained underwater breathing apparatus 
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach 
Success Likelihood Index Methodology using Multi-Attribute 
Utility Decomposition 
Scenario Organisation Team 
Skill, Rule, Knowledge 
Short-term exposure limit 
Totally Enclosed Motor-Propelled Survival Crafts 
Tecnica Empirica Stima Errori Operatori 
Tail gas unit 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
Temporary Refuge 
Team Resource Management 
Task Performance Resource Constraint 
Temporary Safe Refuge / Temporary Safe Haven 
United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association 
Visual display unit 
Work Process Analysis Model 
Well tower 
NOTATION 
Linear work rate 
Actual Performance 
Initial level of knowledge- 
Jumps in knowledge / short-cut 
Basic rate of resource consumption 
Deviation coefficient of Cb 
Cumulative frequency distribution of time 
Probability density function of variable t 
Common cause factor 
Probability of failure 
Probability of success 
Resource consumption rate 
Required Performance 
Spearman's Coefficient 
Reliability function 
Overall probability of Success of a series of sub-tasks 
Task Requirement / Task standards 
Work progress as a function of time 
Initial resource capacity 
Time between work rate changes 
Standard deviation 
Mean 
Scale parameter of Weibull distribution 
Shape parameter of Weibull distribution 
Location parameter of Weibull distribution 
Gamma function 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
For the benefit of this research, emergency management is the culmination of tasks that 
work to produce a successful outcome in an emergency. Therefore, this does not focus 
just on the decisions and communications of a management team or just on the actions in 
response to these decisions and communications but a combination of the two processes 
and their collective impact on the risk. 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
SECTION 1.1: MAIN INTRODUCTION 
A large majority of the technological accidents that have occurred during the last 
century have been attributed to human error. Except for those rare and unmanageable 
"Acts of God", every technological accident has a human cause, simply because it was 
humans who invented the technology in the first place. However, it may seem 
inconceivable to us to merely accept that such accidents happen. Consequently, as 
science advances, we also try to control the advance and to safeguard the environment in 
which we live. 
Quantitative Risk' Assessment (QRA) is used to measure the risks posed both by 
technological change and in everyday life. It generally involves an objective process of 
collecting reliability information on the relevant technological hardware and software. 
However, given that the human contribution to accidents is so great, it is critical to 
quantify the probability of human as well as "non-human" errors in the system. 
The field of Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) attempts to provide this 
information by scientifically assessing the contribution of human error to accidents. This 
requires great understanding of how humans respond to particular environments and 
systems. We, as humans, sometimes pride ourselves on being unique and unpredictable, 
making this process extremely difficult. Generally, such data can be estimated through 
scientifically controlled experiments and observation. When large amounts of data have 
been collected, probable error rates can be assumed - in the same way that it is 
calculated for the reliability of technological systems. However, collecting data on human 
reactions to an emergency is even more problematic. Firstly, human behaviour in an 
emergency is likely to be as unpredictable as the nature of the emergency itself. To wait 
for a real emergency to occur so that behaviour could be recorded is an impractical 
method of obtaining data. It is also strongly unethical to set up emergencies without 
informing the people involved. Consequently, informing the people of an emergency 
simulation or drill reassures them that the situation is not going to escalate out of all 
control - hence affecting their reaction. Therefore, data on emergency behaviour are 
mostly anecdotal or are assumed from observation of simulated exercises. 
The tragic Piper Alpha disaster of 1988 brought many of the failures of the 
offshore industry to light. The Cullen Report (1990) emphasised the importance of using 
a formal QRA process to identify and quantify the critical risks. One of the main failures 
was identified as being the inadequacy of the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM). In 
this role, he was expected to take responsibility for the incident as the Emergency 
Manager. However, he failed to make critical decisions at the appropriate times, which 
contributed to the scale of the disaster. This human failure emphasised the importance of 
ensuring that the emergency manager is the right person for the job. 
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In this disaster as in any other real life incident, the emergency manager is 
assessed by the general public based on the outcome of the emergency. The emergency 
manager would be held responsible for any deaths, injuries or losses, and acclaimed for 
any rescues. If a minor incident escalates into a major incident, the emergency manager is 
deemed to have failed. If a potentially major incident ends with no casualties or losses, 
the emergency manager is considered successful., 
However, the emergency manager's competency cannot be established by waiting 
for the first real emergency and then assessing the adequacy of the outcome. Therefore, 
it is necessary to set up simulations to test his skill. Assessment typically involves using 
subjective opinions made by someone who is said to be an expert in emergency 
management. However, the definition of an "expert" in emergency management is also 
subjective - which emphasises the importance of maintaining strict guidelines for the 
whole procedure. Also, the expert opinion is usually based on observations of the 
emergency manager's behaviour rather than the estimated impact of this behaviour on 
the incident. This is often biased by hindsight as the expert frequently has insight into the 
nature of the incident that the emergency manager does not have. For these reasons, it 
would be difficult to develop these assessment techniques into a reliable and objective 
approach that can be used in the QRA process. Therefore, the competency assessments 
are unlikely to represent the same factors that are needed to assess the impact of 
emergency management on risk. 
To be able to produce a useful means of assessing the impact, we would require a 
technique that incorporates the following features: 
" Objectivity - to ensure that the assessment is not swayed by biased opinions and is 
based on objectively-defined observable features. 
" Producing quantitative results - to facilitate the use of values in the QRA process. 
" The ability to reflect small changes in timing - to express the criticality of "timeliness" 
in emergencies and to bring the specific quantitative values of time into the 
methodology. 
" The ability to reflect the context of any given emergency situation - to be flexible 
enough to represent any situation, but to potentially be specific enough to identify the 
critical features of emergency management tasks, limitations and goals. 
" The ability to reflect the unpredictability and uncertainty associated with human, 
behaviour - to represent any task, appropriate or inappropriate; and to represent the 
whole scope of human behaviour, to be able to produce results even when some of 
the required data is unknown or may lie within a broad distribution. 
Therefore, the main aim of the research is to make explicit the relationship 
between emergency management and risk. Although it is generally assumed that 
emergency management has an impact on the outcome of an emergency, there is no 
methodology that physically or numerically identifies its contribution. Ideally, this 
methodology should not rely on the subjective opinions of experts from the observed 
behaviour of the emergency management team; but rather, on numerical data related to 
the objective outcome of an incident. This technique should be generic in nature but be 
able to represent context-specific information; for example, the relationship between any 
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emergency management tasks and the escalating situation. Finally, as there is no other 
technique that is capable of assessing the impact of emergency management on risk in 
this way; it would be difficult to validate it. Therefore, as a minimum requirement, this 
method should have good face validity - and produce results that are consistent with our 
knowledge about emergencies, management intervention and risk., Once developed, this 
method should then be assessed in terms of its ability to assess novel situations involving 
novel tasks or new designs. Therefore, the objectives are as follows: 
SECTION 1.2: OBJECTIVES 
1. To develop a method of obtaining objective data on management performance from 
emergency scenarios 
2. To develop a methodology to use these data to assess the probability of success in 
emergency management tasks. 
3. To demonstrate how these methods can be used to evaluate the impact of changes in 
emergency management skill and design on risk values. 
4. To use the above methodology and data to define performance parameters that can be 
applied to evaluate generic emergency situations. 
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SECTION 1.3: SCOPE 
As already stated in the objectives above, the project involves the development of a 
methodology to assess offshore emergency management performance. However, it must 
be stated that the research was limited by a number of factors. 
1. Availability and Validi . of 
data 
It is impractical to wait for a real incident to occur to assess emergency management 
performance or related research topics. Therefore, the data with the greatest validity 
must be obtained from simulations. In this case, the quantity of data was limited primarily 
by the number of simulations run during the course of the project. In addition, there are 
ethical implication for research of this kind - for the most ecologically-valid behavioural 
data, it would be preferable to plan and run simulations without telling those involved 
that they are simulations. This is unethical therefore the ecological validity of the data 
was reduced to maintain ethical practices. 
2. Scope of data application areas 
It must be mentioned that although the project specifically refers to the offshore 
environment, the use of data from the onshore petrochemical industry could also be 
included. As these data were drawn from specific platforms and plants, assumptions of 
specific timings (such as muster timings) and design data (such as distances) can not be 
directly applied to other installations. However, where the data are specified as being 
generic or are based on theoretical information, they can potentially be adapted to suit 
any situation. 
3. Experimenter control 
To a large degree, the dedicated simulations were outside of the control of the 
experiment. Therefore, they were available for recording of data but did not allow 
adjustment of the arrangements of the simulation or the content of the scenario. For 
example, the data available involved the recording of the emergency management team's 
reactions to the escalation incident. Therefore the scenario data represent the decisive, 
communicative and active control room tasks and not the external physical tasks, for 
example, movements of rescuers and fire-fighters. These data were usually assumed by 
the scenario organisers and therefore cannot be guaranteed to be accurate by the author. 
4. Thesis content and focus 
Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the research area, it can be recognised that the 
thesis is potentially of interest to people from many different backgrounds. These include 
emergency planners, emergency management assessors, simulation organisers, designers 
and more broadly, psychologists, ergonomists, safety personnel and reliability engineers. 
However, it would be difficult to successfully focus this thesis for all of these audiences. 
Therefore, this thesis is aimed particularly at reliability engineers who require 
quantification of the impact of emergency management on risk reduction. This may be 
for research purposes or for application in QRA. 
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SECTION 1.4: ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
As shown in Figure la, the thesis will be organised in the traditional order of 
subjects. Following this chapter, Chapter 2 includes the Literature Review, which 
provides a review of pertinent areas in the research - including emergency management, 
risk assessment and related areas. Chapter 3 continues this review with an examination of 
the research in the specific area of offshore risks and the management of offshore 
emergencies. 
Chapter 4 introduces the method and how it came about from the objectives 
defined. It illustrates the arrangements under which the research was made, including 
the description of the platform, the layout of rooms and equipment and personnel 
involved in the running of simulations. Chapter 5 describes the Task Performance 
Resource Constraint (TPRC) model - the technique that formed the basis of the 
assessment technique. Following this, the chapter describes the adaptations that were 
made to the TPRC model to make it suitable for the task as well as the additional data 
that were collected. Using examples from the observed simulations, this chapter also 
described how the data were applied in the model. Chapter 6 illustrates some of the 
additional data that were collected for use in the research. Following this, Chapter 7 
gives a demonstration of how simulation data can be converted into generic and specific 
data representing the "reasonable responses" of an emergency manager and his team - 
referred to as performance parameters. Finally, this chapter describes how these data can 
be used in the TPRC model to assess novel situations and new designs. 
Chapter 8 provides the TPRC results of the examples introduced in Chapter 5 as 
well as an illustration of what can be applied in the model using the Piper Alpha disaster. 
It also compares the results from the earlier scenarios with results that would be obtained 
using different QRA or HRQ methodologies - namely HEART and HAZAN. Chapter 9 
shows the results of the performance parameter analysis, as described in Chapter 7, 
including distributions of the data and further TPRC assessments to demonstrate the 
model's ability to incorporate the performance parameter data. 
Chapter 10 includes a critical analysis of the method and models. Considering 
these, Chapter 11 analyses the results in more detail and in terms of the objectives of the 
research. Chapter 12 concludes the thesis by describing the contribution of the research 
in terms of theoretical knowledge and practical applications. This also identifies areas for 
future work. 
The locations of key parts of the research, as well as topics of interest, are shown in 
Figures la and lb. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
SECTION 2.1: INTRODUCTION 
This section aims to describe where the research problem came from, what is 
already known about the problem and what other methods have been or could be tried to 
solve it. 
In brief, U. K. legislation now recommends, either implicitly or explicitly, the use 
of risk assessment to objectively evaluate all risks to health and safety. In the offshore 
industry particularly, this is implemented through a "goal setting" approach to 
continually improve safety. However, despite reduction or elimination of some of the 
risks, many will remain. 
If an incident occurs, it can result in anything from a near miss to a major 
catastrophe. The aim of emergency management is to ensure that the consequences of 
such an incident are as minor as possible. Therefore, it should be possible to integrate the 
impact of emergency management into the risk equation, ideally demonstrating that 
emergency management reduces risk! This information could then be used to identify 
what are the key factors involved in emergency management; what the critical decisions 
are, which must be made to optimise the outcome, and when such decisions should be 
made. Given that such details could be calculated, this could facilitate the identification 
of good emergency management practice and therefore aid in the recognition of good 
emergency managers and the development of emergency plans. Finally, this information 
could feed back into the design process, ensuring that technology is designed so that any 
possible incidents are manageable by a competent emergency manager. 
However, to be able to assess the impact of emergency management in this way 
is a real challenge. Firstly, emergencies are unexpected, infrequent and unique events. 
Therefore, real data would be difficult to obtain and could not be easily adapted to 
represent or predict all incidents and their possible outcomes. Secondly, assessing the 
impact of any kind of management involves the prediction of human behaviour. Human 
nature can be as unpredictable as the emergencies to which they respond. Therefore, it 
would seem impossible to provide numerical figures to represent "good" or "poor" 
emergency management. 
Nevertheless, competence in emergency management must comply with 
standards and this is generally assessed subjectively by observing simulated emergency 
exercises. There have been few attempts to identify the critical aspects of emergency 
management, including investigations into personality characteristics and decision- 
making style. However, to identify a technique that can evaluate the impact of 
emergency management on risk requires the presence of particular features - including 
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some appreciation of the context of the situation and its seriousness; the time pressures 
involved and, ideally, independence from the current subjective evaluation techniques. 
Therefore, to address the research problem, it is necessary to draw on knowledge 
from a number of topics. These predominantly consider 
" The Nature of Disasters, Emergencies and Major Accidents 
" Emergency Management 
" Risk Assessment techniques 
" Research Methods 
Each of these issues will be discussed in more detail in the rest of this review. 
SECTION 2.2: THE NATURE OF DISASTERS, EMERGENCIES 
AND MAJOR ACCIDENTS 
"Maimed children, contaminated 'communities, 
ravaged landscapes, technological genocide - this is 
the nature of the high-tech holocaust. Man-made 
and rapidly spiralling out of control, it is the legacy 
of the post-war surge of uncontrolled technological 
development across the entire spectrum of everyday 
life; aided and abetted by governments and vested 
interests everywhere who blindly and cynically put 
economic expediency ahead of human life - who 
plan for today and hope that, tomorrow will always 
come. " (Bellini 1986) 
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
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This section will describe the potential consequences of hazardous occurrences - 
disasters, emergencies and major accidents. This illustrates the qualitative impact of 
emergency management by describing how events can escalate when emergency 
management is absent or inadequate. Therefore, this section emphasizes how important it 
is to be able to measure the impact of emergency management on risk, working towards 
a "guarantee" of a certain performance level of emergency intervention. 
This section will begin by attempting to define the type of occurrences in 
question - using the popular terms "emergency", "accident", "crisis" etc. Following this, 
the review will move on to illustrate the concept by describing some of the major 
incidents that have occurred. Then, in more generic terms, the review will describe some 
of the stages that are said to occur in an emergency. Finally, this section will describe the 
"subjective experience" of being in an emergency before moving on to the next section, 
which describes how emergencies should be managed. 
2.2.2 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
In general, there is an implicit understanding about the words used to describe 
certain events as accidents, crises, disasters, tragedies, incidents, catastrophes and 
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emergencies. Many are used inter-changeably without the consideration of the severity of 
consequences, the impact of the event or the culture involved. 
The Chambers concise dictionary (Schwarz 1991) defines Emergency as "an 
unexpected occurrence, requiring immediate attention" and a Crisis as "a crucial or 
decisive moment, a turning-point". Although these definitions are correct; they do not 
encompass all of the attributes that we require for our understanding of major incidents. 
For our purposes, a more clear-cut definition is required. Morin (1976) suggests 
a crisis as "the moment where uncertainty exists at the same time as a problem". Wiener 
and Kahn (1962), Milburn (1972) and Mitroffet al (1988) try to suggest lists of 
attributes in an attempt to define crises. These include time pressure, threats to the 
system goals, lack of control over events, information overload, inter-personal conflicts 
and ambiguity (All references in this paragraph cited in Lagadec 1993). Wilson (1991) 
suggests that "in any emergency, there is virtually always one common factor -a 
shortage of time for people to reach a position of safety". 
Further to these, Kirchsteiger (1997) gives the following definition of a major 
accident: 
"It is a sudden, unexpected, unplanned event, resulting from uncontrolled developments 
during an industrial activity, which causes, or has the potential to cause, serious adverse 
effects, immediate or delayed (death, injuries, poisoning or hospitalisation), to a number 
of people inside the installation and/or persons outside the establishment". 
In terms of description of severity and content, this definition fits our purposes 
adequately. The following points will discuss the different uses of the main terms that 
also sometimes imply this definition. 
1. Accident is often used to mean quite different events including road traffic accidents, 
which are not industrially based and chemical leaks, which may or may not have caused 
injuries (Montiel et al 1996, Explosion Group, TU Delft 1997). The term "accident" is 
commonly used in the nuclear industry to refer to an incident of the sort identified in 
Kirchsteiger's definition (Catton & Lim 1994, Asmolov 1997) and is occasionally used in 
aircraft and chemical incidents (Muir 1996 and Montiel et al 1996 respectively). 
However, popularity of the term is probably due to common use in general circles - for 
example, accident investigation (Johnson & Telford 1996) and accident statistics (HSE 
1997b). 
2. The most popular term used in the literature is "emergency". It is commonly used in 
research circles when developing computer packages to train and assess managers in 
"emergency management" (Petty et al 1996, Doheny & Fraser 1996) as well as 
psychological research into stress and decision-making (Kaempf & Militello 1992, 
Kontogiannis 1996). This term has common use in the offshore (Brandie 1995, Skriver & 
Flin 1997, UKOOA 1997a), chemical (Ramabrahmam et al 1996) and maritime industries 
(Clemmensen 1995). It is also used worldwide. It has been used in Russian and American 
research to refer to natural and industrial incidents (Kosyachenko et al 1998 and Simard 
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1997) and French and Japanese research to describe only technological incidents 
(Samurcay & Rogalski 1993 and Ujita, Kawano & Yoshimura 1995 respectively). 
However, this is often confused with any event which involves the emergency services as 
well as any event requiring particular medical procedures, for example, emergency 
childbirth (St. John Ambulance Association et al 1997). 
3. The term "Crisis" is normally used to describe organizational or political 
circumstances - often in terms of financial rather than physical losses. Although this is 
often used when referring to the organizational response to a physical loss, the events 
that fit Kirchsteiger's definition have already finished. Shrivastava et al (1988 p. 285) 
define industrial crises as "organizationally-based disasters which cause extensive 
damage and social disruption, involve multiple stakeholders, and unfold through complex 
technological, organizational and social processes". Mitroff (1988) attempts to identify 
all the types of crisis; his list includes hostile takeovers, bribery, sexual harassment, major 
computer breakdowns and major product defects. However, Smith (1994) warns that 
there may be confusion in defining the difference between a crisis and a period of 
controlled change in a short period of time. He suggests that occasionally this type of 
change is necessary or even welcome and so does not constitute a crisis but is "a learning 
process by which crises may be avoided". Some references uses crises to describe all 
such problems - both within our definition and outside of it (Smith 1990, Read 1995). 
Richardson (1994) attempts to distinguish between the "socio-technical disaster crisis" 
and the "business-failure crisis" in terms of the suddenness of onset, the contribution of 
technology and the fact that lives, as opposed to careers, finances and public perception, 
are under threat. 
4. The term "disaster" frequently relates to natural disasters. These differ from 
Kirchsteiger's definition in that an industrial process does not produce them and 
therefore no management can attempt to control their effects, except by evacuating the 
area of people and resources prior to the event. Therefore disaster management 
frequently involves humanitarian aid - the organization of clean-up operations, relocating 
and re-uniting survivors (Lerner 1991). This, therefore, may not be subject to the 
extreme time pressure implied in Kirchsteiger's definition. However, many of the major 
events that have been described as crises, accidents and emergencies are called disasters 
by the press (Brown 1997). It also seems to be used as a term for the most severe 
incidents with the more tragic consequences that "differ from accidents and everyday 
emergencies in the sense that they disrupt the fabric of society" (Quarantelli 1993 cited in 
Flin 1998 p. 88). 
5. The term "catastrophe" is used less than the other terms. However, in response to a 
chemical disaster in Basel, Switzerland, Christen et al (1994) used fuzzy set theory to 
devise a set of indicators to describe the severity of an incident, where catastrophe is 
defined as the highest level. These indicators include number of fatalities, injured persons 
and evacuees; number of dead animals, ecosystems and areas of contaminated soil and 
polluted groundwater. This disaster scale used is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure l- Disaster scale 
Using this scale, the Bhopal disaster was given a value of 1.0 indicating the 
highest severity possible on the scale. Seveso was given 0.71 and Amoco Cadiz was 
given 0.61. The Flixborough disaster resulted in a value of 0.50 - indicating that this was 
on the lowest limit to be given the definition of catastrophe. However, this scale involves 
some degree of subjectivity and it is questionable whether scales providing definitions are 
actually useful. 
Generally, to quibble over the definitions and terminology relating to such 
tragedies does not bring us closer to understanding the causes or preventative measures. 
As in the literature, the most popular term used when referring to such an event is 
"emergency" (using the definition by Kirchsteiger 1997 above). Therefore, this review 
will continue to use the term "Emergency management" to refer to the attempts to 
mitigate such an event and limit these adverse effects. However, at this point, this review 
will continue by describing some of the worst events of this kind - those that escalated 
into "worst case scenarios" becoming tragic disasters. 
2.2.3 MAJOR DISASTERS OF OUR TIME 
There are a number of disasters that are frequently cited in research, mainly 
because they involved large loss of life or because they occurred in an unexpected 
manner, perhaps to a company, industry or in a country that was assumed by the public 
to be "safe". These include Bhopal, Challenger space shuttle, Chernobyl, Estonia, 
Flixborough, Herald of Free Enterprise, Hillsborough, Kegworth Air disaster, King's 
Cross, Piper Alpha and more recently the Ladbroke Grove and Southall rail disasters. 
Often when the accident investigation has been completed, it can be identified that many 
of the initiating events involved in these emergencies had occurred before. Many RO-RO 
(Roll on Roll off) ferries had left Zeebrugge with their bow doors open prior to the 
Herald of Free Enterprise disaster; many fires on London Underground escalators had 
occurred prior to the King's Cross disaster (Lucas 1992). It could easily be concluded 
that these accidents were "waiting to happen". 
As can be seen from this very short list of major disasters, no industrial sector is 
immune from tragedy. These examples also refute the beliefs that "it couldn't happen 
here", "it couldn't happen today" and even worse - "it couldn't happen again! ". 
In addition, these accidents have all resulted from a number of contributory 
tailing factors from the root causes through to the final failing act. Such causes include: 
" Poor government decisions 
" Poor attitude towards safety at management and/or operations level 
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" Inadequate training 
" Inadequate or incorrect procedures 
" Poor communication 
" Poor environmental conditions for the activity involved 
" Maintenance errors - 
" Poor design 
" Design modifications without consideration for their implications 
" Operational errors 
" System failure 
" Malicious Acts 
" Inadequate secondary safety devices or procedures 
It is notable that none of these tragedies resulted from so-called "Acts of God", 
such as a lightning strike or some other unusual environmental condition. All could have 
been prevented by reasonable human foresight. For example, although the cold weather 
was a contributory cause of the Challenger disaster, it was the strength of the 
management desire to launch that resulted in the disaster. There were political and 
organizational implications and these overrode the consideration of a possible technical 
failure due to the effects of cold weather on the o-rings (Presidential Commission 1986). 
In the King's Cross disaster of 1987, smoking material ignited rubbish that collected in 
the workings of the elevator. The fire that resulted was left to escalate due to poor 
emergency and evacuation procedures and lack of staff training (Fennell 1988). This 
emphasizes the importance of secondary safety systems - that although a fire had 
occurred, it was the lack of action in response to the fire that resulted in the 31 deaths. In 
many of the accidents described, it was the lack of adequate response to the incident that 
resulted in its severity. Titanic is a famous example of where emergency'preparedness 
and management would have made a difference. The fact that the ship struck the iceberg 
and sank is only the trigger event of the disaster. If there had been enough lifeboats, 
which had been loaded to the correct capacity and if the warning to abandon ship had 
been given earlier, more, if not all, of the 1503 victims would have been saved (Watson 
1995, Smith 1995). 
Disasters of this magnitude are rare but unfortunately, their incidence is rising 
(Richardson 1994) and it is not sufficient to rely on the low statistics of occurrence. 
Once a disaster has occurred, there is much effort placed on finding the contributory 
causes to prevent re-occurrence. This involves a formal accident investigation process. A 
large amount of information must be collected including the damage to people and 
assets, relevant procedures, management structures and background, design and design 
changes. However, there has been suggestion that some investigations are biased 
towards interested parties in terms of blame and exoneration, perhaps due to their being 
lead by legal as opposed to independent engineering personnel (Lees 1994). Therefore 
Johnson & Telford (1996) proposed an investigation, technique and team structure 
including forensic scientists, metallurgists, meteorologists, software engineers and human 
factors experts, as necessary, to bring together their knowledge to provide accurate and 
consistent recommendations. Examples of the details examined are given in some of the 
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public inquiries that have been carried out, for example, into the Piper Alpha (Cullen 
1990) and Hillsborough (Taylor 1989) disasters. 
However, there is always the possibility that a minor incident can escalate into a 
major disaster and so just responding to the specific disasters that have occurred is 
inadequate. Statistics can be used to examine the potential for disaster. These might 
include specific types and severity of injuries (HSE 1997b), types of error (Bradley 
1995), types of tasks (HSE 1997b) or can represent the injury rate for the whole industry 
in question (Lancaster 1996). However, it is better to take a pro-active approach. It has 
been demonstrated that there is a relationship between the number of near misses, minor 
incidents and major accidents as shown in the "Iceberg concept" represented in Figure 3 
(cited in Jones et al 1999). 
Figure 3: Iceberg concept 
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Despite this, there is an inverse relationship between the number of accidents and 
the number of near misses reported (Jones et al 1999). This suggests that if you 
investigate the large number of near misses, it can help to prevent both the smaller and 
larger incidents, hence taking a reactive approach. 
However, these issues are primarily the concern of conventional risk and safety 
management as opposed to emergency management. They focus more on the global 
objectives of this research project (trying to reduce overall risk by identifying weaknesses 
in the emergency management system) than the objectives of an emergency management 
team (reducing the risk in the specific emergency situation). As there is an enormous 
body of research in the former area, this will not be discussed in further detail. Therefore, 
the next sub-section will return to a more pertinent issue by describing, in generic terms, 
the stages through which an emergency is said to progress. 
2.2.4 STAGES IN AN EMERGENCY 
Within an incident of the type described in the Kirchsteiger definition, it is 
believed that the time phases in the event can be placed in various categories. 
Strutt & Lakey (1995) suggest that the physical stages in the emergency are as follows: 
-' " Initiating Event - This is the triggering event and might involve a relatively 
insignificant human or system failure. 
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" Loss of control - This is the first stage of escalation, whereby the triggering event has 
an impact on the rest of the system, perhaps through a lack of controlling systems. 
" Escalation and spread = This is said to be the stage at which the incident escalates 
from a minor to a major incident. The risks to personnel, assets and the environment 
are greatly increased and regaining control becomes more difficult, if not impossible. 
" Failure to evacuate - This is the final stage of an emergency - where there are no 
control-based alternatives, evacuation is the only safe measure. In this case, 
evacuation could be prevented through escalation, leading to the worst possible 
outcome. 
These stages of incident progress also imply the stages of actions that should be 
taken in response to them. In qualitative terms, this can be used to assess the impact of 
emergency management on risk. The incident's potential (negative and positive) 
compared with the eventual outcome are a measure of emergency management 
performance - and progressing to the final stage would usually imply poor emergency 
management. 
In contrast, Tyhurst (cited in Rolfe & Taylor 1989) focuses on the psychological 
reactions to the event and proposes that the phases include: 
" Threat 
" Warning 
" Impact 
" Recoil 
" Post-impact 
These psychological phases can be linked to the physical phases as used by Strutt 
& Lakey (1995). The initial threat stage occurs where people realise that the potential of 
a disaster occurring is probable and that they may be affected. As the realisation 
increases that a disaster is imminent, the individual(s) involved enters the warning phase. 
Occasionally, there is no pre-impact stage of realisation and the disaster occurs without 
any threat or warning. This is the impact stage, which is the area we will focus on in our 
examination of emergency management. Once the initial dangers have been removed by 
either escape, mitigation or by ceasing naturally, this signifies the period of recoil. In this 
phase, it is disaster management that plays its part - where the slow process of 
humanitarian aid and clean-up operations are required. Finally, there is a period of post- 
impact trauma, where the people involved must recover from the experience 
psychologically and rebuild their lives (Leach 1994). 
The fact that these psychological changes occur cause problems both in an 
emergency and when studying the assessment of emergency management and its impact 
on risk. Firstly, it is likely that the point when an incident really requires intervention by 
an emergency manager is going to be the same point at which they are unable to respond. 
Secondly, as it is difficult to recreate these same psychological reactions under "safe" 
conditions, assessment of emergency management performance is somewhat artificial. 
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However, the behaviour of those involved prior to and during the emergency may, 
have a critical (negative or positive) impact on its outcome and it is this behaviour, and 
the emotions behind it, that will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2.5 THE EMERGENCY EXPERIENCE 
Despite this age of technological advances, often it is the human responses that 
provide the main mitigation between minor incident and major accident. This is known as 
Emergency Management, which will be discussed in Section 2.3. However, the current 
section will consider the natural untrained response to an emergency. How does an 
emergency experience affect feelings and behaviour, and does this experience contribute 
to a successful or unsuccessful outcome? 
What is an emergency for one person may be perceived as a normal event for 
another person. Consider, for a moment, the emergency services - their working lives 
consist of involvement with people with severe injuries and fatalities; whereas to the 
public in general, only one of these incidents in a whole working lifetime may be an 
irrepressible and incomprehensible event. As Lagadec states "An event is defined by how 
it is perceived" or more specifically for the subject of crises; Bolzinger (1982 cited in 
Lagadec 1993) states "Without this feeling of being in crisis, there is no crisis; the mere 
clinical perception of the symptom is enough to make the diagnosis". This is comparable 
to one definition of stress - the transactional model (Cox & Mackay 1976) - where stress 
is the perceived inability to cope. In both cases, it is the perception of the reality, rather 
than the reality itself, that creates the experience. 
The reaction to an emergency situation may or may not contribute to a successful 
outcome of the emergency. The stress can be extreme causing unusual reactions. 
However, the early idea that people immediately panic in response to an emergency is 
not strictly true. Neil Townsend suggests "I think that when people die in fires it's not 
because of panic - it's more likely to be the lack of panic (Faith 1999 p. 161). However, 
panic can occur, particularly where escape routes are blocked or there is confined space. 
Such behaviour can be irrational and self-destructive as judgment and reasoning 
deteriorate even to the stage where mass panic spreads throughout a group of people 
(Leach 1994). However, it is not always the case. 
In an incident where all 4 engines failed on a Jumbo Jet flying to Kuala Lumpar, 
Betty Tootell reported "After the initial flurry on the plane - not panic, that's too strong 
a word - people said goodbye to each other, put their arms around one another. Some 
sat sobbing quietly, some appeared not to have noticed what was happening. My heart 
was thumping like mad, but although people say panic is infectious it was calm that 
seemed to have spread" (The Times 19`h August 1985 cited in Leach 1994). Other 
reactions include paralysing anxiety (being frozen to the spot), tunnel vision and 
perceptual distortions, denial, depression, hypoactivity, hyperactivity, guilt, anger or 
irrational behaviour (Leach 1994). Rolfe & Taylor (1989) suggest that "passive trust" 
may occur, where a victim "acknowledges the existence of the threat but takes no 
positive action, arguing that "they" (i. e. community leaders, the police... ) are in 
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command of the situation and all will be well". Such a response emphasizes the 
importance of the emergency managers in these situations. 
However, David Canter adds "... The most remarkable thing about people's 
behaviour in a fire is that "they carry on with their ordinary, conventional, day-to-day 
activity with the script that guides what they do when there's no emergency. They follow 
through on that until the circumstances are so dramatic, so disturbing, so demanding that 
they feel they have to do something very different" (Faith 1999 p. 151). Such a reaction 
was exhibited in the King's Cross and Bradford Stadium fires and the Manchester air 
disaster of 1985. 
Whether or not these behaviours are beneficial to the individual can only be 
determined by the outcome. If such reactions lead the individual to save themselves and 
perhaps other people, they are obviously beneficial. However, if the reactions lead the 
individual into further danger, this could be either due to the disorganised perceptions 
and poor planning or could be just bad luck. 
The following section discusses the factors important in emergency management. 
This requires an individual to be able to control these naturally occurring reactions, not 
only in himself, but also in others, to maximise a positive outcome from the incident. 
SECTION 2.3: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section describes the concept of emergency management in 5 main sections. 
These are as follows: 
" What is emergency management? - describing its goal and objectives 
" How does emergency management work? - describing the means by which it obtains 
these objectives. 
" What types of emergency management are there? - describing various types of 
emergency management shown in the literature 
" How can good emergency management be identified? - describing characteristics that 
have been linked with good emergency management. 
" How can emergency management be assessed and improved? - This describes the 
training and assessment that is available for emergency management and the 
additional factors that influence a good outcome in an emergency 
2.3.2 WHAT IS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT? 
As Section 2.2.2 described, an emergency is an "unexpected; unplanned event 
resulting from uncontrolled developments". As Lerner (1991) states, "A disaster is, by 
definition, a situation beyond control. Therefore the term "disaster management" may 
seem an oxymoron". Similarly, emergencies are unmanageable, if you consider the 
ordinary definition of management, and thus they require skills above and beyond those 
of normal duties. 
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In the same way that there is confusion between the terms emergency, crisis, 
disaster and accident, the term "management" has been used in connection with these 
terms to mean very different duties. Using the earlier definitions by Kirchsteiger (1997) 
and Wilson (1991), it can be assumed that an event has occurred which has the potential 
to cause great damage in a short length of time. The extent of damage that occurs 
depends on initial conditions (for example the presence of latent errors or availability of 
mitigation systems) and the actions that can be taken to limit the damage. Limiting the 
damage to workers, members of the public, assets and the environment is the essence of 
emergency management. It does not involve preventing the initial event - this would be 
normal safe management practice. It does not involve humanitarian aid given that the 
worst-case scenario manifested itself - This is disaster management (or disaster relief). 
It also must be distinguished from crisis management, which is concerned more with 
corporate image and other economic concerns. Therefore, emergency management 
involves the direct attempts to prevent the initial event from becoming the worst case 
scenario in terms of injuries sustained, lives lost, assets damaged and environmental 
pollution. 
Baldwin (1994 p. 20) distinguishes between the "different tiers of management required 
as follows: 
" Emergency response - This focuses on the reaction to the physical emergency to 
protect people, the environment and property. 
" Emergency management - This concentrates on managing the immediate 
repercussions of the emergency, for example, the media and public reaction, 
minimizing its impact on normal operations and ensuring the emergency response 
team is handling the incident in an adequate way; 
" Crisis management - This can be defined as the loss of management control; so the 
corporate team is tasked with developing and implementing pre-emptive strategies to 
secure the company's long-term future which has been threatened by the 
emergency". 
However, to maintain consistency with Kirchsteiger's definition and that shown, 
in the Definition of Terms, this report will use the term "emergency management" to 
refer to Baldwin's definitions of Emergency Response together with the initial stages of 
Emergency Management. 
2.3.3 HOW DOES EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT WORK? 
An emergency can be compared to a competitive game of chess. Once the first 
move has been taken, there are a large number of possibilities to how the game may end. 
It may involve a win or a loss. It may end with a large number of pieces on the board or 
just two or three. One player may lose as they run out of time or because of their lack of 
insight. Each player wants to maximize their own chance of winning and will take the 
actions they believe are correct to gain this end. In emergency management, it is the 
player versus the situation. An emergency manager wants to successfully win over the 
emergency and to minimise the losses. One of the key aspects of an emergency situation 
is that it involves a time base that is non-negotiable. The emergency will `, wait for no 
man". Delays in response only result in escalation - increasing the probability that the 
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worst-case scenario may arise. However, this is not a totally reactive process. Some 
emergencies are unmanageable - perhaps due to poor design, lack of resources or 
because the situation escalates too quickly to allow intervention. These issues will be 
considered in section 2.3.6.4 and 2.3.6.5. 
Even with all the technological advances that we have today, it is still humans 
that provide the important intervention in an emergency. This is surprising when you 
consider that it is estimated that up to 90% of accidents are caused by human error in the 
first place (Hollnagel (1993 p. 4) and some bodies consider this adequate justification for 
the complete automation of safety-critical systems. Professor van der Schaaf argues 
"Whatever you do, don't design humans out of your systems, they are probably all that 
stands between you and catastrophe" - adding that "human beings remedy between 60 to 
80% of the errors that occur in processes" (van der Schaaf 1999 p. 6). As a human is 
capable of creatively experimenting and gaining "deeper knowledge" of systems, they 
become more competent in error recovery. 
In general, the tasks involved in emergency management are wide and varying. 
They involve making appropriate responses to the escalating incident and so cannot be 
fully explained by a single definition. Strutt & Lakey (1995) suggest "the key objectives 
of an emergency management system are to prevent or reduce the likelihood of 
consequential loss in the event of an emergency occurring" and more specifically, "The 
avoidance of a disaster will depend on the knowledge of the emergency management 
team and its ability to control events, to prevent escalation and to successfully plan 
evacuation, escape and rescue, under adverse and highly stressful conditions". However, 
this does not indicate HOW these should be achieved, therefore the next section will give 
a closer examination of emergency management by looking at types of emergency 
management approaches. 
2.3.4 WHAT TYPES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ARE THERE? 
The previous sections described generally what emergency management is and 
how it works. This section will describe some approaches that can be observed as being 
used when managing an emergency. In general, emergency management is reactive - and 
therefore, it is difficult to define specific approaches to be followed - as often 
emergencies rapidly escalate beyond the scope of a defined approach. Therefore, the 
approaches to be considered here are often more concepts relating to the attitude 
towards how the emergency should be managed - namely "Team Resource 
Management", the "Command and Control" approach and the Emergent Human 
Resources model. 
2.3.4.1 Team Resource Management 
Team (or Crew) Resource Management (TRM or CRM) has become increasingly 
popular in the emergency management field, particularly in the aviation industry - its 
importance being emphasized by the chain of failure leading to the Kegworth disaster. In 
this, a fire occurred in one engine and because the instrumentation was confusing, the 
pilot shut down the other engine. The aeroplane then appeared to regain control and so 
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the pilot did not realise his mistake. However, the cabin services crew had information as 
to the location of the fire but did not pass this information on to the pilot. This was due 
to the culture and the communications in the environment (Smith 1995) - that either 
pilots gave the impression that they did not need feedback from the cabin crew - or that 
the cabin crew have utmost confidence in the abilities and knowledge of the pilots or did 
not feel that the pilots would listen to them anyway. In this case, such assumptions were 
disastrous and there are many other examples where the "macho pilot" attitude has 
caused serious incidents. Team Resource Management emphasised a shift in focus away 
from the militaristic authoritarian attitudes and the alleged "superiority" of the captain 
(McIntyre & Salas 1995) towards an information-sharing culture. Many other industries 
have started to implement this approach - also calling it Team Resource Management to 
reflect environments outside of the flight deck 
For this reason, the main characteristics of Team Resource Management have 
also been used to train and assess emergency management. In this context, it can be used 
to consider all aspects of human team behaviour that promote and reduce the probability 
of success in emergency management. This helps people to understand why accidents 
occur and so enables them to identify error-producing conditions in themselves and 
others - both under normal and emergency conditions. These conditions may include 
personal factors such as stress, conflict, lowered attention or perception, fatigue or 
health problems. They may also include understanding of the potential for failure of the 
man-machine interface. Each member of the team is encouraged to participate and learn 
about team resource management. Some of the main issues include: 
" Communication - Open and honest communication is encouraged, where information 
and discussion is carried out and conflicts and ambiguity about information are 
resolved. 
" Teamwork - Leadership is developed through cordial social contact with all the team 
members rather than emphasizing the hierarchical leadership role. Teams are 
motivated to contribute to problem solving. 
" Workload Management - This involves making flexible plans to suit the situation, to 
identify risks and to recognize and manage stress in oneself and others. A good level 
of situation awareness is essential and involves a continuous information-gathering 
and assessment approach. At each point, the information is assessed to see if the 
current conclusions are still valid or whether other possibilities could be correct. 
" Attitudes, behaviour and inter-personal skills - These help to facilitate the 
communications and teamwork through positive intervention. Training may include 
demonstration of the benefits of Team Resource Management and identifying any 
weaknesses in the teams involved. 
(Paris et al 2000, McIntyre & Salas 1995) 
2.3.4.2 "Command and control" or Bureaucratic Approach 
However, the "Command and Control" approach is still popular in emergency 
management. It rests primarily on military experience, including the type of attitude that 
team resource management is encouraging aircrew to abandon. As much of their 
background involves stressful, time-contingent decision making under life-threatening 
conditions, the military leadership approach is thought to be an appropriate method of 
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dealing with an emergency. It is based on creating and using a centralized hierarchical 
structure headed by a "commander" exerting strong leadership over societal chaos.: 
Siegel (1985) favours this "planned, controlled, and organized response over ad 
hoc configurations". However, Dynes (1994 cited in Neal & Phillips 1995) criticizes the 
approach due to its assumptions of the emergency situation involving "Social chaos, 
reduced capacity of individuals and organizations to cope or respond to the incident, a 
level of deep mistrust of effective decision making, and a weak view of civil society". 
Neal & Phillips (1995) cite a large body of research that refutes the merits of this 
approach saying that "Command and control approaches tend to ignore or misinterpret a 
massive existing literature on disaster behaviour" and thus "generally lead to an - 
ineffective emergency response". 
2.3.4.3 Emergent Human Resources Model (EHRM) 
This is the opposite of the Command and Control approach. It emphasizes that 
the emergent norms, groups and social structure that are generated in an emergency can 
result in a more effective response than the rigid methods of the command and control 
approach. This is also more flexible than the Team Resource Management approach 
allowing teams, ideas and rules to emerge as required. Neal & Phillips (1995) state that 
"EHRM proponents assume that a non-bureaucratic, loosely-coupled, organizational 
approach to emergency management is most effective. Flexible and emergent structures 
can provide basic emergency response needs until traditional bureaucratic forms can 
again operate". They also provide a scientific basis to support these arguments and give 
examples of humanitarian aid whereby the requirements fell outside of the duties set 
down in the bureaucratic guidelines and the groups re-organise to effectively meet the 
needs of the people. 
Perrow (1984) supports this argument by suggesting that "bureaucratic structures 
are typically not designed to respond to unpredictable turbulent environments created by 
a disaster". Even the military, typical advocates of the Command and Control Approach, 
have been observed to deviate from their established rules and procedures in an 
emergency (Neal & Phillips 1995). Leach (1994) gives many examples of where 
emergent leaders have successfully managed incidents, including evidence from the 
Zeebrugge ferry and Aberfan landslide disasters. However, it is not prudent to rely on 
this occur in an effective way within industry, but it is reasonable to accept that 
emergency management may not work within rigid boundaries and it should be possible 
for effective leaders to emerge should they be more effective than the current 
mechanisms in place. 
2.3.4.4 Which type of emergency management approach should be used? 
It is not sufficient to rely on the EHRM model as an excuse to not prepare an 
emergency management team - to "hope" that an adequate response will be produced 
whatever the situation. Therefore, according to the literature, the best approach appears 
to be the Team Resource Management approach - where free communication is 
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encouraged and information flows efficiently, rather than rigid "command and control" 
mechanisms. However, using the approach that appears to be the most effective does not 
guarantee a positive outcome. Therefore, the next section will examine how good 
emergency management, independent of type or approach, can be identified. 
2.3.5 HOW CAN GOOD EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BE IDENTIFIED? 
Whichever technique is used, success is determined by the outcome. The best 
possible outcome under the circumstances indicates good emergency management has 
been applied. However, sometimes, management intervention can play no significant part 
- due to the design, initial hazardous conditions (for example, lack of safety mitigation 
systems), the environment or extremely fast escalation. Therefore, good emergency 
management involves making the best out of the situation, given the resources available. 
Often, success is assessed subjectively. For example, if an initiating event 
consisted of an explosion that immediately resulted in a small number of fatalities, this 
would be an unmanageable event. Subsequently, even if the emergency manager 
successfully controlled any escalation and arranged for all other people to be taken to a 
place of safety, the media and members of the public may focus on the fatalities and 
consider it a poorly managed incident. Therefore, it is important to maintain an objective 
and fair view of the possible interventions that could be made. 
Larken (1995) suggested that good emergency management "involves the skills 
of strategy formation and decision making, both of which must take place under 
conditions of time pressure and limited information in a situation which may be moving 
ever further outside the operational envelope". 
Flin & Slaven (1996b) suggest that "a successful response to an emergency 
requires an effective deployment and coordination of resources under dynamic and 
dangerous conditions". To give more specific examples, Flin and Slaven (1995 p. 115) list 
the following skills and competencies as being typical organisational requirements of 
emergency commanders: 
" Leadership ability 
" Communication skills, especially briefing and listening 
" Delegating 
" Team working 
" Decision making under time pressure and especially under stress 
" Evaluating the situation (situation awareness) 
" Planning and implementing a course of action 
" Remaining calm and managing stress in self and others 
" Preplanning to prepare for possible emergencies 
It should be noted that these are very similar to the key skills identified as 
features of team resource management as mentioned in Section 2.3.4.1. Therefore 
identification of "good" team resource management is likely to be akin to the 
identification of "good" emergency management. 
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Given these features, the next sub-sections will discuss some of the main characteristics: 
" Leadership and personality factors 
" Teamwork 
" Decision making 
" Stress management 
This will start with the first of these - leadership and personality factors. 
2.3.5.1 Leadership and Personality Factors 
Given the generic nature of emergencies, it would be difficult to focus on 
numerous procedures to cover every possible scenario. Some research in the area has 
attempted to identify personality characteristics of an individual who could successfully 
manage any of the possible events. 
Until an emergency occurs, it is difficult to determine whether an individual or a 
team will be good at emergency management. One method involves using expensive 
scenario-based selection and training techniques, which will be discussed in a later 
section. However, there has been a great deal of effort oriented towards identifying 
generic personality characteristics that would identify ideal emergency managers. 
Much attention has been devoted to the study of leadership - as part of 
emergency and normal management. In normal management, there have been studies into 
whether leadership is a natural personality attribute or a skill to be learnt. There have 
been studies as to which style of leadership is appropriate for each situation, known as 
the Contingency theory (Fielder 1978). This theory maintains that leader effectiveness 
depends on a relationship between the leader's personality and the characteristics of the 
situation, which is consistent with the concept of the Emergency Human Resource 
Model of emergency management described in the previous section. 
The Normative theory of leadership (Vroom & Yetton 1973) suggests that leader' 
effectiveness is based on adopting the style of leadership that is most appropriate for the 
situation as follows: 
" Autocratic - The leader would take advantage of his position of responsibility and is 
gripped with compulsion to dominate others. 
" Democratic - The leader tends to seek group decision consensus when making a 
decision. 
" Laissez-faire - The leader is indecisive and leaves problems to "solve themselves". 
In normal circumstances, the democratic style is considered the most effective. 
However, in a crucial situation where time is short and the leader is required to make 
decisions alone, the autocratic style is considered more efficient. If team support and 
acceptance are also necessary, the democratic style is still the best option (Baron & 
Byrne 1991). However, as Arnold et al (1991) conclude - "No current approach to 
leadership is substantially better than all the others, but several approaches offer useful 
insights". Therefore perhaps other personality attributes may be identified as 
characterizing a good emergency manager. 
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Mike Smith (1996) considers the personal characteristics that are needed in high- 
risk occupations and he mentions high vigilance and perceptual ability, mental ability, 
physical ability and emotional stability. However, these must be specified in more detail 
for each high-risk working environment. In addition, just because they are appropriate 
for high-risk occupations does not necessarily mean they are appropriate for responding 
to an emergency situation. For example, hazardous environments such as working in the 
Antarctic may not require quick and timely decision-making. Similarly, those who have 
the personality attributes to experience and survive emergency conditions are not 
necessarily those who would be good at coordinating the management process. 
Leach (1994) suggests that the requirements of on-scene emergency management 
change over time. Evidence suggests that the first leader is "authoritarian, decisive and 
will lead by example". But as the incident progresses, another, more empathic and 
understanding leader emerges to deal with the social needs of the group. He adds that, 
surprisingly, it is the second leader that shows more perseverance in the role. 
However, in emergency management, it has been suggested that the emergency 
commander should have the following personality characteristics: 
"intelligence, commonsense, integrity, judgement, enthusiasm, loyalty, cheerfulness, 
sense of humour, energy, high fortitude, moral courage, the will to dominate and 
decisiveness" (Downes 1991 cited in Flin & Slaven 1996b). , 
These characteristics were based primarily on the military domain and may not be 
appropriate for all types of emergency management. At first, these seem to be reasonable 
assertions. However, there should be some discretion taken in using such terms. For 
example, although a sense of humour is recommended, it is more important that it is 
appropriately and sensitively used. 
In addition, Flin & Slaven (1996a) note that the current research has not found a 
correlation between these characteristics and those of competent emergency managers in 
the offshore industry. However, they comment that this could be a criticism of the 
psychometric tests used or the subjective judgment of the simulation assessors. Again, it 
is not clear whether either of these criteria are linked to high probability of success of 
obtaining a good outcome in a real emergency. 
However, an emergency manager cannot manage an emergency on his own. 
Therefore the next section will discuss the requirements and abilities of the emergency 
management team. 
2.3.5.2 Teamwork 
If the focus is on the individual leader, one must not neglect to mention the 
importance of the team in the emergency management process. Emergency management 
usually requires action beyond the capabilities of one person. Whichever type of 
emergency management technique is used, teamwork is essential. If a leader has all of the 
ideal characteristics described above but their team is not competent or is incapable of 
working as a team, the management process will probably fail. Orasanu & Salas (1993) 
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emphasize that the participants must form a "shared mental model of both the situation 
and the roles of the other individuals in order to be successful". 
Further to this, McIntyre & Salas (1995 cited in Flin & Slaven 1996a) noted that 
good emergency management teams typically exhibited the following behaviour: 
" Monitoring - whereby team members monitor their colleagues 
" Feedback - where information on good or poor performance is fed back to the team 
" Closed-loop communication - where information is passed on in a methodical manner 
" Backup - where team members feel responsible for helping each other 
" Values - loyalty and interdependence between team members 
Again, like the issues of personality and leadership, it is not definite that these 
characteristics are the key features that contribute to a positive outcome in a real 
emergency. Obviously; it seems likely but without clear measurement and perhaps 
weighting of characteristics, it is not certain how to assess emergency management teams 
based on these criteria. 
2.3.5.3 Decision-making 
However, in an emergency, it is necessary to have a team of decision makers as 
"the rate of evolution of the situation was faster than the rate of processing by any given 
individual", particularly with the large amount of information that must be gathered and 
understood (Samurcay et al 1993 p. 56). Therefore, focusing on the leader may explain 
how the strategic decisions are made but may not explain how decisions are made 
throughout the whole hierarchical structure (Danielsson & Ohlsson (1997). This 
requires the study of distributed decision-making. It has been demonstrated that although 
each individual may be highly competent in the respective task, this does not guarantee 
efficient working once they have been brought together as a team (Samurcay et al 1993). 
There are roles for information management (ensuring each member of the team is 
provided with the relevant information), logistics (ensuring external resources are 
coordinated) and many others. As the decision-making is now distributed between a 
number of individuals, it is essential to maintain a good communication structure to 
ensure that both the leader and the team are making their decisions based on high quality" 
information. 
Orasanu (1995) suggests that the quality of decision-making can be determined 
by the crew's understanding of the problems that they faced. She cites Endsley's (1994) 
levels of situation awareness to explain how flight crews cope with abnormal situations, 
namely: 
1. Perception of cues 
2. Comprehension of cues 
3. Projecting future developments 
Therefore to rectify problems in decision-making, Orasanu (1995) made a number of 
recommendations to improve team situation awareness including verbalisation of flight 
condition status, questioning their own decisions and working as a team to monitor each 
other's performance. 
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As with the other characteristics, decision-making and situation awareness appear. 
to be important issues in emergency management. However, with clear indication of how 
to measure situation awareness or how to categorise decision-making strategies and link 
these to success in terms of outcome of an emergency, it is impossible to indicate their 
influence. 
2.3.5.4 Stress Management 
Weick (1988 p. 315) noted that "Stress in an accompaniment of all crises, and ... 
many crises escalate because of the secondary effects of crisis-induced stress... ". 
Lagadec (1993) noted that the stress caused by a crisis can be very disruptive to 
performance, particular in learning and decision-making. The decision maker may use 
avoidance strategies to deal with it and so the escalation of an event may continue 
unhindered. Stress also may result in a "certain regression" whereby individuals resort to 
basic behaviour rather than more complex cognitive tasks, including rigid reasoning and 
narrow-minded option generation. Similarly, negative personality traits may emerge 
resulting in problems in team coordination or non-productive emotional reactions. Task- 
oriented leaders may become more task-focused and so will neglect the human-relations 
aspects and vice versa. 
Orasanu (1997) suggests that any weak links in decision making strategies are 
likely to be exposed under stressful conditions and adds that training should help to 
counteract such effects. Breznitz & Ben-Zur (1997) support this by suggesting that "time 
pressure leads to the usage of simpler decision rules" and that "use of information 
management techniques should improve the quality of decision making". 
However, according to the arousal theory of stress (Cox 1993), we can observe 
that a certain degree of stress can bring out the best in people. And if we combine this 
idea with the Transactional model by Cox and Mackay (1976), stress is based on 
perceptions so reactions to stress will be very different for each individual. For example, 
in a mine disaster, cited by Idzikowski & Baddeley (1983), "the person who emerged as 
the group leader was one of the men who had originally shown the greatest fear and had 
apparently "cracked" under the strain". Therefore, there are people who can perform 
well under stress even in the worst type of situation. 
Research into parachuting by Epstein & Fenz (cited in Idzikowski & Baddeley 
1983) found there was a significant difference in the reactions of expert and novice or 
incompetent parachutists. For novices, the greatest self-ratings of avoidance occurred 
just before the jump itself. However, for the experts, the greatest level of avoidance was 
the night before the jump. In terms of physiological arousal, the novices had a much 
stronger reaction than the experts, which rose gradually as the time of the jump 
approached. The experts, however, showed their greatest increase in arousal just before 
entering the aircraft. This was attributed more to excitement than fear. 
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2.3.5.5 Conclusion 
The implications of this for emergency management is the benefits of experience 
and training: - that learning to control one's anxiety in these situations is extremely 
important. However, it must be re-iterated that it is the outcome of an emergency that is 
the important aspect - having strong leadership, decision-making, stress management and 
teamwork do not guarantee a good outcome but they provide a strong influence. 
Therefore, psychological attributes cannot be relied upon as a measurement of the impact 
of emergency management on risk. They certainly influence the actions that physically 
impact on the emergency but may not always be successful - based on the type of 
incident, design parameters and, to a certain extent, luck. The next section will move on 
to discuss issues in training and methods of improving emergency management. 
2.3.6 HOW CAN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BE ASSESSED AND 
IMPROVED? 
This section addresses some of the main issues in improving emergency 
management - not just addressing the actions of the team but issues that can be dealt 
with long before an incident arises. Some of these sections go hand-in-hand. For 
example, assessment and training. Assessment can be used to identify the skills required 
by a task, by developing techniques to assess "expert emergency managers" and then 
these skills can be incorporated into training. On the other hand, assessment can identify 
whether skills have been improved by training. 
Therefore the following sections include: 
" Training 
" Assessment 
" Planning 
" Design 
" Resources 
2.3.6.1 Training Techniques, 
As emergency management involves minimizing loss through the control and 
prevention of escalation, it is reasonable to suggest that it can be assessed in terms of its 
outcome. There are as many stories of heroic rescues as there are of disasters. Airline 
pilots who have completed safe landings in a damaged aircraft "against all odds" are key 
examples of successful emergency management (Stewart, S. 1992). 
However, this review includes descriptions of real emergencies assessed in terms 
of their physical outcome. It has also mentioned the personality and team factors believed 
to be linked to good emergency management. As yet there has been no evidence to 
suggest that the recommended types of emergency management team are successful in 
managing the real emergency. To try and rectify this issue, individuals can be selected or 
trained using realistic simulations and then assessed in terms of outcome that resulted. 
Although simulations have been criticized as being artificial and less stressful than a real 
emergency, Larken (1995) suggests that "it is not necessary to subject people to 
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extremes of pressure and fear in order to produce an adequate vehicle for training ,,, 
"outside the operational envelope'"'. Therefore, often this is the most realistic method of 
predicting emergency management ability. 
Strutt & Lakey (1995) suggest that an emergency management training 
programme should include the following relevant subjects: 
" Industrial Hazards and Technical Information about the workplace involved 
" Risk Analysis ' 
" Protection measures, Emergency equipment and systems 
" Emergency plans and procedures, Alarms and notification schemes 
" Emergency management 
" Escape, evacuation and rescue 
" Accident investigations 
" Communications and dealing with outside agencies 
" Human Factors, Performance Shaping Factors and the causes of Stress 
In most cases, emergency management training involves simulations of varying 
degrees of realism. Larken (1995) suggests that "dry" management should be avoided - 
where command, decision-making and other aspects are taught in isolation from each 
other and that it is an "intellectual not a physical exercise". In addition, training can be 
somewhat reactive and focuses on previous emergencies that have occurred by using 
similar scenarios (Rosenthal & Pijnenburg 1990). Although this facilitates improvements 
in emergency preparedness, care should be taken to ensure that the focus is not too 
narrow and that many different scenarios are considered. 
Carrol & Kidd (1991) mention a number of issues that should be considered 
when planning a scenario. 
1. Its aims must be identified - whether they are solely for training purposes or to 
identify weaknesses in the system. It must also consider the number of people who 
should be included in the emergency management process - the whole organisation or 
a small team. 
2. A realistic scenario should be developed and the appropriate equipment for 
management should be identified and placed at the emergency management team's 
disposal. 
3. The scenario organisers should be chosen - those who have considerable knowledge 
of the organisation and its emergency management potential and people who can 
fulfil the role of "actors" - to play emergency service personnel, casualties or outside 
organisations. These people also must exercise enough control to ensure that the 
scenario does not become a real emergency. Briefings must be given before and after 
the exercise to provide feedback on performance from the scenario organisers and 
comments about realism to the emergency managers. 
4. Plans must be in place to ensure that the organisation returns to normal operation 
once the exercise is complete. 
Kaempf & Militello (1992) recommend that emergency decision makers undergo 
the standard stress management training but also learn to make decisions under time 
pressure. Pattern-matching exercises and increasing the situational awareness are 
28 
benefited by training but most of these can be learnt through regular emergency 
management exercises. The military advocate the use of stressful exercises and even 
recommend extra "stressors" to enhance the effects, including forced use of 
training/operations when the team are fatigued; additional, disruptive tasks; time 
pressure, the presence of other military units and additional navigational constraints 
(Forster 1996). 
Roth et al (1992) emphasised the importance of "completeness" in emergency 
management training exercises. That is, ensuring that teams are tested with the full range 
of cognitive problems with which they may be faced. 
For example: Kontogiannis gives the following list of information uncertainties 
which "should be incorporated into an emergency exercise: - 
" Eliminated or missing cues - simulations that remove or obscure critical evidence 
" Masked cues - simulations involving a latent failure which is masked partially by the 
symptoms of a more recent operational problem 
" Unreliable cues - simulations involving unreliable information 
" Delayed cues - simulations where auxiliary operators delay to collect or communicate 
information 
" Attention-diverting cues - simulations which produce salient information in one area 
to the extent that indications in another area are neglected 
" Familiar or stereotyped cues - simulations in which part of the available evidence 
suggests very familiar explanations which turn out to be incorrect 
" Unfamiliar cues (novel events) - simulations involving unfamiliar failures which have 
not been foreseen in the design process 
" Unfamiliar cues (multiple failures) - simulations of interactions of multiple failures 
" Poorly integrated cues - simulations which require integrating knowledge from 
various team members in order to gain a complete understanding of the problem". 
(Kontogiannis 1996 p. 96) 
Such training is believed to have the positive effects partly through the 
development of coping strategies. Muir (1997) suggests the following coping strategies 
can be adopted: 
" Action coping - By taking positive action to reduce the level of demand, by removing 
the problem or altering the situation so it becomes less demanding. The measures 
may be extreme - for example, getting a divorce or moving jobs. In some cases, it 
may just involve breaking a task into small sections so that it appears less daunting. 
" Cognitive coping - This involves reducing the emotional and physiological impact of 
stress on the individual by changing the perceptions of the demand if not the demand 
itself. These include defence mechanisms, including repression, denial and 
rationalisation. 
Therefore, the following sub-sections will describe the main types of training used 
in emergency management: - drills, computer simulation, talk-through and table-top 
exercises, dedicated simulations and "real" exercises. 
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2.3.6.1.1 Drills ., -r. 
These are not normally concerned with the actual management of an incident but 
usually focus on the actions that are required within it. They may include mustering, 
using fire-fighting equipment or breathing apparatus (Strutt & Lakey 1995). Physical 
tasks are normally included rather than the cognitive decision-making required by 
emergency management. However, without knowledge of these physical tasks, the 
emergency, management process would be futile. 
2.3.6.1.2 Computer simulation 
Computer simulations are becoming increasingly more popular in the area of 
emergency management - mainly evolving from the earlier models testing building fire 
escalation or hurricane evacuation (Sullivan 1989). These were primarily used to 
investigate design or environmental factors as opposed to management intervention. At 
the other end of the scale, they have also been developed to simulate the critical financial 
and economic indicators to assist in crisis management training (Booth 1990). 
With the increased use of computers, packages can be installed simply on a PC 
and many users can learn and test themselves in emergency management. This is a very 
cheap approach and has a critical advantage over other means of training - that the 
success of the training can be objectively and quantitatively measured. However, some 
systems are very complex and involve an interactive network to include a whole 
emergency management team. An important factor in developing computer-based 
simulation is its fidelity to the real situation - namely, are the key issues present in the 
real situation (cognitive, physical etc) represented in an appropriate way in the simulation 
to ensure that it provides an effective training technique? Jentsch & Bowers's (1998) 
work in the aviation industry concluded that PC simulations are a `Valid alternative to 
high-fidelity full mission simulation... including testing team coordination exercises" 
therefore supporting a positive cost-benefit from their use. 
Beroggi et al (1995) has suggested the advantages of using virtual reality in 
emergency management training to really "feel the heat, hear the noise and see their 
actions being implemented". However, most of the software has involved 2D 
representation such as Plowshares (Petty et al 1996), which involved the adaptation of 
the U. S. Army's Janus combat simulation model to cater for civilian emergency 
management actions. This program was then used in combination with a hurricane 
incident causing tornadoes and fires. Using a network of computers controlled by an 
exercise and message controllers, the emergency managers played their role from their 
individual terminals. Other software of this kind includes Tutor (Adamson 1999) and C3 
Fire (Granlund 1999). In addition, Lin & Su (1998) used a chemical spills expert system 
and demonstrated its improvement of rule-based performance in emergency management. 
However, the computer systems may have a serious limitation in that they do not 
represent the social aspects of the emergency - for example, in reality, people may give 
misleading information or that conflicts can arise within the team. They also can be 
restrictive - only allowing the types of emergency in the software to be considered. Users 
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may also discover solutions that the scope of a computer program may not consider or 
allow roles to emerge in teams where individual problems-solvers fail. 
2.3.6.1.3 Talk-through and Table top exercises 
A talk-through involves those who would be the key decision-makers in a real 
emergency lead by an "exercise leader" or moderator who has determined and/or 
designed the scenario to be managed. Within the group, there are experts in their 
respective areas, including those from the emergency services and those who are familiar 
with the environment involved. They are given a scenario to manage and simply discuss 
their expected actions step-by-step. Experts make contributions on the expected 
outcomes from each decision. The exercise leader will introduce the escalation points of 
the scenario and any additional information that emerges. The group will discuss this 
until all are satisfied that the emergency has been completely managed. This allows all the 
individuals involved to learn from the scenario and to identify weaknesses in their current 
organisational plans (from Rutherford 1990). 
A tabletop exercise involves representing the entire emergency on a map or 
diagram on a table. This gives the managers the chance to "see" the emergency and 
appreciate the distances involved, the relationship between specific areas and any 
problems with routes. In the case where this may involve a gas leak, it allows the 
managers to work out which areas are at risk. The discussions involved are similar to the 
talk-through where the decisions made and actions to be taken are discussed. In some 
cases, the moderator asks specific questions to motivate the team to consider particular 
factors (from Dowell 1995). 
Strutt & Lakey (1995) consider 4 types of tabletop exercise. 
" Linear exercises - where the participants follow a route for which correct solutions 
are known 
" Open exercises - where the scenario is free-running and the outcome is not known 
" Communication exercises - where the communication factors is the only aspect under 
test. 
" Committee exercises - where a committee encourages an exchange of views on the 
subject 
These are not usually run in "real-time" so, although they allow the full scope of 
the emergency to be discussed, they do not work under the time pressure that will be 
evident in a real emergency (Baldwin 1994). This is also a reasonably cheap technique 
(Rutherford 1990). Dowell et al (1995) suggest, "the table-top exercise has been 
accepted as an invaluable contribution to improving emergency management 
coordination". 
2.3.6.1.4 Dedicated simulations 
These are commonly used in highly technological industries - for example the 
nuclear, air traffic control and petrochemical industries. Typically, they involve the use of 
control panels and VDUs that are similar to those used in the real control rooms. 
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Therefore this technique is expensive but can be used to train a large number of people <- 
working in the respective industries (Ellison et al 1992). Booth (1990) also recommends 
their use for crisis management training and so classrooms for discussions are also useful. 
The team are also provided with any equipment that they would normally expect when 
managing an emergency. These include phones, hand-held radios, personnel address 
systems and alarms. However, such equipment as fire fighting or breathing apparatus is 
not normally included as this sort of training is expected to be covered by the use of 
drills. 
These simulations are usually internal to organisations and therefore do not 
involve the emergency services. However, they are more realistic than the talk-through 
and tabletop exercises as they are run in real-time. They are also preferred to wholly 
computer simulations as they involve communication between personnel, the social 
aspects of emergency management and are more similar to the actions required in a real 
emergency. For example, if an emergency manager is excellent in choosing decisions on a 
computer but is incapable of sounding the alarm or using a hand-held radio, the 
weaknesses become evident in a dedicated simulation. 
In these scenarios, the personnel involved in managing the scenario are isolated 
from the "real world" and so are only given information from a scenario organisation 
team, who play roles in the emergency services, advisory organisations and as other 
internal and external personnel. Often the teams are monitored by television cameras for 
the scenario organisation team to get feedback on their current thoughts and actions 
(Baldwin 1994). 
Baldwin (1994) also recommends this technique should be taught on 4 day 
courses including at least 5 real-time simulations that get progressively more difficult. He 
also suggests that it includes discussions of stress, communications and information 
management. 
2.3.6.1.5 "Real" exercises 
These are a rare and expensive means of testing emergency management and 
require a great deal of coordination to organise. However, in some industries, they are 
necessary. For example, an airport may need to simulate a crash on the runway and the 
military frequently use real-life exercises (Rutherford 1990, Baldwin 1994). In these 
cases, the emergency services would be mobilised and would act in their expected role. 
Actors would be required to play large numbers of casualties and their families. In most 
cases, all those involved in the incident are aware that it is about to occur. However, in 
any emergency management training exercise, it is recommended to "expect the 
unexpected". For example, personnel may be told the incident will be arranged for 
Tuesday morning - then they are called at 2 a. m. to attend. As they reach the incident 
site, they may be questioned by members of the press, who insist on answers before 
letting the personnel fulfil their management roles. 
Because of the degree of realism used in this technique of training, it is excellent 
at identifying weaknesses in the emergency plans (Rutherford 1990). For example, 
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Richardson (1995 p. 11) describes the following problems that occurred in the 
Hillsborough disaster: 
"While water, electricity, transport, communication etc. support was made 
available rapidly to provide positive help quickly, ambulances initially created their own 
traffic jam and the telephone receptionist for the fire service was unable to respond to the 
first request for help until the request had been formulated in a way that was acceptable 
to the computerized recording/administrating system she managed. She later explained 
"My training is not to assume what an address is; it is up to me to ascertain that from the 
person calling ... 
The fire service computer would not recognize the Hillsborough 
ground as a place". Such communication problems would have been identified by a real- 
life exercise and could easily have been rectified, preventing critical delays in response". 
However, training does not work for everyone and the personality characteristics 
mentioned in Section 2.3.5.1 do have a part to play. Baldwin (1994 p. 19) comments that 
"very clearly it is impossible to train anybody (to the highest level) to guarantee their 
performance in the event of an emergency". But how can trainers ensure that the training 
is really working? There must be some form of assessment to indicate improvement in 
performance. Therefore, the next section will consider some aspects of assessment in 
emergency management 
2.3.6.2 Assessment 
Assessment of complex skills is always problematic. Emergency management 
requires teamwork and a combination of technical and non-technical skills - as well as 
adapting these to fit the situation. Some methods of assessment may focus on evaluating 
individual skills and attempting to weight their importance. Other methods of assessment 
may use a global approach, trying to establish overall performance for a scenario or set 
of scenarios. There is also the use of self-assessment, including questionnaires on 
perception of workload, attitudes towards the use of skills and other factors (Salas & 
Prince 1999). 
For a scientific approach, ideally assessment would involve the use of objective 
techniques. These could include the use of computer-based simulations that are capable 
of giving quantitative outcomes in response to the user-interventions or recording and 
analysis of team behaviour to establish delay times or numbers of errors. However, in 
most cases, emergency management simulations are assessed subjectively. 
Many of the problems in assessing emergency management are the same as those 
experienced in trying to identify good team resource management, as described in 
Section 2.3.4.1. 
Walters (1998) notes that "If we were to observe a crew that has truly integrated 
CRM skill into their daily operations, their behaviour would be transparent to the 
untrained eye". Hence indicating the importance of a trained assessor! However, this 
creates another problem. They should be experts - either in the environment under test or 
in emergency management. However, according to Lagadec (1993), "There is virtually 
no such thing as an expert in crisis management" and comments on the importance of an 
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inter-disciplinary team with wide-ranging experience. This is often not practical when 
training is run on a restrictive budget. Therefore, the assessor is often the same person 
that designed the scenario. The scenario designer usually has a pre-ordained plan of how 
he/she expects the emergency to be managed. This, as in all subjective methods, could 
result in biases. Hindsight may lead the assessors to expect quicker, better solutions than 
those provided by the emergency management team. Ujita et at (1997) confirm this 
tendency towards negative judgments and suggest that assessment should focus not on 
the errors made but on positive objective factors such as response times and error 
recovery probabilities in emergency situations. In general, an objective structure should 
be drawn up before using a scenario so that criteria for good and bad emergency 
management can be pre-defined to reduce biases. However, this may be problematic. 
Ideally, emergency management should be assessed in terms of its outcome and, in 
artificial situations, the outcome may not reflect a real emergency accurately. Therefore, 
it is necessary to base scenarios on realistic data to ensure an accurate and objective 
assessment can be made. 
Given that the individuals have been selected, trained and assessed as competent 
emergency managers, the next section will discuss the plans, equipment and resources 
that must be made available to assist them. 
2.3.6.3 Emergency planninm! 
The successful outcome of an emergency cannot be guaranteed by just having a 
competent and well-trained emergency management team. There are a number of factors 
that must be also present to facilitate a good response (Quarantelli 1988). As stated 
earlier, one of the key aspects of an emergency is the time pressure involved. If the 
workplace or technology is designed so that an initiating event may escalate to become a 
major incident in seconds, it is unlikely that any human intervention can play a part. 
Similarly, if there are no resources for an emergency management team to manage - it is 
unlikely that they can make any impact on the escalating incident. Given that time is such 
a key issue, it should be maximised by all possible means. One key method to maximize 
time in an emergency is to make well-defined emergency plans. These provide guidance 
to the emergency management team to remind them of factors to be considered, 
decisions that should be made and to notify them of resources available or system 
limitations. 
As an emergency plan can be developed before an incident occurs, there is plenty 
of time to consider alternatives and to test the feasibility of various aspects of the plan 
(Brandie 1995). This should also involve the use of the training methods like the "real- 
life" or simulated exercises described earlier. Plans can be made to cater for various types 
of emergency so that they can be generic and flexible rather than focused on specific 
occurrences (Kosyachenko et al 1998). 
However, the provision of a plan does not guarantee that it is adequate or that it 
will work. Quarantelli (1988) argues that plans, that are too "agent-specific" as opposed 
to generic or demand artificial rather than realistic activities, result in poor management 
activities and so are destined to fail. 
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The CIMAH (1984) and more recently the COMAH (1999) Regulations require 
that all appropriate steps are taken to prevent the occurrence of major accidents and to 
mitigate the consequences of any which may occur. Plans must consider on-site and ofd 
site impacts as well as communications with operators, local authorities and the 
emergency services. They must also set out arrangements for initiating the plan, sounding 
the alarm, organising the personnel involved and notifying the public as required (Cassidy 
1988). Kosyachenko et al (1998) adds that it should consider "bottlenecks" in material 
and technical supply services. 
Jones (1995 p. 18) notes that Health and Safety Inspectors identify problems with 
emergency planning by assessing: 
" Does the plan contain sufficient detail for the most probable events whilst retaining 
the flexibility to cope with the largest incident that can have reasonably been 
foreseen? 
" Are there sufficient resources in terms of personnel and equipment to implement the 
plan? 
" Are individual and group responsibilities clearly specified? 
" Has adequate training been given to those involved in implementing the plan? 
" Are there adequate emergency services both before and during incidents? 
" Are there adequate arrangements for rehearsing and reviewing the plan? 
Strutt & Lakey (1995) suggest that an emergency plan should contain the following 
elements 
" The type of accident which might occur 
" The organisations involved in the emergency management and key personnel 
" Communications links telephones, radios etc. 
" Fire-fighting equipment, damage control and repair 
". Technical information, e. g. chemical and physical characteristics and dangers relating 
to the substances involved. 
" Physical information relating to the layout of the plant, pipelines and safety critical 
components such as emergency shutdown and venting equipment etc. 
" The emergency procedures and evacuations arrangements to be used 
" Contacts for obtaining advice on for example, meteorological conditions, emergency 
transport systems, first aid, hospital services 
" Arrangements for dealing with the press 
Kowalski (1995) suggests that stress should be incorporated into emergency 
management plans. She suggests that emergency managers should be provided with 
information on stress so that they can recognise it in themselves and others. There should 
also be guidelines to work hours, frequency of rest periods and short unstructured - debriefings to defuse the event. After the emergency is completed, there should be access 
to organisations that can provide support and counselling. Kowalski (1995) suggests that 
the most serious of stress reactions - Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) can be 
averted through sensible mediation of this kind. 
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Frequently, these plans are written out in forms of procedures to be followed and 
so assist the emergency management team in making decisions. However, for these 
decisions to result in a successful outcome, particular resources must be available - 
people, equipment and enough time! 
2.3.6.4 Design Parameters 
It is often thought that when examining emergency management, it is too late to 
consider design parameters. Emergency management is supposed to be flexible enough 
to deal with incidents and to "work around" the problems caused by the design. 
However, it is now recognised that "inherently safer design" cannot only reduce the 
probability of an incident but also can control escalation speed - hence maximising the 
time for emergency management intervention (Strutt 1999). 
Weick (1988) suggests that the human contribution should be "exaggerated" in 
complex and hazardous systems, again consistent with the ideas of Van der Schaaf 
(1999) from Section 2.3.3. Perrow (1984 cited in Weick 1988) adds that "interactive 
complexity, in the presence of tight coupling, leads to rapid escalation of crisis events". 
Therefore by designing human intervention into a system, rather than out of it, would 
slow down escalation and facilitate the impact of emergency, management. 
Snow et al (1970 cited in Muir 1996 p. 178) suggest that the critical factors 
influencing survival in aircraft accidents can be grouped into four categories. These 
include the procedural actions of the crew, the behavioural actions of the passengers, the 
configuration of the cabin and environmental features (for example smoke ingress and 
external conditions). As earlier stated, the behavioural actions of a survivor can be 
guided by effective emergency management. However, emergency management can do 
nothing about the pre-determined cabin design. In addition, the environmental conditions 
can be influenced by design parameters. Using highly flammable seat materials would 
increase the escalation of a fire therefore reducing the time available to make a successful 
evacuation. Once a fire has started, it is too late to consider the use of alternative 
materials so this should also be considered at the design stage. 
Many aspects of design contribute to a successful outcome in an emergency. It is 
not sufficient just to provide a safety system but it must be guaranteed to work ini the 
correct way and be reliable and robust enough to work under the circumstances for 
which it was designed (Strutt 1999). However, considering emergencies at the design 
stage is an enormous task. It must include alarm bells and lighting, evacuation routes, the 
integrity of safe havens, rescue facilities, the potential for structural collapse or 
infringement and interactions between these factors and many others. The complexity 
involved in such modelling and analysis is the key reason that these ideas have been slow 
to implement in industry. This leads on to the more flexible aspect of design - the 
technical and human resources. 
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2.3.6.5 Resources I 
Kowalski (1995) suggests the necessary resources to manage an emergency 
include "an emergency management plan, trained manpower, appropriate equipment, 
available communication plus knowledgeable and decisive leaders". Many of these have 
been considered in other sections, so this section will focus mainly on the subjects of 
equipment and manpower. 
Weightman (1996 p. 6) illustrates the importance of resources in his description of 
the rail disaster in Harrow and Wealdstone Station in 1952 compared with the Kegworth 
air crash of 1989, as follows: 
"At Harrow, the services had no emergency plans in place to speak of, except 
loud-hailers, calling for doctors to come and help, and many turned up with little idea of 
what they were supposed to do. Ambulancemen then had no higher qualifications than a 
first-aid certificate, and Middlesex, as in many other counties, the ambulance driver was 
a member of the fire brigade, though regarded as a lesser being than the noble 
firefighter... By contrast, at Kegworth in 1989 there were hospital flying squads, highly 
trained ambulancemen and women, whom we would now call paramedics, firefighters 
trained to cut people free from wreckage, their skills honed by the frequent extrication of 
motorists in road accidents; and police who by then had a concept of how order might be 
created from the confusion of a disaster scene". 
People are an essential part of emergency management process - including the 
emergency services, supporting crews as well as the witnesses, survivors or bystanders 
who suddenly find themselves in the midst of an incident. As far as the emergency 
manager is concerned, bystanders, the media or members of the public may be help or a 
hindrance (Richardson 1995). The emergency plan should therefore cater for such 
eventualities and prepare for their coordination. 
There are certain pieces of equipment that are considered essential in an 
emergency and therefore the plan should include locations and numbers of such items. 
They may include hand-held radios, fire-fighting equipment, breathing apparatus, 
personal protective equipment, first-aid kits and stretchers to more extreme equipment 
such as cutting gear, spinal boards, cranes and helicopters. As far as the management 
team are concerned, they must not only consider the coordination of the equipment 
required in the escalating incident, but they require certain resources for coordination 
purposes. These may include white boards and pens to communicate within the team, 
internal and external telephones, public address systems and all available data to help 
manage the incident. Given that it is never certain how long an emergency may last, it 
may also be necessary to have back-up - management team members to replace tired or 
hungry members. In these circumstances, it is also necessary to have some supporting 
staff to provide food and drinks for the team (Ramabrahmam et al 1996). 
One other resource that has not been studied is that of "technological decision 
support". In the same way that computers have the potential to train emergency 
management, they also can provide assistance once an emergency has arisen by providing 
quick analyses of large quantities of complex data. Such examples include RODOS for 
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nuclear accidents (Kelly et al 1996), Emergency Management Decision Support (EMDS) 
for mainly natural disasters (Subramaniam 1996) and other Emergency Management 
Information Systems (EMISs) for chemical disasters (Reed et al 1991). These are 
examples of systems that are widely available to any organization involved in emergency 
or disaster management. It is likely that similar systems exist internally in more hazardous 
organizations. 
2.3.7 CONCLUSION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SECTION 
This section has discussed the key issues involved the study of emergency 
management and therefore has identified some of the problems for this research. Most 
particularly, these include the objective assessment of emergency management skill and 
its relationship with risk. As yet, there appears to be no objective way of assessing' 
emergency management as a global team process. Therefore, this review will now move 
on to examine the techniques that could potentially be used to evaluate the impact of 
emergency management on risk reduction. 
SECTION 2.4: RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
This section provides the academic background to the proposed solution to the 
research problem. The previous sections have discussed the nature of the issue - the 
emergency and how it is managed. This section will continue by addressing the scientific 
aspect - how this attempt at management influences the risk value. Therefore, this 
section will initially discuss the nature of risk and how it can be quantified. 
Risk is defined as "a measure of the probability that the potential for harm or loss 
posed by a hazard will materialize" (Andrews 1999). Employers are now required by 
legislation to be aware of the risks evident in their workplace and, where present, 
demonstrate that risks are reduced to "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP) 
through control and risk reduction measures. Usually this requires a quantitative result - 
therefore applying the use of Quantitative Risk Assessment. 
It is necessary to be cautious when quantifying risks as they are sensitive to many 
influencing factors. As stated by Flin, Mearns, Gordon & Fleming (1996), "People do 
not necessarily rely on objective quantified measures of risk but instead make their own 
judgments on the risks present". These subjective judgments may involve over-estimating 
the risks, resulting in worry and stress; or underestimating the risks, potentially 
producing "risk-taking behaviour", both of which would affect the evaluation of the 
impact of emergency management. Therefore, Quantitative Risk Assessment should rely 
on objective criteria - such as scientific theories of physical and mechanical phenomena 
or statistical values based on prior experience. For example, the Health and Safety 
Executive publishes annual statistics on injuries and fatalities of people at work (HSE 
1998d, 1999). This could be used to provide information on risk of injury for people in 
various work-roles. However, it does not demonstrate the effects of change, or produce 
estimates of risk for specific situations. Therefore, it is necessary to use techniques that 
can evaluate this from first principles. 
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Quantitative Risk Assessment involves evaluating the risks through identification 
of the hazards, evaluation of the possible frequency of the undesired events as well as 
estimating the possible consequences of such an event. In this research, we would require 
it to take this one step further - given that undesired events HAVE occurred, what is the 
probability of the worst consequences occurring? 
Whereas Qualitative Risk Assessment may be quick and inexpensive, the results 
may be inaccurate (Quin & Widera 1996)- this is particularly likely when the perception 
of risk in an emergency situation is likely to be biased. Therefore, Quantitative Risk 
Assessment takes this process further by assigning a numerical value to the risk. Even so, 
producing realistic values can be somewhat problematic. Sometimes the event can have a 
variable risk, depending on certain factors. Sometimes the event is caused by human 
error or relies on human actions to control it - which is inherently difficult to evaluate. 
Sometimes the models used do not produce values that have face validity, or they 
achieve ungrounded confidence in their results when they do (Tweedale 1992). 
Therefore provision of a quantitative risk value may rely on other techniques such as 
probabilistic safety analysis and human reliability assessment. Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine a number of techniques and evaluate their potential for quantifying the impact of 
emergency management on risk reduction. 
2.4.1 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Quantitative risk assessment is now a well-known and well-used technique for 
assessing risk in the field of health and safety. It typically involves the following steps: 
1. Consider all tasks and situations 
2. Identify the hazards that are, or may be involved 
3. Identify those who may be exposed to the hazards 
4. Analyse the risks of injury or loss from the hazards 
5. Evaluate if the risk is adequately controlled against acceptance criteria 
6. Consider measures that may eliminate or reduce risk further in line with the basic 
principles of hazard control. 
7. Implement the risk control measures 
8. Monitor the measures 
9. Review and feedback any corrective action. 
(Andrews 1999) 
The definition of an "acceptable" risk is a problem. Lowering risks involves a 
consideration of cost whereas assigning a cost to a human life is a controversial issue 
(Reinertsen 1995). Also, there is some question to the validity of the techniques. One of 
the main issues is the use of deterministic approaches rather than probabilistic methods. 
Many of the inputs into risk assessment have uncertainties associated with them and 
using a point value for each means that important information may be lost. Similarly risk. 
itself is a probability so should reflect changes in time, conditions or exposure/dose 
rather than using a point value to express a wide range of situations (Burmaster 1996). 
This leads to the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) / probabilistic safety analysis 
(PSA). 
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2.4.2 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT / PROBABILISTIC SAFETY 
ANALYSIS 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) are 
terms that are often used interchangeably. They are more complicated than the QRA as 
can be seen from the description of the technique by Kahn & Abbasi (1998) as follows: 
1. Hazard Identification - sources of potential releases and initiating events ' 
2. Accident sequence modelling - analysis of the initiating events and the response of the 
installation 
3. Data acquisition and parameter estimation - frequencies of initiating events, 
component unavailability and probabilities of human actions 
4. Accident sequence quantification - calculates the frequency of occurrence of the 
accidents using the parameters from step 3. 
5. Hazardous substance release categories assessment - this streamlines the calculation of 
accident consequences and the associated frequencies. 
6. Consequence assessment - undesirable consequences and associated probabilities are 
calculated for each release category. If the hazardous substance is toxic, immediate 
health effects can be estimated by calculation of the atmospheric dispersion of the 
released substance, the assessment of the dose an individual would receive at each point 
around the site, and by establishing a dose/response model. 
7. Integration of results - establishes a range of possible consequences and the associated 
uncertainties. 
This method is said to take "50% more time than QRA for the same level of 
accuracy", probably due to the amount of factual and operational data required (Khan & 
Abbasi 1998). It often relies on the event tree method but this can cause problems due to 
the reliance on expert judgement in identifying failure paths and assigning probabilities - 
potentially leading to biases. Therefore, there was call for more objective methods to 
identify potential failures, outcomes as well as the calculation of probability values. 
Therefore, as the research requires the development of a method to assess the 
impact of emergency management on risk reduction, the next section will describe some 
of the key techniques that have the potential to be used within this project. 
2.4.3 RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
For many of these steps, there are specific techniques that are available. These include: 
" Hazard Operability Study (HAZOP) / Hazard Analysis (HAZAN) 
" Fault Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
" Influence Diagrams 
" Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
" Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
" Quantitative Uncertainty Analysis (QUA) 
Each of these will be described in the following sub-sections together with a preliminary 
evaluation of their suitability for the assessment of the impact of emergency management 
on risk or how they could be applied as part of the research. 
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2.4.3.1 Hazard Operability Study (HAZOP) / Hazard Analysis (HAZAN) 
The HAZOP method involves the use of a team of people, of whom the leader 
must be experienced with the HAZOP method and the team must be familiar with the 
process under investigation (Kletz 1999). It uses a set of guide-words (NONE, MORE 
OF, TOO LATE) in relation to the process to look for weaknesses in design. From these, 
it can look at the consequences and actions required to avert these consequences. 
Normally, this involves examining physical processes such as chemical flows and 
temperature changes. However, it can also be applied to management tasks as shown in 
the example in Table 1. 
Table 1: Example of contents of a HAZOP (from Redmill, Chudleigh & Catmur1999) 
Guide word Deviation Consequences 
Flow of Data NO No information flow 
PART OF Information passed is incomplete 
Speech (flow of 
data between 
humans) 
NO They do not or cannot communicate 
AS WELL 
AS 
Recipient hears originator but someone 
else talking causes confusion 
PART OF Recipient only hears part of message 
OTHER 
THAN 
The originator gives the wrong 
information or it is totally misunderstood 
MORE The originator says more than is 
necessary 
Although HAZOP has the potential to identify necessary actions and responses, 
there is no means of quantifying the risk - hence the development of HAZAN. 
HAZAN is quite a simple method of quantification, primarily relying on past 
experience such as "events/year" data. It caters for novel processes by likening them to 
processes with known failure rate that may not always be appropriate. Further to this, its 
treatment of human error is very simplistic, giving the following suggestions for human 
failure rate: 
"When complex and rapid action is needed to avoid a serious incident - (... the 
probability of failure is.. ) 1 in 1- The operator will not be as unreliable as this but he 
will be very unreliable and we should assume this figure and install fully automatic 
systems" (Kletz 1999). 
As "complex and rapid action etc. " would be a typical description of any 
emergency, this would imply that this probability would be assumed for most, if not all, 
emergency management tasks - leading to an overly pessimistic view of their chances. In 
addition, if the statements of Van der Schaaf (1999) from section 2.3.3 were to be 
41 
considered, the recommendation of fully automatic systems would not be ideal. This 
suggests that HAZAN (or its derivatives) would not be the ideal method for examining 
the impact of emergency management on risk. However, if such a method was to be 
developed, it could be used within HAZAN to make design recommendations. 
2.4.3.2 Fault Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is comparable with HAZOP but is more structured and can be carried out 
by an individual (Kirwan & Ainsworth 1992). It involves the following steps (as 
described by Khan & Abbasi 1998): 1,. 
1. Identification of each failure mode, of the sequence of events associated with it, its 
causes and effects. 
2. Classification of each failure mode by relevant characteristics, including deductibility, 
diagnosability, testability, item replaceability, and compensating and operating 
provisions. 
Its main general criticisms include its time-consuming nature plus the fact that it 
considers the component level of tasks whereas some errors arise at the sub-component 
level. The main problem for its use in this research is its lack of a quantification module. 
Therefore, it is the Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA) method that 
must be considered here. This adds in the probability of component failure (mostly 
obtained by expert opinion) to produce an overall probability of failure. However, as for 
HAZAN, there is no definitive method of examining human tasks - Kirwan & Ainsworth 
(1992) suggest it should be used in conjunction with a checklist of human errors. Quin 
& Widera (1996) add that this technique cannot be used for complicated situations such 
as multiple failures or when the uncertainties surrounding data values have non-uniform 
distributions. Therefore, in its current form, it cannot easily contribute to the examination 
of the impact of emergency management on risk reduction. 
2.4.3.3 Influence Diagrams 
This approach involves graphically representing the factors that influence the 
occurrence of a particular event (Kirwan & Ainsworth 1992). This approach can be used 
for quantification of failure probabilities by assessing the influence of various factors on 
the event and the likelihood of them being present in the given scenario. Like the 
HAZOPs, this requires a team of experts who are familiar with the scenario under 
examination as well as the expected influences of the factors. Figure 4 shows an example 
of an "a posteriori" influence diagram to explain the event dependencies in the Piper 
Alpha disaster (by Pate-cornell 1995). This shows how influence diagrams could be 
potentially used to quantify the impact of emergency management on risk reduction. 
However, the weightings and probabilities used in this technique are obtained from 
expert judgment and therefore there is still a risk of bias in the technique (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth 1992). 
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Figure 4: Event dependencies in the Piper Alpha accident; influence diagram 
representation 
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probability of the cut-sets. An example of a simple fault tree (based on the Piper Alpha 
disaster and taken from Bradley 1995) is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Example of a Fault Tree (Bradley 1995) 
VERY SERIOUS LOSS 
OF LIFE 
III 
No training in 
evacuation 
procedures 
No leadership of 
evacuation process 
during the emergency 
1. Explosion and fire in module 
2. Deluge system destroyed by explosion 
3. Oil pipes ruptures - oil burns 
4. Fire spreads to lower level as oil runs down 
(Th 
Source of 
ignition 
(unknown) 
Deluge 
system at 
lower level 
de-activated 
for 
maintenance 
during day 
Deluge 
system not 
re-activated 
after 
completion 
of 
maintenance 
Blank Operator 
flange recommissions 
leaks pump A and starts it 
Pump B trips and will not restart 
Pump A 
is O/C 
for PM 
PSV 504 is 
removed for 
rectification. 
Flange 
blanked off. 
Bolts finger 
tight. 
PTWs for 
Pump A 
and PSV 
504 not 
cross- 
referenced 
KEY: PTW: Permit to Work 
PSV: Pressure safety valve 
O/C - Out of commission 
PM - Planned maintenance 
Gas risers overheat and 
rupture huge fire totally 
destroys the rig 
No fire 
protection at 
lower level 
Diesels driving 
standby deluge 
pumps put on 
manual 
operation 
during day 
because of 
divers near 
suction intakes 
Work on 
PSV 504 
not 
recorded 
by 
operator 
in daily 
log 
Artisan 
does not 
give 
suspended 
PTW on 
PSV 504 to 
night shift 
operator. 
(Both 
should sign 
it) 
I-- 
Diesels not 
put back on 
automatic 
control at 
end of day 
shift 
Night shift 
operator 
does not 
read 
suspended 
PTWs 
during Ms. 
shift . 
44 
This can be compared with the Influence diagram shown in Figure 4- but shows 
different aspects of the same incident. However, the probabilities must still be obtained 
from some alternative source and the reliability of these data will affect the reliability of 
the whole tree. In terms of the problem in this research project, this technique could be 
used to identify the critical features of emergency management that mitigate a given 
incident. However, the probabilities of success of emergency management tasks would 
still be obtained from some sort of expert judgment technique. Therefore, a technique 
that is capable of quantifying the probability of success in emergency management tasks 
would be a useful contribution when developing a fault tree. 
2.4.3.5 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Whereas Fault Tree analysis works out the possible circumstances that can lead 
to a "top event", an event tree works out all of the possible consequences from an initial 
event. Therefore, it can also represent time-dependency or the sequential pattern of 
events - where one event may lead to a choice of two or more other events. An example 
of an event tree (also based on the Piper Alpha incident and taken from Cox & Miles 
1991) is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: An example of a simple event tree (Cox & Miles 1991) 
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From Figure 6, it can be seen that the final consequences are dependent on 
mitigating and escalating events that occur following the initiating event. If each branch 
(representing Yes or No answers to each question) is assigned a probability of 
occurrence, the likelihood of the final events can be established. It is normal that the Yes 
or No labels are shown on the tree or are used consistently (yes above no for each 
branch). In this example, however, this is not the case. Also, it is questionable that, in the 
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event that there is immediate ignition, the emergency shutdown does not work and the 
wind direction is not towards the LQ, that no evacuation is attempted (branch A). 
However, where there is no immediate ignition or delayed ignition (and therefore no 
fire), the evacuation is attempted (branches B, C& D). However, as an example, this 
represents the concept of an event tree. 
Therefore, if each branch represented a particular emergency management task, 
the impact of emergency management on risk reduction could be calculated. However, as 
for the fault tree analysis technique, many of the quantification values (in this case; 
probabilities of occurrence) are obtained from expert judgment techniques. Therefore 
this technique would only be successful if a reliable method of obtaining the probabilities' 
is used. 
2.4.3.6 Quantitative Uncertainty Assessment (QUA) 
Up this point, most of the techniques have required the acquisition of error and 
failure probabilities from alternative sources. Quantitative uncertainty assessment is a.. 
technique that can be used to assist this process by incorporating uncertainty into the risk 
equation. This technique has been described using the following steps: 
1. Identify the desired numerical expression and characteristic of risk for each endpoint in 
the analysis, e. g. 100% growth rate impairment, 25% reduction in disease. 
2. Specify the equation that will estimate risk 
3. Generate an uncertainty distribution for each input variable (a probability density 
function) in the risk equation. 
4. Generate the output distribution by combining the input probability density functions 
(PDFs) as specified in the risk equation. 
This step typically involved Monte Carlo simulation, which carries out numerous 
reiterations of the risk assessment equation to produce a PDF of expected risk 
representing the "best" estimate of variability in risk as a result of variability in input 
parameters (Bartlett et al 1996). Another approach is the Dynamic Logical Analytical 
Methodology (DYLAM) that is said to be more sensitive than the Monte-Carlo approach 
(Devooght & Smidts 1996) and is preferred for treating rare events (Marseguerra & Zio 
1996). This considers time-dependent states of components in a system. As described by 
Cojazzi (1996 p. 280) "It follows all the paths resulting from the initial states of the 
components of the system and from transitions in-time of the components states and to 
drive the corresponding simulations" and thus is complementary to the fault tree - event 
tree method. However, this method may be somewhat inflexible as certain events, such 
as simultaneous multiple failures of components, cannot be included. 
5. Fine-tune the analysis. One may use the results of a sensitivity analysis to determine 
those input PDFs that had an important influence on the estimate of risk. The input PDFs 
must be re-examined to ensure that the data used and distributions selected are 
scientifically acceptable. Often the tails of input PDFs must be truncated to eliminate 
physically or logically impossible values (for example, below zero). 
6. Summarise the results in terms of a risk distribution graph. 
Finkel 1990 (cited in Moore & Elliott 1996) 
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However, this method requires many more data than a quantitative risk 
assessment, some of which can only be acquired during operation - due to the ranges of 
values required in the modelling process. The users of such models must acquire new 
skills to gain the "expert judgment" capable of acquiring the best input parameters, 
assessing their realism and then to choose a "best fit" distribution (Moore & Elliot 1996, 
Carrington 1996). Therefore the resultant distribution is only as good as the models used 
and the practitioners using them (Bartlett et al 1996). For reliable results, it is essential 
that risks are accurate, unbiased and that they cannot be manipulated to serve parties 
with vested interests (Heyes 1995). 
2.4.3.7 The Need for Improved Assessment Techniques 
Therefore, considering the inadequacies with the current methods, as shown in 
the previous sub-sections, there was call for methods that represent human, 
organisational and design failures as well as additional dynamic uncertainties produced by 
component ageing (Bley et al 1992). Hsueh & Mosleh (1996) emphasise the importance 
of time in PRA - from short time constraints, such as operator response time, to long 
time constraints, such as seasonal changes, plant configurational change and component 
ageing. They suggest a computerised approach to dynamic PRA known as Accident 
Dynamic Simulator (ADS) to ensure such variables are incorporated into the risk 
distribution. 
With regard to the issue to human failures, there has been much more research 
into the incorporation of human errors into the probabilistic risk equation. Such work 
includes the Work Process Analysis Model (WPAM) by Davoudian et al (1994b) and the 
System Action Management (SAM) approach by Pate-cornell & Murphy (1996) or the 
aforementioned DYLAM methodology. 
However, none of these complete methodologies provide the flexibility to be 
applied to the research problem. Therefore, to introduce the issue of human reliability 
into the risk equation, it is necessary to examine the original assessment methods and 
their potential for understanding the impact of emergency management. 
2.4.4 HUMAN RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
2.4.4.1 Introduction 
This section will attempt to summarize the area of human reliability assessment, 
by defining the term, giving an example of the structure of the method, briefly discuss 
some of the techniques available, mentioning the new developments in the field as well as 
the advantages and disadvantages of HRA for assessing the impact of emergency 
management on risk reduction. 
Reliability has been defined as "The probability that an item will operate 
adequately for a specified period of time in its intended application" (Park 1987 cited in 
Hollnagel 1993 p. 51). This mainly addresses the reliability of a hardware system rather 
than a person. Human Reliability is not as easy to define as humans are much more 
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complex and are continuously working on tasks in parallel - for example, the physical 
processes required to stay alive as well as mental processes. They do not have one 
particular purpose to perform. 
Swain and Guttman (1983) define Human Reliability as " the probability that a 
person (1) correctly performs some system-required activity in a required time period (if 
time is a limiting factor) and (2) performs no extraneous activity that can degrade the 
system. 
Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is an essential part of risk analysis and 
management. It was designed to assess the probability of human errors particularly in 
complex and unsafe environments. This involves a number of stages as follows: 
" Problem definition - this stage attempts to define the scope of the HRA process - the 
environment, tasks and roles to be assessed. 
" Task Analysis - this stage involves formally describing the human-system interaction 
by collecting the information on the tasks and breaking the task down into small parts 
to be able to analyse what is involved. 
" Human Error Identification - this involves examining the tasks to see whether they 
would produce dire consequences if particular errors occurred. 
" Representation - this stage involves building a model to represent the information 
obtained from the previous stages in a form whereby the errors can be quantified. ` 
" Human Error Quantification - this involves trying to quantify the probability of the 
occurrence of the errors. 
" Impact Assessment - This stage involves considering whether the risks are low 
enough to be acceptable and discovered which sorts of events contribute to the risk. 
" Human Error Reduction - Once the errors and their importance have been 
established, ideas to reduce the critical errors must be analysed. This involves reducing 
the likelihood of root causes, negative mitigating factors or the final dire consequences. 
Some of these reduction techniques will cost too much to implement, whereas some will 
not produce enough impact to be worthwhile. 
" Quality Assurance - This stage is an ongoing check that the analysis has been carried 
out correctly. This ensures that system changes are incorporated into the analysis and 
that the documentation is kept up to date. 
; 
ocument 
Documentation - Once the whole process has been completed, it is important to 
the results so that they may be kept for reference and so the process does not 
need to be repeated unnecessarily. 
(from Kirwan 1994) 
Within each of these stages, there may be a number of techniques available for 
use depending on the importance of the results, the resources available and the skills of 
the personnel involved. Some of the more structured techniques involve a number of 
these stages and may use computational models to produce quantitative probabilities of 
error. There have been a number of comprehensive reviews of the techniques available 
including Swain & Guttman (1983), Reason (1990), Kirwan (1992a), Hollnagel (1993), 
Kirwan (1994), Loa & Strutt (1995), Kirwan 1998a & b, 1999). As there are at least 38 
human error identification methods (Kirwan 1998a) and at least 8 human reliability 
quantification techniques (Kirwan 1990), it would be difficult to describe each technique, 
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its advantages and disadvantages. Therefore; as the purpose of this research is to 
examine the impact of emergency management on risk reduction, the main factors that 
are important for the technique to represent are as follows. 
1. Taking into account real measures of time as opposed to a subjectively assessed 
variable for "time pressure". 
In an emergency, there is always time pressure due to the nature (and definition) of 
emergencies. Therefore, to assess the risk, this factor must discriminate between degrees 
of time pressure that result in a successful outcome (as we know some can! ) and those 
that fail. Therefore, as time makes such a critical contribution to the outcome of an 
emergency, it should feature predominantly as a variable in an assessment of the impact 
of emergency management on risk. 
2. Quantitative measures 
As it is intended that this research should produce a technique that measures the impact 
of emergency management on risk reduction - it is necessary to have more than the 
"good/bad" criteria produced by some techniques. Therefore, quantitative measures are 
required to indicate by how much a certain delay worsens the situation or by how much a 
particular decision improves the situation. These should ideally be based on objective 
criteria. Certain quantitative techniques, such as Paired Comparisons and Absolute 
Probability Judgment, rely on expert judgment. Both are subject to bias for the 
assessment of "non-emergency" tasks. Due to the increased amount of uncertainty 
inherent in an emergency situation, it is likely that these biases would be increased when 
analysing the impact of emergency management on risk reduction. Therefore, they are 
not considered as possible techniques for use in this research. 
Further to this, some of the HRA techniques are based on the risk assessment 
techniques described in Section 2.4.3 including PREDICT (Procedure to Review and 
Evaluate Dependency in Complex Technologies) by Williams & Munley (1992) based on 
HAZOP; HEMECA (Human Error Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis) by 
Whittingham & Reed (1989) based on FMEA and COGENT (Cognitive Event Tree 
System) by Gertman (1993) - based on the event tree approach. (all cited in Kirwan 
1998a). These HRA techniques are subject to the same criticisms as their parent 
reliability techniques - namely, the problems in producing a reliable means of error 
quantification. Therefore, they will not be discussed further in this section. 
Therefore the next sub-section will look at the following techniques: 
" THERP 
" HEART 
" SLIM-MAUD 
" HRMS 
" Time-line Analysis 
" MicroSAINT 
" TESEO 
" Other methods that consider time 
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2.4.4.2 Human Reliability Assessment Techniques 
2.4.4.2.1 THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) (Swain & Guttman 
1983 
This is a complete HRA technique incorporating a database of human errors, 
event tree modelling and assessment of recovery paths (Kirwan 1992b). Initially, this 
involves defining all the possible system failures. It then uses task analysis to describe the : 
operator's tasks. Following this, it examines the failure points for each sub-task, which is : 
often done using an event tree structure. For each failure, the impact of human errors 
must be established. 
The errors are simply classified as follows: 
" Error of omission - acts omitted (not carried out) 
" Error of commission - acts carried out inadequately; in the wrong sequence, too early 
or too late; to either too small or too great an extent (or degree), or in the wrong 
direction (errors of quality) I. 
" Extraneous error - wrong (unrequired) act performed 
The error rates are then estimated from the database, considering Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSFs) as well as any dependency between the human errors. At this point, any 
potential error recovery paths can also be established (from Taylor 1994 and Kirwan 
1994). 
THERP was considered a step forward in HRA due to the introduction of PSFs 
including situational characteristics, task and equipment characteristics as well as 
environmental, physiological and psychological stressors. Park & Jung (1996) use the 
PSFs and modify them to reflect distributions of values rather than a single point 
estimate, therefore introducing the concept of variability into the process. Kirwan 
(1998a) suggest that the method can be low on resources usage but the reliability of the 
results is dependent on the assessor and his understanding and experience of the 
technique and the context being analysed. It is difficult to use for novel situations and 
demonstrates variation between assessors, possibly due to the high level of 
decomposition involved. Loa & Strutt (1995) suggest it is suitable for assessing 
individual human reliability performance but not particularly good for evaluating human 
errors concerned with diagnosis, crew operation and/or high level decisions. 
For the purpose of examining emergency management, THERP may be subject to 
a number of criticisms. The level of decomposition of tasks and error definitions make it 
impossible to represent the physical features of the situation that would have a large 
impact on the risk. In addition, it is likely to result in a pessimistic view of emergency 
management tasks due to its representation of the impact of performance shaping factors, 
such as time pressure. For example, as shown in Kirwan (1994), the Human Error 
Probability (HEP) of diagnosing a single abnormal event 1 minute after its occurrence is 
1.0. Further to this, the HEP of diagnosing a second event is still 1.0 after 10 minutes. 
Obviously, these are situation-specific and the data are based on nuclear events. 
However, using these specific probabilities and times, this would indicate that very few 
abnormal events in the offshore industry could be diagnosed before further escalation 
occurs, which in practice is not the case. By the nature of an offshore emergency, it is 
usual that an operator has more information than is provided by the control panels. For 
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example, emergencies include helicopter crashes. ship collisions, explosions and fires. All 
of these would result in additional stimuli - whether it is structural movement, impact 
noise or communications from platform personnel - therefore speeding up the diagnostic 
process. Normally, a nuclear emergency can only be diagnosed from the control panels - 
resulting in more complex cognitive tasks. These are therefore likely to take longer than 
diagnosis in an offshore incident and so the timings are probably inappropriate. Kirwan 
(1997) suggests that it is not known whether THERP can be extrapolated to the offshore 
industry - this specific example suggests that, in this form, this is not the case. 
2.4.4.2.2 HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique) (Williams 
1986). 
Following the advancements in the field by THERP, the HEART technique 
attempts to quantify the effects of error-producing conditions (EPCs) on human error 
probability - comparable to the PSFs of THERP but with more definition of the 
predicted influence of these factors. HEART includes 38 different error-producing 
conditions each with a value indicating the potential strength of its effect on reliability. 
Such factors include "Unfamiliarity" (x17), "Time shortage" (x11), "No obvious means 
of reversing an unintended action" (x8), "Ambiguity in the performance standards" (x5) 
and many others. After giving a weighting to each value, the result is then multiplied with 
nominal human reliability values (error probability) assigned to generic tasks, such as 
"totally unfamiliar, performed at speed, with no real idea of consequences" and "fairly 
simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention". In this case, a distribution of 
values for each error probability is given with 5t` - 95th percentile boundaries. 
Loa & Strutt (1995) suggest it is quick, flexible and cost-effective and provides 
the user with reasonable human error reduction techniques. However, there has been 
some criticism to the method in that it does not consider interactions or overlapping 
between the EPCs. In addition, the nominal human error probabilities have not yet been 
validated (Kirwan 1992b). 
However, using HEART to quantify the impact of emergency management tasks 
on risk is difficult as the categories are too generic to give an indication of the context of 
the task. For example, most emergency management tasks have'features such as 
"unfamiliarity" or "time pressure" yet there is no discrimination between the physical 
features of the situation on the resulting risk values. The combination of all the error- 
producing conditions that are present in an emergency are likely to result in a large 
number of multipliers leading to pessimistic values for probability of success in 
emergency management tasks. In reality, many emergency management tasks ARE 
successful, which questions the reliability of the technique for this purpose. Although, the 
attitude of obtaining the "worst case scenario" is adequate for normal risk assessment as 
it leads to the necessary improvement of the risks, it also leads to the implication that all 
emergency management tasks will fail and therefore, providing any effort in improving 
the probability of success for such tasks is fruitless. 
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2.4.4.2.3 SLIM-MAUD Success Likelihood Index Methodology using Multi-Attribute 
Utility Decomposition Embre, 1Y 986) 
This technique requires the presence of a panel of experts - including operators 
experienced in the task, a human factors analyst and a reliability analyst. They are 
required to examine the specific task and to identify the relevant Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSFs) as used by THERP. Following this, they are required to rate the PSFs in 
the situation in terms of their quality (optimal vs sub-optimal) then their importance. This 
gives the "Success Likelihood Index" which can then be converted into Human Error 
Probabilities. 
Loa & Strutt (1995) argue that it is based on a strong theoretical understanding 
of decision-making and is highly auditable. Also, it does not require the extensive 
decomposition of a task used in THERP so it results in more holistic representations of 
the Human Error Probabilities. 
However, as these PSFs are identified and rated by people, some subjective 
biases may occur. There is also a computerised technique that produces slightly different 
results to the panel of experts. Therefore, the group technique is only as good as the 
experts taking part and, for this, there is no definition or verification of what skills or 
knowledge are required of the experts involved (Kirwan 1992b, 1994). These are 
weaknesses that would become particularly evident in examining emergency 
management. Firstly, 10 years is the recommended level of experience required of the 
operators to examine the error probabilities in normal everyday situations (suggested in 
Kirwan 1992b). It is unlikely that any operator has 10 years experience of emergency 
situations to give a realistic estimation of the relevant weighting of the performance 
shaping factors. 
2.4.4.2.4 HRMS 
HRMS (or the Human Reliability Management System) encapsulates some of the 
features of the other techniques into a new technique - primarily based on sets of 
questions for the assessor. It initially involves the use of Hierarchical Task Analysis. 
Using this, it then establishes whether there is a risk of cognitive errors then continues to 
identify the possible errors associated with the task. This requires a high level of expert 
judgment and used the following concepts: 
" External Error Modes - the overt form of the error (e. g. turn valve in wrong 
direction) 
" Psychological Error Mechanisms - the internal mechanism of failure (e. g. stereotype 
take-over - the valve design violates the local plant population stereotype for closing 
a valve) 
(Kirwan 1997). 
Following this, the errors were screened (removed if they were deemed "incredible" or if 
there were no consequences) and the result was represented in a fault tree or event tree 
as described in Sections 2.4.3.4 and 2.4.3.5. Quantification was carried out using the 
PHOENIX module - where human error data were obtained from various sources, 
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including THERP, HEART and APJ, then modified using 6 of the main PSFs from the 
THERP/SLIM methodology. 
In general, this method relies strongly on expert judgment, but this is mainly for 
the human error identification module. In terms of quantification, it is data-driven but has 
the same problem that all methods using Human Error Probabilities have: - 
They risk having a description that is too generic to distinguish between two different 
situations in terms of numerical error probabilities., 
or 
" They are obtained from data that is too specific to be generalized to another 
situation. 
These are both problems for the assessment of emergency management as there are very 
little data available for specific situations and it is nearly impossible to generalize data 
from one emergency to another. 
2.4.4.2.5 Time-line Analysis 
This is not a Human Reliability Assessment tool in itself but could potentially be 
applied to the development of a new technique for examining emergency management. It 
can be used to determine which sub-tasks are required to achieve a goal and how long 
the overall task is likely to take. Quite simply, it uses bars on a chart to represent how 
long each sub-task will take. Horizontal time-line analysis is the most relevant for 
analysing emergency management tasks as shown in Figure 7 (from Kirwan 1996a). 
Figure 7: Horizontal timeline analysis for evacuation scenario (from Kirwan 1996a 
7. Abandon platform 
6. Muster personnel 
5. Decide to evacuate 
4. Fire protection 
3. ESD platform 
2. Confirm gas leak __ 
1. Detect gas leak 
TIME 0 10 20 30 
The inputted data are based on observation, timed trials and expert judgment - 
therefore it can use a variety of sources to get the most accurate estimation of time 
53 
taken. It can even represent variability by showing the deviations on the chart and can 
represent time constraints as vertical lines by which point the various sub-tasks should 
have been completed (From Kirwan 1994). Its main criticisms (as shown in Kirwan & 
Ainsworth 1992) are that it does not indicate how problems can be resolved, that the 
timing of events may be based on expert judgment and that it does not represent 
interdependencies between tasks. 
For the purpose of evaluating the impact of emergency management on risk, 
timeline analysis has great potential. As shown in Figure 7, it can represent the specific 
features of a task in a sequence including numerical values of time. If these are not 
known, it can represent them using a distribution of times. Therefore, the only issue to 
consider now is how this information can be converted into a useful form for input into 
the risk equation; namely - how the values of human error probability can be obtained 
from the analysis. 
2.4.4.2.6 MicroSAINT 
MicroSAINT evolved from the SAINT (system analysis of integrated networks 
of tasks) approach (Laughery 1984 cited in Kirwan & Ainsworth 1992). SAINT takes 
the concept of timeline analysis further by including a Monte Carlo simulation of the 
performance (Kirwan 1994) - and therefore, like the timeline analysis technique 
described in Section 2.4.4.2.5, is not a Human Reliability Assessment Technique in itself. 
However, it can be used to produce the average, maximum and minimum times taken to 
perform a task. MicroSAINT is the computerised version - providing a language for the 
representation of physical events in a simulation. To obtain the time information, it uses 
the GOMS (goals, operators, methods, selection modelling) method - where the time 
taken for each activity comprises a perceptual processing, cognitive and motor 
components. The results obtained from this analysis are usually relating to workload or 
the time taken by various tasks. The main criticisms of this technique are the effort 
required to produce accurate results, the number of parameters necessary to be specified, 
the number of assumptions to be made and the problems in representing cognitive tasks 
(Kirwan & Ainsworth 1992). For investigating emergency management, the problem is 
the same as for timeline analysis. There is no analysis of the time limits for completing 
the task - or this limit is fixed and does not represent the uncertainty in timing that is 
likely to be present. Therefore, there is no obvious method of obtaining human error. 
probabilities from this technique alone, though like timeline analysis, it has the potential 
to be applied with other concepts to be useful in this analysis. 
2.4.4.2.7 TESEO (Tecnica Empirica Stima Errori Operatori) (Bello & Colombari 1980) 
This technique uses the multiplication of values from 5 parameters: - 
type of activity, time available, human operator's characteristics, their emotional state 
and the environment. However, each value was categorised in terms of levels not relating 
to continuous variables. For example, time available is a choice of 3,30,45 or 60 
seconds. Therefore even though actual times are incorporated into the model, their use is 
limited by the choice involved. For example, in an emergency, it may be more than 60 
seconds before the incident escalates and by this point, particular tasks must have been 
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completed. It is therefore too orientated towards a control room operator role and is 
unlikely to be capable of being extrapolated to physical tasks in an'emergency. Loa & 
Strutt (1995) add that there is a lack of supporting data for the model. 
2.4.4.2.8 Other methods that consider time 
As emphasized in section 2.4.4.1, Time has an enormous impact on the success 
or failure of an emergency management task: Even if a correct decision is made and the 
correct action is initiated, even small time delays may mean a failure results. In 
qualitative terms, it is known that a fire escalates very quickly - and consequently, it 
takes more effort to control the longer it has been left. The delay in initiation may mean 
a) the team still can put out the fire but at considerable effort and risk to themselves, b) 
the fire impinges on another system making it unapproachable, or c) the fire causes an 
explosion injuring people and destroying the bridge to an emergency exit. The qualitative 
construct "too late" may be applicable to all of these situations therefore would not 
distinguish between the context of the qualitative outcomes. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to use quantitative measures - and as time is a key feature, it is best to 
include this as a value in the measures. 
There are a number of other techniques can consider "time availability" or "time 
required" as key features. This is obviously desirable for a technique to analyse the 
impact of emergency management on risk as time plays a major part in determining the 
success or failure of tasks. 
HCR (Human Cognitive Reliability) was the first model of this kind to be 
successful (Hannaman & Worledge 1988). It includes the concept that, during an 
accident sequence, a crew has a limited time to perform key actions to deal with the 
situation. This involves the use of a task analysis method, then categorisation of the 
cognitive processing required into skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based actions. 
The median time to complete the tasks must be calculated based on experience. This is 
then adjusted by Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs). The "system time window" - the 
time in which the actions must be taken, is also calculated. A normalised time value is 
calculated from the median response time and the system time window. Using this, and a 
set of time-reliability curves, the probability of non-response can be calculated. Despite 
this use of real time values and the representation of variance, this model has the problem 
that it is unlikely to be capable of representing the relevant physical characteristics that 
dictate the probability of success in an emergency situation. 
There are other models that use the concept of time-reliability curves (TRCs). 
In general, these use the formulae: 
Time-dependent Reliability = Probability (Performance time < Available Time) 
(Reer (1994), Dougherty (1997) and Moieni et al (1994a) 
In these cases, the distributions of the times are calculated from simulations, expert 
judgment and/or lognormal distributions as used in the HCR methodology. 
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Dougherty (1993) criticises the use of TRCs in that just because there is "too 
much" available time, this does not guarantee success. Likewise, "too little" time should 
not guarantee failure. Care should be taken particularly at the median response time, 
where probability is 50: 50 for success: failure. Dougherty (1993) suggests that some of 
these problems can be resolved by using a normal instead of a lognormal distribution. 
However, as a concept, this has the potential to be developed to provide numerical 
values to assess the impact of emergency management on risk reduction and will be 
considered in more detail in the method chapters. 
Kolarik et al (1998) suggests that a time-varying model of human reliability 
should be developed. They suggest that this technique should have: 
1. Ability to tailor models to specific situations. 
2. Ability of models to self-generate and evolve with respect to situational change. 
3. Ability of models to offer timely information relevant to operational decisions. 
However, at this point, they make no specification of how should a model should be 
developed, but the approach used in this research has the potential to be used in this way. 
It is apparent that the mathematical approach to the influence of time is the way forward 
in this domain - particular as the probability of success in emergency management is so 
contingent on time-based parameters. 
2.4.4.3 New Developments in the field 
In general, the research in the area is now working towards correcting some of 
the disadvantages of the current methods. Kirwan (1998a) notes that there has been an 
increased move towards examining errors of commission and violation analysis and the 
use of cognitive simulations and cognitive psychology based techniques. He adds that 
there has been interest in developing a database of human error probabilities including 
CORE-DATA (Taylor-Adams 1994) and others (reviewed in Dhillon 1990). These 
would be particularly useful for quantifying the impact of emergency management on risk 
reduction if they included the relevant emergency tasks. 
There also appears to be greater focus on cognition behind human errors (Meister 
1995, Yoon et al 1996, Shen et al 1997), context of tasks (Dougherty 1993, Gertman et 
al 1996), errors in a continuous time frame (Reer 1994, Kim & Bishu 1996, Hollnagel 
1996) and in team decision making (Furuta & Kondo 1992, Gertman et al 1996). There 
has also been some interest in the nature of human reliability for developing such models 
- whether the models should be "fuzzy", stochastic or precise (Lee et al 1988; Liang & 
Wang 1993, Kim & Bishu 1996, Dougherty 1997). On this point, the literature agreed 
that that point values should not be used to represent variable performance in a variable 
context, where understanding is not great enough to produce precise representations; but 
opinion is that it should not resort to the use of random variables either (Dougherty 
1997). 
Kirwan (1998b) recommends the criteria for the development of a new HRA system as 
follows: 
1. Accuracy - including consistency between different assessors and erring on the 
conservative (pessimistic) side in areas of uncertainty 
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2. Theoretical validity - ensuring it is consistent with current frameworks 
3. Usefulness - easy to use, considering context-specific information and incorporating 
practical and flexible error reduction in terms of training, procedures and design 
4. Comprehensiveness - considering all forms of human error as well as rule violations 
and communication errors in all stages of the plant (system) life cycle. 
5. Auditability - the system, its inputs and outputs should all be informative, explanative, 
auditable and transparent. 
6. Resource-effectiveness and efficiency - the system should channel most resources to 
the high-priority human error concerns and should not use excessive resources. It should 
not require a great degree of expertise to use or equipment resources or facilities. 
Kirwan (1998b) also suggests the use of a toolkit approach so that a range of techniques 
can be selected to solve the particular situation. 
Despite these moves towards cognitive approaches in the general field of HRA, 
this may be too far ahead for the examination of human reliability in an emergency 
management. In HRA analysis of non-emergency situations, usually the physical 
behaviour is easier to categorise as "right" or "wrong" - or even "timely" and "too late" 
- therefore, it is easier to start working towards the underlying cognitive processes in 
these situations. The emergency situation itself is so dynamic that it can determine 
whether the decision is good or bad - depending on the timing, the context and situation- 
specific features. Therefore, looking at the cognitive aspects as "right" or "wrong" is 
inappropriate until the outcome of such decisions (in terms of the actions and their 
impact on the emergency) has been established. Therefore, to examine the impact of 
human behaviour on the probability of success in emergency management tasks, it is 
necessary to start by looking at the active physical behaviour - that which impacts upon 
the physical emergency - in a positive or negative way. These are observable actions and 
therefore are recordable and objective. Following this, it may then be possible to look at 
the cognitive behaviour behind this physical behaviour - with regard to quality and 
timeliness of the communications leading to the action then finally the decisions behind 
the communications. Therefore, it is important to first examiner the result measured in 
terms of PHYSICAL outcome (the probability of failure in a physical task carried out by 
a person or group of people) before moving on to look at the probability of human error. 
(probability of making the decision error leading to this failure). 
However, currently; there is not even a technique that can currently provide a 
time-contingent distribution of values quantifying probabilities of success in emergency 
management tasks at the physical level of human behaviour. Therefore, this is what this 
research must address. The impact of time is crucial and giving point values to represent 
"too early" and "too late" would be meaningless in such a dynamic context. In addition, 
expert judgment techniques cannot be used, as they would lead to unreliable values for 
the error probabilities as an "expert" in emergency situations would be difficult to 
identify and verify. Therefore, it would require a model or combination of models, with 
all of the improvements listed above and more, to adequately model the impact of 
emergency management on risk reduction. 
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SECTION 2.5: RESEARCH METHODS 
Some of the methods used in this research area have already been mentioned in 
the earlier sections. For example: 
Simulations of emergencies to test emergency management competency 
Modelling of physical incidents and human reactions for the QRA 
Expert judgment to provide input to human error quantification or to assess human 
performance 
Collection of anecdotal information from real emergencies 
However, if these are to contribute to scientific knowledge, the methods must 
follow the strict guidelines laid down by established methods. Most of the scope of this 
research involves the understanding of human behaviour, which has always been a 
problem when the aim is to produce reliable scientific data. Fortunately, the area of 
psychology has specified methods to optimise the collection of meaningful scientific data. 
There are two main areas that must be considered when designing psychological research 
tools. 
1. Validity - the extent that a test measures what it is supposed to measure 
2. Reliability - the consistency of a test within itself 
These will therefore be considered in turn. 
2.5.1 VALIDITY 
It seems pointless to develop tests that do not measure what they are supposed to 
measure. However, finding corroborative data is often difficult and therefore many tests 
and methods are used without full validation. 
In general, it can be said at this stage that the emphasis in this research is leaning 
towards the use of mathematical models based on comparison of time values as described 
in Section 2.4.4.2.8. Therefore, unlike most techniques used in psychological research, as 
long as the equations are correct, the validity of the method rest primarily on the 
appropriateness of the data that are used. 
In our case, validity is most critical in data collection. For example, use of 
simulations to assess emergency management behaviour has questionable validity. Does 
the simulation reflect behaviour in a real emergency? If so, is the assessment technique 
measuring the correct aspects of behaviour when making a judgment of competency? 
Are the models that result from the research consistent with knowledge about emergency 
management and its impact on risk? Considering the "subject and experimenter"effects", 
an emergency management candidate may use behaviour that they know the assessor 
favours. This will produce an assessment of competency for themselves as well as a mark 
of endorsement for the examiner's methods. Whether or not this behaviour really reflects 
good emergency management or if the candidate really would use this behaviour in an 
emergency has not been determined by the assessment. Therefore these factors should 
be considered strongly when developing the methodology. 
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2.5.2 RELIABILITY 
Obviously, a test of reliability should itself be reliable. However, what are the 
features that should be considered? In general, this is concerned with the reproducibility 
of the technique. Therefore, these include the following issues: 
" Inter-rater reliability - one person's measure should agree with anyone else's measure 
of the same variable measured in the same way. 
" Test-retest reliability - if a test is repeated, it should produce the same results 
" Internal consistency - if all parts of a test are measuring the same thing, they should 
all correlate with each other. 
Again, as the emphasis is towards mathematical models of the probability of 
success in emergency management tasks, it should be reliable - being influenced only by 
any statistical applications and the data applied. 
Validity and Reliability are both important parts of psychological research. 
However, it should be noted that these are not "all or nothing" concepts and that all tests 
and models have degrees of validity and reliability (Graziano & Raulin 1989). 
SECTION 2.6: CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has discussed the background to the research problem as well as 
some of the methods used to understand it and their respective findings. Overall, it is 
clear that there is much to be learnt about the impact of emergency management on risk 
reduction and how to measure this in scientific terms. 
To summarise the issues in this chapter, some of the key factors that have emerged are as 
follows: 
" Although human errors are the main cause of technological accidents, designing 
human intervention out of the system is not to be recommended. Humans are better 
than machines in recovering systems from emergency situations. However, in an 
emergency situation, good design can facilitate the human interventions by slowing 
the escalation time. 
" An emergency manager is required to make "good and timely" decisions to control 
the escalation and to prevent the worst-case scenario from occurring. Such decision 
making skill, can be enhanced through realistic training exercises, which should be as 
representative of an emergency situation as possible. 
" Assessment of performance in emergency management exercises is usually assessed 
by the subjective technique of expert judgment. This is based on the assumptions that 
certain types of behaviour are conducive to a positive result rather than focusing on 
the physical outcome. This means that the technique is subject to biases as well as 
having questionable face validity. 
" The techniques used to provide quantitative values of risk or human reliability have 
not yet provided any definitive means of representing time availability, uncertainties 
associated with each parameter, team work and the modelling of situation-specific 
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tasks. All of these are critical aspects of emergency management. 
_Therefore, 
it is 
necessary to produce an innovative technique to solve the research problem. 
By the descriptions of some of the emergencies that have occurred, it is clear that 
this is a most important field to research. The consequences of failure can be devastating 
- and any work that promotes even small successes in emergency management is clearly 
valid. This chapter has examined the links between the physical emergency and how it 
escalates over time - as well as the psychological reaction. As the physical aspect of the 
emergency can only be influenced by physical reactions -, it is important that the 
psychological reactions to this promote "good and timely" physical reactions, hence 
facilitating a positive physical outcome. This is the most important concept of emergency 
management. Therefore, to test and measure the effectiveness of emergency 
management, it is necessary to predict the likely outcome in physical terms 
However, there is no technique that adequately addresses the issue of how to 
quantify the impact of human behaviour on the probability of success in an emergency 
management task. The Risk Assessment techniques used to examine emergency 
management usually address the impact of human behaviour with expert judgment 
techniques or global coverage of human failures in an emergency with one quantitative 
value and little consideration of the contextual factors considered. Therefore, for this, it 
would be necessary to apply HRA techniques - and none of these approaches'can cater 
for quantification, the impact of real time on outcome, contextual factors, and 
particularly, the result measured in terms of PHYSICAL outcome (the probability of 
failure in a physical task carried out by a person or group of people rather than the 
probability of human error). This is what this research must attempt to address - thereby 
creating a foundation on which other techniques can be built to incorporate the cognitive 
aspects of human reliability in emergency management. 
Given that the relevant theoretical subjects have been discussed, the next chapter 
will describe the background to our study by introducing the nature of the offshore oil 
and gas industry and the relevant research carried out therein. 
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Chapter 3 
THE OFFSHORE INDUSTRY 
SECTION 3.1: INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the general research carried out that is relevant to 
this project. This chapter aims to introduce the context of the research - by introducing 
work carried out specifically in the offshore industry. Therefore the following sections 
include a description of the offshore industry - including the roles of the personnel 
emphasising the importance of on-site emergency management in reducing risk. 
Following this, there will be a brief introduction of health and safety and the development 
of legislation in the offshore industry. This ensures that the research takes account of the 
structure in which risk reduction and emergency management are implemented. 
Therefore, any conclusions drawn from this research must be consistent with current 
ideas or future strategies for safety legislation in the offshore industry. 
Next the review will move on to the relevant areas of research, starting with a discussion 
of emergencies - in particular, the Piper Alpha disaster - then discussing offshore 
emergency management. Finally, this chapter will discuss some of the specific risk 
analysis techniques that have been applied in the offshore industry. This will therefore 
cover all the relevant research in the areas of interest. 
SECTION 3.2: DESCRIPTION OF THE OFFSHORE 
ENVIRONMENT 
3.2.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea, natural gas was discovered in , 
1965 and oil in 1970. However, the petrochemical industries were slow to exploit the oil 
and gas reserves in the North Sea, probably due to lack of knowledge and an 
underestimation of the quantities available (UKOOA 1998b). However, offshore oil and 
gas now provides 85% of all the United Kingdom's total energy output and is expected 
to dominate for many years to come (Odell 1995). 
The workplaces of the offshore industry typically fall into one of the following 
types: 
" Mobile drilling rigs for oil exploration. 
" The larger production platforms for drilling and processing the hydrocarbons before 
transporting them to an onshore facility. 
" Floating Production Supply & Offloading (FPSO) (floating installations using flexible 
risers from the subsea system) These normally separate the petrochemicals then 
transfer them to a shuttle tanker to be carried ashore. 
" Service vessels including floating hotels "flotels", standby vessels & supply vessels 
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(Flin, Slaven & Whyte 1996, Strutt 2000) 
Mobile drilling rigs can be of four main types: the older'shallow-use submersibles, 
semi-submersibles, jack-up platforms and drill ships. As far as production platforms are 
concerned, there are four main types: steel jackets, artificial islands, concrete structures 
and tension leg platforms. A comprehensive description of these types of platform can be 
found in Lancaster (1996). 
3.2.2 THE OFFSHORE ENVIRONMENT AND PERSONNEL 
Even under normal conditions, the offshore environment is an unusual workplace. 
Accommodation is only metres away from the workplace, both surrounded by hazardous 
and noisy drilling and processing technology, then situated in the middle of the sea. Work 
colleagues are the only social companions. Shift work is a normal requirement, 
potentially leading to fatigue (Parkes 1992). Some days, when weather is particularly 
poor, personnel may not be able to leave the internal accommodation and offices. The 
only normal way on and off the platform is by helicopter, wearing a survival suit, with 
journeys lasting between 20 minutes to over 2 hours. Therefore, there is no opportunity 
to freely "come and go as you please" (Flin, Slaven & Whyte 1996). Even when leave is 
scheduled, this may not be possible due to bad weather. Then, if the worst-case scenario 
does occur, forcing workers to abandon the platform, the only escape is via helicopter, 
lifeboat or, in the most desperate situations, jumping from a large height into the freezing 
North Sea. Hence the people who choose to work offshore are often visualised as a 
"rough, tough bunch, battling against harsh weather elements to "bring home the oil'"' - 
but it is a far cry from the glamorous view of luxurious floating hotels and above-average 
salaries held by some members of the public and the media (Whyte 1989). 
Obviously, this means that only a certain type of person is suitable to work in the 
offshore environment. Usually this is self-selecting. Few people who were afraid of 
water, flying or heights would choose to work in the offshore industry. Also, a large 
number of the workers are contractors, making it difficult to ensure consistency on an 
installation (Flin, Slaven & Whyte 1996) and therefore creating 
'a 
problem in maintaining 
a competent emergency management team. 
As such platforms are almost self-sufficient, there are a number. of different roles 
that must be fulfilled on a platform. These have been categorised by Flin, Mearns, 
Gordon & Fleming (1996) as technicians and mechanics, production, maintenance, 
caterers, administration and management, drillers, deck crew, auxiliary staff, medics and 
logistics. However, specialist roles such as divers and crane drivers must have been 
incorporated into one of the above categories or have been erroneously left out of the 
research. Over and above these normal roles, an emergency situation requires these 
personnel to adapt to become muster captains, fire-fighters, rescue teams and lifeboat 
coxswains. 
The work involved can potentially involve physical exertion, adverse weather, hot 
and cold exposure, helicopter and boat travel, exposure to heights and, possibly, 
exposure to smoke (Flin, Slaven & Whyte 1996). Therefore, medically, there are a 
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number of conditions that would make a person unsuitable for offshore work. Logically, 
these include insulin-dependent diabetes, gross obesity, infectious diseases, psychoses, 
pregnancy or congenital heart disease. Detailed guidelines as to the acceptable and 
unacceptable conditions are given in UKOOA (1986) and Flin & Slaven (1996a). 
There have also been a number of psychological attributes suggested to be 
indicative of someone who will be ideal for the offshore environment. These include 
"coping with long hours, isolation, teamwork ability" and, for Offshore Installation 
Managers (OIMs), "an ability to stay calm, leadership, decisive under pressure, ability to 
assess the overall situation, ability to communicate and self-confidence" (Flin & Slaven 
1996a). These are consistent with the ideas of Crew or Team Resource Management, 
described in Section 2.3.4.1. and will be considered further in Section 3.5. However, 
psychological attributes are difficult to measure and to define standards therefore these 
are usually only implied in the relevant legislation. Therefore, this section will discuss the 
development of offshore legislation with particular regard to emergency management and 
risk assessment. - 
SECTION 3.3: HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION IN THE 
OFFSHORE INDUSTRY 
3.3.1 PRE-PIPER ALPHA 
Historically, legislation in the offshore oil and gas industry has responded to a 
number of major accidents. The Minerals Working (Offshore Installations) Act (1971) 
was introduced in response to the collapse of the Sea Gem rig in the North Sea. Despite 
already using a risk management based approach, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD) issued their "Regulations concerning safety related to petroleum and installations" 
in 1976. Eventually, this technique grew into full Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) 
including safety systems and the design process (cited in Smith, E. J. 1995). Further to 
this, the NPD Guidelines for simultaneous operations and concept safety evaluation were 
introduced in response to the Ekofisk blowout and oil spill of 1977 and Alexander 
Kielland capsize in 1980. 
Up until Piper Alpha, the law in the U. K. regarding offshore safety was primarily 
rule-based based on "prescriptive legislation and associated Guidance notes" without any 
application of QRAs (Lloyd & Hunter 1991). Further to this, Lloyd & Hunter (1991) 
state that the design process was "relatively straightforward and quick with assessment 
based on a checklist approach to compliance". However, the Piper Alpha disaster drew 
attention to many of the weaknesses in these strategies. 
3.3.2 THE PIPER ALPHA DISASTER 
Piper Alpha was a large production platform situated in the UK sector of the 
North Sea, 110 miles northeast of Aberdeen. It was of the steel jacket design with 8 legs 
piled into the sea-bed in 144m of water. It began production in 1976; operated by 
Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd., initially exporting oil then, at a later date, gas 
too. In terms of oil pipelines, Piper and Claymore were connected to the Flotta oil 
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terminal on the Orkney Islands. Gas was received from the Tartan platform for onward 
transmission to the MCP-01 where it joined the trunk-line between the Frigg gas field 
and the onshore St. Fergus gas terminal in Aberdeen. Further to this, Piper provided gas 
to assist the Claymore platform with production (Cullen 1990, Hales 1995, Lancaster 
1996). 
,I 
At approximately 22: 00 hours on Wednesday 6th July 1988, there was an 
explosion on the production deck of the platform, which was caused by ignition of a 
cloud of gas condensate leaking from a temporary flange. Large oil fires then caused a 
rupture of a pipeline carrying gas from Piper to the Tartan platform resulting in a massive r 
explosion. The fires and explosions lead to structural collapse of the platform resulting in 
the deaths of 167 people, including two rescue workers. 65 people, including 3 rescue 
workers, survived but were injured. Most of these did so by jumping heights of up to 175 
feet into the sea (Cullen 1990, Hales 1995, Flin & Slaven 1996a). 
The cause of this incident all stemmed from a combination of actions that 
occurred earlier in the day. Maintenance was scheduled for condensate injection pump A 
and so this pump was electrically isolated but no other actions had been taken. Another 
contracting firm were scheduled to carrying out rectification work on a safety release 
valve so this was removed and replaced with a blind seal (now known to be inadequate). 
In addition, divers were working near the seawater intakes and so the standby pumps 
were set to manual and the deluge system was deactivated due to welding work. Later in 
the evening, condensate injection pump B tripped and would not restart. Because of poor 
procedures in the permit to work system, the operator was unaware of the status of 
pump A and put this into service. The high-pressure condensate began to escape through 
the inadequate blind seal. About 30 seconds later, an explosion destroyed the firewalls on, 
both sides, damaging the crude oil pipes and the deluge system. The burning oil spilled 
down and heated the risers of the gas pipelines resulting in the subsequent and deadly 
explosions. Within all of this chaos, the OIM (Offshore Installation Manager) panicked 
and made no attempt to communicate with surrounding vessels, installations, helicopters 
or the shore. He provided no guidance or leadership for the other personnel on Piper, 
contributing to the large loss of life. (Cullen 1990, Bradley 1995). With the current 
legislation in place, there was no reason to suggest that this could not occur again and it 
was necessary to make changes to prevent this or another tragic accident. 
3.3.3 THE CULLEN REPORT 
After the incident and before the public inquiry was released, the initial response 
by industry was to conduct assessments of their installations and management systems, 
considering: 
" Improvements to "Permit to work" management systems 
" Relocation of some pipeline emergency shutdown valves 
" Installation of subsea pipeline isolation systems 
" Mitigation of smoke hazards 
" Improvements to evacuation and escape systems, and 
" Initiation of Formal Safety Assessments 
(UKOOA 1998c) 
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The Public Inquiry was chaired by Lord Cullen and consisted of an investigation 
to establish the causes of the disaster then recommendations towards safety changes, 
some of which will be discussed in Section 3.3.4. Cullen's Recommendations lead to the 
introduction of the Offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations 1992. These have 
been compared to the previously introduced Control of Industrial Major Accident 
Hazards CIMAH (1984) Regulations but were "considerably extended" (Mansfield 
1992, Flin, Mearns, Gordon & Fleming 1996). 
These regulations required installation operators to provide safety cases for 
designing, operating and abandoning an installation. The safety case must include: 
"a full description of the platform, 
" the meteorological and oceanographic conditions involved, 
" numbers of people, 
" details of the hazards involved in the processes, 
" information regarding temporary refuge, routes to the safe haven and means 
of safe evacuation (HSE 1993), and 
" evidence of an adequate safety management system (Smith, E. J. 1995). 
Operators were required to identify all possible hazards, to quantify the risks arising from 
such hazards, and then demonstrate that these risks have been controlled to a level "as 
low as reasonably practicable". Further to this, operators were required to provide 
statements of performance standards for their emergency arrangements to deal with 
major hazards (Finucane 1994). By 1989, the Offshore Installations (Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations were in place, to ensure that the 
communications of safety concerns were being brought to the attention of managers 
(UKOOA 1998c). 
Also, a new HSE division - the Offshore Safety Division (OSD) - was created to 
oversee the implementation of all of the inquiry's recommendations. By the end of 1996, 
this was successfully completed. This division is responsible for research to assess the 
risks involved in offshore work, conduct accident investigations and provide technical 
guidance to support legislation (HSE 1998e). Further to this, The Offshore Safety Act 
(1992) was created so that the HSE and HSC held the formal responsibility for offshore 
safety and could create new legislation as required. Since then, the Offshore Safety 
Division has "inherited the Department of Energy's program of research into offshore 
safety" (Lane et al 1994). 
Apart from these changes, a large research project investigating blast and fire 
engineering for topside structures was initiated to look at the behaviour of fires on 
offshore installations. (See Selby & Burgan 1998 for results). 
The Cullen report (1990) intended to both identify the causes of the disaster as 
well as make recommendations for future safety improvements. This report made 106 
recommendations including the following: 
" Introduction of a single regulatory body responsible for safety in the offshore oil and 
gas industry 
65 
" Use of Formal Safety Assessments including HAZOPs, QRAs and Safety Audits. 
" Improved permit-to-work systems 
" Evacuation, escape and rescue procedures and training 
" Attention to the vulnerability of emergency systems analysis 
" Prevention of smoke and gas ingress into the accommodation 
" Fire Risk Analysis 
" Adequate temporary safe refuge 
" Involvement of the work force in the Safety Case preparation and in improving safety' 
performance 
" Chain of command for safety 
" Leadership from the top 
" Goal-setting approach as opposed to a prescriptive approach 
(Cullen 1990, emphasised in Mansfield 1992, Barrell 1992, Bellamy & Geyer 1991, 
Miller 1996, Lloyd & Hunter 1991). 
Many of these improvements are outside the scope of the research. Therefore, 
this report will continue by focusing on the provision of resources, training and personnel 
selection for emergency management. In general, Cullen's recommendations and the 
corresponding legislation have not supplied a large amount of detail regarding the skills 
required of an offshore emergency management team, or the training and assessment 
process. Therefore, the following section will discuss the literature that speculates on 
how this problem should be approached. 
3.3.4 RELEVANT CHANGES IN OFFSHORE HEALTH AND SAFETY LAW 
AFTER THE CULLEN REPORT 
The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency 
Response) Regulations were introduced in 1995. These placed obligations on the 
installation operator covering emergency response and specify goals for preventative and 
protective measures for controlling the hazards of fire and explosion. This requires that 
they establish the appropriate performance standards for items of equipment or systems 
that they have installed to deal with the risks. This would include the provision of an 
adequate temporary refuge as well as a safe means of evacuation. 
The Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration) 
Regulations 1995 require that "a competent manager is appointed as manager of the 
installation and provision made for appropriate resources to be available for managers to 
be able to carry out their functions effectively. Managers are responsible to the duty 
holder for day-to-day management of operations and are in charge of the health and 
safety of persons on board, including the command and control function in an 
emergency. " 
The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction etc. ) Regulations 
1996 provide regulations to ensure that the integrity of the installations is ensured at all 
times as is reasonably practicable. The duty holder must therefore address the forces that 
act on the installations, its layout and configuration, including the changes brought about 
by decommissioning. 
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UKOOA (1998b) stated that by November 1993, every installation in UK waters 
had submitted a safety case to the HSE. However, all was not as it seemed. A 
questionnaire-based study by Whyte et al (1995) suggested that "the current system of 
safety representatives and safety committees was unable to deal adequately with 
workforce input to safety", particularly due to fear of reprisal. Even with the 
introduction of the safety case regulations, many of the respondents in the study were not 
asked to contribute to the safety case - and those that were usually found their 
suggestions rejected by management as "either inappropriate or deliberately obstructive". 
In general, the study found that although the workforce were willing to cooperate with 
the new focus on safety, the management and oil companies were still aiming for cost- 
cutting by reducing the number of support vessels, encouraging workers to supply their 
own safety equipment and reducing training times (Whyte et al 1995). This is further 
backed up in a statement by Dr Charles Woolfson, who said "Despite Lord Cullen's 
recommendations that "it is essential for the whole workforce to be committed to and 
involved in safe operations", neither effective means for workforce participation, nor the 
legal backup required by safety representatives or worker whistle-blowers has yet been 
put in place... Unlike in the Norwegian sector, the workforce have been consigned to the 
role of passive onlookers" (Yahoo! News 1998). 
3.3.5 A STEP CHANGE IN SAFETY ?, 
However, some aspects appeared to have shown improvement. The industry 
agreed to report offshore hydrocarbon releases to the HSE on a voluntary basis. From 
1992 to 1994/95. the numbers of reported releases were as follows: 
36 major releases 
170 significant releases and 
111 minor releases 
From 1994/95 to 1997/98, these values decreased to 
22 major releases 
102 significant releases 
50 minor releases (data from UKOOA 1998c). 
These figures showed a significant improvement which may have lead UKOOA to 
introduce "a step change in safety" in 1997, which stated their objectives as follows: 
" Deliver a 50% improvement in the whole industry's safety performance over the next 
3 years 
" Establish our own safety performance contracts which will demonstrate visibly our 
personal concern for safety as an equal to business performance 
" Work together to improve sharing of safety information and good practice across the 
whole industry, through active involvement of employees, service companies, 
operators, trades unions, regulators and representative bodies. 
(quoted from UKOOA 1997c) 
UKOOA (1997c 1998c) emphasised the use of cooperation between individual 
companies and across all industry sectors to improve safety performance. 
However, it is now clear that the first of their goals will not be achieved. In a 
report by Gibb (1999b), it was noted that this had been a "stretch target" and that injury 
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rate figures from early in 1999 had showed a 20% improvement compared with when 
Step Change was initiated. 
However, Gibb (1999a) described an incident in which a 10' tonne tank of liquid 
nitrogen was being lifted from a supply vessel to the Britannia oil and gas platform. In , 
this case, the crane pennant snapped and the tank crashed to the deck. It was fortunate in 
this case that it had snapped early in the lift as if this had occurred high above the 
platform during processing, it could have caused an incident as serious as the Piper 
Alpha disaster. In this report, Gibb quoted Jake Molloy who said, "All the elements that 
existed in the run-up to Piper Alpha are back again -a cost-cutting environment, 
rationalisation and massive down-manning". However, in Gibb (1999b), these allegations 
were denied by UKOOA's director of operational and technical affairs, Dr John Wils, 
who stated that "Safety will always remain this industry's highest priority. It is a pre- 
requisite of good business". This debate is likely to continue for some time without a 
solution. Therefore, this review will briefly mention some of the other major emergencies 
that have occurred in the offshore industry before discussing emergency management. 
SECTION 3.4: MAJOR EMERGENCIES IN THE OFFSHORE 
INDUSTRY 
Apart from the Piper Alpha disaster, safety and reliability in the offshore industry 
has been drawn to the public's attention by other memorable accidents. The ten worst 
offshore accidents worldwide from between 1955 and 1988 are shown in Table 2. ' 
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Table 2: The 10 Worst Accidents in the Offshore Industry between 1995 and 1988 
Date Name Installation Location Activity Fatalities 
6/6/88 Piper Alpha Fixed Steel 
Jacket 
UK sector 
North Sea 
Production 167 
27/3/80 Alexander 
Kielland 
Semi- 
submersible 
Norwegian 
sector 
Accommodation 123 
11/3/89 Sea Crest * Drillshi Thailand Stand-by (storm) 91 
15/2/82 Ocean 
Range r 
Semi- 
submersible 
Newfoundland Stand-by (storm) 84 
26/10/83 Glomar Java 
Sea 
Drillship China Stand-by (storm) 81 
25/11/79 Pohai 2 Jack up China Under tow 72 
16/8/84 Enchova 
PCE-1 
Fixed steel 
jacket 
Brazil Development 
drilling 
37 
30/6/64 C. P. Baker Drillship Louisiana Exploratory 
Drilling 
22 
30/12/56 Qatar 1 Jack up Qatar Dry tow. 20 
2/10/80 Ron 
Tapp me er 
Jack up Saudi Arabia Exploratory 
Drillin 
19 
(Strutt 1994) 
The Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) run by the Bureau Veritas 
in Oslo publishes biennial reports of the industry's accident record. However, in terms of 
fatalities, the Piper Alpha disaster is the worst to date, and has had the greatest impact on 
the organisation of safety and emergency management in the industry through the 
aforementioned Cullen report. Therefore, this review will move on to discuss the 
implementation of the recommendations with respect to emergency management. 
SECTION 3.5: OFFSHORE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
One of the critical aspects of an emergency on an offshore installation is that, due 
to their location, personnel are required to exhibit a certain degree of self-sufficiency. 
External assistance is unlikely to arrive within the first half hour of an emergency and 
responding to any incident with an immediate evacuation carries other risks. Therefore, 
the role of an emergency manager is likely to have a significant impact on the outcome of 
an incident - through the early on-site application of control, prevention of escalation and 
rescue (Stewart, K. 1994). 
Many of the issues regarding generic emergency management have been 
discussed in Section 2.3. Therefore, this section will continue by looking at the specific 
research in the area of offshore emergency management, including the roles of the OIM 
and his team, training, assessment, emergency planning, design and resources. This will 
start by examining the development of the role of the Offshore Installation Manager 
(OIM). 
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3.5.1 THE OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER (OIM) 
The role and responsibilities of the Offshore Installation Manager first became 
defined in response to the Sea Gem accident. On Dec 27`x` of 1965, the Sea Gem 
collapsed while drilling, capsized and sank with the loss of 13 of the 32 men on board. 
This led to the introduction of the Minerals Workings (Offshore Installations) Act of 
1971 - facilitating regulations for the health, safety and welfare on offshore installations. 
The public inquiry into the disaster recommended that the person in charge or "master" 
should be clearly defined, together with a chain of command (Flin & Slaven 1996a). 
However, the Piper Alpha disaster further illustrated the importance of the 
Offshore Installation Manager. If the OIM had not panicked, he may have provided some 
positive interventions in terms of evacuation or co-ordination of fire-fighting and many 
lives could have been saved. However, it is futile to assign blame to this single individual. 
Errors occurred in promoting him to the OIM status without proper emergency training, 
and, not providing any available chain of command if he was found to be unable to fulfil 
his duties. (Pate-cornell 1993). 
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations (1992) and the Offshore 
Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response) Regulations 
(1995) attempted to rectify this by clarifying the importance of "command by competent, 
persons" and a specified "chain of command" should the OIM or his deputy become 
unable to cope. 
UKOOA (1995a p. 20) suggests that the factors contributing to a successful assessment 
of an incident and activation of an appropriate response include: 
" Clearly identified responsibilities for decision making 
" Clearly identified lines of command and control 
" Competence in those with responsibility for decisions, based upon selection, 
experience, knowledge, training and practice. 
These Regulations and Guidance obviously promote'the"techniques of "command 
and control" emergency management above the other types mentioned in Section 2.3 
(Crew Resource Management and Emergent Human Resources). 
So, given that it was a commander that was required to fulfil the role of OIM, it was 
deemed necessary to identify selection and training techniques to ensure that the person 
in the role had "the right stuff". Therefore, it was also necessary to identify what that 
"right stuff" was (Flin & Slaven 1995). 
Larken (1995) suggests that the emergency manager must have a broad base of skills, 
including 
" Capability to manage under pressure 
" Capability to operate outside the operational envelope. The broader the range of 
operational experience, the less likely the emergency commander is to find himself 
having to operate outside of his personal objective envelope 
" Ability in emergency team command; leadership 
" Skills in the basics of emergency management - logistics; personnel accounting and 
movement, evacuation plans; communication and information processing. 
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" Skills in major hazard management - process plant; drilling; technical diagnosis 
" Knowledge of major hazards; fire and explosions; chemical; radiation 
" Knowledge of the facility itself 
In practical terms, Larken (1995) also emphasises the importance of developing 
"the big picture", making early appraisals, planning ahead and monitoring incoming 
information. However, although these are reasonable assumptions of the requirements of 
an OIM, there is no evidence that these are actually tested in the selection process. Pate- 
cornell & Murphy (1996) also suggest that the OIM must fulfil the role of the on-scene 
commander in the event of an emergency, however other literature does not support this 
view. Mills & Coleshaw (1998) comment that the OIMs often have little understanding 
of the on-scene processes (such as loading casualties into a lifeboat) and that this impairs 
their management performance. This suggests that OIMs should have personal 
experience of the physical tasks in an emergency - including fire-fighting and medical 
support, before being appointed to the management role. In terms of our research, this 
could be interpreted as "greater understanding of how the physical actions make an 
impact on risk leads to better fulfilment of the management role". 
Flin, Slaven & Whyte (1996) investigate the use of scientific selection techniques 
and found that there was "a general lack of objective assessment measures and 
psychometric testing" for the role of offshore installation manager and that selection was 
mostly based on recruitment within the company, a good track record or personal 
recommendations (p. 90-91). The companies who did use psychometric tests described 
the ideal personal qualities for an OIM were as follows: 
" Leadership ability 
" Stable personality 
" Communication skills 
" Delegating 
" Team working 
" Decision making under time pressure and stress 
" Evaluating the situation 
" Planning a course of action 
" Remaining calm and managing stress in self and others 
" Pre-planning to prepare for possible emergencies 
(Flin, Slaven & Whyte 1996) 
This appears to be more consistent with the concept of crew resource 
management than the command and control approach implied by the Regulations. 
However, Flin, Slaven & Whyte (1996) concluded that none of the companies had any 
means of validating their selection procedure. Flin & Slaven (1996b) attempted to define 
a set of personality criteria for those judged as competent in dealing with a simulated 
offshore emergency. They discovered few significant correlations between performance 
measures and personality factors. Their results indicated that "the OlMs with the highest 
rated performance were those who: 
" Like to take charge and supervise others 
" consider themselves to be fun-loving, sociable and humorous 
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" are less interested in analysing human behaviour 
" are more interested in practical than abstract problem solving, and 
" prefer to make decisions quickly rather than take time to weigh up all the evidence". 
+. s 
However, the performance measures are still based on subjective views of 
observing behaviour in a simulation rather than based on the impact of the emergency 
management on the outcome of the emergency. Further to this, this section has focused 
on the OIM alone - and must now examine the broader scope of emergency management 
and its impact on risk by considering the skills of his team. 
3.5.2 THE OFFSHORE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TEAM 
Despite the focus on the importance of the OIM and his "command presence", 
the supporting team are critical for successful management. Flin & Slaven (1995 p. 118) 
state "an important principle is that leaders should be as familiar as possible with the 
strengths and weaknesses of the teams they would have to rely on in an emergency, as 
decision quality can depend on appropriate use of other members of the command tear 
Larken (1995 p. 108) suggests the "key points in constructing an emergency management 
team are: 
" There must be a balance between totally overloading a single individual with 
information-handling duties and creating, at the other extreme, too complex a matrix 
of interfaces 
" Information-handling and presentation systems must reflect the specific needs of the 
team and the demands placed (on them) by the nature of the installation 
" Team members should be trained to observe and support each other, including 
support of the emergency commander at difficult moments". 
The skills required of the team include situation assessment and maintaining "the 
big picture", maintaining effective communication with installation personnel, onshore 
personnel, other installations and external resources, keeping an accurate log and 
accounting for personnel, directing and deploying on-scene fire-teams, rescue teams and 
other resources, controlling process operations and shutdown. They therefore have a 
large amount of information to gather and assimilate so that they can plan and anticipate 
responses (Flin & Slaven 1996b). 
Keith Stewart (1994) suggests that the OIM and perhaps one or two others hold 
the shared problem model and the rest of the team are responsible for gathering and 
processing the information to ensure that the key people maintain "the big picture". 
Therefore, this is consistent with the concept of naturalistic decision-making. Skriver et 
al (cited in Flin & Slaven 1996a) also found that 90% of the decisions made by OIMs in 
a simulated table-top exercise were of the types described in Klein's Recognition Primed 
Decision model (1989) - one of the main models used in the naturalistic approach. 
Initially, there were some doubts that OIMs have the experiential basis on which to make 
naturalistic decisions, as they do not experience emergency management on a day-to-day 
basis as fire-fighters do. However, Flin, Slaven & Stewart (1996) identified that OIMs 
have such an excellent mental model of the workings of their installation including risks, 
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layout and technical understanding, this can substitute for their lack of practical 
emergency management experience. 
However, few of these concepts have objectively-measured scales of performance 
which can be developed as a training or assessment tool. Therefore, although it appears 
likely that naturalistic decision-making is used by effective emergency management 
teams, the research in the area does not yet show signs of solving this research problem. 
Instead, it is more likely that a technique that can quantify the impact of emergency 
management on risk reduction can be used to validate these concepts - by demonstrating 
that emergency management teams having particular decision-making skills do indeed 
have a greater impact on risk reduction. 
3.5.3 TRAINING 
Given that particular skills are necessary for both OIM and his team, it is unlikely 
that they would be able to form an effective emergency management team without any 
practice. Flin & Slaven (1995 p. 118) add that "Deficiencies in team performance 
frequently relate to communication problems and these can be minimised by training 
teams together in emergency response procedures". Despite this, Flin & Slaven (1994 
cited in Flin & Slaven 1996a) found that "28% of the OIMs received no specific 
emergency command training, though some had received such training through earlier 
careers in the armed forces". 
The Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (OPITO) is the body 
responsible for ensuring the quality and content of key safety and emergency training for 
the workforce and to develop measurable standards of competence for the industry to 
meet the requirements of UKOOA guidelines". (Institute of Petroleum 1998). It specified 
that duty holders (usually operators) are required to provide emergency response training 
to OPITO standards, if not from an OPITO approved training provider (UKOOA 
1997c). The Safety Case regulations required more formal specification of selection and 
training than previous legislation, mostly based on simulated exercises and the use of 
"command and control" management. However, David (1996) argues that the military- 
type of command and leadership training that OIMs frequently attend may provide some 
benefits in emergency response but is "organizationally, operationally and culturally 
specific" so may not be time or cost-effective. He suggests that training should be 
properly designed for the industry in which it is applied and suggests that perhaps the 
Crew Resource Management approach taken by the aviation industry would be more 
applicable. As stated before, it has not yet been determined which approach is more 
effective - and this is another reason why a technique of assessing the impact of 
emergency management on risk reduction would be useful. 
Therefore, the next set of sub-sections will consider all the various types of 
emergency management training that are used in the offshore industry. 
3.5.3.1 Drills 
All offshore personnel must undergo basic training for musters, interpretation of 
alarms as well as emergency evacuation, fire-fighting and survival which is normally 
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carried out in the form of team drills (Strutt & Lakey 1995). UKOOA (1997a) requires 
that all workers must complete a basic offshore safety induction and emergency training, 
which must be refreshed every 4 years. OPITO specifies the requirements for the 
survival course (incorporating a simulated evacuation from a submerged helicopter) and 
maintains an up to date register of those currently certified (Flin & Slaven 1996a). The 
training must be platform-specific and includes the location of muster stations, lifeboats, 
rescue equipment and survival suits for all personnel including visitors (Flin & Slaven 
1996a). However, there are other important skills that may be learnt which are essential 
for effective emergency management. As stated earlier, maintaining communication is a 
critical skill and it cannot be identified using a questionnaire. Communication skills are 
often taught in combination with radio skills and learning to make messages clear, 
accurate, informative and concise is essential. This is particular crucial for those who 
speak a different language to the rest of the group so that it can be ensured that all 
personnel are able to communicate together. 
3.5.3.2 Computer Simulation 
There has been some training conducted in the industry using computer 
simulation. Flin & Slaven (1996a) give an account of its success in training personnel to 
use permit to work systems. It was found to significantly enhance performance in the 
short-term and 4 weeks after training. However, there seems to be no other software 
available that fulfils aspects of emergency management training in the offshore industry. 
3.5.3.3 Major (real-life) exercises 
These can involve both onshore and offshore emergency management as well as 
co-ordination with external bodies, for example, the coastguard and police. UKOOA 
(1997a) suggests that these should be held annually, though this an expensive technique 
in terms of personnel, resources and organisation time. For these reasons, although this is 
the technique producing results with the greatest validity, it would not be practical to use 
it as a research tool or for testing all-round breadth of emergency management 
knowledge for each individual. 
3.5.3.4 Dedicated simulations or "integrated Onshore Exercises" 
These are the main type of emergency management training. UKOOA (1997a) 
emphasise the importance of competent training providers running "integrated and 
realistic" scenarios to maintain competence. They recommend the use of an integrated 
onshore exercise as it frees the team from their normal offshore roles to be able to 
concentrate on their role in an emergency. UKOOA (1997a) recommends that if these 
are carried out successfully at least once every 3 years,, this will fulfil their competence 
requirements. Similarly the onshore role in an offshore emergency should be assessed at 
least once a year. 
Flin & Slaven (1996a and Skriver & Flin 1997) suggest that training should focus 
on improving situation awareness and building up experience by managing realistic and 
complex scenario-based exercises. Further to this, OPITO Guidelines require that 
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emergency managers must prove that they are capable of managing at least 3 of the 
following emergency scenarios: 
" Well control incident 
" Explosion and fire 
" Accommodation fire 
" Helicopter incident 
" Collision or wave damage causing structural collapse 
" Loss of stability (Flin & Slaven 1996a) 
Further to these requirements, UKOOA (1997a) recommend that training should also 
consider the following issues: 
Mustering and Evacuation 
Fire-fighting 
Breathing apparatus 
All emergency equipment 
Casualty handling 
Process emergencies 
Loss of station keeping 
First aid 
Man overboard 
Standby and emergency service vessels 
Well control 
Security - terrorist threat 
Loss of stability 
Loss of structural integrity 
These simulations are run as described in Section 2.3.6 and they are obviously 
quite popular. OIMs have listed the following points to describe how they feel the 
simulations benefited them: 
1. Discovering how one responds and makes decisions under pressure 
2. Practice in thinking of possible courses of action to deal with emergencies 
3. An increase in self-confidence from having performed well 
4. The opportunity to test the team structure and identify strengths and weaknesses 
5. An appreciation of the importance of communication during an incident. (Flin, Slaven 
& Stewart 1996 p. 265) 
3.5.4 ASSESSMENT 
The problems of assessment of emergency management performance in the 
offshore industry are the same as for most other industrial sectors as described in Section 
2.3.6.2, for example, obtaining objective measures of behaviour, use of artificial 
situations and assessing a team rather than individuals. Competency assessment of an 
OIM is based primarily on judgement of his performance in an emergency exercise - 
usually of the "dedicated simulation" type described in Section 3.5.3.4. UKOOA (1997a) 
suggests that assessment should be carried out by "at least 2" assessors, where at least 
one of these should be a "discipline expert" - that is "someone who has served in a 
position of authority within an operational group" (UKOOA 1997a p. 13). UKOOA 
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(1997a) also recommends the inclusion of someone who has served as an OIM on the 
installation in question or a similar installation. Flin & Slaven (1995 p. 120) add "it is 
obviously vitally important that the competence assessments are carried out by 
experienced and highly trained individuals, to ensure the quality of the evaluation and 
also to maintain the credibility of the process for those being assessed". Therefore, 
competence in emergency management is primarily judged through observation of these 
exercises and the use of specific criteria. However, some flexibility is given where there 
is proven ability in real emergencies or evidence of competence from other sources 
(UKOOA 1997a p. 14). 
OPITO (Institute of Petroleum 1998) have attempted to clarify the performance 
criteria which is accepted as "competent" by drawing up checklists and assessment 
material to be used on a platform manager appraisal form. 
The levels of competence are defined as 
" No evidence of competence 
" Competence not demonstrated fully 
" Competence demonstrated fully 
" Excellent competence demonstrated 
The skills that must be demonstrated are specified in a checklist prepared by 
OPITO (see Appendix 1 for details). However, as indicated earlier in Sections 2.3.5, 
3.5.1 and 3.5.2, it is the outcome of an emergency that is the critical factor. Stewart, K. 
(1994) has analysed the possibility of identifying the behavioural characteristics of high 
performance emergency management teams. He therefore used observation of live and 
recorded training exercises and analysed the conversations that took place. Although his 
paper described a model of crew decision making offshore, this illustrated the point that 
it is not necessary to rely entirely on subjective judgements or checklists of positive 
attributes to assess emergency management performance. Such a concept could be useful 
for this research - as objective measures provide a reliable base from which quantitative 
methods can be developed. 
3.5.5 EMERGENCY PLANNING 
Emergency planning can have a critical impact on the outcome of an emergency. 
For example, in the Alexander Kielland disaster, the onshore emergency plan had not 
catered for prolonged incidents and so did not consider that the emergency personnel 
may need rest or replacement over the time period involved (Bellamy & Brabazon 1993). 
The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency 
Response) Regulations (1995) require each installation to have an Emergency Response 
Plan, containing sufficient information for the guidance of personnel: - 
" on the organisation and arrangements to take effect in an emergency, and 
" on the procedures by way of emergency response to be followed in different 
circumstances. (Flin & Slaven 1996a) 
UKOOA (1995a p. 17) specified that the arrangements must include: 
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" Incident detection 
" Raising alarm 
" Assessment of incident and activation of response 
" Access to muster areas 
" Muster 
" Egress from muster areas 
" Evacuation 
" Escape 
" Recovery and Rescue 
" Place of Safety 
" Preparation for emergencies, emergency planning and communications 
Planning should include all of the emergencies included in the Safety Case as specified in 
Section 3.3.3 as well as planning for longer term incidents such as a serious illness on 
board the platform. The next section will therefore consider the other factors that affect 
the escalation of an emergency and therefore dictate the potential success of emergency 
management. 
3.5.6 DESIGN 
Design has played a critical part in the serious accidents that have occurred 
offshore. In Piper Alpha, the location of the production modules near the control room, 
radio room and accommodation resulted in the lack of a save haven to congregate once 
the incident had occurred. In addition, the exits and evacuation routes were poorly 
planned leading to blockages and inaccessibility of the TEMPSC's (Totally Enclosed 
motor-propelled survival crafts). Even on a large scale, it was known that the steel 
structure could not tolerate an intense and prolonged fire (Pate-cornell 1995). 
Similarly, the capsize of the Alexander L. Kielland occurred due to "fatigue 
cracking" of a brace on one of the columns. Both the design and the use of materials 
were blamed for the incident (Lancaster 1996) though other design considerations 
promoted the escalation of the incident. Such problems included the lifeboat release and 
hatch design (Bellamy and Brabazon 1993). 
Because of these incidents, design has become a popular focus of research in 
offshore emergency management - including the impact of deluge on fire and explosions 
(van Wingerden et al 1998), structural response to explosions (Fraser & Wilkie, 1998), , 
extended life temporary refuges (Rogers 1998) as well as evacuation routes (Bellamy & 
Brabazon (1993) and lifeboat design (Wilson 1991). 
Given that these issues have been recognised, there is an ongoing project to 
develop "design performance parameters" - design standards that facilitate emergency 
prevention and control and can be identified at the conceptual stage. These can be 
identified through the collation of current ideas on "good design practice" as well as 
information on designs that have failed (Strutt et al 1998). 
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The "impact of design on risk in emergencies " obviously has closely- related 
objectives to this research. If particular design-features have a recognisable and 
measurable impact on risk, it is likely that the methods used to identify this could be 
applied to emergency management as required by this research. 
3.5.7 RESOURCES 
On a smaller scale, the equipment available on a platform must be sufficient to 
allow emergency management to have an impact. Resources include both human and 
technological resources. The earlier sections have already emphasised the importance of 
communications, In the Piper Alpha disaster, electrical power failed resulting in the loss 
of the public address system and emergency lighting (Pate-cornell 1993). Although this 
was in fact a design error, the lack of the public address system meant that no 
coordination was possible. Consequently, UKOOA (1995a p. 29) recommends that 
communications systems should include "PA and alarm system, telephone, hand held 
radio, marine based radio, aeronautical band radio". 
In the emergency management room, there are a number of pieces of equipment 
that facilitate the management process. These include white boards - some with 
permanently marked checklists or grids to be filled with relevant information; a board for 
muster information; a time log and diagrams of the installation. Temporary markers for 
these boards must be provided so that the information on the boards can be updated as 
necessary. The Emergency management procedures should be readily available. Other 
useful information includes manuals on hazardous materials, detailed plant description 
and contacts for information. A clock is considered essential so that all of the 
management team have access to time information and can co-ordinate their activities to 
the correct time. As suggested in Section 3.5.2, there are many roles to be fulfilled in the 
team. Apart from the emergency manager himself, there must be people assigned to the 
boards, the log keeping and communications. This is likely to involve some process 
expertise so a production supervisor is likely to be present. 
UKOOA (1997a) specify particular roles and their duties in an emergency. Apart 
from the aforementioned emergency management team, there are also the on-scene 
commander and his team, offshore lifeboat coxswain, radio operator, muster checker, 
muster co-ordinator, helicopter landing officer, emergency helideck team control room 
operators, standby/rescue vessel crew, marine crew - support vessels and 
production/drilling crew. Even for personnel who have no specialist duties, there are 
training specifications as well as performance standards required. 
As far as the resources outside the control centre are concerned, the main focus is 
on adequate fire-fighting, medical and rescue resources. The Alexander Kielland disaster 
illustrates problems with these resources as "7 out of 8 people could not fasten the zips 
on their survival suits and those that jumped into the water wearing a lifejacket were 
subjected to hitting their head and face due to it riding up on impact" (Bellamy & 
Brabazon 1993 p. 2). Flin & Slaven (1996a) add that the sick bay should fully equipped 
to be able to set up an infusion or treat a casualty with oxygen. Information such as this 
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illustrates the scope of resources and their potential impact on the outcome of an 
emergency. . 
In all cases, there should be a tested plan to ensure that the resources are more 
than adequate for any incident. If a method can be developed that assesses the impact of 
emergency management on risk, there is a possibility that it can also be used to test these 
plans. Therefore, given that all the relevant aspects of offshore emergency management 
have been considered, this review will move on to looking at techniques that have been 
used to examine and quantify risk in the offshore industry. 
SECTION 3.6: HRA, PSA AND ORA IN THE OFFSHORE 
INDUSTRY 
3.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Most of the techniques used to assess risk in the offshore industry are those that 
have already been described in Section 2.4. Therefore, this section will examine risks that 
are evident in the offshore industry, through the collection and analysis of accident 
statistics, some techniques that have examined the subjective attitude to risk and finally, 
application of the risk assessment techniques used in the offshore industry. 
3.6.2 SAFETY STATISTICS 
One of the first aspects of assessing risk involves the examination of the accident 
statistics. These give some indication of the breadth and frequency of unsafe practices. 
A report from the Offshore Safety Division of the HSE gives the provisional summary of 
numbers of accidents and incidents from 1991-1997 in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary of Accident and Incidents in the Offshore Industry 
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 
Estimated workforce* 33,200 29,500 34,200 27,200 29 003 26 853 
Total Fatalities 13# 5 1 1 5 2 
Total major injuries 73 79 52 41 42 25 
Combined total of 
major injuries and 
fatalities 
86 84 
- 
53 42 47 27 
Total over 3 day 
injuries 
571 511 412 270 375 328 
Dangerous 
occurrences 
373 525 633 594 528 585 
*- From Inland Revenue statistics for the period shown. 
#- figures include Cormorant Alpha helicopter accident. 
(HSE 1997b) 
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Clearly, although this shows there were still a large number of injuries and -,, ýý, 
dangerous occurrences in 1996/97, some slow improvement is being made. However; 
compared to the work hour/accident statistics in the United States, these are still 
disappointing (Falker & Nickerson 1996). In terms of incident type, the statistics for the 
year Apr 1996 - March 1997 are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Types of Offshore Incidents between April 1996 to March 1997 
Broad Incident 
Type 
Fatal 
Accidents 
Major 
Injuries 
Over 3 day 
Injuries 
Total 
In uries 
Dangerous 
occurrences 
Totals 
Loss of 
containment 
1 1 238 239 
Fire / Explosion 1 1 47 48 
Air Transport 1- 1 
Sea Transport 1 1 15 16 
Slips/Trips/Falls 15 110 125 2 127 
Falling objects 1 1 21 23 69 92 
Handling 
goods/materials 
4 76 80 3 83 
Lifting / crane 
operations 
3 18 21 64 85 
Use of hand tool 19 19 3 22 
Use of machinery 1 21 22 6 28 
Exposure 
to/contact with 
harmful 
substances 
6 6 3 9 
Diving related 8 8 11 19 
Electrical 10 10 
Structural/ 
Foundation 
4 4 
Mooring 14 14 
Radiation 0 01 
Other 1 1 46 48 95 143 
TOTAL 2 25 328 355 585 940 
(HSE 1997b) 
Obviously, as shown in the iceberg concept in Figure 2, it is likely that there are 
many more near misses that should be analysed to create a safer work environment. 
However, statistics such as these help to identify the tasks where safety is critical and 
therefore where the efforts should be focused. 
Statistics can also help to identify where safe practice is providing a strong 
contribution. For example, statistics have been used to estimate that standby ships in the 
UK sector have been responsible for saving 190 lives in the last decade (Daniel & 
Westwood 1997) which obviously is a prominent argument why these vessels should not 
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be replaced (Gibb 2000). Techniques that examine the impact of change on risk would be 
useful for strategic safety decision-making - therefore a method that can quantify the 
impact of intervention in an offshore emergency could indicate its positive influence - 
perhaps leading to more of an emphasis on the training and selection of emergency 
managers. 
3.6.3 RISK PERCEPTION 
Risk perception is the study of the subjective estimations of risk. Mearns & Flin 
(1995) identified many factors that directly affect risk perception in the offshore industry 
- including experience and job satisfaction. Further to this, Rundmo (1996) examined the 
changes in risk perception on Norwegian platforms in the period 1990 to 1994. This 
obviously reflected the feelings after the Piper Alpha disaster as well as the impact of the 
changes that this disaster provoked. In general, it was found that a greater percentage 
felt "safe" in 1994 compared to 1990. Flin, Mearns, Gordon & Fleming (1996) used a 
similar questionnaire in the UK sector examining risk perceptions associated with the 
probability of a hazardous event occurring and its respective outcome and generally 
found positive results. The majority of the personnel felt safe with regards to the hazards 
to themselves, the installation and in their working tasks. The items which provoked safe 
feelings in half or less than half of the population included "handling radioactive 
materials, completing a task started by others, being on the platform when drilling is 
taking place and helicopter flight". Rundmo & Sjöberg (1998) added to this with a study 
of the effects of bad weather on risk perception, concluding that "the specifically 
potentially hazardous consequences of platform movement" were the main worries. 
However, most importantly, often such research has been criticised for not 
identifying causal relationships between risk perception and risk factors. Consequently, 
Fleming et al (1998) did a comparative study between QRAs and risk perception and 
concluded that in general, workers do have "a reasonably accurate perception of the 
relative risks". This indicates there is a possibility of obtaining reasonably reliable 
quantitative risk values from subjective techniques in this research. 
3.6.4 EXAMPLES OF HRA, ORA AND PSA IN THE OFFSHORE INDUSTRY 
As stated at the beginning of this section, many of the techniques described in 
Section 2.4 are applied in the offshore industry. For that reason, many of the examples 
shown within that section described how the techniques could be applied to the Piper 
Alpha disaster or other offshore incidents. 
Carrying out a QRA is a specified requirement in the Offshore Installations 
(Safety Case) Regulations (1992). QRA was particularly emphasised in assessing the 
design of the Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR), evacuation routes and lifeboats as well as 
when considering fire and gas hazards, flammable gas or smoke ingress and loss of 
integrity. To be able to produce reasonably accurate values of risk, the technique relies 
on information such as hardware failure rates, human error and human response, 
consequence and escalation modelling as well as use of a valid QRA technique (Pape 
1992, O'Donnell & Smallman 1993). 
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` Therefore, research in modelling and quantifying the risks from explosions and 
escalation mechanisms proceeded: from the use of event trees (Cox & Miles 1991) to 
building up databases of relevant factors such as the Pipeline and Riser Loss of 
Containment Study PARLOC (Robertson et al 1996) and creating complex computerised 
models of particular aspects such as PLATO (Morris et al 1994), the Offshore Hazard 
and Risk Analysis (OHRA) toolkit (Ramsay et al 1994) and others (Crawley & Grant 
1997). There was also research that focused on calculating the risks at the design stage 
(Shaw 1992, Malone 1996, Vivalda & Carpignano 1997, Trbojevic et al 1997) as well as 
risks that could occur during construction and installation (Trbojevic et al 1994). In 
general, these techniques have the same problems that are evident in all risk assessment 
techniques - that the results are either based on expert judgment, assumptions from 
singular events or that they cannot represent the full "dynamic range" of risks present in 
an emergency situation. 
If the uncertainty in risk values is not considered, it will limit the usefulness of 
QRA (Pitblado 1994, Bolsover et al 1998). K Miller (1994 p. 334) suggests that these 
inaccuracies could be critical when considering an emergency - for example in the Piper 
Alpha disaster "the escalations produced smoke which entered the accommodation much 
earlier than might have been expected. Small changes in time-scales could have reduced 
the number of fatalities by nearly two orders of magnitude". Therefore again, the 
importance of representing uncertainty and the impact of time on risk values when 
examining emergency situations is evident. 
Using the Piper Alpha disaster as a case study, Pate-Cornell (1995) suggests the 
use of a dynamic risk analysis model incorporating time-contingent fire propagation and 
the mitigation provided by firewater pumps on an offshore platform. This model can 
therefore identify the most effective practical risk reduction intervention. Pate-Cornell & 
Murphy (1996) developed this into the System Action Management (SAM) Approach. 
This calculates the probability of system failure through the addition of initiating events, 
including those produced by human actions and decisions, which are said to be indirectly 
reflecting management and organisational structure. Mathematically, this uses the idea of 
conditional probability to represent the links between events - as used in the 
quantification of an event tree. As a concept, the SAM approach has a lot of potential for 
this research - however, it currently uses expert judgement to acquire quantitative values. 
Therefore a technique that provided objective quantitative values of risk for specific 
events could contribute to the development of this technique. 
There has been very little research in the area of HRA specifically focusing on the 
offshore industry. Gudmestad (1996) has considered the relevant human factors in the 
construction, fabrication and installation stages of a platform life cycle, though this relied 
on the methodologies analysed in the earlier section on HRA. Kirwan (1997) made some 
development in the field by the initiation of a database of human error probabilities 
including those observed in the offshore industry. He also discussed the use of current 
HRA techniques in the offshore industry. He suggests that because THERP was 
conceived for the nuclear industry, its applicability to the less-proceduralised offshore 
industry may be inappropriate and that this could be rectified by using the more 
pessimistic values for risk. Kirwan (1997) also comments that HEART is to be adapted 
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to the offshore industry. However, the main issues concerning the use of these 
techniques in this research have already been discussed in depth in Sections 2.4.4.2.1 and 
2.4.4.2.2. 
Bellamy & Geyer (1991 p. 58) suggest that the critical human factors to be considered in 
a QRA on escape, evacuation and rescue are as follows: 
" Available time (e. g. 30 minutes to platform collapse) 
" Available courses of action (e. g. Escape alternatives) 
" Response goals (e. g. Get to TSR). 
They add that the fatalities would be dependent on: 
" The time available 
" The personnel location and manning levels 
" The likelihood of installation/emergency control/rescue personnel carrying out 
appropriate actions in time, including recognition, communication and decision 
making 
" Performance shaping factors (design characteristic, procedures, weather conditions 
etc. ) 
Therefore they suggest that modelling should reflect time-contingence rather than being 
restricted by the rigidity of "risk at a fixed time point" approach. Therefore, this should 
consider: 
" Whether appropriate actions occur in time to avoid the threat (e. g. whether the 
platform is evacuated before structural collapse) 
" Whether these actions are successful, given the inherently hazardous nature of certain 
of them (e. g. lifeboat evacuation, jumping into the sea) - The hazards associated 
with certain actions will also vary, dependent upon factors such as weather and the 
capacities of personnel to meet action demands (e. g. problems in gripping ladders 
when wearing survival suits). 
(All from Bellamy & Geyer 1991). 
These concepts have great potential when examining the objectives of this 
research. Focusing on the outcome provides the technique with an objective measure of 
performance - which may be quantified when considering the degree of success or time 
margin involved. However, this is only at the conceptual stage and the practical issues in 
developing such a model will be discussed in later chapters. 
3.7: CONCLUSION 
Therefore, this chapter further illustrates the issues as described at the end of the 
previous chapter with particular regard to the offshore industry. This chapter has 
discussed the legislation in place in the offshore industry and the emergencies that have 
impacted upon it; then the issue of emergency management and how it is identified, 
trained and assessed. Finally, this chapter has discussed the risk and reliability techniques 
used in the offshore industry. Despite the obvious need to assess the competency of 
emergency managers in an offshore incident, it is apparent that there is not yet an 
established technique of predicting the impact of emergency management on risk in an 
offshore situation. As emphasised in the previous chapter, it is the impact on the physical 
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emergency that is important and therefore, it is this that should be used as 'a basis. 
Furthermore, as it is the "dedicated simulation" type of assessment that is recommended 
to establish emergency management competency in the industry, these should be 
available for research use. Therefore, this should give some indication of the emergency 
management behaviour performed in an emergency - and thus provide indications of the 
timing spent in making emergency management decisions and actions. Together with 
timings recorded in real simulations, these can be used to predict the probability of 
success (using the time available / time required concept described Section 2.4.4.2.8) - 
therefore producing the probability of success in emergency management tasks and 
therefore assessing the impact of emergency management on (physical) risk. Therefore 
this thesis will now move on to the method - initially by describing the arrangements of 
the scenarios that were available for research use. 
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Chapter 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
SECTION 4.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the rationale for the research, the initial assumptions made and the 
research methodology that was adopted to progress the research and then illustrates the 
scenario arrangements that were available for the research. 
The first half of this chapter will focus on how and why the research was carried out in 
this way, including the decisions that were taken - the second half will focus on the fixed 
aspects of the research - the scenario arrangements that were provided for data 
collection by the companies involved. 
The next section starts with the research rationale and assumptions associated with it. 
Following this, Section 4.3 will define the overall research objective - then the 4 
objectives that were derived from this and the methodology chosen to approach these 
objectives. Section 4.4 will introduce the scenario arrangements. 
Section 4.5 describes the specific offshore platform that was used in the scenarios. 
Sections 4.6 and 4.7 describe the layout of the rooms involved in the scenarios and the 
equipment available in the simulation. Section 4.8 describes the personnel roles involved. 
Section 4.9 describes the content of the scenarios used for data capture in this research. 
Finally, Section 4.10 concludes the chapter. 
SECTION 4.2: RESEARCH RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
It had been decided from the beginning to focus the research on Emergency 
Management and its relationship with risk. The reason for this was twofold. 
Firstly, it was considered to be an important field of research through which the 
Cranfield Reliability Engineering Risk Management Group could achieve one of its core 
mission objectives, namely to provide research in support of the offshore oil and gas 
industry. The need for more effective emergency management had clearly been called for 
in the Cullen Report (1990) and the "Safety Case" Regulations (1993). Since then, all 
Offshore Installation Managers (OIMs) have been required to undergo emergency 
management competency assessments. The need for research to progress the 
development of tools to assess the impact of Emergency Management on risk reduction 
was of particular significance to the "Safety Case" Regulations. In these Regulations, it is 
essential that the Duty Holder can demonstrate that the installation design and its safety 
management system (which includes Emergency Management) is such that risk of a 
major accident has been reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP). This research and the use of the Task Performance Resource Constraint 
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(TPRC) model or similar type of technique had the potential to facilitate decision makers 
in this task. 
Secondly, the research was considered relevant and necessary. Prior research in 
this area had largely been qualitative in nature and although there had been academic 
research and joint industry work on understanding the effectiveness of emergency 
management decision making and competence (OPITO 1992, Flin et al. 1996), the tools 
for quantifying the impact of emergency management performance on risk reduction 
were very limited. Research was considered necessary to address this deficiency. 
The TPRC model had been developed in a previous research study (Loa et al 1996). It 
had, as its basis, the idea that task success is time dependent -a concept that is even 
more evident in an emergency management context. The TPRC model provided a means 
of linking the probability of task success to uncertainty in both the time required to 
perform one or more tasks and the time available to perform the tasks. The core code for 
TPRC had already been developed and written to some extent. This core code was taken 
as "given" and available as a starting point for the research. 
Whilst it was recognised that further development of TPRC would probably be needed at, 
some stage, especially once data collection was in progress, it was never intended that 
the research would focus on mathematical model development, although it was clearly 
recognised that any data developed in the research programme could provide a very 
important input to future model development. The research therefore was focused on 
developing data to support future model development and how the model might be used 
in practice in an emergency management context and led to the following definition of 
research objectives. 
SECTION 4.3: OVERALL RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND 
METHODOLOGY 
It was decided that the overall goal for the research would be to evaluate the TPRC 
model as a tool for assessing the impact of emergency management performance on risk 
reduction. 
Given that this was the overall aim, in developing the research methodology, it was very 
important to first identify where the data would come from. It was not ethical to study 
this topic in set-up emergencies and not practicable to study this topic based solely on 
reports of real emergencies. Whilst the information for Piper Alpha was sufficiently 
detailed and available for use, it was considered important that the methodology should 
be able to cater for all the main emergency types that may occur - therefore, limiting the 
data to this one source during model and method development may have resulted in 
complications if it was necessary to broaden the scope at a later point. 
Therefore, there were two possible alternatives considered, namely; desktop studies and 
simulated emergency scenarios. Although some effort was initially expended on 
developing a desktop model, it was obvious that the best that could be done was to use 
simulated emergencies - particularly in terms of the extrapolation of the data to real 
situations. Therefore, the bulk of the research effort has focused on the observations of 
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full-scale simulations during emergency management training exercises and this is largely 
what is reported in the thesis. 
Therefore, assuming that the main source of data would be from simulations, the first 
two objectives defined in working towards the overall goal were focused on extracting 
data from the scenarios and, using these data, obtain some objective and quantitative , indication of success for the emergency management tasks. There were stated as follows: 
1. To develop a method of obtaining objective data on management performance from 
emergency scenarios 
2. To develop a methodology to use these data to assess the probability of success in 
emergency management tasks. 
As described in the sections to follow, it was only once these had been achieved that it 
was realised that, to identify the significance of the results, it would be necessary to 
examine the impact of change in the parameters on the overall probability of success - 
thereby showing the IMPACT of emergency management on risk reduction. The 
completion of Objective 2 gave quantitative values - but without comparison with, for 
example, the probability of success in the absence of emergency management, these 
values can not be fully interpreted. Therefore, following the work on Objectives I and 2, 
Objective 3 was defined as follows: 
3. To demonstrate how these methods can be used to evaluate the impact of changes in 
emergency management skill and design on risk values. 
The work on Objective 3 also provided some face validity in support of the method used 
and the application of the TPRC model to this problem. However, at this point, whilst 
changes in the parameters obtained from theoretical data (platform sizes, distances of 
platform from shore, survival time of casualty in water) could be applied according to 
externally defined equations, at this point there were no "rules" available to speculate on 
the changes in emergency management performance. The main contribution of 
management performance in the TPRC model was to the "initial delay" parameter. 
Therefore, being that the emergency simulation data were available for any sort of 
analysis, it was speculated that they could be "decomposed" into `unit management 
tasks", then built to model the performance of an emergency management team (and its 
impact on the delay parameter) for generic emergency situations. This concept gave rise 
to objective 4, defined as follows: 
4. To use the above methodology and data to define performance parameters that can be 
applied to evaluate generic emergency situations. 
Together these four objectives were intended to provide a "complete" method for the 
evaluation of the impact of risk reduction - allowing a user to collect information from 
scenarios and supporting theoretical data to produce an analysis of the impact of the 
emergency management on risk in specific circumstances. Where necessary, this model 
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could also be used in the absence of scenario data to test the extent to which emergency 
management could reduce risk with particular design criteria. 
This section has described, in brief, how the objectives arose in response to the needs 
identified within the research and thus, why the decisions to work on these were made. 
How each of these objectives were addressed in the research process will be discussed in 
more detail in the sections to follow. 
4.3.1: RESEARCH GOAL 1: DEVELOP A METHOD OF OBTAINING 
OBJECTIVE DATA ON MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE FROM 
EMERGENCY SCENARIOS 
The first step in this was to identify sites where Emergency Management 
simulations could be observed and data could be extracted. This was actually achieved by 
developing a link with and then working collaboratively with an Emergency Management, 
training provider, OCTO. Immediately prior to and during the project, OCTO had been 
working with a number of companies, providing training and performing competency 
assessments. 
These scenarios were essentially the practical examination following a taught 
course on emergency management skills. An overall pass in the scenarios results in the 
candidate and his team being judged as "Competent" or "Highly competent" to manage 
emergencies. A marginal fail (known as "Notable Shortfalls") would result in further 
training and another examination in the future. If passed as competent, it was likely that 
the candidate would be given more responsibility in their day-to-day work as well as 
adopting the position of emergency manager should an incident arise. The assurance that 
individuals are capable of fulfilling this role was seen as critical. Therefore to obtain a 
valid assessment, it was essential that the scenarios were carefully planned to ensure 
testing of the relevant skills and that each test was as realistic as possible. 
Through an agreement with OCTO and the companies working with them, an 
arrangement was made whereby the author could observe scenarios, the Emergency 
Management task sequences and "behind the scenes" scenario developments and , 
assessments. ( For commercial reasons, the names of the company and the installations 
on which the training was performed and the names of the trainees cannot be reported. ) 
Once the opportunity to observe training exercises had been established, the next step 
was to develop a method for data collection, recording and analysis. It is important to 
point out here, that the author was only an observer and had no control over the actual 
scenarios or the progress of the scenarios. Therefore, the method had to be pre-designed 
to be flexible enough to cater for any scenario situation - in terms of the content, 
environment and personnel involved. However, a method of data gathering, recording 
and analysis was developed and this is described below - within the context of OCTO's 
scenario procedure. This procedure was used for all of the scenarios used in this 
research. 
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4.3.1.1 Pre-Scenario Procedure 
Prior to the scenarios, the scenario organiser spent time - usually at the 
installation itself - collecting information to make sure that the scenarios were both 
testing and accurate. At this stage, whilst the author was invited to attend this 
development work, it was not clear how the research would unfold and therefore the 
information that should be collected could not be defined formally as a procedure - but it 
seemed the best plan to gain awareness of what information was relevant in the 
development of scenarios and therefore to take a-X opportunity to capture information 
relevant to hazards, risk (particularly QRA information), emergency procedures, 
evacuation routes, training and installation statistics. The relevant documents were 
copied for future reference, where permitted by the company involved. 
However, as the overall method had to be flexible enough to cater for an 
observer inexperienced with the simulation and/or assessment process to collect 
information from the scenarios, it was important that this pre-scenario data capture 
process would not affect the quality of the eventual results. Therefore, it was required 
that the method should be designed so that all the data required outside of the scenario 
could be identified and obtained post-hoc. Therefore, to allow this, it must be assumed 
that the scenario organiser was experienced and competent in his role. Once the author 
gained more experience in this role, it was realised that whilst the information (outside of 
the video-recorded scenarios) required for the TPRC analysis could be obtained post- 
hoc, it was easier to obtain much of this during this development stage - as the 
installation personnel were focussed on providing such information for the scenario 
organiser. This could also assist the scenario organiser in their work by contributing 
valuable numerical (for example, timing) data to be integrated into their scenario. 
Overall, the type of data that was usually seen as useful for the post-hoc analysis 
included : 
For the offshore scenarios: - 
Distances on the platform (from a platform map including all floors) - particularly 
walking distances from muster points to evacuation points and "furthest point" to 
muster points, medical bay to evacuation site/ helicopter pad. 
" Expected muster times 
" Expected shutdown / blowdown times for individual and whole system(s) 
" Expected rescue helicopter travel duration 
" Source of rescue helicopters (distances from platform) 
" Expected crew-change helicopter travel times 
" Source of crew-change helicopter (distance from platform) 
" Likely hazards - location of hazards and travel distance from them to medical bay 
/ muster point and evacuation points 
" Duration of availability of personal rescue equipment (fire extinguishers / 
breathing apparatus) 
For the onshore scenarios: - 
Distances on the platform (from a platform map including all floors) - particularly 
walking distances from muster points to evacuation points and "furthest point" to 
muster points, medical bay to exit/entrance. 
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" Expected muster times 
" Expected shutdown / blowdown times for individual and whole system(s) 
" Expected emergency service travel times (distances and allowable speeds) 
" Likely hazards - location of hazards and travel distance from them to medical bay 
/ muster point and evacuation points 
" Duration of availability of personal rescue equipment (fire extinguishers / 
breathing apparatus) 
On the day of the scenario, the scenario organiser gave the brief (example in 
Appendix 3) to those concerned, i. e., the scenario organisation team, the observer and, if, 
he required it - the assessor. Care was taken to ensure that this information was kept 
from the emergency management team. Once all the relevant personnel were present and 
in their specified place, the scenario organiser briefed the emergency management team 
on the status of the platform, as specified in the plan. This brief included weather 
conditions; hot work, cold work, lifting or diving operations that were ongoing; time of 
day and any other relevant information. This information may have given the emergency 
management team some clue to the problems that were involved. However, it was 
sometimes irrelevant and used to draw the team away from the main issues. Following 
this brief, the teams settled into their normal roles. Members of the emergency 
management team who were not usually present in the control room were asked to leave 
the emergency management room for the start of the scenario. 
It should be noted that as these scenarios took place in rooms within an office 
environment (i. e. onshore), occasionally there were interruptions of a non-scenario 
nature. For example, fire engines and ambulances passed outside and prevented the team 
from hearing radio messages. Other interruptions from within the organisation were rare 
but occasionally included people wandering in accidentally or phone calls from people 
who were unaware that the scenario was taking place. If this had provided a major 
disruption, it was agreed that the exercise would be stopped, either temporarily to re- 
organise or permanently. Fortunately, no major disruptions occurred within this set of 
simulations. 
Initially within the research, OCTO were hoping that the scenario data required 
for the research would rely mainly on the subjective recording and assessment technique 
used by the assessors. However, the author persuaded them that the data required for a 
quantitative and probabilistic technique should be based on data that are as objective as 
possible - and to a level of detail that could not reasonably be recorded by someone 
observing and recording the scenario as it happened. Therefore, once this was realised, 
OCTO persuaded their client companies to agree to video-recording of their scenarios - 
with the agreement that this information would be anonymous and used only within the 
context of this research. Therefore, once this was agreed, prior to each scenario, the 
author set up the video camera in the test environment to record all the actions of the 
emergency management team from when the scenario began. Together with the 
collection of the scenario organiser's brief, this was the initial task that addressed the 
objective of obtaining data from the scenarios. 
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4.3.1.2 Scenario Procedure 
Once the teams had been briefed and the emergency management team had 
settled into their normal (i. e. non-emergency) roles, the scenario would start. This either 
started with the occurrence of an immediate incident (e. g. a helicopter crash) or a small 
problem that escalated (maintenance required on a pipe which leaks and injures the 
technician who tries to fix it). Once a state of emergency existed, it was usual for the 
control room operator or the production supervisor to call a muster, which would bring 
the rest of the emergency management team into the room. The team then attempted to 
manage the emergency by imagining the normal resources that they had available and 
communicating their orders to the scenario organisation team. To the emergency 
management team, this was treated like a real emergency. They had to consider the 
resources available and all the possible risks to personnel. They also had to give clear 
communications to the on-scene commanders (played by the field supervisor and the 
scenario organisation team) and respond quickly to incoming information about the 
emergency. 
The scenario organisation team received the communications of the emergency 
management team and then discussed the practicality and the validity of the decisions 
made. To them, this was more of a real-time tabletop exercise, analysing how the 
emergency would progress if they really did carryout the orders of the emergency 
management team. Poor decisions by the emergency management team were either 
rejected by the scenario organisation team or were carried out resulting in failure. 
However, this had to be communicated to the emergency management team in a realistic 
way; for example, workers refusing to go into a certain area because of the smoke. The 
scenario organisation team were essentially able to "play God" in that they could allow 
all, some or none of the emergency management team's suggestions to succeed. 
The scenario organisation team attempted to follow the plan specified in the brief. 
Obviously, the interventions of the emergency management team may have an impact on 
the plan so post-hoc changes were sometimes made. Therefore, the planned event 
timings were not always accurate. Scenarios generally lasted about 30 minutes and could 
end even if the situation had not been brought back to normality. The ending was 
normally preceded by a short discussion between the scenario organiser and the assessor. 
If the assessor was satisfied that he had seen enough to make an assessment, the scenario 
organiser could then end the scenario. At this point, all communications were stopped 
and the emergency management team could relax. 
During this, the author would use the video camera to record all the activities of 
the emergency management team - focussing on the conversations taking place, the 
control panels used and the contributions written on the white-boards. This would 
attempt to record the essence of the scenario for post-hoc analysis. 
4.3.1.3 Post-Scenario Procedure 
The normal post-scenario procedure would involve the assessors discussing the 
performance of the emergency management candidate and his team. At the same time, 
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the candidate and his team were given the opportunity to discuss what they think `. 
happened and how they had dealt with it. After this, the candidate had a debriefing from 
the examiners in which he was informed of the real "big picture" and given an indication 
of his performance. Often, he was asked to justify why he made particular decisions. Any 
actions, which the assessors believed should have been carried out but were not, were 
discussed and, if necessary, justified by the emergency management candidate. Following 
this, the candidate updated his team on the results of the debriefing. This would include 
any feedback on how their emergency management performance could be improved. 
For the first set of scenarios attended by the author, it was not possible to 
influence any change to this stage of the process and as there was often no structure to 
the decision and sometimes not even a unanimous opinion on the result, it was difficult to 
incorporate this into the scientific process. For example, often the conclusions recorded 
only represented the subjective opinion of the assessors and were sometimes in 
contradiction to what the emergency management candidate believed was possible on his 
installation. 
As this subjectivity could not necessarily be linked to the "objective" risk that the 
research was looking for, the decision was made not to record the outcome as a precise 
indication of competency until the method could be adjusted to allow the recording of 
both assessors and candidate's views. Therefore, at this point, the author's role in this 
process was to gain information to clarify the links between the hazards revealed to the 
emergency management team and their responses to them - their actions and the risks 
they were intending to prevent or mitigate. This was done using the structure of the 
TPRC model as a guide, as will be described in the next section. 
However, these subjective opinions may have had some link with the impact of 
emergency management on risk reduction, and it was decided that where possible, this 
information should be recorded also. Therefore, later in the research, in some of the 
onshore scenarios, it was possible to formalise this data-collection process by allowing 
the distribution of questionnaires by the author (As shown in Appendix 9). These 
questionnaires were designed to capture the opinions of the main assessor and the 
emergency management candidate - in terms of their opinions on decision quality, 
timeliness and whether the team responded in the desired way. Also, they were asked to 
given an indication of the overall level of competency displayed. This would immediate 
follow the simulation; therefore the discussions between the assessors and emergency 
management team would follow the completion of the questionnaires. I 
Further details on how the scenarios were laid out - in terms of environment, equipment 
and personnel is described in Sections 4.4 to 4.8. 
4.3.1.4 Presentation of Scenario Data 
To successfully achieve the goal as defined in objective 1, it was necessary to 
process the data in a form in which they could easily be used to evaluate management 
performance. Whilst the video-recording (plus the later addition of questionnaires) 
formed the bulk of the data collection process for management performance, it was 
considered best to produce this as a transcript of the whole scenario to facilitate further 
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analysis. This would allow quick reference from point to point in the scenarios, 
comparison across scenarios and easy identification of the times taken to carry out tasks, 
conversation or delays. Therefore the video of each scenario was observed together with 
a timing device (in this case, incorporated into the video). The scenario transcript was 
started at the point the video recording started and was given a start point of 0 min 00 
seconds - often also the point at which the initiating event of the emergency took place. 
Sometimes, there was a short period of "non-emergency" activity that was also recorded 
in the transcript. From the 0.00 point onwards, every activity was recorded on the 
transcript with respect to person involved and time. 
In the case of events that were instant or of equal to or less than 1 second's 
duration (for example, a loud crash or a controller pressing a button) - these were 
recorded as point timings. For events of 2 seconds or longer - the start and finish of the 
event were recorded separately according to the times at which they occurred. If this was 
a spoken instruction or response - the content was recorded in the space next to where 
the start of the event was recorded. Therefore if there were a number of conversations 
taking place at the same time, the start and finish of each person's contribution would be 
recorded individually as well as the delays between, for example, a question and a 
response. 
For each event recorded, if there was a person associated with it, their name or 
role (initials) was entered on the transcript. Where the events occurred outside of the 
control room (and therefore their timing could not be established by the author - or the 
emergency management team), these timing were noted post-hoc at an appropriate time 
based on their nature. For example, if the content of the scenario indicates that an event 
has just happened, it could be inserted just before the relevant information was received. 
If an event could have happened at any point between two "known" times, then it was 
inserted directly in the middle of these two timings. Such events are easily identifiable as 
they are shown in capital letters in the transcript starting with the word "ASSUME". . 
When the TPRC model was used including these events, the uncertainty in the timing of 
the event was broadened to reflect this degree of uncertainty. Further details are 
described in Section 5.4 and a full example of such a transcript is shown in Appendix 6. 
Whilst only the development of the method was necessary to fulfil Objective 1, it 
should be noted that within this research, the data collection method was tested on 14 
scenarios -5 offshore and 9 onshore. The content of these are described in Section 4.9. 
One such transcript is shown in Appendix 6. 
At this stage, the data collected were not yet sufficient to provide all of the data required 
to apply the TPRC model. As management performance data were not the only 
information required, the methodology used for the collection of additional data is 
covered within the next section. 
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4.3.2: RESEARCH GOAL 2: DEVELOP A METHODOLOGY TO USE THESE 
DATA TO ASSESS THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT TASKS. 
At this stage in the process, there was, at least, the following information available for 
further analysis: - 
" The video of the scenarios 
" The transcripts from the scenarios - produced from the videos 
" Some information that was used to design the scenario - including the brief from 
the scenario organiser. 
There could also be additional information on the hazards, emergency management 
actions and the relevant physical data - plant layout, available mitigation resources 
collected during the scenario design process - though this was not compulsory prior to 
this stage. 
To fulfil Objective 2, it was now necessary to use this information to assess the 
probability of success in emergency tasks. The intent behind this objective was to extract 
data from the scenarios that were linked with success or failure in an emergency 
management task and could be applied within a model to give quantitative values for the 
probability of this success or failure. After attempts at purpose-building simplified 
models from scratch (as used in the pilot study shown in Appendix 2), it was decided 
that it would be more time-efficient to adapt the more advanced Task Performance 
Resource Constraint model to cater for emergency management data as it incorporated 
attributes that deemed it an ideal structure = particularly the incorporation of variance 
and the use of "real" time as well as giving the output of "probability of success/failure' 
with respect to time. Therefore, the TPRC model was adapted where necessary, as 
described in Chapter 5, and this structure was used to identify the data required. 
Based on the structure of this model, in any situation, there are tasks and resources. In 
the terms of emergency management, these would be "attempts at management of the 
situation" and corresponding "events at which the attempts would be deemed futile or 
would be considered a failure". 
Therefore, the process to successfully meet this objective involved going through the 
scenario and identifying all the relevant tasks and resource constraints, linking them and 
identifying the relevant numerical values, then finally applying them in the model - as 
described in the sections to follow. To achieve a full picture of the performance of an 
emergency manager, it would be necessary to look at all the task/resource constraint 
results carried out within a scenario. One observed phenomenon in "poor performances" 
by emergency managers was a focus on only one aspect of the emergency - therefore if 
this happened to be the task/resource constraint result analysed, it should show excellent 
results in terms of the probability of success in this task - but would not be a good 
indication of the performance. 
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4.3.2.1 Identifying the-Tasks 
These tasks included any actions taken by the emergency management team 
(whether these actions are carried out inside the control room or outside in the "real" 
emergency) that changed (or aimed to change) the physical characteristics of the, 
situation. These may have been sending teams to different places, attempting rescue, 
activating fire control, isolating gas pipes, activating alarms - anything that could change 
the behaviour of people involved or physical systems. Within the scenario, they may have 
been considered (post-hoc) to be correct or wrong decisions; they may have succeeded 
or failed, they may even have been carried out by the "scenario organisation team" 
without the control of the emergency management team. These are all relevant and all 
tasks must be noted. It is helpful to list these and identify the place (or places) in the 
transcript where the tasks were discussed, ordered, initiated or completed. A concept 
that was recognised within this part of the research was the pattern of how these 
emergency management teams responded to events - namely Situational Awareness (of 
an event), Decision, Communication, Action and (system) Response. This was duly 
named SADCAR. Within the context of this research, the time taken for the "SADC" 
parts defined the delay from an event to the initiation of the physical action in response 
to the event. To test this part of the research, this was carried out to identify all the tasks 
in all 14 scenarios. 11 
4.3.2.2 Identifying the Resource Constraints 
Following the identification of the tasks, it was then necessary to identify the resource 
constraints. These were points in the emergency that limited the activities of the 
workforce - defining the situation as an emergency. These were usually also escalation 
points. For example, ignition of fire, explosions, helicopter crashes, injuries to personnel, 
blocking of routes, impingement of fire on more systems, death of personnel. 
Often these could be linked to tasks - as the event(s) that could have changed the goals 
of the emergency management team. 
Again it was helpful to list the resource constraints and where possible, identify 
the place (or places) in the transcript where they occurred - or if not realised, expected 
to occur had certain tasks not been successful, or, at points in time after the scenario was 
completed. To test this part of the research, this was carried out to identify the resource 
constraints in all 14 scenarios. 
4.3.2.3 Linking the Task and Resource Constraint 
Given that the lists of both tasks and resource constraints had been completed for the 
whole scenario, it would now be necessary to link them in content in accordance with the 
structure of the Task Performance Resource Constraint model. This had probably already 
been done in an informal way - but at this stage, it would be necessary to identify, for 
each task : - 
" Which escalation event motivated the initiation of the task? (A) 
" What goals was this task aiming to fulfil? (B) 
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" Which escalation point(s) - observed or possible - would signify a partial or total 
failure in this specific task? (C) 
This could be described as: 
Given that (A) has occurred, what is the probability of success in completing (B), when 
the occurrence of (C) would result in certain failure. 
Notably, there may be more than one resource constraint for each task - where it would 
be desirable to succeed in the task before one resource constraint but another resource 
constraint would define ultimate failure in the task. In some cases, these may not . 
materialise within the scenario - hence indicating success in the task - however, they 
may often be imagined as the event that the tasks were aiming to prevent. 
For example, 
Task: Attempting rescue of trapped workers 
Resource Constraints: Injury to workers from smoke inhalation / Injury to workers from. 
fire / Death of workers. 
These resource constraints may be separated over time in the scenario and when applied 
in the TPRC model usually produced an increase in probability of success in the rescue 
task as each subsequent resource constraint was applied. Whilst it is most desirable to 
rescue the workers before they are injured in any way (As this complicates the rescue 
task as well as requiring additional "medical treatment tasks" afterwards), one would not 
expect to abandon the rescue task if this resource constraint limit was reached. If this 
was the case, then there would be no further progress in the rescue task and probability 
of success of rescue before the death of workers would tend towards 0. 
Some resource constraint points may apply to a number of tasks. For example, a large 
escalation - such as an explosion of a system causing multiple fires, blocking of routes 
and injuries to people will change the goals (and actions taken) of the emergency 
management team. It makes certain tasks redundant - including the focus of cooling on a 
particular system and mustering people along this route. It is likely to lead to the 
initiation of new tasks that are intended to be completed before certain other escalations 
occur. Naturally, an ultimate resource constraint point would be the " collapse of 
platform" - if expected by the emergency management team, the goal would be to get 
the platform personnel evacuated before this happened. To test this part of the 
methodology, this process was carried out in combination with the process described in 
the section to follow. 
4.3.2.4 Applying the Information in the Model 
Given that the important events had been identified, it was now necessary to put them 
together in the TPRC model. Therefore, for each grouping, some of the following 
information should have been calculable from the scenario: - , 
" When in the scenario did the initiating escalation point (A) occur? 
" How long did it take before the emergency management team became aware of 
this event? 
" How long did it take to decide on this task in response to the` event and' 
communicate this decision to the relevant people / system? 
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" How long did it take to initiate the physical response? 
" How fast is the task carried out and how much "work" must be done to succeed 
in the task? OR How long should it take to complete the task? 
" When should the limiting "resource constraint" point (C) occur? 
" When did the process leading to this point initiate? (eg. if an impingement, when 
did the original ignition occur, if an ignition, when did the fuel leak occur? ) This 
initiation point is often the same as point A. 
Some of these time points could be clearly defined - others could only be identified as 
being between two other points within'the scenario - and it was in these cases that the 
application of the variance must be applied accordingly. 
Using the basic graphs for the TPRC model, each of the parameters described in 5.4 (of 
which examples are shown in Section 5.5) should be available. These include: - 
" Delays in initiation of the task (D) 
" Speed of the task (a) 
" Frequency of changes in task progress speed (At) 
" Task performance required (W) 
" Resources (Time) available to complete the task (X) 
" Resource consumption rate (r) 
For each of these, there should be a mean and x, the coefficient of variation (ß/µ). 
Notably, it was at this stage that it was realised that whilst the scenario was 
adequate for a subjective assessment of the competency of emergency management 
(thereby providing an informal and subjective technique of assessing the impact of the 
emergency management on risk), not all the data required for a TPRC analysis was 
available therein. Therefore, theoretical information needed to be collected to support the 
analysis. Some of this information was fortunately collected during the scenario 
development phase - and any additional information could be collected from the platform 
personnel as well as from research literature, as appropriate. For example, it may be 
assumed that the shutdown of a system would take 20 minutes, or a person would be 
severely injured or dead after being exposed to the cold water for 3 minutes, but if it had 
not been recorded in the scenario, it would need to be identified from other sources for 
the model to be used. Whilst this was not defined as an objective in its own right, this 
research also aimed to collect and record a large amount of such data for future use of 
the model - particularly where data were commonly applicable to many scenarios. The 
collection of non-scenario data would reduce the reliance on the TPRC user to collect 
this either before or after each set of scenarios and could, eventually result in the self- 
sufficiency of the TPRC method. This information included injury data, fire escalation 
data and the abilities of the rescue personnel. These data are recorded in Chapter 6. 
Once all the information was described in terms of the structure of the model - including 
mean and variance for each value, these numerical values were applied in the model 
program and the output of probability of success with respect to time was obtained. The 
development of this methodology fulfilled the requirements for Objective 2. 
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As this was more intensive than the previous tasks within the methodology, this was 
carried out on task/resource constraint combinations chosen at random from the 14 
scenarios. In total, this process was carried out for more than 60 task/resource constraint 
measurements. 8 examples are shown within this thesis in Chapter 8.3 examples from 
Offshore scenario 2 are shown in Strutt et al (1997) and 23 examples from Offshore . 
scenario 1 are shown in Lyons et al (1998) - both shown in Appendix 12. Chapter 8 also 
shows how the methodology to address Objective 2 could be carried out on real data - 
with 3 examples of original data from the Piper Alpha disaster. For comparison, the main 
crane driver scenario was assessed using two other techniques of QRA and HRA - 
namely HAZAN and HEART to exhibit the differences between the TPRC model and 
the other methods. This included a demonstration of the factors considered, the results 
obtained and how the results from the methods could be combined or the applicability of - 
the data for further analysis. 
4.3.3: RESEARCH GOAL 3: DEMONSTRATE HOW THESE METHODS CAN 
BE USED TO EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT SKILL AND DESIGN ON RISK VALUES. 
The technique developed to address Objective 2 produced a probability of success 
function linked to time as required. However, this function represents only the situation 
that was observed in the scenario. Therefore, as this indicated the probability that this 
situation arose, it really represented the fortune / misfortunate of the emergency 
management team - not necessarily the impact of their actions on the situation. 
Therefore, whilst this successfully addressed Objective 2, the output did not fulfil the 
overall research objective as it did not indicate whether this probability of success was 
good or bad based on the situation presented. Therefore, it was considered necessary to 
compare the probability of success obtained in the scenario with those of other possible 
emergency management performances to identify the impact this team had on probability 
of success and risk. To define the impact, these should ideally include data based on the 
total absence of any emergency management and the actions of the "perfect" emergency 
management team 
Already at this stage, it was observed that one of the limitations to emergency 
management success was often design. In reality, as well as in simulations, some 
emergencies ARE essentially unmanageable based on the restrictions placed on the 
emergency management team by the design - if the emergency management team could 
only make a small impact on risk reduction compared to the impact of design changes - 
then this indicates where the emphasis (and perhaps, industrial investment) should be 
placed. As design was always a fixed parameter within the scenarios and no emergency 
management mitigation could change this, it was also reasonable to test the impact of 
change in design on probability of success. 
These two issues gave rise to Objective 3, which was stated as follows: - 
To demonstrate how these methods can be used to evaluate the impact of changes in 
emergency management skill and design on risk values. 
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Therefore, to fulfil this objective, it was first considered necessary to examine which 
parameters within the TPRC model that were affected by emergency management and 
design. 
Following this, it was necessary to examine each individual partnership of task and 
resource (as carried out for the observed task in Sections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4) and 
speculate on the values for these parameters representing the best and worst possible 
emergency management performances and/or best and worst design descriptions in terms 
of this specific situation. 5 
Completion of these two tasks would give two benchmarks (best and worst) on which 
the observed performance within the scenario could be assessed, thereby giving an 
indication of how effective this emergency management team working with this design 
could be in reducing the risk associated with emergencies. Comparison between the 
observed values and the two benchmarks indicates how the impact of change on design 
and/or emergency management performance would affect probability of success - hence 
risk. If successful, this process would fulfil Objective 3. 
In observing the scenarios and doing the post-hoc TPRC analysis, the main impact of the 
emergency management team in terms of parameter variables was observed as firstly, 
whether they made a good decision and, secondly, the extent of the delay in starting the 
physical management task. With great foresight, the delay could reasonably be shortened 
to start before the risk had manifested itself - therefore tending towards zero. Therefore, 
as a first attempt, it was decided that the benchmark of optimal emergency management . 
could be defined as good decisions made with "zero delay" - and this could be applied as 
such in the model. In the reverse situation, poor emergency management could be seen 
as a poor decision, an absence of any decision or a good decision but made with maximal 
delay - almost certainly leading to failure in the time-dependent task. When applied in 
the model, where the results obtained from the observed scenario would fall between 
these two functions would give an indication of the impact of the observed emergency 
management on risk reduction. Therefore, in the model, ideal was defined as "0 delay" 
and poor was defined as "delay in excess of resource constraint limit". For comparison, 
the probability of success functions were displayed on the same graph as the original 
scenario data. 
Similarly, the impact of design was most often observed as influencing the "task to be 
carried out" (for example, a distance for a rescue team to cover) and the "resource 
constraint" (for example, the time before fire was allowed to impinge on another 
system). Depending on the situation, this could also influence the task speed (for 
example, a change in the pressure of water used in a deluge system). Again, for each 
situation, speculations on the extent to which design could be changed could be applied 
in the model parameters to test the impact of design on risk reduction. Unlike the 
definition of optimal emergency management shown in the previous paragraph, there was 
no corresponding definition of optimal design. In theory, the design could be optimised 
for emergency risk reduction to an unlimited degree for each task / resource pairing - 
where deluge water is maximised - rescue distance is minimised or the distance between 
hazardous systems is maximised. Notably, the latter two parameters could be linked in 
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opposition - where a rescue must take place before fire impinges from one system to, 
another. The ideal for rescue distance would be short but the ideal distance for 
impingement would be long - depending on the speed of rescue compared with the 
"speed of impingement". In this case, possible distances between the features in the 
scenario could be "tested" using the TPRC model to identify which design results in the 
maximum probability of success for this specific scenario. Where realistic design data 
were available from published sources or on the advisement of designers, these were 
applied in the model. Like the emergency management data, the results from the 
speculative or theoretical designs could be compared with those from the observed 
scenario to identify what impact a change in design would have on risk. 
The development of this method was deemed to have successfully fulfilled Objective 3. 
This was tested for more than 17 original task/resource combinations (used to fulfil 
objective 2), in particular, examining changes in the delay, speed of task, task to be 
completed and resource constraint parameters - in terms of both mean and/or variance. 
This produced more than 90 Probability of success results. 4 changes in the data for 
Offshore Scenario 2 are shown in Chapter 8. Also one change in the resource constraints 
parameter is shown for the Piper Alpha example. In combination with the performance 
parameter data, 14 examples of how the TPRC model can show the impact of change are 
also shown in Chapter 9.10 examples of change in the parameters are shown in Strutt et 
al (1997), 21 examples of change are shown in Lyons et al (1998) both shown in 
Appendix 12.1 
4.3.4: RESEARCH GOAL 4: USE THE ABOVE METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
TO DEFINE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS THAT CAN BE APPLIED TO 
EVALUATE GENERIC EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. 
Whilst carrying out the work in fulfilling Objective 3, it was most notable that the 
parameters defining "best" and "worst" emergency management were primarily 
theoretical and only speculative - not based on observation of real emergency 
management teams. Therefore, whilst the observed emergency management teams were 
being compared with theoretical "best" and "worst" performance in each situation, it was 
not known how realistic these benchmarks were. As identified whilst working on 
Objective 3, the main impact of the emergency management team was on the quality and 
timeliness of the decisions - which, in terms of the model was measured as the presence 
or absence of a good decision and the delay in starting the physical mitigating action. 
From some of the onshore scenarios, the subjectively judged quality of the team's 
performance was also recorded. 
Putting all this information together, it was considered that it should be possible 
to establish more realistic definitions for best and worst performance in each situation - 
and identify whether this corresponded to the subjective assessments. This could be done 
by working out the "best" and "worst" delay that was likely to occur in this situation. 
This led to the decision to reconsider the scenarios as an additional source of data. It had 
been observed that many emergency management actions occurred in response to most 
emergencies - for example, to start a muster. Also, from the theoretical data, there were 
a number of mathematical models considering how long a muster would take - based on, 
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for example, predictions of how people move and how fast. However, despite the data 
available in scenarios, there were no models to predict how long it would take to order a 
muster. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to obtain rules or structures for the behaviour of 
the emergency management team. This led to the development of Objective 4, stated as 
follows: - 
4. To use the above methodology and data to define performance parameters that can be 
applied to evaluate generic emergency situations. 
Given that the TPRC model could already show the impact of emergency 
management on risk - including the impact of theoretical changes in emergency 
management and design performance, fulfilling Objective 4 could allow the TPRC model 
to be almost self-sufficient in terms of data collection. If a set of "theoretical emergency 
management data" was available in the way that other theoretical data were applied in 
this research, then designs could be tested without relying on the input from scenarios. 
To fulfil this objective, it was considered that the best technique would involve bringing 
together the methodologies defined to fulfil Objectives 1,2 and 3. In this case, the data 
collected to fulfil Objective 1 could be re-analysed and collected together to identify and 
define performance parameters. The scope of these performance parameters could be 
from "very specific" to "very generic" - to allow a "perfect match" to be made where the 
desired analysis was identical to one observed in a previous scenario, or, to allow a level 
of behavioural decomposition based on individual parts of the SADCAR concept, where 
a novel situation could be built from `unit management tasks" to give a good 
representation of how long this novel task would take. 
Once identified and defined, every incidence of each performance parameter could be 
recorded in terms of its duration. From the 14 scenarios recorded in this study, some 
(particularly the most generic) parameters would be observed occurring many times - 
therefore allowing a distribution of values to be obtained. It was hoped that these, in 
particular, might show differences between the small amount of non-emergency situation 
data and the emergency situation data - between the offshore and onshore team - and 
between those scenarios judged as being managed "highly competently", "competently" 
or "with notable shortfalls". Given that these data were now available, it seemed feasible 
that someone could consider either an entirely novel situation or a situation based on the 
observed scenarios and could refer to the performance parameters to choose timings 
from the distributions to represent these. Consistent with the concept that the smaller the 
delay, the better the performance of the team - the smallest values from the distribution 
could be chosen to represent the optimal team - now based on observed performance as 
opposed to the speculative optimal performance used to fulfil Objective 3. These could 
be then re-applied within the TPRC model to evaluate the impact of this "possible" 
performance on risk. 
This work was carried out by going through each scenario transcript and looking at each 
task and communication made - both on its own and within the context of the scenario - 
as described in Chapter 7. First, it was necessary to ensure that the definition of each 
performance parameter was unambiguous. The definitions of the final set of generic 
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performance parameters are shown in Appendix 7. For example; every radio call was 
defined in terms of whether it was made by the emergency management team or the 
scenario organisation team - and whether this provided significant information or not. 
Following the definition of terms, each scenario was analysed in terms of how many of 
each performance parameter were observed and the duration of each occurrence. For 
each scenario, this allowed the average length of time taken by this performance 
parameter to be calculated for the scenario. Following this, the data from the scenarios 
were collected together - categorised in terms of-- 
" the emergency manager in charge 
" offshore/onshore 
" pre-emergency / post-emergency 
and then for the onshore scenarios only: - 
* the competency rating awarded by the chief assessor: 
The Scenario-Specific Performance Parameter data are all shown in Appendix 8. The 
groupings of Generic Performance Parameter data that were considered to be the most 
useful to future users are shown in Appendix 10. 
As stated earlier, it was hoped that these data could be compared, perhaps identifying 
notable differences in delays therefore reflecting emergency management performance - 
perhaps also linked with the subjectively assessed competency rating. But, even if no 
comparison was possible, it was considered important to have these distributions 
available for use - as this would allow the "closest" match of data to be used when 
designing a novel situation. 
Given that this information was now available, it was necessary to test this. This was 
tested using the problem identified whilst working on Objective 3. Rather than having a 
theoretical "best", now the same pattern of performance parameters as observed in the 
scenario (for example, information call, delay, non-informational call) could be re- 
assigned optimal durations for each observed parameter, thereby producing a realistically 
possible "best" - improving the benchmark by which the observed performance is 
measured. This is shown in Chapter 9 (Figure 63). 
The development of this methodology was deemed to have fulfilled Objective 4 and was 
duly tested. Using all 14 scenarios, Performance Parameters were categorised. leading to 
the definition of 46 Generic performance parameters. The Generic performance 
parameters were recorded in 30 different categories - based on collated combinations of 
onshore/offshore, pre-scenario/during-scenario, in terms of competency rating and in 
terms of the emergency manager in charge. There were up to 2742 data points recorded 
for an individual performance parameter and 17924 data points recorded in total - some 
of which were recorded in up to 9 of the 30 different categories. 
Thus, this completes the research methodology laid down to address the four objectives. 
The following section will therefore continue by describing the scenario arrangement 
available - and thus both facilitating and limiting the progress of the research. 
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SECTION 4.4: SCENARIO ARRANGEMENTS 
The following sections describe the scenario arrangements under which the 
research was conducted. These represents the actual arrangements used for the 5 
offshore scenarios and is typical of arrangements used in other environments (onshore 
and nuclear). These arrangements were also based on how the control room would be 
organised in a real incident - in terms of personnel, technology and information. 
However, an exact reproduction would be expensive to organise. Therefore items such 
as particularly expensive control panels and VDUs were represented by using simplified 
versions of the panels (as described in section 4.4.2) including only the characteristics 
that would be relevant in an emergency. Where the panel was unable to provide the 
specific information required by the scenario, the scenario organiser would announce the 
relevant changes. For example "low level on valve AS2". However, any items that were 
not critical to the management aspect of the exercise were excluded (For example, coffee 
machines, breathing apparatus, fire extinguishers, overalls and hard hats). It should be 
noted at this stage that the onshore simulations described in the research included the use 
of a purpose designed dedicated simulator (of the type described in Section 2.3.6.1.4). 
As no details on this could be revealed, it should be assumed that the simulation 
environment was the same as the offshore environment. Its presence had no impact on 
the research methodology as described in the previous sections. 
SECTION 4.5: DETAILS OF THE SPECIFIC PLATFORM USED 
IN THE RESEARCH 
The work in this research project focused primarily on the personnel on a small 
(situated in approximately 42m of water) concrete gravity structure gas-production 
platform situated in the Southern North Sea so this will be the key emphasis throughout 
this review. (For clarification, a concrete gravity structure consists of metal platform 
mounted on top of concrete columns. This is all constructed on a reinforced concrete 
base that rests by gravity on the seabed - Lancaster 1996). 
The platform in question consists of a central production platform, supported on 
two concrete columns, joined to a gas compression deck, which is supported by another 
column. These are connected by a bridge to a steel supported wellhead tower. This 
platform also processes gas from a field 7 kilometres away and from two more steel 
satellite towers (BHP 1994). 
The Central Processing platform consists of 4 main decks - the helideck, a 
weather deck, mezzanine deck and cellar deck. The helideck is an octagonal deck above 
the accommodation section of the weather deck. It is capable of withstanding extreme 
wind-loads as well as the force provided by a Sikorsky helicopter. The deck is 
surrounded by safety nets, provided with foam release systems and can be lit up at night. 
The weather deck below includes one level of accommodation, the laboratory and stores, 
methanol laydown area, helifuel store or "skid" as well as some of the processing areas, 
for example, the export gas cooler. The flare stack and the crane pedestal also stand on 
this deck. 
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The mezzanine deck is situated below the weather deck and this deck 
accommodates the high voltage and low voltage switchgear rooms, the methanol store 
and more processing, for example, the glycol contactors and glycol regeneration unit. It 
also consists of another level of the accommodation, so that the entire accommodation 
block is together and is protected by fire-protective bulkheads from the rest of the 
platform. The main control room is situated in the lower part of the accommodation and 
is also protected by blast walls. Within the accommodation are a recreation area, a 
galley, dining room, toilets, bedrooms, a sick bay and a gymnasium. This can 
accommodate up to 56 people. On the technical side, there are offices for the Offshore 
Installation Manager (OIM) and the Maintenance Supervisor. There is also a 
telecommunications equipment room and a radio operations room providing 
communication to the shore, shipping and helicopters. Within the control room, there are, 
panels and VDUs to oversee all parts of the production process as well as emergency 
shutdown and blowdown control, which starts deluge, foam monitors and fires the halon. 
In an emergency, this room becomes a muster point for essential personnel. Non- 
essential personnel, including the medic and first aid teams, enter the Temporary Safe 
Haven (Muster point 2), adjacent to the lifeboats on the cellar deck below. 
The cellar deck includes the diesel storage tank, the slug catcher, pig launcher 
and receiver, HVAC (heating, ventilation and air-conditioning) room, firewater and 
halon stores as well as the seawater processing for use on the platform. 
The gas compression deck (GCD) has 3 compression trains that are involved in 
exporting the gas from the platform. This is connected to the Central Production 
Platform by bridges on the cellar and mezzanine decks. The well-tower is connected to 
the main production platform via a bridge from the mezzanine and cellar deck and it has 
another crane on it. This deck consists of a number of well slots. 
To communicate with the rest of the platform, there is the use of a tannoy (public 
address system), hand-held radios and telephones. In an emergency, the fire and gas 
panel in the control room can automatically start the muster with an intermittent alarm at 
600 Hz. In non-fire and gas emergencies, this can also be started from the control room, 
OIM's office, radio operations or telecommunication rooms. In the event'that it is 
decided that abandonment is the only option, a PAPA (Prepare to Abandon Platform 
Alarm) is started, which is a continuous tone of 800Hz. Evacuation will then take place, 
via lifeboats or helicopter or, in the worst case scenario, via ladders into the sea. 
(All information provided by BHP 1994) 
In terms of the installation used for the offshore scenarios, the company involved 
requested that no detailed description could be given to identify it. 
4.6: LAYOUT OF THE SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
The simulations used two rooms configured as shown in Figure 8. Each of the features 
shown in Figure 8 will be discussed in the following sections. 
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Figure 8: Layout of Rooms in the Emergency Management Exercise 
SCENARIO ORGANISATION ROOM EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ROOM 
1 11 23 
EI 
1-87 
0 
v 
Key 
  Phones 
1 Emergency action checklist 
2 Focus board 
3 Event board 
4 Muster board 
5 Map of platform 
6 Desk including controls for tannoy and muster and PAPA alarms 
7 Panels - fire and gas, deluge and shutdown. 
8 Scale model of platform 
9 Radio operations controls (including contact with shore & standby vessel using 
hand held radio or phone) 
10 Scenario organisation room, including map of platform, procedures and any other 
relevant information. 
SECTION 4.7: EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE IN THE SIMULATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
This included notice-boards, panels, manuals and communication systems so that 
the room used by the emergency management team should be as similar as possible to the 
control room that would be used to manage a real incident. 
4.7.1 NOTICE-BOARDS 
The notice-boards used were identical to those present in the offshore 
environment. Some of these were typically used on a day-to-day basis. For example, the 
map of the platform is used to identify where technicians are working. The other boards 
were only usually brought out in the event of an incident and would be stored until such 
a time when they are required. The boards are described in the following sections 
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4.7.1.1. The Emergency Action Checklist 
This contained two lists - one intended for the control room staff and one 
intended for the OIM. Both had a list of procedures that could be useful reminders in an 
emergency. As the boards were specific to the platform, it is not possible to completely 
recreate these list due to confidentiality reasons, but it is possible to give some indication 
of what information was on the boards. The OIM list contained procedures similar to 
those shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: OIM's Emergency Action Checklist 
All Radios to Channel 15 
Appoint communications / OIM assistant 
Appoint team leader 
Alarm initiated (silence for communications) 
Shutdown plant 
Blow down plant (if vent integrity sound) 
Shutdown incoming / export lines 
Make P. A. announcements (be informative) 
Start fire pump (release deluge if required, confirm release) 
Emergency systems (review isolations on emergency shut down / fire and gas panel) 
Muster status - 
Notify 3`d parties 
Availability of helicopter / vessels in vicinity 
Review emergency procedures 
Review permits in force 
Review weather conditions 
The control room list contained procedures similar to those shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Control Room Emergency Action List 
Inform OIM 
Cause identified 
PA Announcement 
Radios to Channel 15 
Fire pumps starts 
Deluge released 
Isolations removed on ESD Panel 
Isolations removed on Fire and Gas Panel 
Have plant depressurised 
Have ESD valves closed 
Hot work stopped 
All persons accounted for 
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4.7.1.2 The Focus Board 
This was the sole responsibility of the Emergency Manager. He used this to note 
down actions which are to be taken and then would announce these to the rest of the 
team during a time-out. The types of entries that were made on this board included 
"Complete Muster", "Location missing people" or "Put out fire". Once the actions had 
been completed or when the Emergency Manager had brought the team up to date, he 
would cross out the current actions and write new ones. This was primarily designed to 
ensure that the team were focused on the main objectives and could maintain the "big 
picture" as a group. 
4.7.1.3 The Event Board 
This was used by one of the members of the emergency management team (not 
the emergency manager) to log the events that had occurred. In a real emergency, this 
would be included in the formal incident report. An example is shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: Example of the Event Board 
Time started Action Who by Estimated Time 
of Completion 
16: 13 Explosion in regeneration plant - 
16.15 Muster MC 16: 30 
16: 17 Fight fire in regen FTL 16: 50 
From this, the team could establish the chronological order of events, the person 
or team dealing with them and the time at which the actions can be expected to be 
completed. If the team reached the estimated time of completion and the action had not 
been completed, they would then discuss whether they needed to devote more resources 
to completing the action, for example, by supplying another fire team to put out the fire. 
4.7.1.4 The Muster Board 
This was used by one of the members of the emergency management team (not 
the emergency manager) to note down the status of the personnel on the platform. An 
example of the muster board is shown in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Example of the Muster Board 
Expected Missing Helicopter Standby boat Support 
Teams 
Muster Point 14 1- Fred 
1 
Muster Point 26 0 
2 
107 
The expected number of personnel at each muster point was placed in the first 
column and once the muster captains had contacted the control centre with the numbers 
of people present, the numbers of missing people could be calculated. The numbers on 
the helicopter (for example, the arriving crew-change helicopter) and standby boat were 
also counted in the event of a helicopter crash or man overboard/evacuation incident. 
The support teams column referred to those sent out to rescue people or fight fires so 
that the location of people was clearly recorded for all the team to see. 
4.7.1.5 Man of platform 
This showed a plan view of each floor of the platform. It was recorded in 
permanent ink on a white board so that it can be updated using wiper-board pens to . include special activities that are continuing in specific locations - for example, permits to 
work for hot work, cold work or work going on below the platform. During the 
simulation, this could be updated to give indications of the location of any problems and 
the wind direction. It was also used to plot possible routes across the platform. 
4.7.2 PANELS 
4.7.2.1 Fire and Gas Panel 
This panel showed a column of locations on the platform and next to each of 
these was a row of lights (corresponding to fire, 20% gas, 60% gas or manually activated 
alarms) and a reset button. This panel was mainly controlled by the scenario organiser. 
When a fire, gas or manually-activated alarm occurred in a particular location, the 
scenario organiser would sound an audible alarm and light the bulb on the panel 
corresponding to the type of alarm and its location. The control room operator would 
then accept the audible alarm by pressing the reset button (thus stopping the audible 
alarm but leaving the light on the panel). 
4.7.2.2 Shutdown Panel. 
This panel showed a column of locations on the platform and next to each of 
these was a set of 2 lights (one representing shutdown, one representing blowdown) and 
a reset button. These could be controlled by the scenario organiser or the control room 
operators. Certain systems resulted in an automatic shutdown or automatic shutdown 
and blowdown, which were therefore activated by the scenario organiser. This lit the 
respective bulb and sounded an audible alarm, which could then be accepted by the 
control room operator. Sometimes, the emergency management team decided to shut 
down the system themselves, which was carried out by pressing the reset buttons. 
4.7.2.3 Fire pumps and Deluge Panel 
This panel was split into an upper and lower section - the upper for fire pumps 
and the lower for deluge. The fire pump section had rows for "A", "B" and "C" fire 
pumps and next to each one was a bulb and button corresponding to their status - either "on" or "off'. The deluge section had rows corresponding to each deck of the platform. 
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Next to each name was a bulb, which was lit for "on". Next to the bulb was a button that 
allowed switching between "on" or "off'. These were normally initiated by the control 
room operator, but could be activated by the scenario organiser, representing an 
automatic system response. 
4.7.3 COMMUNICATIONS 
4.7.3.1 Panel Alarms 
These were described in section 4.7.2 and were normally activated by the 
Scenario Organiser. 
4.7.3.2 Muster and PAPA alarms 
Unlike the genuine article, these were not activated automatically by systems but 
were represented by a tape recording of the real alarms to be played back by the Control 
Room Operator at appropriate times. The Muster alarm was an intermittent tone whereas 
PAPA (Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm) was a continuous tone - as described in 
Section 4.5. 
4.7.3.3 Phones, hand-held radios and the tannoy / P. A. system 
The phones were shown in the diagram of the room plan in Figure 8. There were 
also a number of hand held (walkie-talkie type) radios available - usually surplus to the 
requirements of the emergency management team. A typical arrangement involved the 
radio operator, control room operator and production supervisor each having a hand- 
held radio. The scenario organisation team also had a number of hand held radios to 
reply to the emergency management team. The tannoy / P. A. system was represented by 
a desk mounted microphone which was connected to small speakers in the emergency 
management and scenario organisation rooms. In a real-life incident, this could be 
accessed by dialling a particular number on the phone. Therefore, as this facility was not_ 
available in the scenario, the receiving team were notified that the tannoy was being used 
in this way. 
4.7.4 SCALE MODEL OF THE PLATFORM 
This was available to add another dimension to the map of the platform as 
described in Section 4.7.1.5. It stood approximately 1.5 metres high and 1x1 metres 
width. This would not be available to the emergency management team in a real 
situation. However, a real incident would take place on the actual platform in the middle 
of the North Sea rather than in an onshore office building. Therefore, this information 
would be more accessible in the actual environment. However, this model was 
occasionally used to aid the memory in the layout of the installation or to help 
communicate a specific location or route to another member of the team. As it was found 
to be useful in some instances, it might be a recommendation to have a smaller model 
available for emergency managers in the real control room. This would allow locations 
and routes to be clearly explained to individuals before they left the safe area. 
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SECTION 4.8: THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE DEDICATED 
SIMULATIONS 
This section includes descriptions of the many different roles that were involved 
in running the simulations. This includes the team who designed and assessed the 
exercises as well as those who were required to manage the simulated emergency. 
4.8.1 SCENARIO ORGANISER 
I 
This person was responsible for the organisation of all the scenarios. Given that 
he already has some knowledge of generally emergency management, he initially 
discussed the potential hazards with experts from the installation and therefore defined 
the possible emergency scenarios. This person also discussed with the emergency 
management examiners as to their requirements for the scenarios. From this information, 
this person designed a set of scenarios. Each scenario must test different aspects of 
emergency management, with differing levels of severity over different times - as 
specified in Section 3.5.3.4. The scenario organiser then prepared a brief plan of the 
forthcoming scenario and gave this to the scenario organisation team and the examiners 
(an example plan is shown in Appendix 3). The scenario organisation team prepared any 
further details and when both teams were ready, the scenario started. The role of the 
scenario organiser often required him to go into the emergency management room to 
assess how the scenario was progressing, to discuss the progress with the examiner, to 
set off the alarms or to announce certain occurrences, e. g. smell of smoke or chemicals, 
vibration or sound of explosions. He was also required to act in some of the roles with 
the scenario organisation team. 
4.8.2 SCENARIO ORGANISATION TEAM 
The scenario organiser controlled this team. In their normal role, they were 
usually members of the internal organisation and were familiar with the emergency 
processes that were involved in the scenarios. For example, they were often the night- 
shift team corresponding to the day-shift team who were under test. In the role of the 
scenario organisation team, they were required to play all the roles of people external to 
the emergency management team. These may include people on the platform who were 
working on different decks or who become injured or trapped; people on the standby 
vessel and people onshore. Apart from playing the roles, they also provided some 
contribution to the progression of the scenario. For example, if they became aware that 
the emergency management team had ignored a critical point or had forgotten an action, 
they could increase the importance of this error and worsen the consequences. They also 
could choose to increase the difficulty of the scenario by neglecting to mention critical 
information until it was requested or by distracting the team from the main issue. 
Similarly, they could help the emergency management team by giving helpful emergency 
management hints. 
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4.8.3 ASSESSORS 
In some cases, one of the group who was responsible for training the team was 
also responsible for assessment. Sometimes there would be a team of assessors, where 
the judgement of competency was based on a majority decision. In this set of 
simulations, this person was the main assessor and his judgement on the competency of 
the candidate would be the most influential. The assessor was experienced in emergency 
management from a military background but had no personal experience of incident 
management in the petrochemical or offshore industry. Typically, this assessor stayed in 
the room with the emergency management team to see all of their responses to the 
escalating scenario. In some cases, the assessor was given the plan by the scenario 
organiser and so was aware of the actual situation. He would then try to predict the 
emergency manager's response and look out for their timeliness. In other cases, the 
assessor preferred to watch the scenario "blind" - without using the plan, and therefore 
based his assessments on how he believed the emergency manager should respond to the 
incoming information compared with the real responses observed. 
The assessors made notes on the performance of the emergency manager and his 
team but usually made no contribution during the scenario. In the first few assessment 
scenarios, they would occasionally stop the scenario to explain points. These points were 
usually stylistic, for example, explaining how the boards should be laid out or the order 
of events in a time-out. They ensured that they did not provide additional information on 
the scenario that the emergency management team may have missed. Once this 
information had been given, the scenario would continue from the point where it was 
stopped. 
Following the scenario, this assessor, together with the scenario organiser and 
usually one of the scenario organisation team (typically someone senior and internal to 
the organisation), discussed the candidate and team's performance. They then had a 
debriefing with the emergency management candidate, in which they pointed out the' 
negative and positive aspects of the performance. 
4.8.4 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CANDIDATE (TEAM LEADER) 
As stated in Section 4.4, this set of dedicated simulations were designed 
predominantly to assess the competency of the emergency manager - to identify if he 
could be approved to manage an installation as an OIM. Therefore, in this case, those 
chosen to manage the simulations were "candidates" in a competency examination. 
Although, emergency management is generally considered to involve a team effort, the 
responsibility for the outcome was firmly placed on the shoulders of this candidate. 
The candidate usually played the role of the OIM. However, in some scenarios, it 
had been predetermined that the OIM would be injured in the incident, and so the 
candidate occasionally found himself in the role of the Field Supervisor. Following, a 
course in which the candidate and his team were taught the general aspects of emergency 
management practice, the candidates were examined, usually in pairs. This meant that 
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when one candidate played the OIM, the other could be the Field Supervisor. 'This way, ' 
they could learn from each other's mistakes. 
During the scenario, the candidate was expected to be responsible for the overall,,,, 
management of the emergency. Ideally, he provided a supervisory role to the team, 
merely re-focusing them on important points and giving a pro-active response to the 
situation. Essentially, the candidate should not get drawn into the rote actions of the 
group but to rise above this, by obtaining an overview of the "big picture". Sometimes 
the team were particularly effective and would "flatter" the emergency manager - making 
him look more effective than he was. In this case, it was the role of the assessor to 
identify this and to mark the candidate accordingly. 
4.8.5 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TEAM 
These provided the responses to the emergency management candidate's 
decisions. A good emergency management team should be aware of the progressing 
situation, communicate important issues to the other members of the team, ensure 
important actions are initiated quickly and react appropriately to the incoming 
information. Although they were not the key people under test in these scenarios, if their, i 
management of the situation is poor, it is likely that the candidate's assessment will also 
be affected. For example, if the emergency manager has to become involved in sorting 
out the detailed organisation of the scenario, he may become unable to make overall 
strategic decisions. Therefore, if the team are good at management, they will free the 
candidate to make strategic decisions therefore resulting in a better overall performance. 
The team typically split into a number of roles, either based on their normal roles (e. g. 
radio operator, control room operator), or based on carrying out required emergency 
management tasks (e. g. muster captain, person responsible for the event board or 
emergency action checklist). 
4.8.5.1 Control Room Operator (CRO) 
This person was one of the few people who were in the control room at the start 
of the exercise and therefore, one of the first people to be aware of an incident. Their 
role involves responsibility for the control panels that, in an emergency, involves the 
panel alarms, muster and PAPA alarms, the tannoy and any initial communications that 
are transmitted to the control room. Therefore, they were responsible for putting out the 
calls to start a muster or for the OIM to attend the control room. 
4.8.5.2 Production Supervisor (PS) 
This person was usually present in the control room at the start of an exercise, as 
is consistent with their role on a real installation. However, this person is senior to the 
control room operator and so occasionally made early tactical decisions before the OIM 
had arrived. 
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4.8.5.3 Radio Operator (RO) 
As can be seen in Figure 8, the radio operations room is separated from the main 
control room by a door. However, as for the control room operator and production 
supervisor, the radio operator would be present at the start of a scenario - as is 
consistent with their usual role. The radio operator is responsible for communications 
with external bodies. This includes talking to the parent company and emergency services 
onshore as well as the standby vessel and helicopters. 
4.8.5.4 Field Supervisor / On-Scene Commander (FS) 
Whereas most of the people who muster at the control room fulfil a role there, 
the field supervisor is usually sent to investigate the incident. This would mean returning 
to the scenario organisation team and temporarily becoming one of their team. This is 
usually the only person who travels from one team to the other. If they are then asked to 
return to the emergency management team for any reason (for example, the OIM 
believes the situation is too dangerous and that they should return to the control room), 
they must not reveal the details of the emergency which they had learnt while acting as 
part of the scenario organisation team, which they would not have learnt in their role as 
the on-scene commander. 
4.8.5.5 Other Emergency Management Team Members 
Typically the other team members have other roles outside the emergency 
management role, for example, crane drivers, deck foremen, electrical technicians etc. In 
their emergency management role, they now become responsible for the boards. 
Occasionally, they are required to act in their normal role - or carry out skills at which 
they are particularly adept. In this case, the team must arrange that their emergency 
management role is adequately covered in their absence. 
4.8.6 OBSERVER 
The author of this research was the only "observer". Initially, this involved taking 
notes of how the scenario progressed, the decisions made and the outcome of the 
emergency. However, once permission had been granted by the companies involved in 
the exercises, this involved the data recording as described in the next few sections. 
4.8.7 ROLES USED BY SCENARIO 
In terms of each scenario, the roles fulfilled included those within the emergency 
management team, the scenario organisation team and some roles that involved joining 
both. From the transcript, all of those who were heard to speak or activate controls 
within the scenario are as shown in Table 5. It should be noted that this was the data 
obtained from the Scenarios - and so it was mainly based on that which could be seen 
and heard. As the other side of phone-calls could not be heard, all those roles 
(helicopters, fire service, police, ambulances, senior managers of the company and family 
members) could be played by one person, so this information on the Scenario 
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Organisation team was based mainly on the roles heard over radio. Where "? " is shown, 
this indicates that the person could not be identified from the call - so may be a new role 
not already accounted for. 
Table 5: Personnel Roles identified in the Scenario Transcripts 
Scenario Present at Arrives later Leaves Minimum number of 
beginning during Permanent Roles in 
of scenario scenario to Scenario Organisation 
join Scenario team 
Organisation 
team 
Offshore 1: RO, CRO, P, G, OIM, FS HP, HLO, Med, HP2, 
Helicopter PS D, FS MP2, ??? 
crash 
Offshore 2: CRO, PS, OIM, FS, P, FS CD, SB, ?, 
Methanol leak RO G, D 
Offshore 3: PS, CRO, OIM, P, G, FS Med, R28. 
GCD cooler RO D, FS 
Offshore 4: HV CRO, D, PS, G, OIM, FS PW, AH, Med, FT2, 
switchgear RO FS, P BA3, 
room T/DM 
Offshore 5: PS, CRO, G, OIM, D, FS, G CD, CM, SB, LB2, LB3 
Dropped object RO P, FS 
Onshore 1: Hot PQ, AR, PD, WR, JF, AE, MC, 
oil leak W, D, G, N MI 
Onshore 2: AR, OIM, AE, PD, MF, IF, HS 
Broken leg on G, N, W, D 
regen unit 
Onshore 3: AR, PQ, PD, MF, AE 
Tanker driver W, D, G, 
bangs his head N, 
Onshore 4: OIM, AR, AE, PD, MF 
Explosion at W, G, D, N 
tail gas unit 
Onshore 5: AR, OIM, PD, AE, Sec, MF, B, JF, 
Brown liquid G, D, W, N ??, ? 
emission 
Onshore 6: AR, OIM, PD, JF, WF, AG, T 
Leak on GSU G, W, N, D 
B 
Onshore 7: G, AR, PO (Police AE, ?, HS, PD, ? 1, SF, 
Collapsed OIM, N, officer from 'MF, AG, ?, 
scaffolding W, D, Scenario 
organisation 
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team) 
Onshore 8: AR, OIM, FO (fire JF, AE, PD, MI, MF, 
Spinal injury on D, W, N, G officer from HS, Sec, ?, 
column, icy the Scenario 
weather Organisation 
team) 
Onshore 9: AR, OIM, U (Inspector JF, AE, MI, PD, HS, 
Leak at W, G, D, N from the MF, MC, A, AG, ? 
Dewpoint A Scenario 
Organisation 
team 
With regard to the abbreviations used in the table above, those that refer to the initials 
for the role are as follows: - 
RO - Radio Operator 
CRO - Control Room Operator 
PS - Production Supervisor 
OIM - Offshore Installation Manager 
FS - Field Supervisor 
HP / HP2 / R28 - Helicopter pilots 
HLO - Helicopter Landing Officer 
MED - Medic 
MP2 - Muster Point 2 
CD - Crane Driver 
SB - Standby boat 
FT2 - Fire Team 2 
BA3 - Breathing Apparatus team 3 
PO (Police officer - from Scenario organisation team) 
FO (Fire officer from local fire brigade - from the Scenario Organisation team) 
IJ (Police Inspector - from the Scenario Organisation team) 
Sec - Security Officer 
In the Offshore scenarios, P, G, D, PW, AH, and in the Onshore scenarios, PQ, AR, W, 
G, D, N (within the emergency management team) and PD, WR, JF, AE, MC, MI, MF, 
HS, B, WE, AG, T, SF, A (in the scenario organisation team) represent the initials of the 
people within the scenario. As described in Section 4.8.5.5, it can be assumed that these 
are "operational" people in their normal roles and fulfil "untitled" roles as required in an 
emergency. For the emergency management team, this mostly involves being assigned to 
update a specific board. The greater use of names in the onshore scenarios (as opposed 
to titles in the offshore scenario) reflects their normal procedure, so AE, PD, MF in the 
onshore scenarios could represent the equivalent of FT2, BA3 or FS in the offshore 
scenarios. Any roles defined as ?,?? or ?1 are simply described as such because the 
identification could not be heard clearly in the recording. In offshore scenario number 4, 
T, the assessor and DM, the scenario organiser, both make a contribution from within 
the emergency management room so this is recorded in the scenario transcript as such. 
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4.9: SCENARIOS OBSERVED IN THE RESEARCH 
The story-lines of the scenarios used in the research are described in the Sections to 
follow. 
4.9.1 Offshore Scenario 1: Helicopter Crash 
The crew-change helicopter crashes on the helideck starting an explosion and fire. The 
EMT start a muster and shutdown. The power fails - preventing the use of additional 
systems including the tannoy. The EMT start the deluge system. A Fire team'and 
Medical team are sent to investigate. The main route from the hospital is blocked. The 
helicopter is hanging over the edge and there are several fires. Some of the people have 
been thrown clear of the helicopter, some are still inside. The whole area is flooded with 
fuel. They order an additional rescue helicopter. The wind is in the wrong direction for 
the foam to be effective; therefore the fire team approach this from a different direction. 
The fire enters the upper level of accommodation. They dump the methanol to make it 
safe. Other than the 2 casualties that were thrown clear, no further survivors are to be 
expected. The fire team suggest that Muster Point 2 and Lifeboat 2 are no longer useful. 
The fire team attempt to clear the bridge to the Gas Compression Deck. The fire dies 
down and the field supervisor suggests that they push the wreckage into the sea. The 
OIM negates this order and says that the casualties can be winched off the Well Tower 
instead of the helideck. 
4.9.2 Offshore Scenario 2- Methanol Leak 
While lifting methanol tote tanks, the wind takes the load and the tanks are knocked. 
This results in a methanol leak that ignites. The EMT organise a shutdown and muster 
and they activate the deluge. The crane driver is forced back into his cab by the fire and 
calls for help. The fire team attempt to get to him but he is forced to jump out of the 
crane and into the water before they get there. When the standby vessel reports that there 
is a man overboard, initially the EMT are not sure who this is. The fire team activate the 
foam cannon on the fire. The standby vessel rescues the man overboard. The fire team 
recommend the use of extra foam so another team is sent to put portable foam monitors 
on the gas compression deck. A diesel fire starts in the crane cabin. The foam monitors 
start to run out of foam so the fire team attempt to use a different foam monitor. Another 
team are despatched to supply them with extra foam. 
4.9.3 Offshore Scenario 3- GCD Cooler 
Initially, 60% gas is detected on the Gas Compression Deck. The team initiate a 
shutdown, deluge and muster. Fire is detected in the same area. A number of technicians 
had been working on the compressor in that area. The muster is completed and 4 are 
missing. The fire team go to the area. The incident is believed to be located on the Mezz 
deck of GCD and the technicians were believed to be working in the control room. It 
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was then established that the B cooler has gone. The bridge is inaccessible from the 
Mezz deck so the field supervisor suggests that he uses the Weather deck. The GCD 
Control Room phone the control room to say that all four missing people are there - one 
is injured with flash bums from opening the door. The EMT organise a medical team. 
The field supervisor attempts to get to the GCD control room via the main door. The 
field supervisor reports that his BAs are getting low so the EMT send some technicians 
with additional BA bottles. The field supervisor finds that one exit is too smoky so he 
tries another door. He is unable to open it, saying that the door handles have come off. 
The EMT call the GCD control room to get them to open the door. The EMT send an 
additional team to assess whether the GCD Weather Deck is at risk. The field supervisor 
finally gets into the GCD Control Room. The casualty is suffering from flash burns, 
concussion and is bleeding from the ear. The others are very frightened. A stretcher team 
is despatched with the medical team. The field supervisor suggests that the EMT stop the 
deluge. This is negated, as there are still fires. 
4.9.4 Offshore Scenario 4- HV Switchgear Room 
A smoke alarm is activated in the HV Switchgear Room. The Halon is activated there. 
The operator gets to the HV Switchgear Room and finds that it is full of toxic smoke. He 
reports that he cannot stay there. A shutdown and muster are started. The electricians 
prepare to investigate. HV Power failure occurs. The field supervisor enters the 
accommodation to search for two missing people and the operator. The field supervisor 
gets to the LV Switchgear room and says there is smoke there. An alarm is activated in 
the Lab and Stores. The field supervisor requests backup. It turns out that someone has 
wedged open the door of accommodation so that it is filling with toxic smoke. The field 
supervisor complains about the visibility and leaves the accommodation. Their BA starts 
to run out so they return to the control room. There is some confusion over which teams 
were assigned which roles. Despite the team's complaints about the visibility, the EMT 
insists that the teams are wearing BA so should be able to cope with it. One casualty is 
found in the HV Switchgear room. He is resuscitated. The field supervisor searches level 
1 of accommodation and no one is found. They continue to search level 2 and find the 
steward. The field supervisor requires extra BA and reports that the fire in the HV 
Switchgear room is escalating. The EMT start relocating to muster point 3 and they 
inform all external teams of this fact. The field supervisor gets the doors of the HV 
Switchgear Room closed to activate the reserve banks of Halon. The field supervisor 
starts to lose contact with the EMT and does not hear the order to pull back. They 
contact him on the tannoy and he then reports that he may have trouble in pulling back. 
They agree to send extra teams to help him escape. 
4.9.5 Offshore Scenario 5- Dropped Object 
There is a 60% gas detection on Weather deck of the J facility. The muster is started. A 
fire is then reported on the Mezz deck. They start to activate the deluge. The crane 
driver radios in to say that the whole crane boom has gone down. The crane is sitting on 
the top of the bridge. Shutdown is activated., The wind has apparently taken the crane 
boom over the Weather Deck bridge and there are just a few wires attached to the load. 
The fire on the bridge starts to impinge on the central platform. 8 people are missing in 
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total. Someone reports in from the GCD saying that there are 3 of them there and they 
are returning to the control room, as they cannot get across. The lower bridge has gone 
completely and the upper bridge cannot be used due to the fire and smoke. One person is 
found in the GCD control room and is injured but is safe there for now. A jet fire occurs 
on the slug catcher. The fire team are sent to investigate. Someone reports that they saw 
someone crossing the bridge when the incident happened and they believe they may have 
gone into the water. The EMT contact the standby vessel. The field supervisor starts to 
set up hoses to play on the ESV valves. The load is still hanging on the wires, half in and 
half out of the water. If it falls, it is likely to damage the platform or the subsea pipeline. 
The standby vessel can find no one in the water. The group on GCD launch the lifeboat. 
The fire starts to diminish. The OIM suggests that the load can be lowered but the field 
supervisor negates this plan. They agree to shut the subsea barrier. 
4.9.6 Onshore Scenario 1- Hot Oil Leak 
When fixing a hot oil leak valve, a fire starts. 2 technicians are badly burnt; The EMT 
start a muster, which is completed minus the 2 technicians. The fire truck is called to the 
area. The foam monitors are activated but the on-scene team request that they are turned 
off to make the rescue easier. That requires a manual isolation by the on-scene team. One 
casualty is rescued. The fire starts to threaten the diesel and hot oil tanks. The fire 
brigade set up cooling on the tanks. There are problems communicating with the fire 
brigade to identify where they are working. The team then realise that one of the 
casualties is still missing and attempt to rescue him. The on-scene team are exhausted but 
are asked to carry out an isolation on the leak. 
4.9.7 Onshore Scenario 2- Broken Lei On Regen Unit 
The levels are fluctuating on the regen unit and a technician is sent up the ladders to 
investigate. The pressure starts to drop. There is a massive H2S leak. The technician sent 
up the ladder falls while trying to get out and his mask falls off. Another technician 
attempts to assist him. The EMT start a muster and shutdown and call the emergency 
services. The toxic alarms go off. It becomes apparent that the technician has broken his 
leg. He is given breathing apparatus but this is rapidly running out of air. The EMT try to 
bring the crane into action. The toxic gas starts spreading over the site. One other person 
is missing from the muster -a contractor. The emergency services are diverted round the 
safe routes on site. The on-scene team attempt to provide the casualty with a permanent 
supply of air. The contractor is found. The levels of gas start to fall around the site and 
the fire brigade use sprays to control the gas cloud. The on-scene team ready the crane 
and the stretcher to rescue the casualty. 
4.9.8 Onshore Scenario 3- Tanker driver bangs his head 
The propane tanker driver falls and hits his head. There is a serious propane leak from 
the loading hoses and the technician tries to shut it off. The EMT activate shutdown and 
the fixed monitors then call the emergency services. Multiple fires start in the 
refrigeration building and the deluge is activated. The driver is pulled clear but is 
unconscious. The muster point is moved to a safer area. The emergency services must be 
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diverted to the back gate to avoid worsening the situation. The gas cloud drifts so the 
team set up foam monitors on the hot oil system. They also activate cooling on the 
propane tanker. The muster is completed minus one person -a training consultant. A 
fireball occurs which send propane down the drains. Foam is put down the drains. The 
missing person is found. The ESV does not close properly and the on-scene team are 
asked to deal with this. The fire starts to die down. The casualty is put in the ambulance 
and the ESV is successfully closed. The main fires are put out and the refrigeration unit 
is depressurised so the on-scene team can concentrate on isolating the leak. 
4.9.9 Onshore Scenario 4- Explosion at tail gas unit 
There is an explosion at the tail gas unit. The emergency services are contacted and the 
shutdown is initiated. A muster starts and a technician sent to investigate. He finds 3 
casualties in the area, all of whom are badly burnt. The EMT depressurise the tail gas 
unit and organise the fire truck. The fire dies down and the team manage to activate 
water curtains on it. One person is missing from the muster and one of the casualties 
starts to go into shock. A search and rescue is put under way and the on-scene team turn 
the foam monitor off to help them with the search. Meanwhile, the missing person turns 
up at the muster. 
4.9.10 Onshore Scenario 5- Brown liquid emission 
There are gas alarms on the tail gas unit and security report a strong smell in that area. A 
number of people are injured at the top of the unit and are covered in brown liquid. The 
EMT start the muster and shutdown. The gas cloud moves over the area and the EMT 
organise for fixed monitors to be activated. Security move from their block out of 
danger. The muster is completed with 3 people missing. However, because security were 
not in their unit, the emergency services were not contacted. The EMT arrange for this 
to be carried out. The emergency services arrive but the keys to the site are in the 
security block so they must use bolt cutters. The EMT suggest that they go round 
through the colliery gate. This involves passing underneath a low bridge but the 
installation manager believes this is possible. One technician is stuck in a lab and can 
smell gas but cannot get his breathing apparatus to work. They realise that it is solvent 
regen that is losing pressure. Two technicians are suited up in chemical suits and 
breathing apparatus to enter the unit. The HVAC trips. The on-scene team need to break 
into the lab to rescue the casualty. The gas affects a man and his dog walking outside the 
site. The technicians identify the leak and work on it. The police arrive to reassure the 
villagers. Resources are diverted to the man and his dog. The leak is isolated and the gas 
levels drop. 
4.9.11 Onshore Scenario 6- Leak On GSU B 
The amine flash drum starts to lose pressure. A technician goes to investigate. A leak 
starts on Gas Sweetening Unit B. The EMT start a muster and shutdown. The 
technicians muster. Manual Alarms are activated by the Dew Point B and by the Hot oil 
heaters. There are strong winds on site taking the gas across the railway track. The 
emergency services are called. The gas affects people working on the railway track. The 
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EMT activate the foam monitors. 2 people are missing from the muster. One of the 
missing persons is found and he is suffering from gas inhalation. The EMT stop the 
railway traffic. The final missing person is found and he has had a fright. The plant is 
depressurised. One of the railway workers is found to have had a heart attack. The 
casualties are taken off in the ambulances. 
4.9.12 Onshore Scenario 7- Collapsed scaffolding 
The scaffolding collapses around the regen unit. The technicians go to identify the 
problem. B train regen appears to have fallen down and there are 2 people lying on the 
side of the road. The technician can see at least 2 more people trapped in the wreckage. 
There is a flammable gas and toxic gas detection. The technician finds the scaffolding on 
the export pipeline. The EMT start a shutdown, muster and call the emergency services 
(including ordering cutting gear). They activate the monitors in the area. The muster 
point is moved to a safe area. Essential services are stopped and the water curtains are 
activated. The EMT suggest that the emergency services come round the colliery road. 
The ESV is shut but a hot oil spill occurs on the scaffolding. They arrange for tarpaulins 
to be placed over the casualties to protect them from the hot oil - however there are no 
tarpaulins available. The EMT suggests that they use water sprays instead. The on-scene 
team find that the tapping on the outlet valve has broken so it is impossible to isolate. 
They realise that they will need lifting gear so get the crane driver from the muster. They 
start cutting the men out and moving the scaffolding. This causes the platform to 
collapse. A policeman arrives in the control room to discuss the problems. There is a 
hissing noise in the region of the scaffolding. The crane driver is reluctant to go back on 
site until he is offered double time for the job. The on-scene team identify that the leak is 
an air leak. The hot oil leak is dying down and the plant is depressurising. The team find 
all the missing people and start to cut them out. They get a Nitrogen purge on the sales 
gas manifold. The casualties are badly burnt and in shock. 
4.9.13 Onshore Scenario 8- Spinal injury on column, icy weather 
There are technicians working on top of regen B in icy weather. One of the technicians 
slips and falls off the stairs and knocks himself unconscious. Another technician climbs 
the column to join them and finds that the technician will need an ambulance. Spinal 
injuries are suspected. The EMT call an ambulance and a snorkel and start a muster. The 
team on top of the regeneration unit ask for a stretcher and some blankets, as they are 
worried about hypothermia. The casualty starts to go into shock and the nurse is 
convinced that he has broken his neck. They start to activate the crane. The fire engine 
comes over the bridge and skids into the front gate, crushing one of the security guards. 
The crane skids and goes into the pipeline - some technicians struggle to get the driver 
out. There is a smell of H2S so they activate the monitors but the diesel firewater pumps 
fail. The casualty's condition deteriorates and he starts to have breathing difficulties. As 
the security guard is crushed against the gate, the next fire engine and snorkel cannot get 
through the gate. They send the resources to the colliery gate and send personnel there 
with bolt croppers. The casualty on the regeneration unit goes into cardiac arrest. The 
on-scene team work on putting Nitrogen on the flare line. 
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4.9.14 Onshore Scenario 9- Leak at dewpoint A 
Technicians working on Dew point A cause a leak. This gets worse then sprays fluid 
everywhere. There is a flammable gas detection in Dew point A. The EMT activate 
shutdown and the monitors. A radiographer is working with a radioactive source and 
they ask him to ensure it is replaced before attending the muster. The monitors are facing 
away from the incident. The emergency services are called. The on-scene team put the 
breathing apparatus on and go to turn the monitors around. The gas cloud drifts towards 
Dew point B. The radiographer cannot be found and they do not know whether the 
source is safe: 3 people'are missing from Dew point A. ' When found, the radiographer 
does not want to go back on site but confirms that the source is exposed. A body is 
found by one of the technicians. The 2 other missing people are found. One is vomiting 
badly; the other is in shock with cold bums. The emergency services arrive but are 
reluctant to let their staff on site as they overheard messages about a "bombing source". 
The on-scene team agree to bring the casualties to the emergency services at the gate. 
4.10: CONCLUSIONS 
Given that this chapter has described both the research rationale and 
methodology and the scenario arrangements set down for the research, the next chapter 
will move on to discuss in more detail how data were collected and analysed. 
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Chapter 5 
SCENARIO DATA ANALYSIS - THE TASK 
PERFORMANCE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT 
MODEL 
SECTION 5.1: INTRODUCTION 
Given the arrangements for the scenario were as described in the previous 
chapter, it was necessary to find some way of collecting data to analyse the simulations 
in an objective and scientific way. At the beginning of the research, it was thought that to 
fulfil the objectives, the methodology would be required to: 
" examine decision-making in an emergency situation 
" differentiate between good and bad emergency management strategies and decisions 
" produce a quantitative result based on objective measures that could be useful for 
HRA or QRA. 
" be scientifically valid and reliable 
" be consistent with real-life knowledge of emergencies and emergency management 
therefore could represent all the relevant features for a post-hoc analysis of a real 
incident (and potentially be validated in this way) 
" have the potential to be developed to incorporate additional factors, different 
contexts or situations. 
" did not rely on the provision of external resources (for example, access to emergency 
management teams), but could still be useful if such resources became available 
" was simple enough to be used with novice emergency managers but also beneficial 
for those with more expertise (and therefore could be used to quantify the impact of 
training) 
" was fully repeatable 
However, these requirements were focused on developing both a medium for 
data collection and a method of analysis - hence the initial development of the desktop 
simulation (as discussed in Appendix 2). Therefore, given that the external resources and 
dedicated simulations were now available, the requirements had to change to compensate 
for this. At this point, it was deemed possible that this would require a completely new 
methodology. Although the dedicated simulation data could be considered as having 
greater external validity than the desktop simulation, it also would create problems for 
the analysis - namely recording the data, incorporating the complexity into the 
assessment methodology and coping with the lack of experimental control over the 
scenario organisation. 
Ideally an observation methodology should have yielded data from the dedicated 
simulations by developing a framework to categorise the actions, events and decisions 
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over time. However, it quickly became obvious that each scenario was so data-intensive 
that recording all the activities with written notes would be impossible. Also, due to lack 
of technical knowledge of what was generally considered to be "good" emergency , 
management, it quickly became clear that the author would not acquire the assessment 
skills within the length of time assigned to this research project. Fortunately, the 
companies involved permitted the author to use a video camera to record the emergency 
management room activities during the simulations - as long as confidentiality was 
ensured. Together with this, the crucial boards could be photographed once the scenario 
was completed, allowing most of the important information to be recorded. However, 
the dedicated simulations were not based on a strict framework like the desktop 
simulation. Therefore there was no clearly identified point in time when external tasks are 
completed or when incidents have escalated or been controlled to a particular degree. 
For scientifically ideal conditions, it would be necessary to control the environment in 
which the investigation takes place to a degree where it is fully repeatable. This would 
probably involve changing the scenario arrangements (particularly the planning stage) 
described in the previous chapter - which was not an available option for this piece of 
research. However, even a highly flexible plan may be changed during the running of a 
simulation due to the reactions of the emergency management team. Therefore, although 
the scenarios themselves were not expected to be repeatable, given that the critical 
information was recorded, it was expected that the assessment technique should yield 
consistent results. Therefore, this methodology should produce reliable quantitative 
values of the impact of emergency management on risk for the observed decisions, 
independent of the assessor's judgement. 
Therefore, considering these differences between the desktop and dedicated 
simulations, it was necessary to identify a method of scientifically evaluating the recorded 
data. At first, it was reasonable to return to the concepts used in the assessment of the 
desktop simulation. The relationship between % safe area, % people evacuated and time 
seemed to correspond to a valid indication of successful outcome in an emergency. 
Although this was a simple technique, this objective outcome-based assessment 
mechanism dealt with some of the criticisms of current HRA and QRA techniques 
suggesting their unsuitability to assess the impact of emergency management on risk 
reduction. 
These positive features include the following: 
" Situation-specific features of the tasks, such as the impact of real-time or team 
actions, can be incorporated into the quantification process - without task 
decomposition or generalisation 
" Quantification is less reliant on expert judgment, in that the expertise required were 
mainly in the planning stage and predominantly involved physical information (such 
as movement speed and fire escalation), which is obtainable from objective sources. 
" Consistency with real-life knowledge of emergency management - Some 
interventions do yield results (despite the often pessimistic views used in other HRA 
techniques). Also, faster pro-active intervention is observed as producing a more 
successful outcome than slower reactive actions. 
This technique also managed to incorporate some of the positive features of the 
current techniques - such as the task context and real-time representation used in the 
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time-line analysis and the relationship between time available'/ time required and 
reliability used in HCR and other HRA methods (See Sections 2.4.4.2.5 and 2.4.4.2.8 for 
more details). 
Therefore, using a system of assessment that was objective, observable and based 
on the physical outcome of emergency tasks was a good starting point. This would fulfil 
the requirements of assessment in that it could distinguish between good and poor 
emergency management. Also, it was not based on "luck" - in that it could compare the 
observed outcome against the best possible and worst possible outcomes given the 
situation. However, at this stage, it was required that the technique could produce post- 
hoc results for real-incidents as well as the assessment of simulations. At this point, it 
was not clear how this level of complexity could be incorporated to give an overall 
quantitative value for reliability. Another main issue in HRQ was the incorporation of 
uncertainty in the process. It is rare that information is so accurate that point values can 
be obtained to apply in quantification. Therefore the superior methods of HRQ would 
use distributions of values to encompass the whole range of possible values in their 
assessment. 
Therefore, at this point, it became logical to return to the TPRC model and 
identify whether it could use its particular features of merit within the research. These 
included: 
" Production of a Probability of Success / Time function 
" Flexibility of structure to represent any task that has a time required / time available 
relationship with reliability 
" Ability to incorporate situation-specific factors affecting the outcome 
" Incorporation of "real-time" - consistent with the importance of time impact in an 
emergency 
" Ability to represent the concept of the desktop simulation (i. e. the objective 
outcome-based assessment technique) 
" Results were based predominantly on physical, observable quantitative values 
including degrees of uncertainty 
" Changes in parameters values can be tested using the model to assess the impact of 
change on risk reduction 
" Basis in sound mathematical principles of reliability 
" Minimal reliance on expert judgment for the selection of values 
Therefore, this could be used with the same concept as the desktop simulation (i. e. 
objective outcome-based assessment) in the context of the dedicated simulations 
(multiple tasks and objectives in an offshore/onshore situation) hence fulfilling the first 
three objectives of the research. Therefore, this model and its use in this research will be 
discussed in the sections to follow - starting with a brief overview of how the model 
works. 
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SECTION 5.2: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FINAL METHOD 
This section describes pictorially the overview of the whole method as it appears 
at the end of the research. Figure 13 shows the top level of the TPRC process which 
demonstrates how it can be adapted for real incidents (that is, incidents that have actually 
happened), novel situations (possible situations that can be "imagined") and simulations 
(which may be developed through a combination of knowledge on real incidents and 
imagining novel situations and are then simulated and observed through the use of an 
emergency management team). Central to the analyses of these three sorts of data is the 
TPRC methodology that uses the TPRC model. This methodology is described in further 
detail in Figure 14 and the model, which is essentially mathematical, will be described 
later in this Chapter. From Figure 13, it can be seen that, in general, the analyses of the 
three different type of incident (real, novel or simulated) follow a similar pattern. In each 
case, a transcript of the incident including estimated timings is required. In a real 
incident, the transcript follows the recorded physical events as they are known or 
remembered therefore the time relationship between some of these events will be 
accurately recorded. However, often the management actions, decisions and 
communications are not recorded. The black boxes used in aircraft would provide this 
information but currently these are not used in the offshore industry so are not available 
for post-incident analysis. 
However, in a simulated scenario, the physical events may be based on models 
and real events or they may be imagined, but the management actions and 
communications can be observed and recorded using a video camera and included with 
some degree of accuracy in the transcript. Therefore, for each of these two types of 
situation, there are uncertainties associated with at least one of the aspects - the real 
physical events or the management events. Therefore, information can be collected in the 
form of performance parameters from one to supplement the knowledge and enrich the 
transcript for the other. Sometimes, there will be uncertainties associated with both 
management and physical events - for example, in the case of a novel situation. In this 
case, these performance parameters must be used to provide realistic timings for both 
physical and managerial aspects of the scenario as required. 
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Figure 13: Description of the Top Level of the TPRC Process A 
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Within the centre of Figure 13, is stated "Use TPRC Methodology" which is 
expanded in Figure 14. 
I 
Using the transcripts defined for the scenario, it is necessary to first define the 
main escalation events (1). These may be points at which circumstances change - for 
example, the fire impinges on another system or a man falls overboard. Then taking each 
of these escalation events in turn, it is necessary to determine the severe consequences 
that could occur (2). Therefore, for these events, the fire could cause another explosion, 
could impinge on a critical system, such as communications, or could block a possible 
escape route. Each of these must be considered as they could be grades of possible 
"severe consequences" and all may have different impacts on other aspects of the 
emergency. In the case of the man overboard, the worst-case scenario is that he is killed - 
either by injuries caused by the fall or by hitting the structure of the platform or by 
hypothermia. 
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Figure 14: Description of the TPRC Methodology 
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Given that all the severe consequences have been defined, it is then necessary to 
try and work out what sort of tasks would impact on these consequences (3). These 
could be positive interventions (such as applying cooling to the fire or getting the fast 
rescue craft to rescue the man overboard) or negative interventions (forgetting to shut- 
down the platform, applying cooling to a different area, sending the fast rescue craft to 
rescue someone else - if the analysis is based on one specific person, this would not be 
considered as improving his chances! ). These may even be tasks that are consider 
unlikely to succeed - for example, attempting to rescue the man using the rope-ladders 
on the platform. Some consequences (for example, assuming the man dies immediately 
from injuries caused by hitting the platform during his fall) are impossible to avert using 
emergency management tasks. Therefore, these must be analysed looking at emergency 
procedures and design issues to ensure that these circumstances do not arise - or that the 
risk is as low as reasonably practicable. In the case of the real / simulated incidents - 
these tasks may be those that were actually used or attempted or those that seem like "a 
good idea" after the event. For each task, it is necessary to identify the ideal "end-state" 
of the task (4) and the point (defined in terms of resource constraints) by which the task 
must be performed to be successful (5). In the case of the fire, one ideal end-state would 
be to put out the fire - another one may be to get it to a point where it is unlikely to 
impinge on another system. Therefore these must be done before it escalates beyond 
managerial control or is allowed to reach this point of impingement. For the man 
overboard, the end-state is "ensure he is out of danger" - either by removing him from 
the water by boat or by other means. Obviously, these must be done before he dies, 
otherwise the task will be deemed to have been unsuccessful. In each case, these may 
involve managerial "sub-tasks", such as situation awareness, decisions, and 
communications, which, in terms of the physical processes, are delays. Therefore it is 
necessary to work out the possible factors causing delays for each emergency . 
management task (6). Given that all these issues have been taken into account, it should 
then be possible to define numerical values (including values to represent the uncertainty 
associated with each value) for the main parameters in each task - resource constraint 
relationship (7). Data can be collected from a variety of sources to produce the most 
accurate numerical representation of this relationship as shown in Figure 13. These 
values are then inputted into the TPRC model program (8). The output of the 
"probability of success" function for each respective task under the defined 
circumstances is produced as shown in Figure 13. 
This section describes, in brief, how the TPRC methodology and the TPRC 
model work together to produce probability of success functions for emergency 
management tasks. Figures 13 and 14 also demonstrate how real and simulated incidents 
can be used to provide performance parameter data both to enrich the assessment 
process for each other as well as increase the accuracy in assessing novel situations. 
Therefore now this chapter will continue by describing the detailed functioning of the 
TPRC model. 
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SECTION 5.3: THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINT MODEL 
This section describes the original philosophy behind the model, including the 
mathematical equations that define it. This also describes how the original model was 
constructed and then the modifications that were made to allow the emergency 
management exercise data to be analysed. 
5.3.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINT MODEL 
The Task Performance Resource Constraint model, developed by Strutt, Loa & 
Allsopp (1996), has its origins in mechanical and structural reliability. The original model 
involved probabilistic methods to give time-contingent probabilities of success - mainly 
focused on component strength, the loads applied on it and the progressive effects of 
fatigue. This model also incorporated the idea of uncertainty - where measures of both 
strength and load were assigned a distribution of possible values. 
These attributes indicated that the model had great potential for measuring 
human reliability over time. This original model then underwent considerable 
development to be capable of assessing human reliability in non-destructive inspection 
(Loa, Strutt & Lock 1995), system operations (Loa, Strutt and Allsopp 1996) and diving 
(Strutt, Loa and Allsopp 1996). As discussed in Section 2.4.4 and further in Section 5.1, 
the current methods of HRA do not represent the aspects which have an impact on risk 
in an emergency. Therefore the TPRC model had the potential to rectify this problem. 
First, it was necessary to convert the important concepts from emergency management 
into a form that could be used in the model. This conversion will be described in the next 
section. 
5.3.2 THE APPLICATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DATA IN THE 
TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
As discussed in Section 2.36.1, the success of emergency management is often 
subjectively judged by the outcome. If an optimal conclusion is obtained from a 
dangerous initiating event, emergency management has been successful. If a tragic 
outcome is produced from a minor incident, then emergency management has failed. This 
may be an informal and subjective assessment method but it is based on objective 
physical values, such as the number of survivors or amount of the building saved. This 
idea was already demonstrated in the desktop simulation shown in Appendix 2. . 
Given that emergency management is often assessed by its outcome, it must be 
established which factors or tasks to be completed are critical in influencing the outcome 
in a real incident. For example, the factors that influence the number of survivors in a fire 
may involve the rescue of some casualties, which may involve: 
" putting out the fire 
" removing the casualties away from the problem 
" leaving the casualties where they are but protecting them from the problem 
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It is notable that these are all tasks that can be objectively measured and therefore, their 
progress can be quantitatively assessed. 
The problems that occur in carrying out these tasks may include: 
" increased escalation of the fire 
" increased escalation of the casualties' injuries 
Both of these problems would restrict the progress of the tasks - eventually 
preventing the tasks from being successfully completed. For example, it would be 
impossible to remove the casualties away from the problem if the fire escalated to make 
the area impenetrable. Also, the task would not be deemed successful if a team of 
rescuers risked their lives to reach the casualties then found that they had already died 
from their injuries. However, the objective view of the situation must be considered. If, 
given the situation, the observed outcome is compared against the best possible and 
worst possible outcomes - then the success of the task can be established. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider how emergency management tasks such as 
these can be represented in a form where they can be used in the TPRC model. Therefore 
initially, a simple movement task, namely "getting to the casualties" can be used to 
describe how the TPRC model is used. Any task where the performance is measurable 
using objective physical limits can be represented in the same way. This task can be 
shown as the distance/time graph shown in Figure 15.. 
Figure 15: Simple distance/time graph 
Distance 
-; Zz: ýq Delays 
Required Distance (R) 
Time 
However, in an emergency, it is unlikely that there is unlimited time available to 
complete the distance. If the task cannot be completed within the available time, it is 
failed in either of two ways. A performance shortfall occurs when the task is carried out 
up to the limit of time available but is not completed. Late completion occurs when the 
task is continued until it is completed but overran the time limit. In our example of 
"getting to the casualties", a performance shortfall is where the rescuers do not complete 
the distance. This may be due to the fact that they are driven back by fire. Late 
completion is where the rescuers reach the casualties but it is too late to provide any 
assistance to them. These failures can be shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Task Performance graph showing failures due to time limit 
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This provides the fundamental concept behind the use of the TPRC model to 
assess the impact of emergency management on risk reduction. However, the complexity 
is provided by the underlying probabilities as used in the model. Each of the parameters 
has a degree of uncertainty associated with its numerical value. For example, it is not 
known how long the casualties will live, the exact speed of the rescuers or the actual 
distance of the casualties. If each parameter is assigned a distribution of values, we may 
get a graph similar to that shown in Figure 17. 
Figure 17: Emergency Management task performance graph showing variances and their 
respective probability distributions 
In this case, the solid lines represent the original values from Figure 16. However, 
each of the lines (representing speed, distance to be achieved and time limits) is now 
enclosed by two dotted lines. These represent the uncertainty around the values given to 
the three parameters. Therefore speed is not a specific constant value, for example, 1 
metre per second. It is a range of possible values, for example, from 0.5 metres per 
second to 1.5 metres per second. Therefore, if each of the parameter involved has 
uncertainty associated with its values, it may be represented by a probability distribution, 
as symbolised by a, b and c on Figure 17. If the task action is initially considered on its 
own - without considering the available time, this gives us the graph shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Emergency Management task performance graph showing probability 
distributions of speed and distance to be achieved 
Figure 18 shows that over time the "task progress" distribution eventually reaches and 
overlaps the "distance to be achieved" distribution. The pattern of distributions at time x 
and time y will be shown individually in Figures 19 and 20 (having been rotated 90° to 
the left). 
Figure 19 represents the characteristics of the distributions obtained at time x. 
Figure 19: Distributions of actual performance and required performance at time x 
Required task Actual task 
performance (R) performance (A) 
Frequency 
Performance 
At this point in time, there is very little overlap between the two graphs. 
Therefore there is a minute probability that the actual task performance (task progress) 
will equal the required task performance (distance to be achieved) at time x. This use of 
probability distributions that change over time is based on the limit state concept by 
Strutt (1995). Figure 20 represents the characteristics of the distributions obtained at 
time Y. 
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Figure 20: Distributions of actual performance and required performance at time y 
Required task Actual task 
performance (R) performance (A) 
Frequency 
Performance 
Now there is some overlap of the distributions. This indicates that although it is 
not definite, it is probable that the actual task performance (task progress) is equal to the 
required task performance (distance to be achieved). The uncertainty surrounding each 
value has given rise to a probability that the task will be achieved rather than discrete 
values of "task not achieved" or "task achieved". For example, if the actual task 
performance (task progress) tends towards the upper limits of its distribution and the 
required task performance (distance to be achieved) is at the lower limits of its 
distribution, it will fall within the shaded area. This means that the required task 
performance will be achieved (equalled by the actual task performance). However, 
consider how the graphs would appear if there was greater certainty about the size of the 
distance to be achieved and the task progress rate. This would make the dotted lines 
shown in Figures 17 and 18 closer to the solid lines. Consequently, this would decrease 
the breadth of the distributions in Figures 18,19 and 20 - probably removing the overlap 
shown in Figure 20. This relates to the concept of reliability (Strutt 1995), which will be 
further explained through the use of the mathematical equations upon which the original 
Task Performance Resource Constraint Model was based. These will be described in 
more detail in the next section. 
5.3.3 THE MATHEMATICAL BASIS OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
In terms of mathematical formulae, it is first necessary to simplify the concept of 
"probability of success" by calculating the probability of success of the actual 
performance (A) when the required performance (R) is a known. measured value. Firstly 
the Required Performance R is represented as a distribution from R to R+dR (where dR 
tends to zero). The use of a distribution at this stage facilitates calculation of the 
probability of success when Required performance (R) is represented as a probability 
density function - as will be described later. The Probability of Success is represented by 
the Actual performance (A) being greater than the Required Performance (R). 
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For this, the logical concept, IF -Y AND Z, THEN X can be used. 
Where X, Y and Z are defined as: 
X: Actual performance A succeeds at Required performance level R. 
Y: Required performance lies between R and R+dR 
Z: Actual performance A is greater than Required performance level R. 
Therefore the probability of success is defined as P(X) and is calculated from the 
respective probabilities of events Y and Z occurring. In statistics, this is given by the 
product rule, whereby the probability of two events occurring is calculated by the 
product of their respective individual probabilities. 
That is, P(X) = P(Y). P(Z) 
P(Y) is the probability that the Required performance R lies between R and R+dR, which 
is written as P(R, R+dR). In the graphs shown below, this is represented as -a probability 
density function to represent the range of possible values. 
P(Y) = P(R, R+dR) = f(r). dr 
f(r)dr is the term that is used to calculate the area beneath the curve corresponding to the 
Required performance (R). This is the probability that R is a particular value obtained 
from a distribution of possible Required performances - as shown in Figure 21. 
Figure 21: Representation of Probability (Y) 
R+dR 
Probability rl 
Performance 
P(Z) is the probability that the actual performance (A) is greater than the required 
performance R (A>R). As this function represents the probability that one value is 
greater than another value, it can be represented as a Cumulative Frequency Distribution. 
As shown in Figure 22, Al is relatively low in comparison to the distribution. This 
indicates that it is very unlikely that the actual performance will exceed the required 
performance therefore indicating failure in the task. However, at A2, it is probable that 
the actual performance will exceed the required task performance therefore resulting in 
success in the task. 
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Figure 22: Representation of Probability (Z) 
Probability 
Al A2 
Performance 
The mathematical formula for the probability is obtained from the calculation of the area 
bound by the curve, which is found by integrating the formula of the curve between the 
origin and L as follows: 
P(Z) = P(A>R) = of g(A)da 
Given that P(X) = P(Y). P(Z), 
P(X) = P(A>R). P(R, R+dr) = f(R) oTg(A)da 
This formula considers the case for a specific known value of Required performance R. 
Therefore; this has only derived the formula for the probability of component failure for 
this Required performance level. If it is necessary to establish the formula for probability 
of success for ANY value of required performance in the distribution, the whole range of 
possible values of R must be included in the formula. This involves using the integral of 
the formula for R, R+ dr. 
P(F) =2 f(R) [ -Jg(A)da 
] dr 
This is abbreviated as: 
P(F) =(°° f(R). G(P) dp 
Combining these probabilities results in the graph shown in Figure 23. This is also 
comparable to the graphs shown in Figures 19 and 20. 
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Figure 23: Combined probability of success based on distributions of actual performance 
and recguiredperformance 
Probability 
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Performance (p) 
The overlap between the two curves shown in the graph above represents the probability 
of success. Note that if the distribution of required performance was increased, the 
overlap would be greater and hence the probability of success would increase. If the 
distribution of required performance was decreased, then the overlap (and consequently 
the probability of success) would be smaller. 
However, there is another factor be considered. As shown earlier, actual performance 
changes over time - usually increasing towards the required performance. Therefore in 
mathematical terms, this requires the use of another axis to represent change over time. 
As shown in Figure 19, there is initially no overlap. However, as time progresses and 
actual performance improves, this overlap occurs. This can be shown in Figure 24. 
Figure 24: Performance change over Time 
P 
Performance 
The areas bounded by the curves R and A>R (as shown in Figure 23) give the probability 
of success. Over time, the increasing actual performance results in an increase in the 
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probability of success. If the probability of success is plotted with respect to time, a 
graph similar to that shown in Figure 25 can be obtained. 
Figure 25: Probability of Success Curve from comparison of Actual 
_ 
Performance with 
Required 
_Performance 
However, emergency management performance has another feature, which has 
not been mentioned for some time - the concept of available time (or available 
resources). Modelling the time or resources can be carried out using the same process as 
was used to model the task performance. There are resources available (the upper limit 
of the resource consumption) and a resource consumption rate - where resources are 
consumed over time. Both parameters may have uncertainties associated with them. This 
can be shown in Figure 26, which is comparable with Figure 18. 
Figure 26: Emergency Management task performance graph showingprobabiliiy 
distributions of resource consumption rate and available resources 
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However, this concept differs from the Actual Performance - Required Performance 
graph in that an overlap between the two distributions represents the event of running 
out of available resources. This therefore would result in failure. Therefore as time 
increases, the overlap between the two distributions increases in probability. If we take 
the probability of success to indicate "having available resources", this results in the 
graph shown in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27: Probability of Success Curve from comparison of Resources used with 
Available Resources 
Probability 
of success 
Time 
. rr 
Therefore the overall probability of success over time (as both resource 
consumption rate and task progression rate can be compared to the time axis) can be 
represented by the area underneath the two curves as shown in Figure 28. This is similar 
to the HRA methods described in Section 2.4.4.2.8. 
Figure 28: Probability of Success in Human Performance Tasks 
Probability of task completion 
given no time constraint 
Time availability 
Probability of task success 
given time available 
Figure 28 represents how the TPRC model is used to assess human reliability. In 
mathematical terms, the probability of success is calculated at each time point by the 
product of the two probabilities for Task Performance and Resource Consumption 
respectively. This is comparable to the use of the product between % safe area and % 
people evacuated as used in the desktop simulation. In the TPRC model, this is 
calculated by a computer program. Some of the terms that were used in the original 
TPRC computer program are shown in Figure 29 and are comparable to the graphs 
shown in Figures 15 and 16. 
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Figure 29: Task Performance Model showing terms 
The formulae used to incorporate this into the model are shown in Appendix 4 and are 
quoted from Appendix 1 of Strutt, Loa and Allsopp (1996). However, the parameters 
are shown here in Table 6. 
Table 6: Parameters used in the Task Performance Resource Constraint Model 
MODEL PARAMETERS SYMBOL 
Linear work rate / Learning rate a (ij, p) 
Initial level of knowledge / Head start bo , Jumps in knowledge / Short cuts b (ij, p) 
Time between work rate changes At , Common cause factor k (ij, p) 
Task requirement / task standard w, 
Resource consumption rate r Cb, dc) 
Initial resource capacity X(1,3) 
As can be seen in Table 6, each symbol is followed by a bracket containing two 
other symbols. These symbols represent the values needed to express the probability 
distribution for each parameter. For the resource consumption rate, Cb represents the 
basic rate of consumption and dc refers to the deviation coefficient associated with this 
parameter. This is a linear parameter and is not affected by jumps forward or short cuts. 
For all the other symbols, il and ß refer to the scale and shape factor in a Weibull 
distribution respectively. This distribution is widely used in reliability analysis as its 
probability density function is capable of exhibiting a number of different shapes (Loa 
1997 Chapter 3 p. 13 & Appendix B). 
In brief, the scale factor of a Weibull distribution is similar to the mean value - it 
gives an indication of the scale of the distribution. The shape factor is more complicated 
- values equal to or less than 1 tend towards a random value, the value 3.4 approximates 
to a normal distribution and values equal to or greater than 5 are strongly deterministic - 
showing a sharp peak around the scale factor. Examples of these are shown in Figure 30 
and the relevant equations used to define the Weibull function are shown in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 30: The Weibull Distribution 
The next section discusses the inputs, processing and outputs of the original TPRC 
model. 
5.3.4 THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
PROGRAM 
5.3.4.1 Inputs to the Original Program 
The inputs to the program are based around the parameters in Table 6 with a few 
additions. The actual format of the input is given in a text file similar to that shown in 
Figure 31. 
Figure 31: Input to the TPRC Model Program 
W (T1, R) 
a (T1, ß) 
b (T1, R) 
X (T1, ß) 
r (Cb, dc) 
Number of data points 
Frequency of data point collection 
Number of Iterations 
bo Initial level of knowledge (r1, ß) 
At, Work rate change (r1, ß) 
k, Common cause factor (rl, ß) 
Many of these values are represented in Figure 29. For example, if W is given the values 
of 100,6.7, this indicates that there is a small amount of variance surrounding the value 
100. This would be used when the task involves moving 100 metres or can be used to 
represent a percentage of task completion. 
a (n, ß) represents the task speed. If this is given the values, 1,1.0, this indicates that the 
speed is 1 unit of task per unit of time but there is a larger amount of variance about the 
value. This may be 1 metre per second, 1 mile per hour etc. 
b (rl, ß) represents a jump forward or a short cut. Therefore, this would indicate progress 
in excess of the normal speed defined by "a" and is defined by a vertical line on the task 
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performance graph shown in Figure 29. b,, (rl, p) represents a jump forward at the 
beginning of the task - indicating a head start. 
X and r are linked parameters as they relate to resources available and the resource 
consumption rate. These may represent available air or water (and therefore breathing 
rate or speed of water use). They may also be represented as time, whereby the resource 
consumption rate would have a one to one relationship with the time axis. 
The number of data points that are collected when outputting the final data are shown in 
the second column. This indicates the number of probability values that are selected - 
with respect to time. Given that the final output of the model is a probability of success 
curve, a larger number of data points in the same length of time (along the x axis) results 
in a smoother, more accurate curve. However, due to the memory limitations of the 
computer, this was given an upper limit of 200 points. Therefore, there would be 200 
pieces of data recorded for each calculation. 
The next value is linked to this concept as it specifies how often a data point is collected. 
For example, this may be every time unit (0,1,2,3) or every 2 time units (0,2,4,6) etc. 
Sometimes, the task completion and resource availability are expected to take over 200 
time units. If 200 data points were recorded for every time unit, the crucial data would 
not be recorded by the analysis. In this case, we must sample over a greater duration so 
must stretch out the time between the collection of points. Therefore this value may be 2 
(collecting points at 0,2,4... 400), 3 (collecting points at 0,3,6... 600). Ideally this should 
be as low as the data demands - to get the best possible level of accuracy in the curve - 
as demonstrated by Figure 32, comparing the same data using 3 points or in II points 
respectively. 
Figure 32: Demonstration of the Impact of Number of Data Points in Probability of 
Success Functions 
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The next value reflects the number of Monte Carlo iterations to be carried out. For each 
iteration, the program will run through the task performance and resource constraint 
variables - choosing a value from each distribution and eventually producing a probability 
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of success curve with respect to time. The more times that the program runs through this 
procedure, the more variations that will be incorporated into the final values - therefore 
producing a more accurate curve. This is limited by hardware capabilities more than 
software and it is found that the higher the number, the longer the processing takes. 
At reflects how often the work rate "a" changes within its distribution over time - that is, 
the consistency of the speed. A small value indicates that the work rate changes often 
within its distribution, only working for a small sample of time before the rate is chosen 
again from the distribution. A large value indicates that there is a large time value before 
the speed changes - indicating a more consistent level of speed. These can be 
demonstrated in Figure 33. 
Figure 33: The Impact of At on Work Rate 
Task 
Progress 
IIIIIIII 
Large At 
Small At 
F7 Time 
Note that, as shown in Figure 33, just because the rate of change of work is faster for the 
small At does not mean the overall work progress is faster. 
k can affect the overall speed of the task. This has been compared to motivation. If given 
a scale factor of I with a highly deterministic shape factor, this will not affect the other 
parameters. If given a scale factor value greater than 1, this indicates that the person 
doing the task is more motivated and therefore, works quicker, increasing the task speed, 
«a", 
5.3.4.2 The Processing of the Original Task Performance Resource Constraint 
Model Program 
Once these values have been inputted into the text file as appropriate, the file is 
saved and the program is loaded. This involved a Delphi (Visual Pascal) program - with a 
button labelled "Run". On clicking on this with the left mouse button, the program will 
run - indicating its progress along a bar. When processing is finished, the words "run 
complete" appear in a box. 
In mathematical terms, the program starts with time point 0. Using this, it 
calculates the associated probability of success according to the formulae specifying the 
task performance and resource consumption. Then, the program will take the second 
time point and repeat the process. The probability of success is calculated again and so 
on until the specified number of data points (up to 200) has been collected. The program 
will repeat this whole process until all the iterations have been carried out and then, for 
each time point, will give the average value produced. This will then output the values of 
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the time points and the probability of success associated with each one. This result is 
shown in the next section. 
5.3.4.3 The Outputs from the Original Task Performance Resource Constraint 
Model Program 
The program outputs the data to a text file, in which it displays two columns of 
data. These can then be loaded into a spreadsheet (e. g. Excel) to allow graphs to be 
plotted. The data obtained takes the form of Table 7. 
Table 7: Output from the Task Performance Resource Constraint Model Program 
1.0 , 0.00 
2.0 0.03 
3.0 0.09 
4.0 0.18 
5.0 0.30 
6.0 0.44 
7.0 0.59 
8.0 0.72 
9.0 0.82 
10.0 0.90 
The column on the left represents the time points at which the data was taken. So 
if the frequency of data collection had been 4.0, the values reading down this column 
would be 4.0,8.0,12.0 etc. The values in the right column represent the probabilities of 
success associated with that point in time. The probability of success has been calculated 
considering the probability of task completion as well as the probability of still having 
available resources as shown in Figure 29. This concludes the description of the original 
model as designed by Strutt, Loa & Allsopp (1996). 
5.3.5 ADAPTATIONS OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINT MODEL FOR THIS PROJECT 
5.3.5.1 Introduction 
Up until this point, this section has only described the original model's 
development and processing - as described by Strutt, Loa & Allsopp (1996). Section 
6.2.2 outlined how emergency management performance could be represented in the 
TPRC model - through a comparison of actual and required performance. However, this 
section will describe how the model was adapted to facilitate the calculation of 
probability of success in emergency management tasks. This would fulfil one of the main 
objectives of the research project. Despite the TPRC model being a good basis for a 
performance evaluation mechanism as outlined in Section 5.3.2, there were a few 
changes that were necessary before this could be achieved. 
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5.3.5.2 Removal of Motivational Element, k 
Firstly, the current emphasis of the model was based on a positive attitude 
towards task completion. For example, as stated in the previous section, the" common 
cause factor, k, had to be a positive value greater than 1. The concept behind this was 
the idea of performance increasing due to high motivation but was a late addition to the 
original model concept - only being added in Loa (1997). As all the inputted values were 
required to be positive, it could only increase task performance. In an emergency, there 
are many factors that are likely to decrease task performance, such as confusion or 
stress; therefore, this was taken out of the equation returning it to the original form used 
in Strutt, Loa & Allsopp (1996). 
5.3.5.3 Representation of Physical Parameters and Incorporation of the Delay 
Concept 
At the initial stage of developing the TPRC model to measure human reliability, it 
was thought that the critical factors would be "required knowledge" and "available 
knowledge" (rather than "required performance" and "actual performance" as illustrated 
earlier in the text). However, assessment of emergency management indicated that 
although it relied on cognitive decision-making, it was the observable physical actions 
that provided the impact on the risk. Although deciding on a plan of action was an 
important objective; unless the plan was implemented, it would have no impact on the 
outcome of the emergency. Therefore, the main function of the TPRC model in 
evaluating emergency management skill would be to assess the probability of success in 
the physical tasks. 
Using the TPRC concept to represent emergency management tasks,, the 
mitigation of the emergency management team is defined in terms of task progress and 
the escalation is defined in terms of resource consumption. On re-examination of the task 
performance aspect of the TPRC model (as shown in Figure 29), it was notable that 
although there were facilities to represent jumps forward in progress or an initial "head 
start", there was no method of representing the reverse -a delay in the initiation of the 
task. In a real-life or simulated emergency, it is usual that the escalation (or resource 
consumption) starts before any of the mitigation activities (or task progress). This could 
only be represented by a step backwards (-b), a "jump forward" in the initiation of 
resource consumption or a new parameter indicating a delay on the time axis before task 
progress started. Therefore, the simplest method was to represent this concept as delay 
parameter D (r1, ß) as represented in Figure 34 (as adapted from Figure 29). (Though, it 
should be noted that as described in Section 5.3.5.4,11 and ß were changed as the input 
parameters to be the mean and x, the coefficient of variation (a/µ). 
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Figure 34: New Task Performance Model showing Delay Term 
Therefore task performance rate and overall performance achieved would have a 
value of 0 (represented by the blue line) until the delay had been completed - that is, the 
physical activities had begun. Like all the other values used in the model, D has a 
distribution value associated with it. Therefore, this can represent the variance or 
uncertainty associated with the delay value. In terms of the program's use of the 
parameter, each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation will choose a value of D from 
the distribution specified. It will then treat the resource consumption rate as before 
(starting the count at t=0) but will not start to progress the task performance parameter 
until t has reached the value of D. The task performance rate will then be calculated as in 
the previous version of the program. On the next iteration, another value of D will be 
chosen from the distribution and this will be repeated until all iterations have been 
processed. 
In mathematical terms, the equation shown in Appendix 4 defining the original 
TPRC model gives the Task Progress rate as follows: 
n 
W(t) = E(a;. At + b; ) + a+, . (t-t. ) 
i=1 
To incorporate the delay factor, this was changed to be: 
n 
W(t) = E(a;. At + b; ) + a+, . (t-t. ) 
i=n 
Where nD = D/At (nv is an integer and At is the time step for the summation process) 
As consistent with the rest of the original program, D was chosen from the Weibull 
distribution at random with scale parameter il and shape parameter ß and the values were 
given by: 
1 /ß 
u= TI. (-In(R; )) where R; is a random number between 0 and 1. 
145 
In terms of the rest of the equation, the resource consumption rate was unaffected, 
starting at the origin (i=1). 
Given that this parameter was now available in the model - it could now represent the 
delays that were evident in emergency management tasks. For example, when a fire 
starts, it would take a certain length of time before the Emergency manager is aware of 
it. This situation awareness may be brought about by a fire alarm or by being told by 
someone near the fire. Time ticks away as the emergency manager decides what to do 
about the fire. This might be a relatively quick decision, for example - activate deluge; or 
more complex, for example, send the team from the gas compression deck over the 
bridge to activate the foam monitors. Once he has decided on a course of action, he will 
then need to communicate it - this may involve telling the control room team to flick a 
switch or may involve passing on messages to a number of different parties. There is then 
another delay until these people react to the orders and follow them. As far as the fire is 
concerned, there has been no change up until the point the team act upon it. Although in 
strategic terms, much planning may have been carried out in this time, no progress 
concerning the physical emergency has been made and so using the TPRC model, this 
time is all included in terms of the delay parameter. 
This concept is called SADCAR, whereby the phases from the initiating event are 
described as: - 
" Situation Awareness 
" Decision 
" Communication 
" Action, and 
" Response. 
These are as described in the example. The term "response" refers to the system's 
response to the team's action. That is, if deluge was activated, was the fire put out or 
diminished in any way or was it as powerful as ever? 
Therefore, the delay term shown in Figure 34 can be described in more detail using 
Figure 35. 
Figure 35: Representation of Task Performance Graph for Emergency Management 
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Other examples of the delay parameter are described in Section 5.4.2.1. 
time 
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5.3.5.4 Use of the Coefficient of Variation 
In the original model, parameters were represented in terms of a distribution of 
values as defined by a scale and shape function of a Weibull distribution. However, the 
distributions of each parameter were not shown by the model before the final processing 
took place. Therefore, there was no way of checking whether the user had put in the 
values corresponding to the distribution that they believed they were using. Therefore, to 
allow the user to check whether the distribution inputted into the model was as expected, 
the program was updated to show the values + and -2 standard deviations of the mean 
for each inputted parameter. 
Also, instead of inputting Weibull values, the model was adapted so that the user 
could input a mean value and a value, x, the coefficient of variation ((Y/µ). This was 
added more for simplicity than any other reason. In general, the data obtained from the 
emergency management exercises gave strong indications of a mean value and 
implications of the variance surrounding it. It was less obvious to estimate the shape of 
the distribution. Therefore, it was simpler to describe these data in terms of a coefficient 
of variation. This was not expected to be a permanent change to the model but as an 
additional option to expand the model's capabilities - so that the user could input Weibull 
or coefficient of variation (or in the future other distributional parameters) values as 
desired. 
The relationship between the value x and the Weibull shape factors are shown in 
Figure 36, and the equations linking these are shown in Appendix 4. 
Figure 36: The relationship between the value x and the Weibull shave factor 
Coefficient of Variation, x 
0 2 4 6 
Given that these changes were made, the listing of the final program is shown in 
Appendix 5 (Original program shown in Loa 1997). . 
This concludes the section on adaptations made to the model in this research project. 
These were required to facilitate the analysis of the impact of emergency management on 
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risk reduction. Therefore the following section will describe in more detail how the data 
were collected and adapted for input into the model including specific examples. 
5.3.5.5 Independence of the Task Performance and Resource Constraint 
Parameters 
During the research leading to the model development (described in Loa 1997), it 
was thought that the tasks considered in future research would involve dependence 
between task speed and resource consumption. The example used involves a diving task 
- where the quicker the task is carried out, the quicker the resources are consumed - in 
this case, volume of air. For this reason, there was a parameter "a" linking the calculation 
of the task progress rate calculation with that of the resource consumption rate. As 
stated in Loa (1997) and shown in Appendix 4, "This fractional increase in the rate of 
resource usage is dependent on the work progress rate through the parameter a. This 
dependency is assumed to be inversely proportional to a, hence the factor r12 /a. This 
strict proportionality is moderated through a further random factor". The formula for the 
resource consumption rate included :- 
Cr; = X. (1+2. R4. dc. tji /a; ) 
However, during this research, it was identified that many emergency 
management tasks were independent. Also, where there was dependence between task 
and resource consumption rate, it could not always be established whether this 
relationship was "inversely proportional". Therefore, for simplicity - and in most cases, a 
more accurate representation of the relationship, the parameter (a; ) was set to 1- , 
therefore ensuring independence of the two equations. This issue could be readdressed 
within the equation and the program for future research, as described in Section 10.7.1.2. 
SECTION 5.4: CONVERSION OF DEDICATED SIMULATION 
DATA FOR USE IN THE TPRC MODEL 
5.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given that the TPRC model was available and could potentially be used to 
evaluate management performance in real or simulated emergencies, it was necessary to 
collect the relevant data to be used. 
To run the model required collection of the following variables - including mean values 
and the variance or uncertainty surrounding each: 
" Delays in initiation of the task 
" Speed of the task 
" Frequency of changes in task progress speed 
" Task performance required 
" Resources available to complete the task } which were used to determine the time 
" Resource consumption rate } available 
Ideally, the scenario content and timings should be designed based on realistic 
behaviour - of on-site emergency management teams, casualties and fire escalation. 
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However, these were not usually validated so collection of the real data was often useful 
in the modelling process. This included collection of design information on the 
installation and relevant equipment, human psychological, physiological and physical data 
(as shown in Chapter 6) as well as information extracted from the exercise. Given that 
the emergency manager and his team were attempting to manage the exercise as though 
it was real, their behaviour can be assumed to be a realistic representation of emergency 
management team behaviour. Further to this, as these exercises were used for assessment 
of competency in emergency management, it must be assumed that the emergency 
manager and his team were working to the best of their ability. 
The behaviours that were observed in the scenario as occurring at a specific 
moment in time were assigned a deterministic value on input to the model (e. g. deluge is 
activated when the control room operator presses the relevant button). This can be 
described as a purely objective process. However, some behaviour is imaginary, and so is 
assigned a possible time within the possible time bracket and assigned a more uncertain 
value - giving a distribution of believable figures. For example, if at 05.00 minutes into 
the scenario, the medical team leave the control room and at 15: 00 minutes, they report 
that they have located and are treating one of the casualties, it must be assumed that the 
casualties were located at some point in the 10 minute time period. However, the 
scenario organisation team does not normally record the exact point in time so this is 
assigned a mid-point value (e. g. 10 minutes) with a distribution not exceeding a width of 
5 minutes on either tail. It is recognised that this choice of variance currently relies on a 
degree of expert judgment - which involves understanding of the events and tasks 
involved as well as knowledge of the mathematical processes occurring in the model. 
Therefore, the model is not entirely objective, which somewhat contradicts the purpose 
of the research. However, this issue will be discussed more in Chapter 7, when the 
problem is addressed through the concept of performance parameter data. 
Therefore the next section will comment on particular examples of each variable 
to clarify the model's potential. 
5.4.2 EXAMPLES OF SIMULATION DATA AS USED BY THE MODEL 
5.4.2.1 Delays in initiation of the task 
As shown in Figure 35, a delay can be any feature of the task that does not 
directly (and usually positively) affect the escalation or the active physical processes. 
Although delays of some types are very productive when considering the overall 
incident, they do not have any impact on the physical emergency and so they are not 
actually reducing the risk. Therefore they should show no positive effect on the 
probability of success in emergency management tasks. 
Delays in action can be due to team strategy discussions, "time-outs", reading 
procedures or manuals, phone conversations, making tannoys or at the more negative 
end of the scale, panicking, crying or ignoring the current problems. Although the team 
strategy discussions and time-outs may result in a better response once they have been 
completed - while the team are engaged in conversation, the incident continues to 
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escalate. The only circumstances where the communication actually affects the escalation 
of an incident is in a social emergency as opposed to a physical emergency - for example, 
terrorism, sabotage or bomb threats. In this case, the communication is considered to be 
an action but the reaction to such communication is dependent on the individual., 
differences of the terrorist/saboteur, therefore is nearly impossible to model. 
Delays are also caused by the time taken in making a decision. The longer an 
individual thinks about a problem, choosing options and running through some "mental 
simulations" - the longer the incident is left to escalate. Although the resultant decision 
may be a good one, it may be too late for it to have an impact. For this reason, 
Naturalistic Decision Making is promoted in emergency management training - resulting 
in quick and timely decisions based on good situation awareness and experiential pattern- 
matching (See Section 2.3.6.1 for comments on the Kaempf and Militello 1992 
reference). 
Similarly, delays could be used to represent multiple tasks. For example, if a 
system would only work after three different buttons have been pressed, the action of 
pressing the first two buttons can be represented as a delay. Until the final button has 
been pressed, the system will not be activated. This could be represented as the success 
in 3 separate tasks. However, as the individual button-pressing tasks do not produce an 
objective physical result, they do not have any impact on the eventual outcome of the 
emergency. Only the combination of 3 tasks would make a difference by starting a 
process that will produce an objective physical result. Therefore, these are grouped 
together as a delay. 
Most of the delays that have already been discussed can be minimised so that they 
do not slow the emergency management process. These can include the design of 
technology and the careful planning of discussions or tannoys to ensure that all 
immediate actions have been initiated. However, there are some issues that will produce 
some delay no matter how efficient the emergency management team are. As shown in 
Figure 34, there is a delay before the team are aware of the problem, then delays before 
deciding on a plan of action and communicating this to the relevant parties. On receiving 
the communication, there is likely to be a delay before the action is initiated - depending 
on the complexity of the task and the preparedness of the individual. For example, if the 
task involves pressing a button in the control room, it is likely that the delay will be very 
small. If the task involves getting a medical team halfway across the platform with the 
relevant equipment, it is likely to take some time. The only way in which these delays can 
be limited is by alerting all relevant teams to stand by at the beginning of the incident. 
System or organisational delays are another aspect that cannot be changed by emergency 
management at this level. These include: 
" Delays between the control room operator pressing the relevant button and initiation 
of deluge, shutdown, blowdown 
" Delays before fire or gas leaks initiate the detection alarm. 
" Processes that occur outside of their control - for example, assigning a crew to a fast 
rescue craft or a helicopter before attending the incident 
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5.4.2.2 Speed of the task 
Once the physical task is proceeding, it has a certain mean speed of progress. 
These can include human and technological speeds. A few of the relevant speeds that 
need to be considered are listed as follows: 
" Helicopter flight 
" Personnel mustering 
" Medical team resuscitating casualties 
" Fire team searching in low visibility conditions 
" Divers ascending 
" System blowing down 
" Technician isolating valve 
As it can be seen, many of these do not readily produce values for "speed" or 
even "task to be completed" as will be discussed in Section 5.4.2.4. For example, there is 
no "speed" of resuscitation - it is simply carried out until it produces an impact on the 
casualty. For modelling purposes, if the performance requirement is a distance to be 
covered, the distance is calculated and then a mean speed of movement is used. 
5.4.2.3 Frequency of changes in task progress speed 
This is not a critical attribute of the model when it is used in emergency 
management as usually it is very uncertain (for example, the point at which a fire 
escalates) or relates to changes in the features of the task (for example, helicopter take- 
off compared to normal flight speed). Therefore this may use a very large value to ensure 
that there is no change of speed recorded in the modelling process or a very small value 
so that the number of changes made will result in an average value. 
5.4.2.4 Task performance required 
This represents the performance standard necessary to successfully complete the 
task. This may be a distance to be covered, a system state to be obtained or a number of 
casualties to be rescued. However, as shown in Section 5.4.2.2, some tasks cannot be 
measured in terms of quantitative values. Some are simply measured in terms of 
percentage. For other tasks with more complicated time-contingent processes, the 
estimated distribution of time taken to achieve the task is given as the performance goal. 
In this case, the speed of the task will have a one-to-one relationship with time. For 
example, imagine that it takes 20 minutes to blow down the platform. In this case, if the 
time base is in minutes, the task will be called 20 and the speed will be 1. If in seconds, 
the task will be 1200 and the speed will still be 1. 
5.4.2.5 Resources available to complete the task 
Resources often refer to the amount of equipment or personnel available to assist 
in the task. However, by their increased intervention, the task action speed is faster 
therefore increasing the probability of success in the task. Therefore, these aspects are 
included as part of the speed parameter. 
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In the model, resources refer to a quantity that is gradually being consumed as 
time goes on. Once consumed, if the task is not completed, it will be failed to some 
extent. In most cases, the critical resource in an emergency is time itself. Usually tasks 
must be completed before "it is too late" for example, due to fire impingement, death'of 
casualties or structural collapse of the platform. Therefore, the resource is often 
calculated in terms of time - for example, the estimated distribution at which point the 
resources will have expired. In this case, resource consumption rate will have a one-to- 
one relationship with time, as described in Section 5.4.2.4. 
Other resources are as follows: 
" water/foam - which are consumed as a fire-fighter uses an extinguisher, 
" breathable air - being consumed by divers, in breathing apparatus or in a room filling 
with smoke. 
" food - not normally a key feature in these sorts of emergency. However, for. a longer- 
term incident, having enough food to last until rescue occurs is extremely important. 
This would be particular relevant when considering natural disasters, such as famine 
and flood as well as "psychological" emergencies, such as kidnapping or terrorism, 
5.4.2.6 Resource consumption rate 
This involves the speed at which the resources are consumed. As stated in 
Section 5.4.2.5, this is often calculated in terms of time, whereby this will have a one to 
one relationship with time. For the more unusual cases, it is necessary to calculate 
consumption rate - for example, the speed of air consumption by a diver or foam 
consumption in an extinguisher. This will then be applied according to the time base used 
- for example, 25 litres/minute. 
5.4.3 CONCLUSION 
This section has described how the simulations can produce data that can be used 
in the TPRC model. Each of the model parameters has been described in turn, including 
the type of simulation data that could be applied in each case. Therefore, it is now 
necessary to describe an example of how the TPRC is applied using emergency 
simulation data. 
SECTION 5.5: AN EXAMPLE OF THE TPRC MODELLING FROM 
DEDICATED SIMULATION DATA 
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Now that the method has established how data are collected from the scenario 
and combined with theoretical data for use in the TPRC model, this section will work 
through an example of such use. 
In total, there were 5 offshore scenarios and 9 onshore scenarios. ' A video 
recording of the actions taking place in the emergency management room allowed a 
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transcript of events to be produced, so these were prepared for each scenario to facilitate 
TPRC and other analyses (transcripts available on request from the author, brief 
descriptions of each scenario are shown in Chapter 8). Each scenario contained at least 
10 decisions that potentially influenced the emergency's outcome - and could be 
modelled using the TPRC technique. To represent all of these results would involve 
displaying in excess of 140 probability of success curves. Following this, it would be 
necessary to consider the impact of parameter changes - such as changes in the delay, 
task speed, resource availability - to compare the observed outcome with the best 
possible and worst possible outcomes. Overall, this would involve more than 1000 sets 
of results that would add little to the project other than to illustrate the scope of the 
model's use. Therefore, this section will use a few examples that adequately demonstrate 
the capability of the model in representing parameter change and a number of different 
types of task to show its flexibility. After working through these examples, further 
examples will be shown in Chapter 9. This is to ensure that the reader is not confused by 
a large number of different decision analyses at this point. 
5.5.2 EXAMPLES OF THE TPRC METHOD BASED ON THE CRANE DRIVER 
SCENARIO 
The examples shown here are taken from Offshore Scenario number 2 (full 
transcript shown in Appendix 6). This involves a methanol leak resulting from a dropped 
methanol tote tank. An extract of the transcript is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Extract taken from the Methanol Tote Tank Scenario transcript 
Time Event 
0: 00: 00 ASSUME INCIDENT OCCURRED 
0: 00: 01 CD: Control room, Deck 
0: 00: 03 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 05 CRO: Control, call back 
0: 00: 06 call ends CRO 
0: 00: 07 CD: Yeah, just to warn you, we've had a bit of a knock, moving these 
tote tanks around, the wind took the load and there was an edge-on, an 
edge-on knock, pretty hard, I'm just going to have a look now. 
0: 00: 18 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 18 PS: Okay, stop all hot work, please CRO on the tannoy 
0: 00: 21 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 00: 22 CRO (tannoy): Attention all personnel, attention all personnel, all hot 
-work is to cease immediately, all hot work is to cease immediately, all 
hot work permits to be returned to the control, return all hot work 
permits to the control room, thank you. 
0: 00: 34 tannoy ends CRO 
As stated earlier, the announcements by the emergency management team are not 
an accurate representation of when the event occurred. Even in a real incident, it would 
take some time before the team were aware of the situation. Therefore, if an event could 
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have occurred within a long duration of time, a reasonable value is chosen and large 
standard deviation can be given to the value in the model. As mentioned in Section 5.4.1, 
this introduces a degree of subjectivity into the process, which was not intended. - 
However, this issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, when the problem is 
addressed through the concept of performance parameter data. 
To establish the overall performance of emergency management, a number of 
issues must be taken into account - for example, rescuing casualties, fire-fighting, 
mustering, ordering helicopters. The TPRC can calculate the probability of success in 
each individual task - thus producing an overall impression of performance. Using the 
methanol leak scenario, the probability distributions associated with three tasks will be 
examined, they are: - the probable escape of the crane driver from the crane given ignition 
of the methanol, the probable rescue of the crane driver from the crane before he is 
overcome by fire; then, given that the crane driver jumps into the water, the probability 
that he will be rescued before he dies of his injuries. 
In Section 2.4.3.5, it was discussed that the event tree method could potentially 
be used to structure the concepts relevant in research - by identifying the tasks that had 
an impact on risk reduction. However, it was noted that most of the quantification 
applied to this technique relied on expert judgement. Given that the TPRC model had the 
potential to quantify the probability of success in these tasks, it is possible to link the two 
techniques together. Therefore, this could produce an overall perspective of the incident 
using a known technique - with time-contingent probabilities of success as quantification. 
Therefore, an event tree summing up some of the critical paths of this example is shown 
in Figure 37. 
Figure 37: Event Tree of the Crane Driver's Options 
Ignition 
Escapes to safety Fire team rescue Boat rescues 
in time? him in time? him in time? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Survives 
" Survives 
Survives 
Dies 
As it can be seen, the crane driver has a number of chances to escape the 
emergency situation. He can risk running through the fire to the muster point. He can 
wait in the crane cabin until the fire team rescue him, making it safe for him to move 
from the cabin to the safe haven; or, as a last resort, he can jump from the crane cabin 
(situated at the side of the platform) into the sea. In this final case, his main chance of 
survival involves being rescued by the standby vessel. Therefore it is necessary to 
consider each branch in turn. 
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1. The fire ignites 1: 36 min into the scenario. The muster is started 61 seconds later. At 
3: 06 minutes, the crane driver reports that he is stuck in the crane cabin due to the 
escalating fire outside it. It can not be ascertained from the scenario whether or not he 
attempted to escape, but assuming he did, it is likely to have occurred between the start 
of the muster and before he reports that it is impossible to leave his cabin (NB. it may 
have occurred before the fire ignited but then he was driven back into the crane when 
ignition occurred). Therefore, the time from the ignition to the point at which he reports 
being trapped is given as the resource - the time available to escape safely over the 
methanol laydown area. As these tasks involve data that cannot be observed in the 
simulation, there are certain types of supporting data that are required. These will be 
discussed in the following chapter. For now, we can take the walking speed to be 
approximately 0.7m/s (from Pheasant 1987), given that he is likely to be slowed by the 
fire as well as the fact that he must climb down from the crane pedestal. From the 
diagrams of the platform, the distance from the crane cabin to safety can be given as 
approximately 25 metres, depending on the escalation of the fire as well as the route 
taken. Therefore the main parameters used into the model were: 
Delay = 61 (0.2), Speed = 0.7 (0.1), Distance = 25 (0.3), Time Resource = 84 (0.05) - 
(uncertainty value x given in brackets) 
2. Given that the crane driver either did not attempt to escape, or was unsuccessful in 
this attempt and was driven back to the crane, the next possible solution is to be rescued 
by the fire team. The fire ignited at 1: 36 min into the scenario. The fire team left the 
control room for the area at 2: 20 min. At 3: 20, the control room operator tells the crane 
driver to stay in the crane and wait for the fire team. At 4: 30, the fire team leader tells 
the crane driver to stop swinging the crane. At 5: 04, the standby boat reports someone 
falling into the water. At 6: 50, the fire team get to the crane cabin and discover that no 
one is inside. Therefore, we must assume that the crane driver finds that the heat is 
overwhelming and that he makes his escape sometime between 4.30 and 5.04. This is the 
resource limit - the time at which the fire team should have been able to make a rescue if 
the task was to be successful. As the fire team do not confirm the crane driver is missing 
until 6: 50. It must be assumed that it would take them this long to successfully reach the 
cabin. This cannot be taken as simply moving through the area at a constant speed as the 
fire-fighting is the critical task and it is probably not constant - therefore the time taken in 
completing this task is used as the intended performance requirement of the task - as 
described in Section 5.4.2.4. Therefore the main parameters were: 
Delay = 44 (0.05) Speed =1 (0.1) Task = 270 (0.2) Time Resource = 189 (0.04) - 
(uncertainty value x in brackets) 
3. Given that the crane driver jumps into the water between 4.30 and 5.04 minutes into 
the scenario, the standby boat sees him and starts to report that they have launched the 
rescue craft at 5: 04 minutes. It is likely that this is not an immediate reaction (i. e., delay 
# 0). At 6: 48, the standby boat reports that they have him in sight but have not yet 
picked him up. At 11: 02, the radio operator tells the production supervisor that the fast 
rescue craft has picked up the man and they are heading back to the main vessel. He adds 
that he is in a bad way. It is not known how long he has had this information. As for the 
man's expected survival, it can be assumed that he has suffered bums and smoke 
inhalation (causing him to jump) as well as any injuries from the fall and the risk of cold 
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water shock and hypothermia. Although there is no way of knowing how long he might 
survive, certain theoretical information can provide a reasonable estimate of this (as 
described in more detail in Chapter 7). 2-3 minutes was taken to be the time at which the 
cold-water effects could occur (disregarding any other injuries). Being that it is assumed 
that he had no lifejacket, he could have muscle spasms and cramp leading him to sink 
beneath the surface before the rescue craft can find him so 2.30 min is taken as the 
resource limit. Based on additional information, the recommended distance for the 
standby boat to be from the platform is 200m and the approximate speed of the fast 
rescue craft is 25 knots /13m/s. Therefore, it can be assumed that the standby vessel and 
its fast rescue craft is capable of rescuing a person within 1 minute. However, as the 
probability of success must be based on the actual figures obtained from the simulation, it 
must be assumed that the vessel either had to move at a slow speed while manoeuvring 
round the platform or that the man was difficult to find. Either way, the "observed" data 
must be used, so it can be assumed that the man was rescued 7: 00 minutes into the 
scenario. Therefore the main parameters were: 
Delay = 19 (0.1) Speed =1 (0.1) Task = 116 (0.02) Resources = 150 (0.07) -: 
(uncertainty value x in brackets). 
For each of these three examples, it was checked that the distributions of the input 
parameters produced were not contradicted by the scenario times. % 
SECTION 5.5.3: CONCLUSION OF THE TPRC EXAMPLE 
Although the probability of success curves represent external physical tasks, they 
are influenced by the management decisions. For example, if the crane driver had been 
told to evacuate the methanol laydown area before the fire ignited, the problem may not 
have occurred. However, the crane driver may have been able to prevent the ignition so 
his presence was necessary. Also, it must be noted that a muster was suggested at 1: 15 
min into the scenario but was not actually started until 2: 37 min. Decreasing this delay 
would definitely improve the crane driver's probability of escaping. Assuming that the 
crane driver could not escape on his own, one would hope that the fire team could get to 
the site before the crane driver is injured. This again would be improved by an earlier 
initiation of the muster. However, if it can be assumed that nothing can prevent the crane 
driver being forced to jump into the water, his chances must be improved there. If this 
had been predicted, the standby vessel could have been alerted so it could position itself 
at a safe distance from the platform but on the correct side to facilitate a good view of 
the incident. This could also allow information to be passed on the emergency 
management team on the state of the fire. However, these are issues that will be 
discussed with respect to the graphs produced by the modelling process. The results for 
all three examples will be discussed in Chapter 8. Further to this, additional analyses will 
be illustrated to demonstrate the flexibility and scope of the model as well as the extent 
to which the results were analysed. 
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5.6: CONCLUSION 
Therefore, this section concludes the general use of the Task Performance 
Resource Constraint model from the introduction of the original model to the 
adaptations made to it to apply it to the research problem and an example of its 
application. Therefore, the following chapter will move on to discuss the supporting data 
that were required for model processing. 
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Chäpter'6 
SUPPORTING DATA FOR TASK PERFORMANCE 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL . 
ANALYSIS 
SECTION 6.1: INTRODUCTION 
As described in Chapter 5, many of the data cannot be collected from the 
observation of the scenario alone. Such data should have been collected when designing 
the scenario to ensure that it is realistic or is at least based on valid and reliable 
performance models. However, often the scenario design process is less formal and is 
more focused on providing a good test for the emergency management candidate than 
ensuring a totally realistic incident. For the most part, this is sufficient. Whether every 
detail of the incident is realistic or not, if the candidate has been successful, he can be 
deemed competent. It is unlikely that a candidate will focus on the realism of rescue and 
muster timings while he is under test. Therefore, in general, the model will estimate the 
times at which events occurred based on observation of the scenario. However, this 
model should ideally be able to predict probability of success in any simulation task or 
real-life scenario - given particular information about the task and resources involved. 
Therefore, there are certain amounts of theoretical data that should be collected. 
Chapter 5 focused on the individual parameters used by the model - suggesting 
methods by which certain tasks and resources could be represented. This chapter will 
focus on particular scenario types, considering the task parameters that are typically 
important (e. g. casualty rescue, fires) as well as the relevant factors that affect these 
parameters (e. g. weather). Strutt, Loa & Allsopp (1996) considered a search and rescue 
mission for a diver - which shows the mitigating effects of experience and fitness. 
Therefore, this section will include data relating to some of the most common tasks in 
emergency management - mustering and other human movement tasks, rescue, escape 
and evacuation, administering first aid to casualties, a fire/explosion/gas leak incident, the 
mitigating effects of weather, and the use of the onshore emergency services. For each of 
these, the following sections will discuss how the data can be implemented in the TPRC 
model, examples of data collected and alternative methods of collecting data that have 
not been included. 
SECTION 6.2: MUSTERING AND OTHER HUMAN MOVEMENT 
TASKS 
There are a number of tasks that are affected by human movement - either as a 
delay in the task (e. g. crossing the control room to activate a shutdown, ) or as the task 
itself (moving around the platform to get to the lifeboat stations, climbing ladders, 
rowing an unenclosed life raft or swimming to the rescue vessel). These data are 
obtained either through experience (collection of muster times) or are built up through 
information on human performance capabilities (e. g. average walking speed of healthy 
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individual / running speed of Olympic athlete). These capabilities could also be 
established through anthropometric and biomechanical data (Pheasant 1986) or the study 
of exercise physiology (Reilly et al 1990) and reaction times, though this method could 
be criticised for simplifying the problem through decomposition of the tasks. Some data 
may also be gathered from the "time studies" of Taylor (1964). His method of Scientific 
Management established that work was to be carried out in a particular way and taking a 
specific length of time. Although this was under pressure, it also provides information on 
the human potential to carry out tasks at speed - as would be required in emergency 
conditions. For example, from the study of anthropometry, Table 9 gives the tempo, pace 
and speed of walking for a typical adult (Pheasant 1987). 
Table 9: Walking: tempo, pace and speed for a typical adult 
Tempo Length of pace Speed 
-- Steps / Min Millimetres Metres/Second Miles/flour 
Very slow 60 400 0.4 0.9 
Slow 80 540 0.72 1.6 
Average 110 740 1.36 3.0 
Fast 130 870 1.89 4.2 
Very Fast 150 870 2.18 4.9 
From observations of offshore simulations, Kvxrner (1997) uses the following walking 
speed data: 
"1 m/s on level walkways/corridors 
" 0.8 m/s on stairs 
" 0.3 m/s on ladders (allowing for time taken getting on and off the ladder). 
No variances are given for these values but the environment (slippery, unsafe or uneven 
terrain), visibility (foggy/smoky/lighting), type of clothing, any injuries, characteristics of 
any item being carried (weight, bulkiness) and individual differences (risk perception, 
fitness) will mean that there is an implicit degree of uncertainty surrounding these values. 
Therefore, they are most appropriately represented using a distribution rather than a 
point value. 
As well as these "performance shaping factors", the length of time taken to 
muster depends on the situation (e. g. routes available), the number of people and the size 
of the platform. In normal circumstances (i. e. not the offshore environment), this may 
also consider the type of people who may be involved, for example, children, elderly or 
disabled people. In the case of the offshore environment, there are recommendations 
specified for the employment of people with regard to health (UKOOA 1986). These 
recommendations make it possible to assume a reasonable level of fitness and mobility of 
all personnel under non-emergency conditions. 
Data on muster times from Technica (1991 cited in Kverner 1997) gives: 
" 7-10 minutes for a large northern platform with 100 POB - installed 1983 
" 10-15 minutes for two large northern platforms with 140-170 average POB, installed 
1982 and 1987. 
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7-10 minutes for 3 small southern platforms with 30-50 average POB, installed 1967- 
76. 
These were taken from normal drills so do not include the time taken to raise the 
alarm or any problems due to blocked or hazardous routes. Kvxrner (1997) assumes it 
takes 2 minutes to raise the alarm though this is apparently not based on any real data. 
Modelling of the muster should also consider delays caused by sleeping shift-workers to 
dress and collect survival equipment and technicians making their place of work safe. 
Completing the muster check would also be delayed by any missing (assumed injured) 
personnel (Kvaerner 1997). Pauls (1988) and Nelson & MacLennan (1988) provide 
useful evacuation models based on flow rates, which would be more appropriate for 
large crowds moving through small passageways or doors. 
The work of Bellamy & Brabazon (1993) should also be noted in this section. The 
following equation was found to conform to real data on evacuation rates of an onshore 
installation in the event of a toxic release: 
y= 14.12(x)°. 5 
where x= the numbers to be evacuated 
y= the evacuation rate (numbers evacuating per hour) 
It is not known whether this can be generalised to other situations. However, they 
suggest that the critical aspects positively influencing muster speed are training and the 
provision of unambiguous information. 
SECTION 6.3: RESCUE, ESCAPE AND EVACUATION 
These issues are normally considered as a task - to be carried out before the 
platform becomes uninhabitable. However, they may also contribute to the idea of a 
limiting resource, where the task would be to fight the fire so that the helicopter can land 
- or to ensure that the muster is complete and all personnel are in the correct place to be 
evacuated. In general, this information can be gathered from technical information on the 
vehicles involved, the distances from the relevant installations and previous experience. 
As far as helicopters are concerned, the Coastguard Agency (1996) specifies the 
following requirements: 
1. To launch within 15 minutes of call-out by day and within 45 minutes of call-out by 
night. 
2. To be able, in still air, to reach any incident within 100 nautical miles of the coast 
within 2 hours of call-out by night. 
3. To be able, in still air, to reach any incident within 40 nautical miles of the coast within 
1 hour of call-out by day. 
4. To be able, in still air, to reach any inland part of the UK within 2 hours of call-out by 
day or night. 
5. They should have a declared maximum operational range, without refuelling, of at 
least 200 nautical miles from the base. 
The Coastguard Agency 1996 Statistics show that Item 1 was attained on all except 2 of 
638 occasions (HM Coastguard 1996) so this is a realistic delay to be applied in the 
model. 
Table 10 shows relevant statistics for some of the main helicopters in use. 
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Table 10: Helicopter Statistics for use in modelling of emergency management 
Type Seats Available Speed (in still air) 
Be11212 11 100 
Bell 214 18 125 
S76 8 150 
365N 11 145 
bo105 4 105 
Sea King 18 110 
Wessex 10 90 
S61N 24 110 
(Kvaerner 1997) 
Therefore, given the distance from the helicopter bases to the installation and then to the 
nearest safe haven or onshore hospital, one can calculate the time taken to evacuate the 
platform - or just one casualty. 
Koerner (1997) suggests that it takes 5 minutes to load or unload survivors into a 
helicopter and taking off takes 1 minute. These data could all be used in the model to 
assess the probability of successful evacuation before the casualty dies or before 
structural collapse occurs. 
Other mitigating features (cited in Kvmrner 1997) that could affect the model 
parameters are: 
0 Helicopter size and weight - the platform helideck must be capable of accepting the 
helicopter if it is intended to land. 
" Additional equipment requirements - Winches are required when it is too hazardous 
to land on the platform, or when picking up people from the water or standby boat. 
Also, infrared cameras are useful when searching for people in the water. 
" Weather conditions - These can have a critical impact on helicopter operations. Icing 
(up to 5000 feet and down to temperatures of -10°C), high wind (up to 60 knots) 
and low visibility (300 feet cloud base and 0.5 nautical miles horizontal visibility) are 
acceptable. Beyond these limits, take-off, flight and landing may be hazardous (Free 
1987). 
The helideck can be impaired by fire or platform conditions. Kvaerner (1997) suggests 
impairment is caused when: 
" smoke is above 0.05% by volume 
" thermal radiation is over 5kW/m2 
" there is an un-ignited gas leak on the platform (which could be ignited by landing the 
helicopter) 
Other evacuations can use lifeboats, life rafts or ladders to the sea. Technics (1991 cited 
in Kvaerner 1997) suggests the following times for evacuation, by lifeboat, based on 
typical data from a large manned platform: - 
" roll-call and donning lifejackets -4 minutes 
" boarding the boats -5 minutes 
" launching boats - 10 minutes 
161 
Wilson (1991) suggests that embarking a 50 man TEMPSC (totally enclosed 
motor propelled survival craft) can take from 1 minute and 45 seconds to 3 minutes 30 
seconds. However, Mills & Coleshaw (1998) add that while data from trials indicates 
that 45 fit personnel can load a free-fall lifeboat in 4 minutes, to load a single casualty 
into a lifeboat and secure him for launch can take between 2 to 3 minutes alone! 
Given that the lifeboat has been launched successfully, the time taken to get a safe 
distance from the installation must be added - this value can be influenced by good 
organisation of the standby vessels. 
For a baseline value, Wilson (1991) states that the performance criteria for a TEMPSC 
are to achieve a speed of 6 knots in calm water. BHP (1994) state that their standby 
vessels can travel at a speed of 25 knots and the recommended standby distance from the 
platform is 200m. Therefore, it can be assumed that the standby vessels can have an 
influential effect on the rescue. 
Design of the craft is a key mitigation factor for a successful evacuation. It is 
necessary to ensure that the craft protect the evacuees from the environment - both the 
water, cold and any smoke. Other mitigating factors include the number of lifeboats and 
ensuring they are filled to the correct capacity - as well as the prevailing conditions. 
There should also be reliable launching systems as well as a good clearance of the 
platform structure to reduce the chance of collision in bad weather (Boef 1992a & b, 
Forland 1992). Also the craft should be self-righting (Wilson 1991). Where contact with 
the elements is necessary, survival suits can significantly affect the success of a lifeboat 
evacuation by protecting the evacuees from the cold (Forland 1992). Also, if they are 
likely to enter the water, lifejackets are critical. The probability of surviving immersion is 
affected by the number of people requiring rescue, rate of people entering the water, 
clothing worn, number of rescue craft, sea state, temperature and visibility. 
SECTION 6.4: ADMINISTERING FIRST AID TO CASUALTIES 
For the model, it is necessary to establish how long it takes for someone in a 
hostile environment to be affected by the situation and, if injured, how long it takes them 
before they are incapacitated by the injury (and therefore unable to save themselves) or 
killed. This is normally taken as a resource - where tasks must be carried out before it is 
too late for the casualties. The tasks may include rescue, resuscitation or treatment to 
enable their recovery. Therefore, when the task is to evacuate,, first-aid can be treated as 
a mitigation process depending on the severity of the injuries, the ease of locating the 
casualties and the risks to the rescuers. First aid may also be treated as a task in itself. 
However, even considering the issue of predicting "effects of hostile situations on 
probability of survival" is often considered taboo as this has been compared with the 
torture of Jews in the 2"d World War, which was said to be carried out in the name of 
science. Moral and ethical boundaries need not be broken to give the data required by 
this research - at least, no further than medical science already breaks these by recording 
forensic evidence, animal experimentation or extraordinary stories of survival. Although 
these are usually complicated to a non-medical person, an expert in medical and 
statistical knowledge should be able to collate these data to produce distributions of 
values for survival times given particular conditions. However, caution should be taken 
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to ensure that these values are not used as though they were all-inclusive. For example, 
just because no person has yet survived a body temperature of lower than 56.5°F does 
not mean it is not possible - and so emergency management decisions should not be 
taken on the basis of the known data - but on a distribution surrounding it. 
In the model, the effect of the injuries on the casualty provide the resource - 
whereby treating their injuries and rescuing them from further harm are the tasks. In 
general, detailed knowledge about medical conditions and their probable survival is 
beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, this section will concentrate on some of the 
likely serious conditions that may occur in an offshore emergency. 
These include 3 main types of injury: 
" Trauma 
" Heat and Cold Injuries 
" Injuries due to exposure with chemicals 
and for each of the following sections, it will discuss the general first aid that can be 
applied to mitigate such injuries. 
6.4.1: TRAUMA 
Life-threatening trauma injuries include everything from head injuries to internal 
injuries and blood loss. Research by Dumire and Peitzman (1998) state that death due to 
trauma occurs "in a trimodal distribution relating to the time interval from the injury": - 
"Immediate deaths (50% of trauma-related deaths) occur at the time of injury and are 
generally a result of severe head or cardiovascular injury. Early deaths (30%) occur in 
the first few hours following injury as a result of major torso or head injury. Late deaths 
(20%) result from infectious complications or multiple organ system failure. " 
They suggest that although some of these fatalities can only be prevented by reducing the 
severity of the original injuries, many can be prevented by early treatment and fast access 
to advanced care facilities. 
Streger (1998) suggests that in a mass casualty incident, 75-85% of the fatalities 
occur within 20 minutes of the event, usually before the emergency services arrive. 
The interactions between the systems in the human body make modelling very difficult. 
For example, a combination of apparently minor injuries may result in a very serious 
condition through mitigating circumstances. For example, a small cut to part of the arm 
may just require a plaster. However, a slashed wrist is potentially fatal. Also pre- 
conditions may cause extra problems. For example, haemophilia would increase the risk 
of severe injury if a small injury was sustained. Angina or heart disease would increase 
the risk of heart attack due to shock. 
It is also very difficult to link external physical causes to the resulting injury. For 
example, the severity of a head injury cannot be measured in terms of "pressure of 
impact" or "height of fall" as it relates to damaging very specific areas of the brain. 
Skinner et al (1996) suggests that a high energy impact can be defined as "a fall from 
equal to or greater than 6 metres" or being hit by a car travelling equal to or in excess of 
20 mph. However, the modelling of this would be complicated, so this research will use 
estimates of the expected survival time from specific injuries. Some injuries are instantly 
163 
fatal - and in these cases, no emergency management can make a difference. Some are so 
minor that there are likely to stop of their own accord - without any medical intervention. 
However, in emergency management, the main type of injury of importance is one that is 
potentially fatal if intervention is not rapid. 
However, for certain medical problems, using distributions of the results and a 
large amount of data for each factor could give valid indications of the potential of 
human survival. The most obvious measurable quantity is blood loss as shown in Table 
11. 
Table 11: The Body's Reaction to Blood Loss (St. John's Ambulance 1997 p. 78) 
Approximate Volume Lost Effect on the Body 
(assuming adult has 
approximately 6 litres (10 
pints) in total) 
0.5 litre (1 pint) Little or no effect, this is the quantity normally taken in a 
blood-donor session 
2 litres (3'/2 pints) Hormones such as adrenaline are released, quickening the 
pulse, and inducing sweating. Small blood vessels in non- 
vital areas, such as the skin, shut down to divert blood and 
the oxygen it carries to the vital organs. Shock becomes 
evident. 
3 litres (5 pints) As blood or fluid loss approaches this level (half the normal 
volume of the average adult), the pulse at the wrist may 
become undetectable. The casualty will usually lose 
consciousness; breathing and the heart may fail. 
Of course, this can only be calculated on the rate of blood loss - which is 
dependent on the location and extent of the injuries (e. g. loss from veins, femoral arteries 
or lacerations). This cannot be calculated in the same way as one would calculate flow 
rate from an oil pipe as the rate of internal bleeding cannot be seen or measured. Willett 
et al (1996 cited in Skinner et al 1996) give examples of the expected blood loss 
resulting from a fracture as shown in Table 12. 
Table 12: Estimated Blood Loss caused by Fractures 
Site of Fracture Blood loss (litres) 
Humerus 0.5-1.5 
Tibia 0.5-1.5 
Femur 1.0-2.5 
Pelvis 1.0-4.0 
For an open fracture, the loss is two or three times greater. 
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The St. John's Ambulance (1997) suggests that if a casualty is unconscious after 
3 minutes of an incident possibly involving a head injury, the rescuer should suspect a 
more serious injury. 
In most emergencies, it is best to "assume the worst and hope for the best". 
Therefore in the model, often the survival times from trauma are chosen pessimistically - 
perhaps giving mean values of as low as 3 minutes before the casualty is beyond help, 
depending on the predicted severity of the injuries. However, this depends on the 
purpose of the model's use. If this is used to determine what actions should be taken in 
an incident, if the pessimistic values are assigned and this indicates that the casualty has 
no chance of survival, then this may erroneously lead the emergency management team 
to not attempt a rescue. However, if this is used to dictate how fast such a rescue should 
be, the pessimistic values will force a quick decision, therefore resulting in a greater 
probability of success. Ideally, of course, these values should not be optimistic or 
pessimistic - however, with data that are not fully understood, such as these, it would be 
impossible to obtain. Therefore, these are normally assigned a wide distribution to cater 
for the levels of uncertainty involved. 
Many trauma injuries can be mitigated by first aid. Some injuries are too severe 
to allow any assistance to be useful, for example, decapitation. Others may be extremely 
severe but quick intervention can make a difference, for example, amputation of a limb, 
electrocution or coronary thrombosis. Some injuries can only be treated slowly and 
carefully - for example spinal injuries, though in these cases, the difference between life 
and death may be defined by other issues - for example, serious bleeding or problems 
with respiration., 
Streger (1998) suggests that a patient in triage should be categorised in less than 
60 seconds. This indicates that it is possible to make a reasonable diagnosis in that 
amount of time - so we can reasonably expect this of an offshore medical officer as well. 
Often, the most serious injuries are easy to see, therefore quick action is possible. With 
trauma injuries, the main treatments involve resuscitation (if necessary), preventing 
further loss of blood, and treating for shock. Again the treatment depends on the injury. 
A small injury will require less bandaging than a large injury. Resuscitation can provide 
results quickly after some effort or not at all. Therefore, the mitigating factors include the 
number of casualties and the severity of their injuries, the number of skilled rescuers, the 
available equipment and the conditions. Hazardous conditions can be a risk to the rescuer 
as well as the casualty. So if a casualty falls due to the dizziness caused by smoke 
inhalation, they could die of a combination of the effects. Also, cold conditions can speed 
up the onset of shock. Therefore the times to complete such tasks are inherently variable 
- based on individual differences of the casualty and their injuries, and the skills and 
equipment available to the first-aider. Therefore, any estimation of the time taken to 
carry out first aid times should have a reasonably wide distribution. 
Calculating the survival time for specific injuries and time to carry out medical 
tasks is beyond the scope of this research. If carried out in the future, the author 
recommends that this should only be carried out by a medical researcher who can 
understand the technicalities of the human casualty as well as the sensitivity of the issues 
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involved. In any case, caution should be taken when using these values once obtained 
and they should not be taken as all-inclusive. For example, if an emergency manager 
made the assumption that someone would not survive after 3 minutes in freezing cold 
water based on model data, they may wrongly decide that there is no need to attempt a 
rescue. 
6.4.2 HEAT AND COLD INJURIES 
In general, there is an optimum ambient temperature for human action and an 
optimum core body temperature - generally listed as 37°C (98.6°F) (St. John's 
Ambulance Association 1997). Outside of this boundary, it is unpleasant, and, at the 
extremes of human tolerance - potentially fatal. This section includes the injuries due to 
contact with fire, though the injuries are often due to gas inhalation, so they will be 
considered in the "Injuries due to exposure with chemicals" section. The main injuries 
due to the cold in the offshore environment are due to falling or jumping into the water. 
Medical and forensic journals record extreme and unusual cases of survival or 
death. For example, some people have died of hypothermia with core body temperatures 
of 95°F whereas there are records of people surviving a core body temperature of 56.5°F 
(McWhirter 1999, Hope 1999). This is far below 60°F-, which is, somewhat surprisingly, 
the temperature at which the State of Alaska medical organisation (1996) recommend 
that CPR (cardio-pulmonary resuscitation) should not be attempted. 
Although such medical data is useful, it cannot be directly transferred to the 
model, as we are more concerned with the body's response to the environment in which 
it exists. For example, although we may know that a person can potentially survive body 
temperatures of 56.5°F, it is more useful to establish how this body temperature relates 
to the surrounding temperature - and so, given an approximate value of the surrounding 
temperature, we can calculate the time at which the environment would "vin over" the 
person, whereby their body temperature sink below this value. 
The Guinness book of records (McWhirter 1999) has descriptions of 
extraordinary survival stories, including people who have survived 18 days without food 
or water, 2 days in a freezer (in sub-zero temperatures) and people who survived 8 days 
at 39°c (102°F). In a disaster where an aeroplane crashed in the Andes, it was 10 days 
before some of the survivors died, in conditions of -40°F, whereas some survived to be 
rescued 82 days after the crash. This demonstrates the variance of survival capabilities in 
the human species and, again, could potentially be included as data in a model. A model 
that could be used to predict these data has been developed by the Defence and Civil 
Institute of Environmental Medicine in Canada for hypothermia (Tikuisis 1995, Tikuisis 
& Keefe 1996, Tikuisis et al 1997, Tikuisis 1998). The model considers ambient 
temperature, clothing, sea state, level of immersion as well as information about the 
person's physical characteristics. For example, it gives an estimated survival time of 4.8 
hours for a healthy normal sedentary individual immersed in a heavy sea condition at 5°c 
wearing a shirt and anti-exposure suit. Despite this, passengers from the Estonia disaster 
survived the cold water much longer than the model would have predicted - believed to 
be due to their strong mental attitudes. 
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Regarding short-term exposure, the Sea-Marshall homepage (1999) suggests that 
the physiological effects of cold water are as follows: 
" After 2-3 minutes - Initial shock responses, skin temperature falls, decreased breath- 
holding ability, muscle spasms followed by hyperventilation, loss of manual dexterity. 
" From 3-5 minutes - Losing swimming ability. 
Boating Basics (1999) give predictions of times at which exhaustion and death occur in 
cold water as shown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Predicting impact of water temperature on humans 
Water Temp °F Exhaustion/Unconsciousness Expected time of survival 
32.5 Under 15 minutes 15-45 minutes 
32.5 - 40 15-30 minutes 30-90 minutes 
40 - 50 30 - 60 minutes 1-3 hours 
50 - 60 1-2 hours 1-6 hours 
60 - 70 2-7 hours 2- 40 hours 
Over 80 Indefinitely Indefinitely 
Although not based on critical data as in the Tikuisis model, this can provide 
useful information for our modelling in terms of a resource. If it possible to rescue 
everyone before these limiting times, we can hope for a good probability of survival. 
Pheasant (1987) gives an interpretation of the effects of wind chill using the equation' 
below: 
K. = (10 'V + 10.45 - V) (33 - T. ), where 
K. is the wind-chill factor 
V is the air speed (m/s) 
Te is the air temperature (°C) 
The interpretation of these factors given by Pheasant (1987) is shown in Table 14. 
Table 14: 
_Internretation of wind-chill 
index (from Parker & West 1973 
K. Interpretation 
<90 Hot 
90 to 150 Warm 
150 to 300 Pleasant 
300 to 500 Cool 
500 to 700 Ve cool 
700 to 900 Cold 
900 to 1100 Very cold 
1100 to 1300 Bitterl cold 
> 1300 Exposed flesh freezes 
> 1650 Exposed flesh freezes in one minute 
> 2150 Exposed flesh freezes in 30 seconds 
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As far as people falling into the sea are concerned - there are other causes of 
injury. Firstly, there may be injuries leading the person to jump into the sea - for example, 
caused by fire on the platform above. The fall can cause trauma injury, which could be 
fatal in itself or could lead to drowning as the casualty becomes unable to swim. Shock is 
likely to occur due to the cold water - particularly if they are jumping from hot 
conditions, as in a fire. However, there is also some chance that someone falling into the : 
sea can die of bum injuries - due to radiation from the fires above or fire on the sea 
surface. The effects of cold water can be mitigated through the use of survival suits. 
Weather conditions obviously affect the probability of survival - not only through 
temperature and sea conditions, but because fog can cause low visibility - slowing down 
the rescue attempts. Also survival can be improved by making the person more visible 
(i. e. by wearing bright orange clothing) and by improving the ability of the searchers - for 
example, by having more people assigning to searching, or by the use of transmitters. 
Once rescued, the best treatments include insulating the casualty from further heat loss, 
rewarming with humidified oxygen as well as the use of intravenous methods (Journal of 
the American Medical Association 1992).. 
The Guinness Book of Records (McWhirter 1999) states the highest body 
temperature that a human has survived is 115.7°F / 46.5°C. Living human tissue is burnt 
when its temperature reaches 43°C (Pheasant 1987). The St. John's Ambulance (1997) 
states that: 
"A partial thickness burn of 1% must be seen by a doctor. 
"A partial thickness burn of over 9% will cause shock to develop and the casualty will 
need hospital treatment. 
" Any full-thickness burn requires hospital treatment. 
The main cause of heat injuries in an offshore incident are due to fires. 
Kvxrner (1997) gives the levels of radiation intensity and the effect they have on humans 
as follows: 
"5 kW/m2 - limiting escape actions lasting more than a few minutes in normal offshore 
clothing. At this level, the pain threshold for exposed skin is reached in about 15 
seconds. Second-degree burns on exposed skin would be expected after about 2 
minutes. 
" 12.5 kW/m2 - limiting escape actions lasting a few seconds. At this level, the pain 
threshold is reached in about 4 sec, and second degree burns on exposed skin in 
about 40 sec. 
" 37.5 kW/m2 - is taken as the criterion for immediate fatality. At this level, the pain 
threshold is virtually instantaneous, and second-degree burns occur in about 8 
seconds. 
Given that the radiation intensity can be estimated at particular locations within a 
fire or explosion from fire models, this can be used to predict the expected times at 
which the people involved will be affected. However, Purser (1988) has reviewed a great 
deal of data from research into the injuries caused by fire and heat. Apart from the 
influence of gas inhalation, injuries can be caused through a heightened blood 
temperature, burns or heat damage to particular organs - such as the respiratory tract. 
There is a relationship between the air and contact temperature and the severity of the 
injuries - as one would expect. Using the interaction between all the relevant variables 
(smoke obscuration, heat, toxic gases), Purser (1988) calculated that incapacitation due 
to an armchair fire would occur after 4 minutes of exposure. His models and data can 
also be used to relate to the types of fire that occur offshore. 
Saving people with burn injuries is complicated - mostly because it usually 
involves risk to the rescuers. Either the fire must be controlled or put out - by which time 
the casualties may be beyond help; or the rescuers must protect themselves to the best of 
their ability and then remove the casualties from the environment. Fire injuries are a 
combination of bums and toxic gas inhalation - which will be discussed in the next 
section. Treatment of burns involves cooling the related area, prevention of fluid loss and 
infection where the burns are deep, and of course, treatment for shock. Again, these 
tasks have varying degrees of success - so must be represented by a distribution of time 
values 
6.4.3 INJURIES DUE TO EXPOSURE WITH CHEMICALS 
The data on the impact of chemicals on the personnel can be combined with the 
possible leak rates/chemical production rates to identify when the deadly concentrations 
would be reached. This can therefore be used to establish a distribution of times at which 
personnel in a specific area are seriously injured or dead - and therefore can give an 
estimate of how fast a rescue must be (and what protective equipment the rescuers must 
use). The impact of these chemicals on the personnel can potentially be mitigated by use 
of deluge, ventilation, quantity and location of chemicals and personal protective 
equipment (breathing apparatus, chemical suits) - depending on the characteristics of the 
chemical. 
Obviously there are many hazardous chemicals and it is recommended that the 
reader refers to the published information on each specific chemical involved. For 
example, there'are safety data sheets, produced by NIOSH (1994), with reports from the 
Health and Safety Executive (1992) on industrially used chemicals or the U. S. Army 
(1998) for those used in warfare or by terrorists. Chemicals have two main influences 
in an emergency - firstly, their impact on the personnel involved and secondly - their 
impact on the system, for example, flammable gas causing an increased escalation which 
will be considered in Section 6.5. 
The safety data sheets typically include descriptions of the substances, their 
hazards and their means of action (e. g. flammable, irritant on skin, carcinogenic). . Sometimes there are also recommendations for how the chemicals should be stored and 
transported and any precautions that should be taken. Most importantly for the modelling 
process, the documents give limits of concentrations that are acceptable over different 
durations (e. g. 8 hours and 15 minutes) and those which are deemed to cause "immediate 
danger to life and health". These values are based on animal and human research 
whereby the effects of concentrations over time are tested. Although the IDLH value 
itself may not indicate the concentrations at which life is at risk (as this is a limit value 
representing acceptability and ideally this should be set below the limit at which life is at 
risk), the research contained in the IDLH documents gives valuable insight into the levels 
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of concentrations whereby acute or long-term effects would be sustained. IDLH 
documents typically give a value for: - 
LD50, which is the "calculated dose of a substance which is expected to cause the death 
of 50 percent of an entire defined experimental animal population" 
LC5o, which is the "calculated concentration of a substance in air, exposure to which for 
the specified length of time is expected to cause the death of 50% of an entire defined 
experimental animal population". 
For this research, the value of LC,, o (Lethal Concentration Low) is also relevant as it 
expressed the lowest concentration of a substance in air, other than LC5o, that has been 
reported to have caused death in humans or animals. The reported concentrations may be 
recorded for periods of exposure which are less than 24 hours (acute) or greater than 24 
hours (subacute and chronic). These values give us the relevant information to calculate 
the direct risk to human life. 
Apart from the direct risk caused by exposure to the chemicals, certain chemicals 
may have an impact on the system and risking human life through this - for example, 
flammable chemicals causing fire and structural damage, leading to platform collapse - 
however, this will be considered in Section 6.5. 
Most of the offshore incidents involving chemicals do so through exposure to 
fire. There is also the probability of damage from radioactive substances or contact with 
substances such as acids. In general, the implications of these are the same as for bums, 
shown in Section 6.4.2. Therefore, this section will concentrate on the products of 
combustion producing the most significant effects - Carbon Monoxide, Hydrogen 
Cyanide and Lack of Oxygen (Hypoxia). To assess the probable time of survival involves 
3 main issues - the speed of concentration change in the atmosphere, the rate of uptake 
by the individual, then the rate of impact on the individual's behaviour. The speed of 
concentration change relies on the actual environment - for example the severity of the 
fire or gas leak, as well as the characteristics of the environment - enclosed, ventilated or 
open air. These issues will be considered in Section 6.5. The speed of uptake of the 
chemicals depends on their characteristics, concentration, and duration of exposure as 
well the human behaviour - for example, activity leading to increased respiration. Given 
this, the impact on the individual depends on its toxicity as well as the speed of uptake. 
Carbon Monoxide is a colourless, odourless tasteless gas, which is extremely 
flammable. It enters the human body by inhalation, and then causes its toxic effects by 
bonding with haemoglobin (preventing Oxygen from bonding with haemoglobin) to 
produce Carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb). This therefore decreases the concentration of 
Oxygen reaching the tissues of the body. NIOSH (1994) recommends that the value for 
the "Immediate Danger to Life and Health" Concentration is 1200ppm. However, the 
same document comments that a 30-minute exposure to 1200 ppm will produce a COHb 
of 10-13%, which is thought to only result in a slight headache. Therefore, these values 
are clearly too low to give an indication of lethal or incapacitating doses. 
In Table 15, Kvxrner (1997) gives values of COHb that are more likely to relate to our 
study 
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Table 15: Temporary Refuge Impairment Criteria (Kvxrner 1997) 
Severity Narcosis Body Temperature Obscuration 
oC 
Human Factors 15% COHb. 39 1 dB/m 
Effects 
Significant Effects 30% COHb. 40 N/A 
(Impairment) 
Potential Fatalities 50% COHb. 41 N/A 
In Table 16, Kvaerner (1996) also suggests likely reactions to Carbon Monoxide in terms 
of parts per million of the gas. 
Table 16: Effects of Carbon Monoxide (Koerner 1996, E 
Carbon Monoxide Concentration (PPM) Effects 
1500 Headache in 15 minutes, collapse in 30 
minutes. Death in 1 hour 
2000 Headache in 10 minutes, collapse after 20 
minutes Death in 45 minutes 
3000 Maximum "safe" exposure limit for 5 
minutes. Danger of collapse in 10 minutes. 
6000 Headache, dizziness in 1-2 minutes. Danger 
of death in 10-15 minutes. 
12800 Immediate effect, unconsciousness in 2-3 
breaths. Danger of death in 1-3 minutes 
Purser (1988) shows that the time to incapacitation involves a combination of the 
%COHb and the level of activity. For someone carrying out heavy work, 2% COHb can 
result in incapacitation within 1 minute; whereas if at rest, 2% COHb results in 
incapacitation after approximately 4 minutes. Naturally, we would expect an individual to 
try and escape a hazardous environment, so paradoxically, it is likely that the heavy work 
involved in escaping the environment will also speed up the toxic action. 
Purser (1988) suggests the following "Stewart equation" is a good approximation of the 
%COHb resulting from short-term exposure based on the volume of air and CO 
concentration: 
%COHb = (3.317 x 10,5) PM CO)1.036(R MR)(t) 
where 
CO = CO concentration (ppm) 
RMV = volume of air breathed (L/min) 
t= exposure time (min) 
This shows some potential in being used to estimate the "survival time" as the %COHb 
levels define the distributions at which incapacitation and death occur, RMV can be 
estimated from normal human responses and CO concentrations can be calculated from 
the characteristics of the fire as discussed in Section 6.5 - for example, Initial CO 
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concentrations in smoke are estimated to be in the range from 0.1% for well-ventilated 
fires to 5% for under-ventilated fires. (Kvxrner 1996). 
Unlike Carbon Monoxide, Hydrogen Cyanide produces rapid effects on the brain 
- by diminishing the ability of the body to use oxygen when it reaches the tissues. NIOSH 
(1994) gives the IDLH as 50 ppm. However, Purser (1988) notes the effects of higher 
concentrations, citing values of 100ppm after 20-30 minutes, 200ppm after 2 minutes as 
the levels that cause incapacitation (from Kimmerle cited in Purser 1988). McNamara 
(cited in Purser 1988) notes that there was a report of a survival from accidental 
exposure to 444ppm, though 539ppm is given as the 10 minutes LC50. Purser (1988) 
estimates that from 80 -180ppm, unconsciousness will occur at between 2 to 30 minutes 
based on the following equation: 
tlcn(min) = exp(5.396 - 0.023 x ppm HCN) where tI,, (min) is the time to incapacitation in 
minutes. 
.. Hypoxia is not only caused internally - due to displacement in the tissues by HCN 
and CO - but also due to the lowered Oxygen content in the inspired air, due to the fire 
(Purser 1988). Oxygen levels that drop to 15% causes increased breathing, faulty 
judgement and rapid onset of fatigue. Levels below 10% cause rapid loss of judgement, 
followed by unconsciousness, leading to death within a few minutes. In these conditions, 
escape actions would need to take a few seconds if the individual is expected to survive. 
(Stenaas 1991 cited in Kverner 1996). 
For hypoxia, Purser (1988) gives the time to loss of consciousness ((tio)min) as: 
(t1o)min = exp [8.13 - 0.54(20.9 - %02)] 
Carbon Dioxide is also toxic and is universally present in fires (Purser 1988). 
However, its main effects are caused by interaction with the presence of the other toxic 
gases as it causes hyperventilation. The increased rate of breathing increases the rate of 
uptake of CO and HCN. A level of 3% is said to double the respiratory minute volume 
(RMV) and 5% is said to triple this rate. Unconsciousness is said to occur after 2 
minutes for a level of 10% (Purser 1988). However, Purser (1988) calculates the effect 
of Carbon Dioxide on the speed of uptake of the other toxic gases as shown in the 
following equation: 
VCO2 = ex p [0.2496 x %CO2+ 1.90861 
6.8 
Obviously, a fire would produce combinations of these gases resulting in an 
interaction between the effects. In general, additive effects of the gases are likely. 
However, the mathematical calculation of the degree of these effects is not fully 
understood so caution should be taken before using these specific values without 
consideration of various factors (Purser 1988). 
Of course, there are other mitigating factors. Smoke obscuration of over 1% is 
judged to be impassable by people without personal protective equipment (Kvxrner 
1996). This may be assisted by using guidance systems - perhaps powerful lights or 
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audible alarms. Training and practice through drills will also improve the speed of exit 
from a smoky situation. Certain medical problems may make a person more likely to 
suffer quickly in a toxic gas environment - for example, asthma or lung problems. 
Breathing apparatus can provide some protection against the chemical effects of toxic 
gases and their irritant effects. Whole chemical/fire-protective suits also provide 
protection against the heat. The average man walking at 4 mph consumes 40 I/min of air. 
Based on this, depending on the size of the cylinder and the degree to which it is 
compressed, a cylinder can provide between 11 and 48 minutes of air (Paterson 1993). 
SECTION 6.5: FIRE/EXPLOSION/GAS LEAK INCIDENT 
For modelling of a fire/explosion/gas leak incident, it is necessary to understand 
the nature of the materials involved. This information may include: 
" the chemical characteristics of the materials - for example, the temperatures at which 
ignition is likely, the behaviour of the material once ignited. 
" the probable size of a leak - for example, the amount of chemical in a fixed container, 
the pressure of a pipeline, the likely size of hole in a pipe. 
" the behaviour of a leak or fire - escalation rate, probability of explosion or 
impingement on other systems. 
" means of control - isolation of leak, blowdown of pipes, deluge to control spread and 
escalation and cooling to prevent further impingement 
" mitigating factors - weather conditions, wind direction, location of and relationship 
between critical systems 
Due to the number of variables, often this is very difficult to predict and model. In 
general, it is applied in the TPRC model as follows: 
"A task - such as attempting to control a fire through deluge or fire fighting. Success 
in the task means the fire has been extinguished. 
"A resource - which may be the time at which a fire is expected to impinge on another 
system, in which case, it is intended that the controlling task (defined above) is 
successful. Once it is known that the situation is beyond control, the time at which 
the fire is expected to cause structural collapse or impairment of the temporary 
refuge is a resource, in which case the task involves the evacuation of all personnel. 
The numerical values assigned to these parameters are largely unknown - though possible 
information can be estimated using models. 
Since the Cullen Report (1990), the required survival time of the temporary 
refuge has been specified. It is now required that the walls are resistant to explosions and 
fires to ensure that they are safe long enough to ensure a successful evacuation. These 
are normally specified in terms of fire type and time (e. g. J30 means the wall can resist a 
hydrocarbon jet fire for 30 minutes). 
Obviously, this requires great understanding of the characteristics of the fire that 
is likely to occur. Ramsay et al (1994) provides information on the probably leak rates 
over time from a 30mm hole in an oil pipe. This gives a maximum value of 40 kg/s, 
leading to flames of up to 70 metres high. With or without ignition - blowdown and 
isolation were found to have a significant impact on the leak size and resulting flame 
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height - normally gaining control after 16 minutes., Chamberlain (1998) has carried out 
detailed experiments on offshore fire hazards - including unconfined and confined crude 
oil jet fires and pool fires. This mainly focused on identifying the temperature variance 
across the area. It included the impact of deluge - however, despite specifying "early" 
and "late" activation of deluge, the times at which these were initiated were not 
published. 
Again, the details of such research are beyond the scope of this project. 
Nevertheless, it may be necessary to refer to such data to establish the likely behaviour of 
fire and gas leaks for input into our model. 
Fire and gas escalation are mitigated by weather conditions as well as effective 
safety systems. Safety systems include alarms (decreasing the delay before controlling 
actions are taken), shutdown and blowdown systems as well as fire-fighting equipment, 
such as deluges and portable extinguishers., Such systems can be assessed in terms of 
their impact on the fire (task speed) in terms of quantities available, reliability, duration 
of use as well as the effects of use on the fire. This may also include the impact of 
passive fire systems - for example, fire-retardant designs, enclosures of corridors and 
even pre-planned design parameters - like a re-consideration of the inventory of 
hazardous materials. Table 17 shows some information on the extinguishers available for 
use on an offshore platform (Taken from Paterson 1994). 
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Table 17: Extinguishers used in the offshore industry 
Type of Capac. Duration Range Comments 
extinguisher 
Water 9 litres 60-90 sec. Maximum Best cooling properties of all 
extinguisher range 8m, extinguishers. Most useful against 
most solid fuel fires. Not to be used on 
effective electrical fires or flammable liquid 
3m fires - as the fire can be intensified 
and spread by the water. 
Foam 9 litres 60-90 sec. Maximum Excellent smothering properties 
extinguisher range 5m, and most effective against 
most flammable liquid fires by forming a 
effective blanket. Not good against a free- 
3m. flowing liquid fuel which is alight, 
or with fuel spilling down a vertical 
surface. Not to be used on 
electrical apparatus 
Dry powder 4.5-13.5 15-40 sec, Range: Most suitable extinguisher for 
extinguisher kg depending 10-15 feet inflammable liquid fires and can be 
on size. (3-4.5m). used on electrical fires. Acts more 
depending quickly than foam. Has no cooling 
on size. properties so re-ignition may occur. 
BCF 1-7.5 kg 10-20 sec, 6-20 feet Similar to dry powder 
Vaporising depending (2-3m), 
Liquid on size depending 
Extinguisher on size 
CO2 1.5-7.5 10 - 30 sec, 6 feet It works by smothering fire and is 
kg depending (2m) useful against solid, liquid and 
on size gaseous fire as well as electrical 
fires. 
Wheeled 
portable 
extinguishers 
Foam: 901 
Dry powder: 22-75 kg 
BCF: 22-68kg -- 
CO2: 22-45k 
These can be used to calculate the speed of fire fighting, which is also dependent 
on the numbers of people who are actively fighting the fire. There must be not only an 
adequate supply of extinguishers but also breathing apparatus and personal protective 
equipment for the fire fighters. Water deluge rates have been cited as being between 10- 
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30 litres/min/m2 (Kverner 1996) and 12-48 litres/min/m2 (Vinnem 1989) and are a good 
method of fire control for 3 main reasons: 
" they can be activated instantly from the control room, so can have an impact on the 
fire before it can escalate to a high degree. 
" they allow control to occur without risking personnel going into the hazardous area. 
" they can provide a continuous supply to a large area and do not require regular 
refilling as for portable extinguishers. 
Therefore the models should be able to establish the times at which deluge can 
control a fire. However, very little research has produced formulae for the relationship 
between fire and deluge action. As stated before, there are many variables involved - 
temperature, wind direction, quantity of fuel all affect the outcome. Therefore, as this 
research does not have all the specific variables to make a complete outline of the 
characteristics of the fire, it will rely on published examples of fire behaviour. 
SECTION 6.6: THE MITIGATING EFFECTS OF WEATHER 
As shown in the previous sections, the weather can provide mitigation or 
worsening of a number of incidents. Fire can be adversely affected by strong winds 
blowing towards the temporary refuge or controlled with wet conditions. Fog can slow 
or prevent a rescue. Cold weather can lead to injuries through slipping on ice or 
hypothermia. The weather also affects the surrounding seas - their temperature and wave 
size - affecting the probability of rescue of a man overboard or successful launch of the 
lifeboats. Extreme weather such as large waves, hurricane force winds or seismic activity 
can cause incidents themselves - through structural damage to the platform or by vessel 
collision. 
In general, there is a large body of research into weather, facilitating the 
prediction of extreme conditions in specific areas. Designers are required to build an 
installation for the extreme conditions including wave height and seismic activity in the 
area. Woo & Muirwood (1986) have carried out a study on seismicity in the North Sea. 
Time of day also affects the probability of rescue - Night time would makes all tasks 
more difficult due to the reduced visibility. Brand (1988) gives the climatic conditions in 
the North Sea as follows: 
Sea temperature: 16°C to 5°C (occasionally 2°C) 
Ambient temperature: 25°C to 5°C 
Wind Speed: + Force 10 
Wave Heights: Occasionally + 30 metres 
These should all be considered when establishing variables for the TPRC model. They 
may affect the mean value or increase the uncertainty in the distribution. 
SECTION 6.7: ONSHORE EMERGENCY SERVICES 
Although this project focuses on the offshore industry, this model should ideally 
be generic enough to cater for all future emergencies. Therefore, this section considers 
the effects of involvement from the emergency services. In an offshore incident, 
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emergency management would involve initial intervention from the medic and fire 
fighters - then eventually by external vessels. Onshore, it is possible to rely on the 
emergency services to help within a shorter amount of time. 
The Patient's Charter (Department of Health 1996) specifies two performance 
standards for ambulances: 
1. An ambulance must arrive at the scene within 8 minutes for 50% of all calls. 
2. An ambulance must arrive at the scene within 14 minutes (19 minutes in rural areas) 
for 95% of all calls. 
Further to this, it states that patients in the Accident and Emergency department should 
be seen and assessed within 5 minutes of arrival. Rescue EMS Magazine (1991) states 
that on arrival in triage, a patient should be categorised in less than 60 seconds (cited in 
Streger 1998). 
Data from a number of regions indicates that this is possible. However, the latest data 
from the London Ambulance Service (1999) do not meet the first two requirements. 
These data can be used to provide a resource - where the task is to stabilise the casualty 
until the emergency services arrive, or to get the plant safe in time for their arrival. They 
can also be used as the expected delay - for example, when the casualty does not receive 
proper treatment until the ambulance has arrived and the paramedics have started work. 
The impact on emergency management produced by this delay in arrival may be 
alleviated by emergency services communicating the necessary information to novice 
rescuers to give the remedial treatment required before they arrive. Also, the on-scene 
commander can improve efficiency by providing adequate information to the emergency 
services to ensure that they bring the right equipment and can find the site easily. If 
weather or on-site conditions were likely to slow the emergency services, it would also 
be helpful to assign resources to direct the traffic or clear the route. For example, 
lighting the route in fog or applying salt to melt the ice. 
SECTION 6.8: CONCLUSION 
This concludes the chapter including the details of the data to support the model. 
Although this does not contain all of the potential data that can be applied, it provides 
useful examples, as well as guidance to obtaining further data. The thesis will now move 
on to discuss the method to obtain "performance parameters" from the scenario data. 
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Chapter 7 
COLLECTION OF PERFORMANCE PARAMETER 
DATA 
SECTION 7.1: INTRODUCTION 
Up to this point, the data available for the research include: 
" timings from escalation models 
" design data on installations, for example, distances and routes 
" estimated timings of human survival in hazardous conditions 
" speed (and therefore timings) for human performance in various tasks 
" speed (and therefore timings) for machine performance 
" specific timings of management and external tasks and events observed in the 
dedicated simulations 
These data are adequate for TPRC processing of the probability of success in 
events observed in a simulation. However, the objectives, as stated in Section 1.2, 
discuss the impact of change in emergency management skill and the assessment of 
generic (novel) emergency situations through the application of performance parameters. 
Therefore, these issues will be discussed in this chapter. 
At this point, the delays introduced by a change in emergency management skill 
or a generic (novel) emergency situation can only be ascertained by expert judgement. 
This introduces a degree of subjectivity into a technique that has the potential to be 
completely objective. It is known that the delays are rarely zero, however beyond that 
fact, it is difficult to establish realistic estimations of delays as input for the model. 
The use of performance parameters involves building up collections of timings 
observed in the scenarios so that these can be generalised and applied to novel situations, 
whilst maintaining a degree of objectivity. For example, in the same way that Pheasant 
(1987) used the measurements of human limbs, heights and strengths to assist designers 
in the recommended sizes and functions of tools; distributions of the times taken to carry 
out emergency management tasks could be built up from the simulation data. 
These performance parameters could potentially be used: - 
in the TPRC model to estimate the optimal and worst-case scenarios - using the 
longest and shortest observed delays, and compare these with the values observed in 
the scenario - therefore contributing to the third objective of the research 
" in the TPRC model as a basis for testing novel designs - therefore contributing to the 
third objective of the research 
" in the TPRC model for novel or generic emergency management situations - 
therefore fulfilling the fourth and final objective of the research 
178 
" as raw data, to be used by designers or emergency planners to estimate the best and 
worst response times 
" to build up distributions to represent particular types of data- and distinguish between 
the onshore/offshore industry, pre-emergency and post-emergency reactions or levels 
of competency 
" to reduce the reliance on expert judgment in the TPRC model - therefore increasing 
the objectivity and reliability of the technique 
These issues will be considered in Section 7.3 & 7.4. However, the following section 
will first consider how the performance parameter data can be collected. 
SECTION 7.2: COLLECTION OF THE PERFORMANCE 
PARAMETERS 
7.2.1 COLLECTION OF GENERIC AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
PARAMETERS 
The performance parameters can reasonably be separated into two different types: - 
" generic data - including "time to give a tannoy", "time to respond to a radio call" and 
"time to make an announcement". 
" context-based scenario-specific data - which were of 3 different types including 
estimates of escalation times (e. g. "methanol spill discovered to fire ignited") 
estimates of task times (e. g. "fire team arrive - foam monitor activated") 
estimates of times involved in specific management tasks (e. g. "fire ignited - deluge 
activated") 
In the case of the scenario-specific performance parameters, it would be unusual 
to have a sample of more than one for all of the scenarios. This related to the type of 
scenario and type of actions taken in response to specific events. However, if enough 
scenarios were analysed, these could be used to build up distributions of timings in the 
future. As this project was restricted by the numbers of scenarios available, this was 
beyond the scope of the project. 
As these values were based on simulations and the real events did not actually 
occur, there is no guarantee that they are accurate. Further to this, as the observer could 
only record data received by the emergency management team, the "imagined" events 
may have occurred some time before as specified by the scenario organisation team. 
Therefore, these values are predominantly "assumed" and may bear no relationship to the 
average time taken by the events in a real situation. Nevertheless, the simulations are 
designed to be realistic and therefore the timings should also be `within reasonable 
limits" and would therefore fall within the distribution of time values associated with the 
real events. For these reasons, caution and discretion should be taken when using the 
one-off scenario-specific data - using a broad variance to compensate for the uncertainty 
surrounding the values. Ideally, any real incidents relating to the type of incidents used in 
the simulations should be incorporated into the distribution. 
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However, 14 scenarios had enormous potential for producing a large amount of 
generic data. The generic performance parameters were defined as shown in Appendix 7. 
Timings for announcements, radio calls, tannoys, phone-calls and any relevant delays 
were included. The results are shown as frequency distributions in Appendix 11. These 
generic performance parameters could be used like the decomposed descriptions of 
movement in Chapter 6 that assess how long it takes to cover an area based on the speed 
of walking. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to observe an actual scenario or to use 
expert judgment to obtain the delays taken by management action. Using the data built 
up from dedicated simulations, it would be possible to estimate how long it takes to 
receive information, make a decision and communicate it to the relevant team based on 
the times taken in giving radio calls, making announcements and the delays between 
them. I°'. Ip 
Ideally these data could include cognitive information - such as the time taken to 
make a decision. However, this information is not observable and so cannot be included 
in an objective collection of information. It can only be built up and assumed through 
distributions of alternative timings, for example, the time taken to respond to an 
announcement, Therefore, the performance parameter data collected were based only on 
communications, actions and responses. 
7.2.2 CATEGORISATION OF DATA 
Given that the data were obtained from different sources, it was considered to be 
useful to categorise them - in case the differences between groups were found to be 
important in the future. 
The groupings include: 
" distributions in terms of scenario 
" distributions in terms of emergency manager - C, E, L&P 
" distributions in terms of industry - offshore / onshore (which also corresponded to 
distributions in terms of team) 
" distributions for pre-incident and post-incident timings 
" distributions representing the assessed level of competency (recorded for the onshore 
group only) 
Comparisons between the data for each category may identify particular 
characteristics of the category - and would justify why performance parameter data 
cannot be generalised from one category to the other. For example, pre-incident radio 
calls may be much longer than post-incident calls - therefore normal radio conversations 
cannot be used to predict the time taken in an emergency conversation. Likewise, 
offshore teams may be more familiar with particular procedures than onshore teams - 
therefore the times taken by these particular procedures cannot be generalised from one 
environment to the other. 
Competency ratings were recorded for 8 of the onshore scenarios using, 
questionnaires as described in Appendix 9. These allowed the recording of the assessor's 
judgment of the performance for each scenario - either "highly competent", "competent", 
"notable shortfalls" or "fail". Categorisation of these groups would indicate whether 
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more competent teams produced different timings for specific tasks. It also would 
indicate whether the assessor is influenced by the team's use of time during the incident 
and therefore, if this can be used as an objective method of competency assessment in the 
future. 
The differences between teams or emergency managers may identify particular 
styles of emergency management practice through emphasis on different methods. For 
example, a team using a crew resource management approach may result in longer 
informational calls from the scenario organisation team than those using a command and 
control approach. However, in this research, there were only two groups which differed 
in terms of their working environment (onshore vs. offshore) and, in this case, their 
attitude towards emergency management approaches was not recorded. 
The grouped distributions for the scenarios are shown in Appendix 8. These 
include the scenario-specific parameters for all of the scenarios with the addition of the 
generic performance parameters for Offshore Scenario 2. The summaries of the 
parameter data (e. g. means, standard deviations) are then grouped by type (e. g. offshore 
vs. onshore, pre-incident) in Appendix 10. 
SECTION 7.3: USING THE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS IN 
THE TPRC MODEL 
The Performance Parameter data could be used in a number of separate ways in 
the TPRC model. These are as follows: 
" Using the scenario-specific data, the TPRC can reproduce the same task or escalation 
for different conditions or a novel scenario. 
" Building up a task time from specific or generic performance parameters to test a 
new design 
Building up a "task time from generic performance parameters to estimate the average 
response in a novel situation. 
" Using the extremes of the performance parameter distributions to establish the fastest 
and slowest time. 
" Choosing the generic performance parameter from the closest distribution (e. g. 
scenarios defined as highly competent, offshore scenarios etc) to represent the most 
likely response time from that category of task. 
For example, if the scenario-specific data gives a distribution for "time between 
leak and ignition", a novel task can be plotted for this escalation time. Alternatively, 'the 
scenario-specific data may represent "time from start of incident to getting the fire team 
to the helideck" which could be used for a range of different speeds of escalation or 
different tasks. This improves the objectivity of the whole technique by removing the 
reliance on experts to provide estimates of values. This concept is best described through 
the use of an example, as shown in the following section. 
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SECTION 7.4: EXAMPLE OF PERFORMANCE PARAMETER USE- 
IN THE CRANE DRIVER SCENARIO 
Using the example scenario of the crane driver and the methanol tote tank, the 
performance parameters can be collected from the simulation data. 
The expected amount for the time taken by can be calculated from the times taken as 
follows: 
" passing on a message from the crane driver to the control room, 
" passing the message from the control room operator to the OIM 
" for the OIM to respond with an suggested action, then 
" for this suggestion to be relayed back to the crane driver 
These parameters provide an estimate of how long it could take for the team to realise 
the crane driver's circumstances then to order him to the safe haven. 
This information can then be used in the TPRC as a possible delay in the initiation 
of his movement from the crane and can potentially be used for other similar situations. If 
distributions of the values can be produced, we can establish the minimum delay 
(indicating an, optimal performance), an average delay, or a very long delay (perhaps 
caused by repetition of unintelligible radio messages or delays in response). This could be 
used to define the worst possible and best possible outcomes from the situation. This can 
then be compared with the observed outcome - hence giving an indication of the quality 
of the performance. 
The extract of such a transcript (as shown in Table 8) is shown again in Table 18. 
Table 18: Extract from Methanol Tote Tank Scenario Transcript 
Time Event 
0: 00: 00 ASSUME INCIDENT OCCURRED 
0: 00: 01 CD: Control room, Deck 
0: 00: 03 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 05 CRO: Control, call back 
0: 00: 06 call ends CRO 
0: 00: 07 CD: Yeah, just to warn you, we've had a bit of a knock, moving these 
tote tanks around, the wind took the load and there was an edge-on, an 
edge-on knock, pretty hard, I'm just going to have a look now. 
0: 00: 18 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 18 PS: Okay, stop all hot work, please CRO on the tannoy 
0: 00: 21 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 00: 22 CRO (tannoy): Attention all personnel, attention all personnel, all hot 
work is to cease immediately, all hot work is to cease immediately, all 
hot work permits to be returned to the control, return all hot work 
p ermits to the control room, thank you. 
0: 00: 34 tannoy ends CRO 
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Consider Table 18. As the incident is fictitious, we can only assume when the 
initiation of events took place if it had been real. The first indication of an incident is 
when the scenario organisation team call the emergency management team on a hand- 
held radio. Therefore, the actual time at which the incident occurred is assumed 
retrospectively - given as 1 second before the call was started. Therefore, in generic data 
terms, it takes 1 second from the incident to the crane driver (CD - scenario organisation 
team) to start to call the control room. This call does not give any information about the 
incident or ask any questions. It merely starts the communication process. It is therefore 
a non-informational call that lasted 2 seconds. It takes 2 seconds from the end of this call 
for the control room operator (CRO - emergency management team) to start to respond 
to this call. His reply confirms the start of the communication process and also gives no 
information regarding the incident. This is therefore a non-information call that lasted 1 
second. It takes 1 second for the crane driver to reply, which he does so with a lengthy 
call about his predicament. This call is therefore an informational call, which lasts 11 
seconds, and so on. Considering the content in more detail, the Production Supervisor 
(PS) orders the CRO to stop all hot work using the tannoy. From the end of this order, it 
takes 1 second for the CRO to start this process. Therefore, using just this section of the 
scenario, we can obtain the generic data as shown in Table 19. 
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Table 19: Generic data obtained from section of Methanol tote tank scenario shown in 
Table 18 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES MEAN and STANDARD MIN, 
(in seconds) SUM DEVIATION MAX 
Total time to deliver a 17 17 (n=1) 17 - - 
message 
Scenario organisation team's 11 11 (n=1) 11 - - 
informational calls 
Scenario organisation team's 2 2 (n=1) 2 - - 
non-informational calls 
Emergency management 1 1 (n=1) 1 - - 
team's non-informational 
calls 
Scenario organisational 2,11 6.5 (n=2) 13 6.363961 2,11 
team's calls 
Emergency management 1 1 (n=1) 1 - - 
team's calls 
Non-informational radio calls 2,1 1.5 (n=2) 3 0.707107 1,2 
Informational radio calls 11 11 n=1 11 
Total radio calls 2,1,11 4.666667 5.507571 1,11 
(n=3) 14 
Delays between radio calls 2,1 1.5 (n=2) 3 0.707107 1,2 
Announcements 3 3 n=1 3 
Information known in SOT - 18 18 (n=1) 18 
EMT told 
Time to initiate following 1 1 (n=1) 1 
orders (calling others outside) 
Incident - start first tannoy 22 22 (n=1) 22 
Length of tannoy 12 12 n=1 12 
Incident - start of first call out 5 5 (n=1) 5 
from CR 
Incident - start of first call 1 1 (n=1) 1 
into CR from incident site 
Incident - start of first 7 7 (n=1) 7 
informational call into CR 
from incident site 
Even from such a small section of the scenario, there are some useful data 
available. For example, it can be established that it took 12 seconds to deliver a tannoy. 
In this case, it is a non-informational tannoy as it gives an order but provides no 
information on the nature of the incident. Therefore, in terms of management tasks, 12 
seconds is a possible duration for a non-informational tannoy. In terms of the TPRC, it 
would just be represented as part of a delay. However, as the tannoy provides an order, 
it also initiates actions outside of the control room. In terms of the TPRC, stopping the 
hot work should prevent further escalation of the incident. Therefore assuming that there 
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will be another delay until the personnel carrying out the hot work can initiate their 
response, this will eventually result in the given task being implemented. In terms of the 
TPRC and SADCAR, the progress will look like Figure 38 (comparable to Figure 35). 
Figure 38: TPRC Progress Graph in Stopping Hot Work 
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From Figure 38, it can be seen that there are a number of contributory delays before the 
actual task is carried out. The timing from points a to d is measurable. The actual timing 
of the incident as well as points e and f must be established. In a dedicated simulation, 
these are fictitious but based on the observed reactions; so reasonable estimates may be 
obtained for these values. For example, it took 1 second for the CRO to respond to the 
PS's order to stop all the hot work. Therefore it is possible that it also took 1 second for 
the personnel working on the hot work to react. The time taken to actually complete 
stopping the hot work (i. e. ensuring all equipment is safely switched oft) is not recorded 
and cannot be estimated from the current amount of data. If a future scenario involved a 
technician calling in to say that the hot work is now stopped, this would provide an 
estimate of the duration of this task and would be recorded in scenario-specific data for 
that purpose. 
Taking these ideas further, the generic data distributions can be built up and used 
as best and worst examples of timing. In our small sample of data, there were two non- 
informational calls - one of 1 second, one of 2 seconds. Therefore using the distribution 
from this sample, the average length of a non-informational call is 1.5 seconds; the 
shortest is 1 second and longest is 2 seconds. In combination with data from other 
distributions, this can be used to establish the average, shortest and longest delays before 
actions are initiated. 
Also, these generic management tasks are independent of physical design 
parameters. For example, there is no reason why giving the order to muster should take 
longer for a bigger platform. Therefore, time taken in "ordering the muster" could be 
used from a scenario based on one installation for a scenario based on another 
installation. The actual "mustering time" could either be calculated from muster 
modelling programs, real data or built up based on numbers of people, distance and 
average walking speed. Therefore, given the design parameters (from either a real 
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installation or a future concept for an installation), it is possible to apply the TPRC model 
to given tasks in the environment. This would make it possible to assess the impact of 
design changes on risk - hence fulfilling one of the objectives of the research 
SECTION 7.5: PARAMETER USE OUTSIDE OF THE TPRC 
MODEL 
The use of performance parameters is not confined to application in the TPRC ' 
model. As raw data, it can be used in its own right as a benchmark for performance. This 
could be used for a number of purposes, including the following: 
" for assessment - therefore defining the times taken by highly competent, competent 
or failed emergency managers to react to particular situations so assisting in the 
assessment of other emergency management candidates 
" for design - to ensure that designers are aware of the times taken to respond to 
particular situations and therefore new technology takes these times into account 
" for emergency planners - to take the times taken into account when writing 
emergency management procedures 
SECTION 7.6: LIMITING THE USE OF EXPERT JUDGMENT IN 
THE MODEL 
One key feature of the addition of performance parameters is its potential to 
rectify one of the weaknesses of the current TPRC method. In Sections 5.4.1 and 5.5.2, 
it was noted that expert judgment was sometimes required to define means values and/or 
variance for some of the parameters. Most of the parameters used in the model could be 
obtained objectively using physical data from other research, so this would not cause too 
much of a problem for these data. However, the delays as defined by the management 
tasks were one of the main areas where these data could not be obtained from an 
alternative source. 
The main focus of this research was to use simulation data in the model - 
therefore relying on this as the only source of management-based delays. As stated 
earlier, it could not be determined whether the delays observed (as determined by the 
scenario organisation team) were based on those that would be observed in a real 
situation. Also, it could not always be determined when certain events occurred (due to 
recording only the "emergency management team" side of the activities). Therefore, 
when it was necessary to represent these delays in the model, this required a wide , distribution to be applied to the data - as defined by expert judgment. If distributions of 
the times taken by management decisions / actions or delays could be collated - as was 
the purpose of these performance parameters, this could provide a source of data for 
these observed parameters. Consequently, this would therefore reduce the reliance on 
expert judgment potentially producing an entirely objective technique. 
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SECTION 7.7: CONCLUSION 
This section has demonstrated how simulation data can be applied to a number of 
analyses outside the scope of its original scenario. Using distributions of large numbers 
of data, possible timings of human responses can be estimated for use in design, risk 
assessment or theoretical research. In this case, 9 onshore and 5 offshore scenarios were 
used to produce data - resulting in over 17,000 pieces of data contributing to the 46 ° LL 
generic performance parameters. These could then be applied in the TPRC model, to test 
the impact of optimal, average and poor performance on the outcome of emergency as 
will be demonstrated in Chapter 9. This chapter concludes the sections on the method 
The previous chapters described the scenario arrangements for the research, the original 
TPRC model and the changes made to facilitate assessment of the impact of emergency 
management on risk reduction, plus the supporting data required. This chapter has 
introduced the concept of performance parameters, which collates the simulation data to 
be used in novel situations. Therefore, this report will now move on to illustrate the r 
results that were obtained - initially starting with the results of the TPRC model as 
defined in Chapter 5. 
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'Cliapte'r'8 
TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT 
MODEL RESULTS 
SECTION 8.1: INTRODUCTION 
This section will present the results as obtained from the TPRC model as 
described in Chapter 5. 
As stated earlier, there were 14 simulations used -5 offshore and 9 onshore. All 
14 scenarios were prepared for TPRC analysis. This involved producing a full transcript 
of the scenario (an example of which is shown in Appendix 6) then a collection of the 
relevant timings involved in decision-making tasks. The scenario-specific timings (as 
introduced in the previous chapter) are shown in Appendix 8. The timings of generic 
tasks were incorporated into the development of the generic performance parameter 
distributions. As this involves a considerable amount of data, the means, standard 
deviations, maximum and minimum values are given in terms of categories in Appendix 
10. The frequency distributions for the total post-incident data are shown in Appendix 
11. 
This chapter will focus on how the TPRC model can represent the impact of 
changes in the key parameters by using tasks taken from one scenario - Offshore 
Scenario 2, as described in Section 5.5.2. Once this has been used to explain how the 
technique works, this chapter will include additional examples taken from the other 
scenarios. There will also be use of the TPRC to examine aspects of a real situation then 
comparison with other quantification techniques. In addition to these examples, it should 
be noted that the TPRC results from Offshore scenario 1 (the helicopter crash) have been 
presented in Lyons et al (1998) shown in Appendix 12. 
SECTION 8.2: TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT 
(TPRC) MODEL RESULTS 
8.2.1: INTRODUCTION 
The results show the TPRC graphs for each of three events - the crane driver 
escaping over the methanol laydown area, being rescued from the crane by the fire team 
and by being picked up by the fast rescue craft - in each case, before the crane driver dies 
of his injuries. Following this, the report will continue by speculating on using different 
variables for input to the TPRC model given the same situations - and therefore 
illustrating the impact each variable has on the probability of success. 
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8.2.2: TPRC MODELS OF THE METHANOL LEAK INCIDENT 
This incident clearly involves many factors - activating deluge, putting out the fire 
and ensuring that the fire does not escalate and impinge on other parts of the installation. 
However, one of the main tasks involved is to save the crane driver. In the first instance, 
the leak is the problem. The crane driver investigates this so is still in the area when the 
ignition occurs. For some reason, the crane driver cannot escape to safety and seeks 
refuge in the crane cabin. Before the fire team are able to get to him, he is overcome by 
smoke and flame and is forced to take the only other escape from the flames by jumping 
into the sea. Of course, in many cases, the events that occur in the scenario have already 
been specified. Therefore, perhaps any intervention made by the emergency management 
team would have made no difference. However, in this case, the crane driver was given 
no encouragement to leave the area himself (being told to stay and wait for the rescue). 
Also, once the crane driver was in the water, the standby boat made an immediate 
decision to launch - without any intervention by the emergency management team, who, 
at this point, were still unaware of what had happened. 
Therefore the TPRC results of the crane driver managing to escape over the 
methanol laydown area before being incapacitated by the smoke and fire are as shown in 
Figure 39. 
Figure 39: Probability of Success over time of Crane Driver's escape across the deck 
From this, it can be seen that his probability of success in the task has a maximum 
value of 0.13. Therefore, if using this strategy, his probability of survival is small and he 
would be ill advised to attempt this escape. As the information is not available, we must 
assume that either he did not attempt the escape or his attempt failed and he was driven 
back to the crane cabin. Given this, his next hope of rescue involves relying on the fire 
team to subdue the flames, to access the crane cabin then to lead him to safety. The 
probability of success with respect to time of the fire team reaching the crane driver 
before he is overcome by fire is shown in Figure 40. 
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Figure 40: Probability of Success over time of Crane Driver's rescue by the fire team 
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This time the maximum probability of success is even smaller - 0.013. This indicates that 
the fire team have very little chance of reaching the crane driver in time now that he has 
been driven back to the crane and the fire has escalated. So the crane driver is forced to 
take the extreme measures of jumping into the sea. Given that he survived the fall, he 
now relies on the speed of the standby boat crew and the fast rescue craft to rescue him 
before he dies of his injuries, hypothermia or drowning. For this, the TPRC results are 
shown in Figure 41. 
Figure 4l: Probability of Success over time of being rescued by the fast rescue boat 
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Here, the probability of success is much more favourable. The maximum probability of 
success is given as 0.59. Therefore, the chance is better than a random "50: 50" chance 
though is by no means optimal. 
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Given that these values can be obtained, consider the event tree shown in Figure 42. This 
is repeated from Figure 37 with the addition of the maximum probabilities of success 
obtained in the model. 
Figure 42: Event Tree of the Crane Driver's Options including Probabilities 
Escapes to safety Fire team rescue Boat rescues 
in time? him in time? him in time? 
Ignition 
Yes p-0.13 
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Firstly it should be noted that these" provide the maximum probabilities of success 
for each aspect of the task not the average value. Also the probability of success 
functions relate to time - and the timing of each distribution does not have the same 
starting point. 
Also, caution should be taken that these results are not used in decision-making. 
Given the initial situation, the crane driver would not immediately consider jumping over 
the side just because it has a larger probability of success (and hence survival) in these 
graphs. These decisions are independent of each other in value and can only be compared 
with other solutions taken from the same point in time. For example, if the crane driver 
had escaped over the methanol laydown area before the fire ignited, the probability of 
success should be much higher - as it is the escalating events that effectively reduce his 
chances. Therefore, these results cannot produce the overall probability of survival by the 
product of the probabilities. This must be calculated using the same time base for all 
three distributions. 
8.2.3 USE OF THE TPRC MODEL TO TEST CHANGES IN THE PARAMETER 
VALUES 
Therefore, using this same scenario, it should be possible to use the TPRC model 
to test how changes in the parameter values (through changes in the emergency 
management team's reactions or the emergency situation) affect the outcome. This can 
be used to assess the impact of changes in emergency management skill and design affect 
the risk and will therefore fulfil the 3`d objective of the research. 
Therefore, in the first example, this considers the optimal potential for the first 
situation - the escape of the crane driver. In this case, the same starting time was used 
but rather than waiting for the muster to start, the crane driver attempted the escape 
immediately at the point when the leak ignited. Therefore, instead of a delay of 61 
seconds, the delay is now taken as 0 (0.05). This may be too optimistic - as was 
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discussed in Chapter 7 regarding performance parameters. However, it provides some 
idea of the maximum probability of success in the situation - as shown in Figure 43. 
Figure 43: Probability-of Success over time in escaping over the deck - comparison 
between the observed delay and no delay 
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From Figure 43, it can be seen that the probability of success is greatly increased by early 
initiation of the task - up to 0.99. If there is no delay in attempting to escape, the fire has 
not escalated to a significant level to hinder the crane driver's progress. Therefore he is 
almost certain to successfully escape across the deck without help from the fire team. If 
the emergency management team had been able to predict this course of events, they 
could have ordered the crane driver to leave the area once the leak had been detected. 
This would have significantly reduced the probability of injury to himself - as well as to 
the fire team who were sent to rescue him. In this case, our emergency management team 
failed the crane driver - they were more concerned with other issues and this example has 
illustrated how much difference that could make. 
Consider also the crane driver's speed of movement. If he left at the same point 
(with the delay of 61 seconds) but moved considerably faster, what influence would this 
have on his probability of success. Using a speed of I m/s (0.1) instead of 0.7m/s, the 
TPRC results were as shown in Figure 44. 
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Figure 44: Probability of Success over time in escaping over the deck showing change in 
speed 
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Note that an increase in overall speed has improved the probability of success by more 
than half - now giving a maximum value of 0.3. Despite this, the influence of the 
resources is clear. Although the graph of I m/s starts rising before the 0.7 m/s graph - 
both decrease to zero at the same point. This is consistent with the concept of risk - that 
when the resource limit has been reached, the task progress will be prevented. 
This is also consistent with observations from aircraft evacuations - that fit young 
men are often the first evacuated from an aeroplane - and therefore the most likely to 
survive. Although there are other contributory factors, such as determination or even 
aggression, it is likely that they can react faster (low delay) and move faster than other 
types of passengers - resulting in a higher probability of success in evacuating (Muir et al 
1996). 
There are further changes that could be made. The resources (time) are 
determined by the speed of escalation of the fire. If this could be controlled to a greater 
degree, this would give the crane driver more time until he is overcome by the heat and 
smoke - possibly enough to facilitate his escape. So if the TPRC uses the observed 
scenario times (including the 61 second delay) but with a resource time of 189 (0.05) - 
the point at which the crane driver found the heat so unbearable that he jumped into the 
water - the TPRC results are as shown in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45: Probability of Success over time in escaping over the deck with increased time 
resources 
Again, it can be seen that the maximum probability of success has been greatly 
increased (peaking at 0.997). By increasing the resources either by controlling the fire or 
providing the crane driver with increased protection against the fire - his probability of 
success in escaping over the methanol laydown area is extremely high. 
However, the maximum probability is not the only consideration. One of the main 
virtues of this model is that it produces a distribution of values over time. Currently, 
there are no performance standards that can be related to the TPRC model. For example, 
if a probability of success of 0.75 or better was considered "acceptable" - this model 
could provide us with the amount of time at which the task was on or above this limit. 
This results in a probable time frame for a task to be successfully completed. 
For example, in Figure 45, the probability of success is above 0.75 for 75 seconds 
(between 108 and 183 seconds). However, in Figure 43, the probability of success is 
above 0.75 for 37 seconds (between 44 and 81 seconds). This indicates that the time 
window for a successful result is greater for Figure 45. 
In each of these graphs, the influence of resources, delays and task speed can be 
seen. These results also seem to have validity when considering our knowledge of 
emergencies and emergency management. If the escalation rate is slowed, it increases our 
chances of a successful rescue - hence reducing the risk. If the delays in action are 
shortened or the actions are speeded up, it increases the probability of success in the 
task, again reducing the risk. 
However, this task is greatly influenced by the crane driver's perception of reality 
- rather than reality itself. One might expect his decision to be based on his perception of 
the comparison between his probability of survival if he does try to escape and if he does 
not. If he perceives the chances of success in escaping to be low - he is unlikely to 
attempt it. Consequently, if he perceives the chances to be high, he is likely to attempt 
the escape, even if these perceptions later turn out to be wrong. In graphical terms, if no 
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attempt is made, the delay is assumed to be greater than the resources and therefore the 
probability of success will have a maximum value of 0. 
Therefore the actions of the emergency management team only affected the 
resource consumption rate in this task. The deluge was activated 34 seconds after the 
leak ignited - slowing the escalation. No initial order was given to the crane driver so we 
do not know how he would react if encouraged to escape or stay. 
However, Figure 40 shows that any action by the fire team is "too little too late". 
Although the team were ready to leave the control room 2 minutes and 20 seconds into 
the incident (extremely quickly! ), the fire had escalated enormously by the time they had 
reached the site. The graph indicated that the probability of success was extremely low; 
therefore emergency management would have no real impact on this task. However, it is 
notable that at the start of the scenario, the control room operator calls the OlM to the 
control room - not the rest of the personnel. The OIM arrives 16 seconds later. The 
platform alarm goes off at 1 minute 37 seconds (responding to the ignition). This, 
informally, signals a muster - not formally started until a tannoy is given. However, if the 
muster had been started at the same time as the OIM was called - this would have 
shortened the delay in rescue as well as calling the crane driver away from the site before 
the ignition occurred. Therefore, the delay would be even shorter than that shown in 
Figure 43 - increasing the probability of success even more. To represent this, we have to 
consider the crane driver's probability of success if he attempted to leave the area as 
soon as he found the methanol had leaked (45 seconds into the scenario). This is shown 
in Figure 46. 
Figure 46: Probability of Success over time in escaping over the deck before leak i ný ignites 
As suggested, the probability of success is even greater than in Figure 43 - when the 
crane driver did not attempt the escape until the leak had ignited. The actual maximum 
value was given as 0.9999, occurring between 92 and 94 seconds after the leak was 
discovered. On the graph, it appears that the probability is 1. However, this would not be 
possible using statistical models of reliability such as the TPRC model. 
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This has shown a worked example of how the TPRC model is used'and how it 
demonstrates understandable and realistic results. At this point, this appears to have 
successfully fulfilled 3 out of the 4 objectives. However, to demonstrate the scope of its 
use, the following section will illustrate a number of different examples. 
SECTION 8.3: ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF TPRC MODELLING 
8.3.1 EXAMPLES OF TWO SIMILAR TASKS FROM DIFFERENT 
SCENARIOS 
The first example is from the first onshore scenario - where the incident involves a hot oil 
leak that ignites (description in Section 4.9.6). The TPRC analysis of two tasks are 
shown: 
- getting the casualty to the ambulance before it is too late for him. 
- getting the fire brigade on site before the diesel and hot oil tanks are threatened. 
As far as the management team are concerned, both tasks are one and the same - putting 
out the priority one and priority two calls. 
In the questionnaire study (see Appendix 9 for details), the assessor stated that the 
decision to make priority one and two calls (phoning for ambulance and fire brigade) was 
a good one but was late. 
From the transcript, it was observed that the calls were not completed until 202 seconds 
after the leak had ignited. It was then 869 seconds before the fire engines were on site 
and were actively involved in cooling the area. It was 1202 seconds before the casualty 
was safely in the ambulance. As both of these tasks involve sub-tasks of different speeds 
- for example, travelling, setting up equipment, they are used in the TPRC model as the 
actual time with a speed of 1 unit/second - as described in Section 5.4.2.4. 
As far as the fire escalation is concerned, the next noticeable escalation point is the time 
at which the diesel and hot oil is threatened 974 seconds after the ignition. This is taken 
as the resource. However, the state of the casualty is not revealed and so an arbitrary 
escalation point must be applied for that task - which is taken as 1200 seconds after 
ignition. 
Therefore for the task of getting the fire brigade on site to cool the fire, the data are: 
Delay = 202 (0.05), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 869(0.05), Resources = 974(0.05) 
For rescuing getting the ambulance to take charge of the casualty, the data are: 
Delay = 202(0.05), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 1202(0.05), Resources = 1200(0.1) 
(Figures in brackets represent the coefficient of variation) 
As the assessor suggested that the decision was good but late, it is useful to see what 
impact a shorter delay would have on the probability of success. Therefore, the results 
are shown in Figures 47 and 48, including a comparison with a shorter delay of 60 
seconds. 
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Figure 47: Probability of Success in setting up cooling before diesel and hot oil are 
threatened - comparison between delays 
Figure 48: Probability of Success in evacuating the casualty before escalation - 
comparison between delays 
As expected, the shorter delays result in an improvement in the overall probability of 
success. However, the maximum probabilities of success are still below 50% - suggesting 
either that 60 seconds is still too long a delay to result in a good outcome, or that the 
success of these tasks would be difficult to improve. In this case, we would expect the 
emergency manager to look for alternative means of rescuing the casualty and controlling 
the fire and therefore subjective judgement is likely to reflect the emergency manager's 
flexibility in seeking alternative solutions. 
The second example is from Onshore scenario number 3 (described briefly in Section 
4.9.8), where the incident starts with a tanker driver falling and hitting his head. The 
loading hose of his propane tanker then proceeds to leak propane. Considering the same 
task as in the first example (making the priority one and priority two calls), the assessor 
judged the decision as good and early and the candidate was judged as highly competent 
overall (see Appendix 9). 
The calls were completed 97 seconds after this accident occurred. 1 second later, the 
propane ignites. Therefore, as far as the events are considered, the fire engines were 
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called before a fire had actually started! The fire engines arrive 638 seconds after being 
called and the ambulances arrive 1183 seconds after being called. For the fire engines, 
the escalation point is measured as the point where a fireball occurs and propane goes 
down the drains. For the casualty, again an arbitrary point must be given - 1200 into the 
incident. 
Therefore for the task of getting the fire brigade on site to cool the fire, the data are: 
Delay =0 (0.05), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 638(0.05), Resources = 713(0.05) 
For rescuing getting the ambulance to take charge of the casualty, the data are: 
Delay = 97(0.05), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 1183(0.05), Resources = 1200(0.1) 
(Figures in brackets represent the coefficient of variation) 
The results are shown in Figures 49 and 50. These results also illustrated what the graphs 
would look like if the delay (202 seconds) that had occurred in the first scenario had also 
occurred in this scenario. Assuming that both calls were made at the same time, this 
would result in a delay of 105 seconds for calling the fire engines (202 and 97) 
Figure 49: Probability of Success of fire engines being on site before fireball occurs 
Figure 50: Probability of Success of driver being in ambulance before escalation occurs 
As before, the shortest delays result in the greatest improvement in probability of 
success. However, from the two tasks, it is apparent that the fire engines are more likely 
to be successful than the ambulance team. When comparing the two scenarios, it is also 
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noticeable that the ambulance and fire engines took a different length of time to reach 
their destination. In general, this is a realistic occurrence. Availability, distance and road 
conditions are likely to affect their time of arrival. However, comparing the two 
scenarios directly is problematic as the "early" decisions also had shorter task times than 
the "late" decisions - so in terms of the TPRC, we should not attribute the success of the 
early decision maker entirely to his quick thinking. 
8.3.2 TPRC ANALYSIS OF POOR DECISIONS 
The TPRC analysis of decisions judged as poor is more complicated. In this set of 
scenarios, the main reasons for judging a decision as poor (see Appendix 9) were: 
" overkill - e. g. ordering 10 ambulances and 10 fire engines (Onshore scenario 4). 
" unnecessary - e. g. ordering an ambulance to rescue the man and dog outside the 
complex (Onshore scenario 5) 
" inadequate response - e. g. partial blowdown when full blowdown was necessary 
(Onshore scenario 4) 
" errors of omission- e. g. not protecting the surrounding area from column 
depressurisation (Onshore scenario 4) 
In the first two cases, the decisions would not necessarily have a negative effect 
on the overall management of the emergency. However, in the first case, such a large 
number of resources are unlikely to be available in the short term. Also, this order was 
placed when the emergency manager was not yet aware of the severity of the incident. 
Although it may have ensured that the incident was managed sufficiently, it may also 
have caused a panic in the nearby villages, media interest and a negative public response 
to the "wasting" of resources that'could have been attending other incidents. Similarly, 
the second example shows the emergency manager involving himself in factors outside of 
his concern. This is not as serious as the first issue except when it means that the 
emergency manager is over-focusing on such extraneous issues and not dealing with the 
main incident. As far as the TPRC model is concerned, neither decision in itself would 
negatively affect the overall management of the emergency. The successful rescue of the 
man and dog could also benefit public relations. Perhaps this is one example of where the 
subjective assessment shows inconsistencies with the public opinion or objective 
measures of success. 
As far as the inadequate response or errors of omission are concerned, the TPRC 
is much easier to use. An inadequate response may be represented similarly to the 
concept of delays discussed in Section 8.2.3. In some circumstances, a partial blowdown 
means that the plant is not as safe as it would be following a full blowdown. Therefore, 
the risk of escalation has not been abated. This is comparable to the performance 
shortfall shown in Figure 16. If the desired level of performance is never attempted, how 
can it be achieved? Similarly, if a task is not attempted at all, the probability of success 
can be only left to a minimal chance of it being completed accidentally. Therefore 
technically, this can be used in the model with an "infinite" delay. 
For example, assuming the task of protecting the surrounding areas takes 
approximately 2 minutes (no data are available for this task so this is an arbitrary figure), 
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it is necessary to protect the area until the column is depressurised - at 16.30 minutes r 
into the scenario. As this task was not attempted at all during this time, we can apply a, 
delay exceeding the resource limit, which in this case was chosen to be 1000. Therefore 
the data inputted are as follows: Delay = 1000(0.05), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 
120(0.05), Resources = 330 (0.05) (Figures in brackets represent the coefficient of 
variation). I 
In this, the probability of success never increases above the origin - following the 
time (t) axis. This reflects the probability of success in a task that was never attempted. 
8.3.3 ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES FROM THE OFFSHORE SCENARIOS 
In Offshore scenario 3, a technician has explosion injuries as well as flash burns. The 
TPRC model can be used to plot the probability of success over time of getting the 
medical team to the casualty before he deteriorates. From the transcript, the production 
supervisor is told over the phone that there is an injured person in the GCD control 
room. The phone-call ends 5.08 minutes into the scenario and he informs the rest of the 
team 20 seconds later. A medical team are despatched 6.52 minutes into the scenario but 
due to the fire team leader's difficulties in gaining access, they do not arrive on site until 
20 minutes into the scenario. Although, it is not known how long it will take before the 
casualty's condition deteriorates with these combination of injuries, it will be taken to be 
30 minutes. It is notable that the fire team have been in the GCD control room for a few. 
minutes before the medical team arrive. Therefore, it would be better to have a "multi- 
skilled" fire team that are also knowledgeable in medical skills. Obviously, to a certain 
degree, this will be the case. However, if we assume the medical team arrive on site at 
the same time as the fire team, it is not know how much difference, this makes to the 
probability of success. 
Therefore, taking the task of getting there as a unit task (time taken in the whole 
process rather than time to get from A to B), the data inputted for the "scenario", medical 
team are as follows: 
Delay = 412(0.05), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 788 (0.05), Resources = 1800 (0.1) 
(Figures in brackets represent the coefficient of variation). The data inputted for the 
medical team (assuming they were with the original fire team) are as follows: 
Delay = 126(0.05), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 879 (0.05), Resources = 1800 (0.1), 
The results are shown in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51: Probability of Success in getting to the casualty before he deteriorates - 
comparison between medical team and fire team timings 
From Figure 51, it can be seen that there is very little difference between the two 
tasks. The fire team has a much greater task on their hands, as they are required to clear 
the route to the site on the way. For this reason, the maximum probability of success is 
0.99. This is only slightly greater than the probability of success obtained by the medical 
team - which had a maximum at 0.97 - however, again it can be seen that the time 
window for success has been changed - where the influence is shown at the leading edge 
of the curve. 
In Offshore scenario 4, there is a fire in the HV switchgear room. This initially starts with 
a smoke alarm and a technician is sent to investigate. However, he is overcome by smoke 
and does not attend the muster. It is not known exactly when this occurs but his last 
communication to the control room ends at 1.42 into the scenario and he is known to be 
missing from the muster at 3.50 minutes. Therefore this value is uncertain between these 
two points. The fire team leave to search for the missing people at 5.27 minutes into the 
scenario (therefore delay is between 102 and 230 seconds). 19 minutes into the scenario, 
the search teams find him and mouth-to-mouth is performed. Using the data from Table 
16, it is not unreasonable to expect collapse and/or death after 10-15 minutes. Therefore, 
these 2 values will be applied in the model. 
Delay = 166(0.1), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 813 (0.5), Resources = 600 (0.1) 
Delay = 166(0.1), Task Speed = 1(0.05), Task = 813 (0.5), Resources = 900 (0.1) 
(Figures in brackets represent the coefficient of variation). 
The results are shown in Figure 52. 
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Figure 52: Probability of Success in reaching the technician before he is seriously injured 
through smoke inhalation 
From this graph, it can be seen that neither option gives the technician a particularly 
good probability of survival. Because the task of locating him takes so long, his chance 
of survival (depending on the concentration of smoke inhaled and actual exposure time) 
has a maximum probability of survival of 0.32. 
This concludes the section on examples from the offshore scenarios observed in the 
research. However, as specified, the model should also be capable of representing data 
from real incidents. For this reason, the following section will use a task that occurred in 
the Piper Alpha disaster and was recorded in sufficient detail to facilitate TPRC analysis. 
8.3.4 USING THE TPRC MODEL FOR EXAMINING THE PIPER ALPHA 
DISASTER 
The TPRC model was intended to be a predictive and analytical tool for assessing 
the impact of emergency management on risk reduction. At this point, all of the data that 
had been applied were obtained from models, simulations or theoretical knowledge. To 
ensure the model was capable of incorporating data from real emergencies, this section 
will use data recorded in the Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster (Cullen 1990). 
Therefore, this could assess the probability of obtaining the outcomes that occurred, 
given the situation. This could therefore establish where the actual outcome lay based on 
the optimal and worst-case scenarios - and consequently whether the emergency was 
managed poorly or well. 
Not all the details of times were recorded in the report - usually because the 
people who were most likely to know the information did not survive the disaster. 
Therefore, the information that is known to be the most accurate is that which was 
recorded by those external to the emergency, that is, the onshore rescuers. Therefore, 
using the Cullen (1990) report, it is possible to determine the following points. 
The initial event - the explosion - occurred somewhere around 22: 00 hours. 
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Between 22: 04 and 22: 08, maydays were sent out. 
Rescue helicopter (137) left Lossiemouth at approximately 22: 22 and arrived at Piper 
Alpha at approximately 23: 30 
Lossiemouth co-ordinates are approximately 57° 43' N 3° 17' W 
Piper Alpha co-ordinates are recorded as 58°28' 01" N 00° 15' 36" E 
This gives a journey of 139 miles (121 Nautical miles) that, in this situation, took 
approximately 108 minutes. 
This was a Sea King helicopter - the estimated speed of which averages at 110 Kts in still 
air. 
In terms of escalation, the second explosion (believed to have been caused by the 
rupture of the Tartan gas riser) occurred about 20 minutes after the initial explosion 
(22: 20). At 22: 50. there was another explosion, thought to have been caused by the 
rupture of the MCP-01 gas riser. At 23: 20, there was another explosion, thought to have 
been caused by the rupture of the Claymore gas riser. Between 23: 30 and 00: 45, the 
platform collapsed. 
In the report, it indicates that the second explosion (rupture of the Tartan gas 
riser) could have been mitigated by fireproofing and the use of a cooling deluge system 
by up to times of between 1 and 3 hours. 
Therefore taking the figures from the disaster, the parameters as used by the TPRC 
model are as follows: 
Delay = 22 (0.05), Speed = 1.83 (0.1), Distance = 121 (0.05). 
For the different parameter values for resources: 
Before Tartan riser ruptures, resources = 20 (0.05) 
Before MCP-01 riser ruptures, resources = 50 (0.05) 
Before Claymore riser ruptures, resources = 80 (0.05) 
Before Tartan riser ruptures, given that cooling has been applied, resources = 120 (0.3) 
Therefore, the probability of success with respect to time of the helicopter arriving at 
Piper Alpha before each subsequent explosion is as shown in Figure 53. 
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Figure 53: Probability of Success of Rescue Helicopter 137 arriving at Piper Alpha 
before escalation events. 
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From Figure 53, it can be seen that the scenario that actually occurred on board Piper 
Alpha had a maximum probability of success of 0.01 (shown by the peak in the red line). 
Therefore, Rescue 137 was the first helicopter on scene and could not have arrived 
earlier than the explosion caused by the rupture of the Tartan riser. The events then 
escalated leading to the subsequent ruptures of the MCP-01 and Claymore risers. 
However, if cooling had been applied to the risers, this was predicted to have increased 
the time of the initial rupture to 1-3 hours (if not preventing it altogether). In the TPRC 
model, this was represented using a mean of 2 hours (with a coefficient of variation of 
0.3 to represent the estimations of a minimum of 1 hour and a maximum of 3 hours). 
From Figure 53, it can be seen that this increased the probability of success of R137 
arriving at the platform to a maximum approaching 1. This indicates that if such cooling 
had been applied, there was a high probability of the first helicopter arriving before 
escalation occurred. In practical terms, this also indicates that the helicopter would have 
a greater probability of approaching the helipad without danger and was more likely to 
have successfully evacuated some of the personnel. In emergency management terms, it 
also demonstrates the importance of fire control and on-site emergency management - 
rather than reliance on the onshore support for evacuation. In terms of this research 
project, this demonstrates how the TPRC model can be used with real data - and how it 
can provide support to emergency plans or recommendations - such as those shown in 
the Cullen (1990) report. This is potentially a form of validation for the TPRC model - 
however, just because a probability of success has been produced does not mean that the 
figures are an accurate representation of risk -a problem that is observed for many new 
techniques. Therefore, the following sections compare the results obtained using the 
TPRC model with results obtained from other QRA and HRA models, in this case, 
HAZAN and HEART 
SECTION 8.4: COMPARISON OF TPRC MODEL WITH OTHER 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS 
As discussed in the literature review, there are many different techniques of 
Quantitative Risk Assessment and Human Reliability Assessment. However, whilst these 
are available for use to quantify the probability of error or failure of systems in different 
circumstances, what the user requires from a technique may become overlooked. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment often requires the probability of failure - such as the 
failure of a valve or switch. Human Reliability Assessment aims to provide values of a 
similar type towards Quantitative Risk Assessment. However, instead of failure, it 
provides the probability of error - which when considering the term "reliability" may 
equate to be the same thing. This research aims to clarify the link between these two 
aspects - that human error may or may not lead to human failure and human failure may 
or may not be caused by human error. 
The TPRC model has aimed to quantify the probability of success with respect to 
time in emergency management tasks. Therefore, to consider the role of this model, it 
was considered useful to compare this with other methods of QRA and HRA - and the 
best way to do this is to consider how other techniques would approach the crane driver 
scenario presented - what quantitative results they would produce and what these results 
represent. 
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Many of the techniques described in the literature review perform quantification 
using the opinions of a group of experts. "If these techniques were to produce comparable 
results; in this case, the group must be knowledgeable in the probability of success in 
specific emergency management tasks - and ideally, the relationship of this probability 
with time. This is expected to be problematic - both in identifying people with the skills 
as well as obtaining reliable results from them. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on 
more objective techniques to compare with the TPRC results. 
Therefore, for this, it made sense to identify the techniques that : - 
a. produced quantitative values 
b. had an objective structure so that these values were not entirely produced by the 
expert judgment of the user 
c. considered the impact of time 
d. could represent some or all of the aspects important in an emergency 
For this, the most appropriate QRA and HRA techniques were considered to be HAZAN 
and HEART respectively. 
Therefore, this section will demonstrate how these techniques would fare when 
considering the tasks shown in the crane driver scenario described earlier, as follows: 
" Crane driver's escape from the crane 
" Fire team's rescue of crane driver from the crane 
" Crane driver's rescue by the fast rescue craft 
These results can therefore be compared with the results obtained by the TPRC model. 
Notably, the TPRC model provides values for probability of success with respect to time 
that could potentially be used in another technique - such as the Event Tree Analysis as 
shown in Section 5.2.2. Therefore, it was not considered necessary to compare the 
TPRC with a whole hazard or error identification techniques - but only that part of the 
technique from which the numbers are calculated. If the TPRC methodology was seen to 
take greater account of the issues that are known to affect the outcome in a real situation 
- and incorporate the effects into the calculation, then it could be considered as 
successfully fulfilling the objectives of the research. Therefore, this section will 
concentrate on comparing the extent to which relevant issues are taken into account in 
the calculation process. 
8.4.1 HAZAN 
HAZAN (or HAZard ANalysis) is the method by which quantitative methods are 
applied to safety problems. In general, this provides a structure to identify and use the 
frequencies and consequences of events - to make safety-oriented decisions. Whilst the 
use of the term HAZAN is occasionally used to refer to the combined process of hazard 
identification and quantification; within this research, in accordance with the former 
description by Kletz (1999), it refers only to the process of quantification - providing the 
numbers to represent probability of failure for pre-identified hazards. I 
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Ordinarily, HAZAN uses past data (such as mean failure rate) to estimate the 
probabilities to be incorporated into its quantification process. In some cases, the human 
data of this kind can be estimated (such as the number of times an operator will press the 
wrong button) from trials based on the proportion of successes to failures within the 
total number of trials. However, to analyse a less typical example, such as in the 
emergencies described in this research, it is necessary to resort to the more generic 
descriptions of human failure rates - For example, as cited in Section 2.4.3.1, "When 
complex and rapid action is needed to avoid a serious incident, the probability of failure 
is 1 in 1" (Kletz 1999). 
The next level of human failure rate defined in the Kletz (1999) methodology is 
"1 in 10" for "in a busy control room where other alarms are sounding, the telephone is 
ringing, people are asking for permits-to work, and so on". However, where there is 
doubt in the description of the tasks, it is recommended that the higher value of 1 in 1 is 
used. 
Therefore P(failure) =1 is the value suggested as a standard value for the human 
failure rate in such situations and whilst this is most probably defined with operational 
tasks (such as activating valves etc. ) in mind, no other values are given for more physical 
tasks, such as those described in the crane driver scenario. In HAZAN analysis, the 
normal implication of a "p(human failure) =I result" is that fully automatic systems 
should be installed to avoid relying on human action in such circumstances - clearly not 
something that could be done in these' circumstances. 
Consider the decisions listed as follows : - 
" Decision to launch fast rescue craft 
" Decision by fire team to attempt to rescue crane driver 
" Decision by crane driver to attempt an escape from the crane. 
All are motivated to avoid the death of the crane driver - which would be described as a 
serious incident. 
All require rapid action to avoid this outcome. 
The complexity of the actions required would be more difficult to assess - the first two 
tasks involve preparation of equipment and then a search and rescue in hazardous 
conditions. The final decision would be made under life-threatening conditions and 
involving potentially life-threatening actions. 
As the HAZAN quantification technique does not provide any distinction between the 
levels of complexity, it is reasonable to assign the definition of "complex and rapid action 
is needed to avoid a serious incident". Given that no mean failure rate can be estimated 
for our novel crane driver situation from past data, it would be necessary to use the 
suggested values - p(failure) for the decision =1. Therefore as no action can result if the 
decision has failed, the probability of failure for the actions resulting from these decisions 
must also be 1. These are marked with * within the Fault tree in Figure 54. 
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Figure 54: HAZAN Analysis of the Crane Driver scenario 
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As it can be seen, it is the values given for the probability of failure in these decisions that 
affect the overall probability of failure - leading to a certain failure in the task, no matter 
what values are assigned to other parts of the tree. III 
Whilst the intention behind the numbers was probably to obtain "conservative" values of 
probability of success when considering emergency management tasks - within the 
method of HAZAN as it stands, there are no means by which to succeed in these tasks. 
Therefore, if we consider the situation whereby mean failure rate for the physical tasks 
was known - the tasks would still fail leading to the death of the crane driver based on 
the guaranteed failure at the decision-making stage. 
This is linked to the concepts of error and failure - in that a failure in the decision leads 
to no action being taken - an error in the decision may lead to action with deficiencies. 
However, while there are no data from other sources to alleviate this problem, the use of 
this method to obtain realistic values of risk for emergency situations should be carefully 
considered. 
/ 
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Whilst this section considers comparing the HAZAN methodology with the results obtain 
from the TPRC model, it is useful to consider where the TPRC results could be used 
with a similar Fault Tree structure. 
For this scenario, the TPRC method produced: - 
Probability of Success/Time Function of the Crane Driver escaping across the 
deck 
" Probability of Success/Time Function of the Fire Team rescuing the Crane Driver 
on the deck 
" Probability of Success/Time Function of the Fast Rescue Craft rescuing the Crane 
Driver from the water. 
As discussed previously in Section 8.2.2. (and shown in Figure 42) with regard to event 
trees, there are problems with using the TPRC in combination with other methods. 
With using Fault trees, there are three issues that must be addressed : - 
Converting the Probability of Success / Time function to Probability of Failure l 
Time function. 
" Calculating the probability of the decision leading to the attempted action 
" Calculating the conditional probability through the tree when using time- 
dependent functions as opposed to point values. 
The first problem is addressed by using the formula: - 
Probability of Failure =1- Probability of Success 
Calculating the probability of the decision was considered beyond the scope of this 
research - as it involves more examination of the cognitive aspects of emergency 
management - as will also be discussed in Section 10.7.2.4. Only the time taken in 
making the decision is considered in the model as it contributes towards the delay in the 
action. The decision may be linked to the perception of the probability of success - 
where the crane driver considers which option maximises his survival. However, while 
we cannot assume this, or even that the decision-making process will be rational, these 
values can not be estimated. However, it should be noted that in every case, if this 
probability was known, it would always decrease the Probability of Success/Time 
function - as the Probability of making a decision would always be less than 1. 
Calculating the conditional probability involving time functions is more of a mathematical 
problem - producing an overall probability/time function for the eventual outcome - as 
will be discussed in Section 10.7.1.4. 
Therefore, to avoid the complexity of these issues, the fault tree shown in Figure 55 
represents the probability of failure/time functions for each task GIVEN that the decision 
to attempt the task has been taken. These are shown symbolically (as A, B and C) to 
demonstrate how the TPRC model may not produce the pessimistic values shown by the 
HAZAN technique. However, it should be remembered that the calculation of 
conditional probability (for example, A+B) is not as simple as portrayed. 
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Figure 55: TPRC Contribution to Fault Tree Analysis of the Crane Driver scenario 
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Therefore, while the HAZAN methodology admits that the levels of reliability are 
probably not really as low as this, no alternative values, weightings or shaping factors are 
provided within the original methodology description to improve these estimates., 
Whilst some techniques are aiming to rectify this, none yet encompass the impact of 
delays, speeds of action, escalation rates or situation-specific features - issues that clearly 
have an impact on failure and success in a real incident. The TPRC model is able to 
distinguish between these critical aspects. 
Because the TPRC model is capable of producing a probability of success or failure 
function based on information obtained directly from the task, it removes the need for 
historical data, which, in such specific circumstances, is likely to be unavailable. 
Ultimately, it could be suggested that (once the issues of conditional probability with 
time-dependent functions and the probability of decisions have been addressed) the 
TPRC values could be incorporated into the HAZAN technique - providing more 
realistic values than suggested in the original HAZAN methodology. This again goes to 
show that the TPRC model does not aim to replace other techniques or QRA - but 
provides supporting data where previously, there may be none available - or TPRC can 
provide data where there are no means of estimating a risk value through other 
AND 
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techniques. Also, because of the TPRC's ability to incorporate changes in emergency 
management skill or design, these changes can be represented in the fault tree to look at 
their eventual impact on the overall risk value. 
8.4.2 HEART 
Like the TPRC model, HEART was developed for reliability engineers to assess 
the probability and consequences of human unreliability within a system. More 
specifically, HEART was designed to identify error-likely situations, to estimate the type 
of error that was most likely to occur and to quantify the impact of the effects. 
Therefore, it can be seen that HEART is already considering a different type of aspect - 
unreliability defined as "probability of error" as opposed to "probability of failure". 
The HEART method involves the use of the basic description of the operator's 
understanding of the task to define a value for the probability of error, which is then 
modified by the error-producing conditions of the working environment. 
HEART's data source is reliant on the observations and knowledge of its author. 
The TPRC model involves the use of a basic structure, on which observations and 
knowledge can be used to refine the data. Also, the use of source data for both models 
means that neither relies solely on the expert judgement of the user and therefore the 
results of the model for a given situation should be reproducible with a high degree of 
reliability. Of course, in this stage of development, the reliability of the TPRC model 
would depend on the extent to which the users researched the source data 
Despite these differences in structure and the sources of data, HEART shows the 
greatest potential out of all the HRA techniques for examining emergency situations - 
and despite the focus on error rather than failure, it seems possible that HEART can 
produce meaningful data that could be applied to our problem. Because the different 
error-producing conditions are represented with different numerical factors, there is the 
chance that the critical attributes of an emergency situation could be reflected in the 
error-probabilities. Therefore, this could achieve two of the original goals of this 
research - to assess the probability of success in emergency management tasks and to 
reflect the changes in emergency management skill. 
As already discussed previously, time is a critical aspect of emergency 
management success and it should be noted that "a shortage of time available for error 
detection and correction" is a key error-producing condition and the generic task 
associated with the highest level of unreliability is "totally unfamiliar, performed at speed 
with no real idea of likely consequences". Whilst neither of these reflect the numerical 
values of real time as the TPRC model does, the fact that they are included should be 
considered in HEART's favour. On the other hand, HEART manages to give 
quantitative value to factors that clearly have impact on the probability of failure/error in 
an emergency - such as "high-level emotional stress" but that are not currently reflected 
in quantitative terms in the TPRC model. Whilst it is suggested that such a condition 
would affect the speed of Task Progress in the TPRC model, it is not yet known to what 
extent. 
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Another feature of HEART that could be considered a positive attribute is the ; 
fact that it quotes not just the nominal value for Human Unreliability but also the 5th and 
956 percentile boundaries. These values could be used to reflect the uncertainty 
associated with the value - and could potentially be used with Monte Carlo simulations, 
to produce probability of success distributions comparable to those inserted into the 
TPRC model. 
Therefore, this section will continue with an example of how the HEART 
approach could be used by a reliability engineer to assess the human unreliability 
associated with the crane driver's rescue and escape tasks. 
The first task involves choosing the generic error probability. This choice is 
somewhat difficult. It is not know whether this should consider the whole unique context 
of the emergency situation or the fact that all of these issues would have been practised 
in drills and simulations. Therefore, it could be considered that all three tasks - the crane 
driver's escape, the crane driver's rescue by the fire team and also his rescue by the fast 
rescue craft could be considered the same type of tasks. 
Therefore, the first choice of value for all three tasks would be represented most 
appropriately by level A described as follows: 
Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely consequences: 
0.55 (0.35 - 0.97) 
The second choice would be represented most appropriately by level E described as 
follows: 
Routine, highly practised rapid task involving relatively low level of skill: 
0.02 (0.007 - 0.045) 
In each case, the first value is the average and the values in brackets represent the 5th and 
95th percentiles. 
Given these distributions of generic error probabilities, it is also necessary to 
incorporate the effects of the relevant error producing conditions. In Section 2.4.4.2.2, it 
was suggested that many of the HRQ techniques view emergency management tasks in a 
pessimistic light (also as verified in the description of HAZAN in Section 9.4.1) therefore 
they should be used with caution. 
However, when using HEART, it could be argued that pessimistic results were 
due to the temptation to include a large number of error producing conditions when 
evaluating emergency management conditions - resulting a probability of failure or error 
tending towards 1. To produce the most accurate results, Kirwan (1994) suggests that 
this evaluation should include a small number of error producing conditions. In this case, 
only the minimum relevant error producing conditions that are evident in this scenario 
and many other emergency situations will be used. 
These are: 
" Time pressure (x 11) 
" Ambiguity about performance standards (x 5) 
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However, Kirwan (1994) also recommends that Time Pressure is not used in conjunction 
with Category A Generic Error Probabilities. 
Given the values (as defined by the generic error probabilities above) and using the most 
optimistic and pessimistic views, the results obtained then depend on the proportion of 
effect assessed by a user. Table 20 represents the scope of results that would be obtained 
using HEART to quantify the probability of failure in the described tasks. 
Table 20: HEART Quantification of the Probability of Failure for the Emergency 
Management Tasks 
Probabilities of Failure for Emergency Management Events 
Values for routine highly- 
practised rapid task involving ` 
low level of skill 
Values for totally unfamiliar task, 
performed at speed with no real 
idea of likely consequences A: 
(If proportion of 
affect is 1.0 for all 
parameters) 
5th Percentile 11 x5x0.007 = 0.385 5x0.35 =1 
Median llx5xO. 02 =1 5x0.55=1 
95 Percentile 11 x5x0.045 =1 5x0.97 =1 
(If proportion of 
affect is 0.4 for all' 
parameters) 
5 Percentile 5x2.6 x 0.007 = 0.091 2.6 x 0.35 = 0.91 
Median 5x2.6'x 0.02 = 0.26 2.6 x 0.55 =1 
95th Percentile 5x2.6 x 0.045 = 0.585 2.6 x 0.97 =1 
(If proportion of 
affect is 0.1 for all 
parameters) 
5 Percentile 2x1.4 x 0.007 = 0.0196 1.4 x 0.35 = 0.49 
Median 2x1.4x0.02= 0.056 1.4x0.55=0.77 
95th Percentile 2x1.4 x 0.045 = 0.126 1.4 x 0.97- =1 
NB: Values of greater than 1 are shown as 1 as specified in the HEART methodology., 
From these results, it can be seen that the possible range of probabilities of error 
that could be assigned to these three tasks range from 0.0196 to 1, depending on the 
interpretation of the task with regards to familiarity and the proportion of effect of the, 
error producing conditions. The expert judgment technique used in HEART would be 
expected to produce only one range of values - for example, one of the six ranges 
represented in Table 20. These ranges demonstrate the scope of the method by 
illustrating how the task could be interpreted by different experts. 
It should be noted that none of these calculations have taken account of the 
physical parameters involved in three very different tasks, such as the distances to be 
covered or escalation speed. Therefore, these can only have an impact on the 
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probabilities if they are taken into account with the proportion of effect. In essence, 
HEART requires that an objective measure of a physical parameter must be converted 
into a subjective measure of an abstract parameter. For example, whereas the TPRC 
model uses real time and distance, HEART would use "time shortage" as a fixed error- 
producing condition of x11. Therefore, could it be assumed that the proportion of effect 
for this reflects "real time" in its calculation and in which case, there is a possibility that 
this be developed to be more objective. 
Many of the results above show that the probability of error is 1, therefore we 
could assume that error is guaranteed. However in the context of this work, what does 
that mean? 
Firstly, is the error in the decision-making process or in the physical process? 
In real terms, this may mean that the crane driver will fail to make the decision to escape 
and will stay in the crane. In terms of his probability of survival, this dictates that he fails 
in the task but it does not dictate that he will not survive - it is just beyond the scope of 
the "escape" task. This is where the fault trees shown in Figures 54 and 54 are so 
relevant - from the two branches - probability of survival would be dependent on escape 
and/or being rescued. 
Otherwise, this value may indicate that there is one guaranteed error in the decision- 
making process. This may mean running in the wrong direction. Again, this will just 
decrease his probability of success in surviving, but does not guarantee failure. 
Conversely, the error could be in the physical process. This may involve a fall. Again, 
this does not necessarily constitute failure in the task - but may increase the probability 
of it. Ultimately, HEART has not provided the answer to the question - in this situation, 
what is the probability that the crane driver escapes or is rescued? Whilst HEART may 
provide a more deeper representation of the probability of error, it can not fulfil the 
requirement of a Quantitative Risk Assessment where the probability of failure is the 
necessary input. 
Therefore, the TPRC model appears to be more successful than HEART when 
examining physical tasks and evaluating the impact of changes in physical parameters 
within these tasks on the probability of success. Of course, this is because one of the 
intended objective of the TPRC model is to examine task failure - and, as discussed in 
Section 8.4.1, like HAZAN, HEART is designed to assess the probability of error. 
Probability of error is not, as such, the probability of human failure - and therefore this 
may reflect the probability of errors in decisions - something that the TPRC model does 
not yet incorporate. Ultimately, these techniques are measuring different things but, as 
suggested in this research, it is the probability of task success produced by the TPRC 
model that should be the intended data required for risk assessment of emergency 
situations and not the probability of error as obtained from HEART. This concept will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 10.7.2.4. 
These analyses conclude the comparison of TPRC results with those obtained from other 
methods of HRQ and QRA. 
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SECTION 8.5: CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter has shown the basic potential of the TPRC model in assessing 
probability of success in emergency management tasks. As risk is defined by the 
probability of an event as well as its consequences - these probability of success / time 
functions illustrate part of the risk equation. As the results show the effects of parameter 
change on the probability of success curve, these show the impact of emergency 
management on risk. 
The results shown in this chapter illustrate the following successes of the methodology. 
" It is capable of assessing tasks observed in an emergency scenario with a high degree 
of objectivity 
" Quantitative values representing "probability of success with respect to time" were 
produced given data on tasks and resources present in an emergency situation 
" The methodology produced appropriate changes in the probability of success in 
response to changes in the inputted parameters 
" The methodology is potentially capable of representing and analysing any emergency 
management task - real or simulated, including novel designs or situations 
" In comparison to other methods of QRA and HRQ, this method produces probability 
of task success not the probability of error as produced using other HRA techniques 
" Particularly in comparison with HEART, the TPRC methodology was found to 
produce results more representative of the emergency situation 
" The TPRC model has been shown to be capable of providing quantitative values for 
other established techniques - such as event tree and fault tree analysis - and more 
representative values than those suggested in the original version of HAZAN for 
emergency situations. 
" As the TPRC model can represent the impact of changes in emergency management 
skill and design, these can now be used in conjunction with Fault Trees and Event 
Trees to be reflected in the overall risk values. 
Overall, this suggests that the TPRC model has been used to successfully achieve three 
of the four objectives of the research. The TPRC model will be discussed further in the 
following chapter with respect to performance parameters. 
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Chapter 9 
PERFORMANCE PARAMETER RESULTS 
SECTION 9.1: INTRODUCTION 
The fourth and final objective states the requirement of defining performance parameters 
that can be applied to evaluate generic emergency situations. 
As stated in Chapter 7, it was suggested that these performance parameters could be 
used as follows: 
" in the TPRC model to estimate the optimal and worst-case scenarios - using the 
longest and shortest observed delays, and compare these with the values observed in 
the scenario 
" in the TPRC model as a basis for testing novel designs - therefore contributing to the 
third objective of the research 
" in the TPRC model for novel or generic emergency management situations 
" as raw data, to be used by designers or emergency planners to estimate the best and 
worst response times 
" to build up distributions to represent particular types of data- and distinguish between 
the onshore/offshore industry, pre-emergency and post-emergency reactions or levels 
of competency 
" to reduce the reliance on expert judgment in the TPRC model - therefore increasing 
the objectivity and reliability of the technique 
These were then recorded as shown in Section 7.4 for the 14 scenarios. These were 
separated into scenario-specific and generic data, which will be analysed in the following 
sections. 
SECTION 9.2: SCENARIO-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
PARAMETERS 
The scenario-specific data are recorded in Appendix 8. The timings of these data 
would be difficult to analyse in detail. As these timings are dependent on the scenario in 
which they occur, they usually only occur once in the whole data set. Therefore, they 
represent only one point value of the estimated timing of this particular task or event. As 
stated in Section 2.4.1, one of the weaknesses of certain HRA and QRA techniques is the 
assumption that point values are representative of a distribution. This project aims to 
move away from this deterministic approach. Therefore, the scenario-specific data that 
have been recorded in this project represent point values from within distributions of 
values. At this point, these timings should therefore be used with caution. They should 
only be used in the modelling process if the data cannot be built from realistic physical 
data or estimated from any other source. Currently, they often represent the timings of 
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tasks and events that were estimated by the scenario organiser - someone who was not 
necessarily knowledgeable about the technical processes involved. Although it is hoped 
that these were based on the scenario organiser's research into the scenario, they are still 
biased by his judgement. Overall, until distributions of the scenario-specific data can be 
built up using further scenarios or real-life data, these are only to be used where no 
reasonable estimate of timing can be made and where the analysis is experimental rather 
than forming a basis of critical decisions. 
SECTION 9.3: GENERIC PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
As described in Chapter 7, the generic performance parameters could be used to 
build up distributions of values. Each generic performance parameter was defined 
carefully to ensure that the collection method was objective - and these definitions are 
shown in Appendix 7. 
As there was too much information to record the generic information for each 
scenario, this is collated in Appendix 10 in terms of numerical descriptions of the 
distribution with respect to categories, which are: 
" post-incident offshore data 
" post-incident onshore data 
" pre-incident onshore data 
" pre-incident offshore data 
" post-incident onshore data - scenarios rated as highly competent 
" post-incident onshore data - scenarios rated as competent 
" post-incident onshore data - scenarios rated as having notable shortfalls 
" post-incident data (onshore and offshore) 
For these, data on the frequency of event (number of times observed), mean ' 
timing (average length of event) and sum of timings (amount of time taken up by these 
events per scenario) were all recorded. The standard deviation gave an indication of the 
spread of variable's distribution for each category. Also, the maximum and minimum 
values were supplied to provide values for the events having the longest and shortest 
duration respectively. 
The final category (post-incident data (onshore and offshore) was expected to be 
one of the most useful collections of data - as it had a broad distribution representing 
emergency management performance parameters from both industries. Therefore this is 
also presented as frequency distributions as shown in Appendix 11. 
As the generic data were collected to build up distributions to be used in future 
analyses, it would be necessary to choose the data that best fit the given situation. This 
would be particularly important if it was found that the distributions recorded were not 
representative of the data required by the analysis. To establish this fact, it would be 
necessary to statistically evaluate the differences between the data recorded. For 
example, in some cases, it may be necessary to represent the responses of a competent or 
highly competent emergency manager. In this case, it may be inappropriate to use a 
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distribution that also incorporates data from a scenario assessed as being poorly managed 
- which might bias the distribution. If it was found that timings from scenarios of 
different levels of competency produced different timings, it would be inappropriate to 
use data with "notable shortfalls" to represent a "competent" or "highly competent" level 
of performance. Alternatively, if the average time to make a phone call in a "highly 
competent" scenario was found to be significantly shorter than in a "competent" 
scenario, using the highly competent timings would give an optimistic view of the delay 
produced by making a phone call. 
However, despite the large numbers of data that were recorded in the research, 
these were actually supplied using a small number of people (2 teams of approximately 6 
people each - depending on the criteria set by the scenario). Therefore the data cannot 
yet be expected to represent the full population of offshore or onshore emergency 
management teams. It was intended that these data should be developed in the same way 
that Pheasant (1987) used his data so the individual differences would be incorporated 
rather than separated in the distributions. For this reason, the statistical analysis of 
differences between the distributions has not been carried out within this research. In 
future, it is recommended that ANOVAs are carried out, considering the differences 
between the categories as follows: 
" distributions in terms of scenario 
" distributions in terms of emergency manager - C, E, L&P 
" distributions in terms of industry - offshore / onshore (which also corresponded to 
distributions in terms of team) 
" distributions for pre-incident and post-incident timings 
" distributions representing the assessed level of competency 
The impact of individual differences can only be reduced by using large numbers 
of individuals such as the amount used by Pheasant (1986) in his anthropometrical study. 
However, even at this stage, most of the data fall into normal or skewed distributions 
therefore it is likely that they already represent the population to a high degree. As there 
are a large number of data for some of the performance parameters (up to 2648 data 
pieces in the "radio calls" parameter), these are potentially useful for TPRC analysis to 
give probable means, variances and an indication of the shape of the distribution. 
For example, Figure 56 displays the frequency distribution for the times taken in 
responding to an announcement. 
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Figure 56: Frequency distribution of delays in responding to announcements 
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From this, it can be seen that the majority of announcements are acknowledged within 
the first 2 seconds. This may mean that someone is answering a question or merely 
responding to their name. Some delays are 3,4 or 5 seconds long; but although the 
maximum delay is 14 seconds, it is rare that anyone takes longer than 7 seconds to 
respond. In contrast, Figure 57 represents the frequency distribution of time-out length. 
This is apparently bi-modal, with the maximum frequencies being observed at 58 and 83 
seconds respectively. As the longest observed time-out was 132 seconds, this may 
illustrate the amount of time that is taken to re-organised and re-focus one's team - 
perhaps less than might be thought! However, on the negative side, this also indicates 
that the physical emergency is being allowed to escalate for this length of time without 
any additional interventions. Therefore, it should be ascertained that all the possible 
physical interventions have been set in action before a time-out begins. 
Figure 57: Frequency Distribution of Time-Out len tthh 
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Finally, Figure 58 represents the frequency distribution of messages (i. e. two way 
communication from initial contact to completion of message content) 
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Figure 58: Frequency distribution of timings of messages 
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Although Figure 58 does not show a normal distribution, it can be seen that the 
largest frequencies (18-25) are grouped around the 13-24 area. From this, the average 
time taken to give or receive a message can be assumed. 
As shown in Appendix 11, many of the distributions have a peak value (mode) 
and a spread surrounding this value. For some of the distributions, the mode is obtained 
for the smallest time value. In this case, as the time values increase, the frequency values 
decrease. The later distributions only have a small amount of data and often show only 1 
data point for each observed time value. Therefore, for these parameters in particular, 
further data must be collected before the patterns can be established. Some distributions 
are apparently bimodal - for example, time out length, which may be influenced by the 
characteristics of the scenario. The tails of the distribution are particularly relevant to this 
research. For example, consider the distribution of "passing information from the 
emergency management team to the scenario organisation team". This distribution 
indicates that a certain task is normally carried out within approximately 200 seconds. 
However, on one occasion, this task took 1022 seconds to carry out. Therefore, it 
cannot be assumed that the mean or modal values should be used as point values for 
emergency planning. 
However, just producing the frequency distributions is not the only analysis that can be 
made. To assess whether the distributions follow recognised patterns, it is possible to 
convert them into Weibull plots and to calculate ß and il using the method described in 
Appendix 4. (Weibull distribution is shown in Figure 30). However, because the Weibull 
plot involves the use of logs, it cannot be carried out where the time data is 0- therefore 
data such as those shown in Figure 56 can only be analysed from time =1 and upwards. 
Therefore, for the rest of the "delays between announcements" data (delays ;, - 0), the 
Weibull plot appears as shown in Figure 59. 
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Figure 59: Weibull plot of Delays between Announcements 
For time-out length, the Weibull plot appears as shown in Figure 60. 
Figure 60: Weibull Plot of Time-out length data 
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For message timing, the Weibull plot appears as shown in Figure 61. 
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Figure 61: Weibull plot of timings of messages 
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The equation on each graph represents the Weibull equation based on the trend-line of 
the data. The gradient is the shape factor (ß) and scale factor (rl) can be calculated from 
the intersect (-3 In rl) (See Appendix 4 for details). As shown in Figure 30, if the 
gradient was 3.4, the distribution would be approximately normal. As it tends to smaller 
numbers, the distribution is more random. 
Figures 59,60 & 61 show very different Weibull plots. Figure 59 is plotted without the 
delays of 0 seconds. However, the equation gives aß value of less than 1. This indicates 
that the distribution has a peak with a large amount of deviation - that is, the parameter is 
more random than normal or deterministic. Figure 60 gives aß value of 2.6018, which 
although still somewhat random, tends more towards the normal distribution (where ß 
would equal 3.4). The trend-line shown in Figure 61 gives aß value of 2.4484. This 
implies that the distribution of values for "timings of messages" should be approximately 
the same shape as that for "time-out length". However, considering the Weibull plots, it 
can be seen that Figure 61 demonstrates more variance around the trend-line. Therefore, 
sometimes the Weibull equation does not represent the whole picture that can be seen in 
the Weibull plots and frequency distribution graphs. The Weibull equations of all the 
performance parameters are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21: Weibull Equation Parameters for the Performance Parameters 
Parameter - In Tj TI 
Scenario organisation team's informational calls 1.5746 -1.2466 2.2071 
Scenario organisation team's calls - non- 
informational 
2.1254 -1.2466 1.7977 
Emergency management team's calls - informational 1.8417 -3.3636 6.2115 
Emergency management team's calls - non- 
informational 
2.1845 -1.0037 1.5833 
Scenario organisation team's calls 1.165 -1.7341 4.4304 
Emergency management team's calls 1.2464 -1.3846 3.0371 
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Non-informational calls 2.1433 -1.1204 1.6866 
Informational calls 1.655 -3.2697 7.2109 
Radio calls 1.1761 -1.5611 3.7712 
Delays between radio calls * 1.1883 -0.7373 1.8599 
Announcements 1.1838 -1.6005 3.865 
Delays between Announcements * 0.7154 +0.2602 0.6951 
Total time to deliver a message 2.4484 -8.23 28.829 
Times between telling to standby and calling back to 
give information 
0.9098 -3.1334 31.315 
Totally unintelligible calls 1.2336 -1.8966 4.6529 
Partially unintelligible calls 1.8822 -4.1529 9.083 
Time left between failed attempts to call in/out 1.4867 -3.7763 12.681 
Delays to answer phone* 1.1937 -2.0408 5.5268 
Time at which the phone stopped ringing 2.4922 -7.9873 24.653 
Phone call length 1.8837 -6.2673 27.857 
Information passed from EM to SO 1.0461 -4.4138 67.9852 
Information passed from SO to EM 1.6978 -6.2497 39.6884 
Time to initiate following orders (control panel 
work)* 
0.7847 -1.9298 11.697 
Incident - Control panel responds* 0.2965 -0.3884 3.7059 
Control panel response - operator res onse* 0.7578 -2.583 30.223 
Time to initiate following orders (moving / calling 
others outside)* 
0.7538 -2.3456 2.459 
Delays from being given information externally to 
drawing the attention of the group to it 
0.8989 -2.7755 21.927 
Time out announced - Time out started* 2.5476 -8.9792 33.94 
Time out length 2.6018 -11.032 69.414 
Delays between time-outs 2.1093 -12.841 440.45 
Incident - first time out starts 2.9072 -16.274 269.83 
CCR (Central Control Room) aware of incident - 
First time out starts 
2.301 -12.819 262.723 
EM arrives - first time out starts 4.4295 -23.019 180.6839 
Incident - start first informational tannoy 0.6197 -3.954 590.223 
EM arrives - start first informational tanno 2.3576 -15.348 671.826 
Incident - Start first tanno 0.5927 -3.4423 5.8078 
Tannoy length 1.2171 -4.0713 28.3629 
Time between tannoys 0.6144 -3.7357 437.117 
Incident - start of first call out from CCR 0.8029 -2.7019 28.939 
Incident - start of first call into CCR from incident 
site 
0.5445 -1.7855 26.554 
Incident - start of first informational call into CR 
from incident site 
0.6453 -2.528 50.28 
Incident - EM arrives 1.0899 -4.7645 79.162 
Incident - call EM 0.953 -3.6768 47.37 
call EM - EM arrives 1.0259 -3.49 30.0308 
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EM arrives - EM's first response 0.6675 -1.9963 19.899 
Incident - EM's first response 1.0304 -4.0574 30.021 
EM arrives - EM's first response 
Incident - EM's first response 
*- include delays of 0 seconds 
As can be seen in the column of ß values in Table 21, only one value exceeds 3.4 
(the value indicating a normal distribution). This was the parameter "OIM arrives - first 
informational tannoy" and is apparently deterministic (See Appendix 11 for frequency 
distribution). However, there are only 5 pieces of data in the distribution, so this is 
unlikely to be meaningful. Therefore, the data are predominantly random. From the, 
frequency distributions shown in Appendix 11, most are approximately logarithmic in 
appearance. However, a cluster of values with a long tail will give a low ß value 
consistent with our results. If we consider the data obtained from large samples, there 
appears to be a surprising relationship between the parameter type and ß. For example, 
"delays between announcements" involves relative simple "response to questions" 
timings. Nevertheless, ß is 0.7154, indicating a high level of randomness. In contrast, the 
ß value for "message length" is 2.4484, indicating more of a tendency towards a 
clustered distribution. We would expect this to be random due to the large variation in 
content of a message. However, as shown in Figure 61, the trend-line is not necessarily 
representative of all the features of the data. 
Given that the data have been analysed and the various distributions have been 
collated (where appropriate), the next section can illustrate how this information can be 
applied in the TPRC model. 
SECTION 9.4: USING THE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS IN 
THE TPRC MODEL 
This project has now collated a large body of data including the following: 
" Physical data on emergencies, their escalation and mitigation (from literature) 
" Physical data on human physiology with relation to physical task speed and injuries 
(from literature) 
" Technological specifications on rescue craft (from literature) 
" Physical design data of installations (from site-specific literature) 
" Scenario-specific estimations of emergency timings (from the dedicated simulations) 
" Distributions of timings for generic performance parameters applicable in emergency 
management (from the dedicated simulations) 
In the previous chapter, the TPRC model demonstrated how a time contingent 
assessment of probability of success could be produced for tasks where the resource-time 
and task progress-time relationships can be plotted. It was also noted how changes in the 
variables could affect the outcome - particularly the impact of an initial delay. Out of all 
the contributory variables, the delay is the easiest to improve. That is, the task goal is 
normally a fixed objective - as defined by the incident. The task speed is typically defined 
by the limits of mechanical or human physical ability. The resources are usually a feature 
of the incident, for example, speed of escalation. Therefore, emergency action can only 
improve the influence of these variables on the probability of success to a small degree. 
0.6675 
1.0304 
-1.9963 
-4.0574 
19.899- 
30.021 
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To produce a significant change, most factors should have been changes prior an 
emergency - for example, changes brought about by design, training or the allocation of 
resources. These might include reducing the distances to rescue by providing a close 
helicopter-launching site, speeding up rescue personnel through fitness training and 
selection, slowing escalation by providing improved safety systems. 
However, the delay in action is a key contributory factor - and is strongly 
influenced by the actions of the management team. Most of the tasks involved in an 
emergency are outside of the emergency manager's direct control. The management 
team can only pass on information and make recommendations, but it is the on-scene 
personnel that carry out the actual mitigating actions. Therefore it is the responsibility of 
the emergency management team to ensure that they limit their delays to a minimum to 
facilitate the probability of success in each task. As stated in earlier chapters (Figures 35 
& 38), the delay in action is made up of a number of sub-tasks: - informing EM, EM 
makes decision, EM gives orders, team act. This is known as SADCAR - situation 
awareness, decision, communication, action, response. Making a "good and timely" 
decision is a critical aspect of emergency management. These "good decisions" are 
intended to produce a positive outcome - which is something that cannot be defined until 
the system or incident responds. Also, because decision-making is a cognitive process, it 
is not something that can be observed or recorded in this context. Therefore, as an 
emergency management is best assessed in terms of the emergency's outcome, an _ emergency management decision is best assessed in terms of the actions that it produces. 
For example, returning to the methanol tote tank scenario, the crane driver is 
initially thought to have tried to escape from the crane by running across the methanol 
laydown area. In our given example of the TPRC results, the delay before he attempts to 
make his escape is 61 seconds - corresponding to the start of the muster. 
To illustrate how the generic performance parameters can be used to give data 
for a novel situation, we can use this part of the scenario. However, instead of the 
Production Supervisor ordering to stop the hot work (as shown in Figure 38), he 
immediately orders a muster. This can be shown in Figure 62. 
Figure 62: TPRC Progress Graph in starting Muster 
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Taking the extract used previously, as shown in Table 8, the generic and 
scenario-specific performance parameters for the process can be considered. In this case, 
the generic performance parameters were taken from the offshore post-incident 
distributions shown in Appendix 11. These produce the possible sets of values as shown 
in Table 22. 
Table 22: Possible Timings for Delays between the Incident and start of the Muster 
Parameter Original Minimum Average Maximum 
Scenario parameter parameter parameter 
Measures value value value 
Incident (assumed) - start of 1 1 36.6 86 
first call into CR from 
incident site 
Scenario organisational 2 1 1.77 5 
team non-informational call 
Delay between calls 2 0 1.51 21 
Emergency management 1 1 1.35 6 
team non-informational call 
Delay between calls 1 0 1.51 21 
Scenario organisational 11 1 8.97 39 
team informational call 
From end of call - PS gives 0 (Scenario (Scenario (Scenario 
order specific - 0) specific - 0) specific - 
0) 
Announcement 3 1 3.32 43 
Time to initiate following 1 1 27.46 126 
orders (call others outside) 
Length of tannoy 1 16.67 40 
Tannoy ends - Personnel (Scenario (Scenario (Scenario (Scenario 
start to muster (Assumed) specific - 0) specific - 0) specific - 0) specific - 
0 
TOTAL TIME 34 7 99.16 387 
In Table 22, the first column represents the figures that were shown in the scenario 
relating to stopping the hot work in response to the incident. However, because the 
modelling process must now examine starting a muster, some changes must be made. 
The time between receiving the information and the production supervisor giving an 
order is based on a cognitive process. The production supervisor decided that the hot 
work must be stopped. This is the closest approximation to a decision to start a muster 
that is available in this sample of data; therefore, the same timing must be used. Similarly, 
the timing between ending the tannoy and the external people starting the muster is 
assumed. As this occurs later in the scenario, the timing is taken from that point - in this 
case, 0 seconds. This produces a total time of 34 seconds from the incident to starting 
the muster. Given that in this scenario, it was assumed that the crane driver attempted to 
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escape when the muster was started, this can also be used in the TPRC model of his 
escape. -: 1- 
For all the other values, generic timings are available. The time between the 
incident and the first call into the control room is an assumed value in this case. 
However, from some scenarios, the control room are aware of an incident (for example, 
due to alarms or panel outputs). Therefore, it is possible to produce estimates of the time 
taken to call in from an incident. Table 22 shows the values obtained from the 
distributions taken from the post-incident (i. e. during the emergency management phase) 
offshore dedicated simulations. The minimum and maximum values are taken as the 
smallest and largest values observed for each parameter. The average values are taken as 
the mean of all values in the distribution. These give us the total times from the incident 
to the start of the muster based on the average, the fastest and the slowest recorded 
times. 
Therefore, to show how these can be used in the TPRC, the following values - 
mean (coefficient of variation) - will be used for the delay for the crane driver to attempt 
his escape: 
" 61 (0.2) - the original scenario timing of the muster 
" 61 (0.05) -a narrower distribution using the scenario timing, to represent less 
uncertainty surrounding the value 
" 34 (0.05) - the possible scenario timings of the muster (based on starting a muster 
instead of just stopping the hot work) 
"7 (0.05) - the fastest possible timings of this process 
" 99.16 (0.05) -a narrow distribution surrounding the average value - suggesting 
precise knowledge of the variable 
" 99.16 (0.2) -a broader distribution surrounding the average value - suggesting 
uncertainty around the average value. This would be used where there was no 
specific information on the nature of the delay. 
" 387 (0.05) - the slowest timings of this process (given a similar pattern of events) 
Ideally, the coefficient of variation for the new values should be calculated using 
a Monte Carlo process. That is, a value should be selected from each of the distributions 
of timings for the relevant tasks. These values should be, added together giving the total 
time taken up by the tasks. This should be repeated to produce a distribution of total 
timings. This distribution should then be treated in the same way as the single tasks have 
been treated in Section 9.3. A Weibull plot should be produced and the equation of the 
trend-line should be calculated. This should then be converted back to mean and 
coefficient of variation values (using the equations in Appendix 4) and applied in the 
TPRC model as above. However, in this case, it is necessary to illustrate the differences 
between the parameters and so this process is not followed. All the other variables are 
kept constant and as are follows: 
Speed = 0.7 (0.1), Distance = 25, (0.3), Time Resource = 84 (0.05) - (uncertainty value x 
given in brackets) 
The results of the TPRC model for these values are shown in Figure 63. 
227 
Figure 63: TPRC results for crane driver's possible escape across the methanol laydown 
area - the effects of various possible delays based on performance parameters 
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Obviously, the best probability of the success was when the delay was based on the 
minimum (fastest) values. These values are probably too optimistic to represent a 
realistic time to pass on the information. For example, the shortest recorded tannoy was 
I second - which would surely not be enough to pass on the relevant information. 
Nevertheless, this information was obtained by observation of previous scenarios so at 
some point there must have been a tannoy that was that short. This delay produced a 
maximum probability of success of 0.98. The second shortest delay resulted from an 
estimation of event timings if the production supervisor had ordered the muster at the 
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point where he stopped the hot work. This resulted in a maximum probability of success 
of 0.69, which is also a reasonably acceptable value. As stated in Chapter 9 (Figure 39), 
the scenario data produced a maximum value of 0.13. With such a low probability of 
success, it would be foolish for the crane driver to risk the attempt. However, if the 
production supervisor had started the muster at the same point that he stopped the hot 
work, the crane driver should have attempted to muster as well. This would have 
increased the probability to 0.69 and if it. was successful, it would have prevented the 
further consequences. The crane driver would not have been trapped in the crane and 
therefore would not be forced to jump into the water, requiring rescue by the fast rescue 
craft. However, the fact that the production supervisor did not give the order to muster 
does not indicate poor emergency management. Using average values from all of the 
other factors, it can be seen that both the 34 second (possible muster timing) and 61 
second (actual muster timing) values were faster than the estimated average value of 
99.16 seconds. This indicates that the crane driver's failure was not due to the 
emergency management team's tardiness, but more due to the task involved and the 
escalation of the situation. The maximum delay inputted was 387. This resulted in a 
maximum probability of success tending towards 0. Although this was calculated from 
the slowest times to carry out the sub-tasks, this does not indicate that it was the slowest 
possible time to complete the task. If this was expanded to include delays in passing 
information from SO to EMT or, internally, or problems with totally or partially 
unintelligible calls, this could potentially be much longer. In theory, this could be infinite. 
If the emergency management team were not informed that there was an incident, it is 
unlikely that the muster would be called. Similarly, if due to their own incompetence, 
they did not respond appropriately to the crane driver's call, the probability of success in 
the task would be 0. 
The relevance of uncertainty has not been discussed in the results. However, here 
it can be seen that when the delay was 61, a broader distribution of inputted values (0.2) 
lead to a higher probability of success than a narrower distribution (0.05). Therefore in 
this case, the variance has acted in the favour of the crane driver. 
In Section 7.3, it was also suggested that the TPRC could be used to test new 
designs using the data from simulations. Given the same situation as shown in Figure 63 
(description of task in Figure 62), we can imagine our crane driver has a greater or lesser 
distance to cross the methanol laydown area to safety. Changing the distance would also 
normally affect the resources. For example, if the given distance is reduced for the crane 
driver, it is also reduced for the fire. Therefore, a shorter distance may result in a faster 
escape but it will also result in a faster escalation. In our current scenario, the distance is 
approximately 25 metres. Figure 64 represents the TPRC results from half this amount 
(12.5m) and double this amount (50m) including the effects on task as well as escalation 
(resource consumption). This was carried out for the possible scenario delay (assuming 
the Production Supervisor started a muster at the point at which he stopped the hot 
work) and the average delay based on the generic performance parameters. 
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Figure 64: Results of TPRC for crane driver's possible escape across the methanol 
laydown area - the effects of changes in distance 
Possible, 25m 
Average, 25m 
Possible, 50m 
Average, 50m 
Possible, 12.5m 
-Average, 12.5m 
Time 
Figure 64 illustrates that greater distances improve the probability of success in 
this task. The 50-metre distance combined with a delay of 34 (0.05) resulted in a 
maximum probability of 0.93. With a delay of 99.16 (0.05), this is decreased to 0.28. 
When this is compared with the original distance of 25 metres, a delay of 34 (0.05) 
produced a maximum of 0.69 and a delay of 99.16 (0.05) produced a maximum of 
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2x10. Therefore, the increase in distance clearly improved the crane driver's probability 
of escape. However, when this was decreased to 12.5m, a delay of 34 (0.05) produced a 
maximum probability of success of 0.03, a delay of 99.16 (0.05) reduced this 0. 
However, an increase in distance also increases the time at which the maximum 
probability occurs. This is a logical change due to the increased time taken by the task. 
However, if the escalation rate should increase dramatically, the larger distance would no 
longer be the optimal solution. Consider the event where an extreme escalation, such as 
an explosion, was to occur at approximately 60 seconds from the initial ignition. This 
would not flow or escalate over a given distance at a constant rate but would be 
independent of the distances involved. This can be seen in Figure 65. In this case, the 
12.5 metres (possible delay) would be the best result, peaking at a value of 0.84. 
25 metres gives a maximum value of 0.15,50 metres gives a maximum value of 0.01. 
Therefore, in situations where escalation is a slow constant rate, increasing the distances 
acts in favour of the person but when the escalation is fast or immediate, a shorter 
distance results in a more favourable outcome. 
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Figure 65: Results of TPRC for crane driver's possible escape across the methanol 
laydown area - the effects of changes in distance in relation to a fast escalation 
(explosion) 
Delay 34,25m 
Delay 34,12.5m 
Delay 34,50m 
It should be noted at this point that the escalation rates in this example were 
essentially artificial - based only on the scenario organiser's interpretation of events. 
Although, these should ideally be based on realistic escalation information, this cannot be 
guaranteed. Also, the idea that escalation would increase at a constant rate relating to 
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distance may not be the case: This example was included only to demonstrate that 
changes in design could be applied to a TPRC of a given situation. 
SECTION 9.5: USING THE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS AS 
RAW DATA 
As suggested in Section 7.5, the use of performance parameters is not confined to 
application in the TPRC model. As raw data, it was suggested that the performance 
parameters could be used as a benchmark for performance, for three main purposes: 
" for assessment - therefore defining the times taken by highly competent, competent 
or failed emergency managers to react to particular situations so assisting in the 
assessment of other emergency management candidates 
" for design - to ensure that designers are aware of the times taken to respond to 
particular situations and therefore new technology takes these times into account 
" for emergency planners - to take the times taken into account when writing 
emergency management procedures 
For example, consider factors that change with the level of competency awarded. One 
key result was the difference in time-out length. The mean values are as shown in Table 
23. 
Table 23: Mean values of Time-out length for Levels of Competency 
Highly Competent Competent Notable Shortfalls 
83 seconds 61 seconds 56 seconds II:: 
j Highly Competent 
83 seconds 
This may indicate that longer time-outs are associated with higher levels of 
competency. Therefore, this may mean that longer time-outs influence the assessor to 
award higher levels of competency. However, it may indicate that time-out length can be, 
used as an independent assessment method. 
Similarly, another indication of competency may be the number, of "negative" 
events per scenario / hour - such as the number of times that the phone was not answered 
and stopped ringing. However, in this case, there were not enough data available to 
make this assumption - occurring on one occasion for the highly competent scenarios but. 
not occurring at all for the scenarios with notable shortfalls. This is contradictory to the 
expectation and, as it is unlikely that competency and "number of phone-calls not 
answered" are closely linked, this requires more data to assess the likely frequency of 
unanswered calls. 
It is likely that the raw data both for scenario-specific and generic performance 
parameters are useful for designers and emergency planners. This might be through 
application of performance parameters in other techniques - such as the timeline analysis 
or Microsaint (as discussed in Sections 2.4.4.2.5 and 2.4.4.2.6). For example, if it is 
known that it takes a specific length of time to receive information and deliver messages 
(considering maximum and minimum times), a designer can ensure that the delay caused 
Competent 
61 seconds 
Notable Shortfalls 
56 seconds 
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by these tasks are not detrimental to the outcome of the incident. A designer can ensure 
that a system allows a certain length of time for a human to cancel a process (for , 
example, security locks on exits, halon firing) or that areas are protected to a certain 
degree to allow rescue or intervention (e. g. a temporary refuge or bridge access must last 
long enough for the personnel to use it). 
Likewise, an emergency planner can use these values to design emergency 
procedures. If it is known that a person can carry out certain actions within a known 
length of time, the procedures can be designed to make the best use of the expected time 
available. For example, if the design is such that certain tasks must be done within a 
limited amount of time and the length of time taken to carry out these tasks can be 
estimated, the tasks can be ordered and prioritised accordingly. 
For example, in Offshore Scenario 1, it takes 13 seconds from the helicopter 
crash to the activation of the Level 3 shutdown. This is a reasonably quick human 
reaction and it is hoped that it will result in immediate action of the systems involved. In 
this case, it would be intended that any escalation that would be caused by leaving the 
systems active have been abated by this quick reaction. This is something that must be 
considered by designers. That is, if the system would only be effective if activated 1 
second after a helicopter crash, this is clearly an unrealistic expectation of the emergency 
management team. Also, if the designers suggest that the system must be activated within 
30 seconds of the incident to be effective, this would indicate that it should prioritised as 
such in the emergency procedures - perhaps indicating that this should be done before 
starting the muster or calling for a medical team. 
Although this has briefly described the use of performance parameters as raw 
data, it is expected that with the large number of examples shown in Appendix 8 that this 
could be used for a large number of different scenarios. 
SECTION 9.6: CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, this demonstrates the potential of the performance parameters, both in 
their own right and when applied in the TPRC model. This has fulfilled the fourth and 
final objective of the research. 
In general, this suggests that the TPRC method can be used to quantify the impact of 
emergency management on risk reduction. The performance parameters add a new 
dimension to the model by allowing it to use distributions of data recorded from 
simulations to represent the reactions of an emergency management team. This reduces 
the reliance on expert judgment to define the values for the delay parameter in novel 
situations. Therefore, this methodology can realistically be expected to fulfil the 
objectives of the research. 
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Chapter 10 
CRITIQUE OF THE METHOD 
SECTION 10.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter includes a critical analysis of the methodology, initially starting with 
a description of how the method developed, problems that occurred along the way 
therefore guiding it to being the method it became. Following this, there will be a critique 
of the final method in terms of the scenario arrangements that were set down for the 
research, limitations of the model as well as other issues relevant to the data collection 
and analysis. 
SECTION 10.2: INITIAL STATE OF THE RESEARCH 
When this research first began, it was thought that the objectives would be 
" to examine the tasks and associated cognitive processes involved in emergency 
management 
" to identify the behavioural features of good emergency management 
" to link these aspects to quantitative risk assessment through development of 
mathematical models 
These would therefore result in the identification of observable, objective and 
quantifiable benchmarks to assist in the emergency management assessment process. It 
would also allow aspects of emergency management to be incorporated into quantitative 
risk assessment and human reliability assessment. 
At this point, the TPRC (Task Performance Resource Constraint) model was 
being developed within the department to examine the probability of success in human- 
based tasks. However, it had only been demonstrated with a limited scope in terms of 
specific tasks and industries (Loa 1997). Obviously, it was hoped that this concept would 
be useful in the research - whether it should remain in this form or be used as a basis for 
a new model. Initially, it was, anticipated that the TPRC model would be developed as a, 
Human Reliability Quantification tool by incorporating the impact of Performance 
Shaping Factors from THERP (Swain & Guttman 1983) and Error Producing 
Conditions from HEART (Williams 1986) into its calculations. There was also some 
speculation that the model could be applied to the emergency situation purely in terms of 
cognitive aspects, for example, the probability of success in making a good emergency 
management decision. 
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SECTION 10.3: INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DESKTOP 
SIMULATION METHOD 
However, the goals outlined above were just the initial plans and, at that time, it 
was difficult to see how such objectives could be met. This was particularly the case as 
there was an absence of useful emergency management data, and no guarantee of data 
for the duration of the research. The only source of emergency management data was 
from the literature, such as those recorded in accident investigations, public enquiries and 
anecdotal reports. 
Therefore, the initial focus was to develop a methodology for assessment of 
simulated emergency exercises in industry that: 
" examined decision-making in an emergency situation 
" differentiated between good and bad emergency management strategies and decisions 
" produced a quantitative result based on objective measures that could be useful for 
HRA or QRA. 
" did not rely on the provision of external resources (for example, access to emergency 
management teams), but could still be useful if such resources became available 
" was simple enough to be used with novice emergency managers but also beneficial 
for those with more expertise (and therefore could be used to quantify the impact of 
training) 
" was fully repeatable 
" was scientifically valid, reliable and ethical 
" was consistent with real-life knowledge of emergencies and emergency management 
therefore could represent all the relevant features for a post-hoc analysis of a real 
incident (and potentially be validated in this way) 
" could be developed to incorporate additional factors, different contexts or situations. 
Also, given that this was in the early stages of the research, it was important that 
it should produce results quickly. This would reduce the risk of investing too much in a 
method that was later found to be ineffective. 
In the early stages of the research, there was no obvious way of obtaining "real" 
data on decision making from real emergency managers. Also, the relevant literature 
rarely reported enough detail to provide the basis for such a method. Therefore, the 
desktop simulation was developed. This could fulfil the objectives stated above in the 
following ways: 
" It was based on a "board-game" format, using a grid to represent the relevant 
physical area, and has specific rules for escalation and personnel behaviour. 
Therefore, it was cheap, easily repeatable but with the potential for development. 
" This involved the use of a "building fire" simulation so that even novice emergency 
managers could make a reasonable attempt at control and organisation - though 
those with more experience could also use this to test their skills. In addition, more 
simulations could be developed to include different situations and contexts. 
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" This could incorporate a methodology to investigate the cognitive aspects of 
emergency management. Using a post-hoc questionnaire, it would be possible to, 
analyse the attitudes towards the decisions made. 
" This method was consistent with the real-life concepts of an emergency - in that 
escalation could be mitigated through the correct human intervention. Also, there 
were penalties attached to making late decisions - which allowed the concept of time 
pressure to be incorporated 
" Use of a board game can be considered an ethical test of emergency management 
decision-making. 
" As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, real emergency management is often assessed in 
terms of the physical outcome - in terms of numbers of fatalities, survivors, 
casualties, assets and environmental damage. Therefore, this seemed to be a 
reasonable premise on which to base an objective, quantitative measurement of 
success. This would be consistent with real-life knowledge of emergencies and could 
distinguish between good and bad emergency management strategies. To be a totally 
objective assessment of management skill, it would be necessary to compare the 
actual outcome against the best possible and worst possible outcomes. Bearing these 
points in mind, the success in the desktop simulation was measured in terms of % 
survived (those evacuated from the building) and % safe area (where the fire was 
controlled). These were both observable quantifiable outcomes relating to the 
success of the strategy chosen. Given that the escalation of an emergency (if little or, 
no mitigation took place) is linked to time - the speed of success was also an 
important aspect. If the people were evacuated just before the building was destroyed 
in a real incident, there would have been more chance that this strategy would have 
failed (due to the variability in the behaviour of an escalating fire). Therefore, both 
the evacuation and safe area parameters linked to a time axis - and the most 
successful strategies were defined in terms of the quickest evacuation/control. 
This method was initially tested using "attitude-based strategies" - such as 
people-oriented, selfish etc. In terms of results, the desktop simulation showed face 
validity - in that the strategies thought to be effective (people-oriented) showed faster 
evacuation and better control of the escalation than those that were not thought to be 
effective (selfish or denial strategies). Therefore, this indicated that objective outcome- 
based evaluation of emergency management skill had the potential for development. 
However, this desktop simulation demonstrated some problems in its infancy - 
mainly the amount of organisation involved in running the game (monitoring real moves, 
recording the moves and using the prescribed rules to analysing the responses of fire and 
people). Therefore, it was decided that this should only be progressed using a computer- 
based simulation. Also, at this point in time, dedicated simulations in the offshore 
industry (as described in Chapter 4) became available for observation. 
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SECTION 10.4: DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR 
ASSESSMENT OF SIMULATED EMERGENCY EXERCISES IN 
INDUSTRY 
Initially, it was not certain how the dedicated simulations would affect the 
research. There was a possibility that these could be used just to enable development of 
the desktop simulation - perhaps by making it offshore specific. It quickly became clear 
that observation was not sufficient to gain the maximum benefit from this experience. 
Therefore, it was arranged that remaining simulations could be recorded using a video 
camera. Unfortunately, there was no opportunity for change of the scenario organisation 
or any flexibility to gain additional data on the cognitive aspects of the decision-making - 
for example, by interviewing the emergency managers or allowing them to talk-though 
their thoughts using the videos. Once the recordings were complete, again, it was not 
certain how they could be integrated with the previous desktop simulation research - if at 
all. 
Therefore, attempts were made to analyse the success of emergency management 
in the dedicated simulations in the same way as it was analysed using the desktop 
simulations. This was problematic as the dedicated simulations were more complex than 
the desktop simulation - involving more complex objectives than those that could be 
defined in terms of % evacuated or % area. Similarly, it would have required 
considerable effort in developing the desktop simulation format to incorporate the 
context of offshore emergency simulations. Whilst the analytical aspect of the desktop 
simulation was already adequate, focusing on the context aspect would not have been 
particularly beneficial - particularly when contextual data could be obtained from the 
dedicated simulations themselves. 
Therefore, at this point, it became logical to return to the TPRC model and 
identify whether it could use its particular features of merit (e. g. the incorporation of 
uncertainty into the inputted parameters and producing a probability of success/time 
function); the same concept as the desktop simulation (i. e. objective outcome-based 
assessment) but be used to incorporate the context of the dedicated simulations (multiple 
tasks and objectives in an offshore/onshore situation). 
This could therefore incorporate some of the positive aspects of current methods 
of QRA and HRQ (e. g. the task representation used in the time-line analysis, probability 
of success linked to time available versus time required as used in techniques such as 
HCR). However, it also could eliminate some of the problems associated with the 
current methods (e. g. reliance on expert judgement or statistics for error probabilities, 
pessimistic view of probability of success in emergency situations, decomposition or 
inappropriate categorisation of tasks, the specific impact of real-time on outcome and the 
use of point values as opposed to distributions of values). 
At this point, it was decided that the desktop simulation would require 
considerable work before it could be an effective research tool and so it was left at this 
stage of development. In addition, the dedicated simulations were expected to provide a 
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wealth of data with greater validity than the desktop simulation was likely to produce 
within the time-scale of this project. Therefore, the desktop simulation was available for 
development if, for some reason, the analysis of the dedicated simulations could not be 
used within the research., As it happened, there was no need to return to the desktop, 
simulation. For that reason, this part of the research is shown in Appendix 2 so that it 
does not distract the reader from the main focus of the research. 
Therefore, from this point onwards, the research had two main focus points: 
" To develop the TPRC model to incorporate the critical aspects of the desktop 
simulation in terms of outcome-based assessment 
" To identify the key features in the videos of offshore simulations that relate to tasks, 
their objectives, escalation points and outcomes with respect to time. 
One of the most important aspects influencing the probability of success 
identified in the desktop simulation was the impact of an initial delay in the initiation of 
the task. The original TPRC model was designed to look at jumps forward in knowledge 
but was not able to represent tasks that had not been initiated immediately at the point 
when the resources had started being consumed. As in the objective outcome-based 
assessment, tasks have'a physical and observable effect (e. g. movement towards an exit, 
activation of equipment to extinguish a fire) and it is usual that escalation is progressing 
before these tasks have actually been initiated. Therefore, in terms of the physical 
aspects, decision-making and communication all contributed to delays in the emergency 
management tasks. Therefore, it was required that the TPRC model should be adapted to 
incorporate these factors as described in Chapter 5. 
Given these changes, a number of tasks from the offshore simulations were 
analysed using this technique. As most physical tasks required data that could not be 
obtained from the scenario alone, it was necessary to obtain the relevant design 
information (distances from platform to shore, from relevant places on the platform (slug 
catcher to safe haven, GCD deck to control room etc)); human physiology information 
(walking speed, tolerances); and environmental information. Some of these are described 
in Chapter 6. 
However, it was still thought that this concept would be linked to the subjective 
assessment of emergency management for use in the benchmarking of performance and 
the cognitive aspects of emergency management performance. Therefore, as a second set 
of scenarios became available (this time based on an onshore installation), it was decided 
that the subjective data should be recorded in some way. It was required that this did not 
disrupt the normal simulation procedure so the pilot study involved the use of brief 
questionnaires. It was possible that these could be expanded for future sets of scenarios 
if they yielded interesting results. However, the main results of this aspect of the research 
revealed little more than the wide difference between the subjective assessments of 
characteristics associated with good emergency management and the estimated physical 
outcome of the emergency actions. In any case, no future scenarios were available within 
the research period so the questionnaires were not developed beyond the pilot stage. 
Therefore, this section is shown in Appendix 9. 
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It was notable that the observations from the dedicated simulations contributed' 
data primarily to the delay aspect of the model. Therefore, it was speculated that these = 
could be used to build up a database of emergency management response times. Initially, 
it was thought that the average reaction for specific situations could be assessed - for 
example - from the awareness of an ignition to the point at which the fire team are called. 
However, it was difficult to categorise these to produce more than one point value . 
without losing the specific context of the situation. Therefore, these were recorded for 
each scenario as examples of possible timings - possibly to be built up into distributions 
in the future. However, many HRA techniques use decomposition of tasks to the generic 
level - and this would also be possible for the observable parts of a delay. For example, 
although the "the awareness of an ignition to the point at which the fire team are called" 
parameter is very specific, it would be made up of generic parts including "length of 
radio call", "delay between radio calls", "length of announcement" etc. In addition, 
whereas each scenario provides no more than one timing for the specific performance 
parameters, it can sometimes provide more than 100 values for the generic performance 
parameters - giving greater insight into the characteristics of the parameter's distribution. 
These parameters are comparable with the idea of the "time and motion" study, 
but rather than physical tasks, they relate more to communication tasks - of which there 
are no recorded estimations for emergency management skills. Therefore, given the 
estimations of the parameters involved in a novel emergency management task, it is 
possible to make an estimation of how long a delay can be expected before the required 
action is initiated. The concept of both specific and generic performance parameters are 
recorded in Chapter 7, which then continues by demonstrating how these can be applied 
in the TPRC model. 
SECTION 10.5: CRITIQUE OF THE SCENARIO 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Unfortunately, the scenario arrangements were fixed for the duration of the 
research project. This meant that the environment, people involved, equipment, 
procedure and, type and number of scenarios were all pre-defined. It was only possible to 
obtain data within this scope. The original scenario arrangements were extended to allow 
the presence of an observer in the emergency management room, and to allow this 
observer to use a video camera. Later in the project, it was also possible to allow 
questionnaires to be given to the emergency management candidate and assessor. 
However, as the simulations were run on a tight schedule, it was specified that these 
questionnaires should take up a minimum length of time, so that they did not delay the 
debriefing. Therefore the questionnaires, as shown in Appendix 9, were shorter than 
would have been hoped to enrich the research. 
As suggested in Section 2.3.6.1, it is questionable whether simulations have good 
external validity - That is, it is not known whether the observed behaviour is 
representative of behaviour that would occur in a real emergency. For example, although 
the stress of being under test may affect the performance, does it affect it to the same 
degree that a real emergency would? However, it would be unrealistic to design a 
research project that relied on the "convenient" occurrence of an emergency that could 
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be recorded and analysed in the same way as these simulation data have. Therefore, it 
was necessary to rely on simulation data for the duration of the project. However, the 
techniques should be capable of using real data, such as those shown in Section 8.3.4 
from Piper Alpha, so that this could be used as a means of validation. ', Therefore, the 
behaviour produced by the simulations was assumed to be "real". 
Other than this issue, it was not possible to identify how much research went into 
the design of the scenarios. Although the scenario organizer was known to have gathered 
installation-specific information to design the relevant scenarios, it was not known how 
realistic this information was. For example, the scenario organizer may have designed the 
scenarios based on the QRA and conversations with senior members of staff. He also 
may have walked around the installation to estimate the duration of certain tasks. 
However, this research has established that the timings involved in an emergency' 
scenario rely somewhat on engineering and medical principles. Therefore, producing 
realistic timings for all the tasks and events is problematic. Also, as there was no specific 
procedure of scenario design, it is not possible to determine the accuracy of the results. 
As mentioned earlier, the scenarios were designed to be a realistic test - not necessarily a 
perfect representation of a real incident. Therefore, some of the installation-specific 
timings that are recorded as "scenario-specific performance parameters" may not be 
based on realistic data. These values were applied in the TPRC model therefore the 
output of this would also be affected 
Another problem was caused by the use of one main assessor. As stated in .- Section 3.5.4, it is recommended that at least 2 assessors are used. However, in this case, 
only one assessor was available to answer the "assessor" questionnaires. As shown in the 
results shown in Appendix 9, the levels of competency may be more orientated towards 
"behaviour correlating with good decision making" rather than the decision-making 
itself. As there was only a sample of one assessor available to answer the questionnaires, 
it is impossible to say if this is a general trend in emergency management assessment. 
Ideally, the other assessors (including the scenario organiser) should have answered the 
assessment questionnaires, to identify whether the views were consistent through the 
whole assessment team. 
Other than this, the assessment procedure created the following problems for 
scientific reliability. 
1. As he is an expert in emergency management, the assessor would try to compare the 
responses that were made by, the emergency manager with the responses he would 
expect to see. However, frequently, the assessor would have the "brief' of the scenario 
as given to him by the scenario organizer. Therefore, he was aware of the escalations and 
problems that would occur in the scenario. The emergency manager does not have the . luxury of this foresight. Knowing this, it would be almost impossible for the assessor to 
try and predict the responses by someone who did not have the same amount of 
information that he had. This is likely to cause some bias as the assessor can plan 
emergency interventions that would mitigate the events that he already knows will 
happen. 
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2. In this research, the main assessor was from the same organization that trained the 
candidate in emergency management skills, often being the trainer himself. The training 
process would involve passing his own judgment of good emergency management on to 
the candidate. Therefore, during the assessment, the candidate would be expected to 
copy this style of emergency management to achieve a high competency rating. This may 
be counter-productive if the candidate has developed an effective emergency 
management style that may be contradictory to the style taught by the assessor. For 
example, consider the emergency management styles described in Section 2.3.4. An 
assessor who expects a crew resource management approach is unlikely to be satisfied by 
the use of a bureaucratic approach - and vice versa, although in reality, both may be 
effective methods of managing an emergency and optimising the outcome. 
OPITO (1998) state "The HSE has indicated, where industry-wide training 
standards are appropriate, they should be developed in conjunction with established, 
independent bodies with the expertise and the capability to monitor standards". 
Therefore, in general, the choice of style and the definition of competency with regard to 
assessors is defined subjectively through their previous emergency management 
experience. Therefore, it would be difficult to use the assessor's results as validation for 
the TPRC model. However, questionnaires and subjective assessment are no longer the 
main issue in this research and, in general, most of these problems would be rectified by 
running dedicated simulations that were designed using scientific criteria. Unfortunately, 
this option was not available during this project. However, the recommendations for 
running dedicated simulations for research purposes are shown in Chapter 12. 
SECTION 10.6: CRITIQUE OF THE DATA COLLECTION 
METHOD 
Other than the questionnaires, which will be discussed in Appendix 9, there are 
two main data collection techniques. One involves extracting the data from the scenario. 
The other is predominantly a research technique, involving collection of data and 
technical information as well as information on human activities and tolerance limits. This 
section will examine both of these in turn. 
10.6.1 DATA COLLECTION FROM THE SCENARIO 
The first data collection technique consists of recording the scenarios on video 
then transcribing the data. This was a long and slow process. Recording the words, 
actions and timings for all members of the group would often require small sections to be 
rewound and replayed more than once. When there was overlap between conversations 
or fuzzy radio calls, this was even more difficult. This made the process a lot more 
tedious -a 30-minute scenario sometimes taking over a week to transcribe. Also, due to 
the nature of the method, it is vulnerable to particular errors. 
The following errors may have occurred: 
" Mishearing the words - Mishearing the words may be caused by unusual accents, use 
of terms that are unknown to the author, volume or fuzziness due to the distance 
from the microphone or using lowered voices, quality of the video-recording or due 
to the acoustic quality of the original radio message. 
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" Recording the wrong words in the transcript - This may be caused by mishearing 
them (as above) or a typing error. 
" Recording the wrong timing - This could be due to a typing error or noting down the 
wrong time from the stopwatch. For example, it takes a finite time between an event' 
occurring on the video and the observer looking at the stopwatch. These data are 
digitally displayed and are recorded to the nearest second, which occasionally results 
in a0 value. If it takes more than half a second to look from the video to the clock, 
there is a possibility that a larger value will be obtained. 
" Recording the written communication wrongly - No information was communicated 
solely using written information therefore this consideration was not deemed 
necessary. In the event that this had occurred, the written messages would be 
recorded in real time as for announcements. However, in the event that this had been 
an issue, errors could be caused by not being able to understand the person's 
handwriting. It could also be due to obscuration (by people standing in front of the 
camera) or due to the size of the handwriting in relation to the frame. It could also be 
due to the position of the writing in relation to the camera. Again this could be 
caused by typing errors - though it should be noted that there was no written 
information recorded in the transcripts. 
The use of video recording is generally considered to promote the use of objective 
techniques. There is no room for interpretation of events and conversations that are 
recorded both visually and audibly. However, as the scenarios were only transcribed by 
the author, there is no guarantee that errors were not made. Simply getting someone else 
to read through the transcripts and compare them to the videos is unacceptable, as the 
reader would be biased by expectancy effects. That is, they would expect to hear the 
words that are in the transcript and so any ambiguity in the words on the video will be 
resolved using the transcript rather than by the reader's interpretation. As the 
transcription process was so long and slow, it was not deemed possible to get an 
independent verifier to produce transcripts for the same scenarios. Therefore, any errors 
produced by the data collection remain in the research - though these are likely to be rare 
due to the contextual relationship of the data provided by conversations. 
10.6.2 DATA COLLECTION FROM THEORETICAL INFORMATION AND 
OTHER MODELS 
This considers the data that were collected from theoretical information and 
models - such as fire models, casualty models and estimations of human performance 
(e. g. Walking speed).. 
This data collection technique was limited by the skills of the researcher, the 
flexibility of the organizations involved as well as the available research that has been 
undertaken in the area. Ideally, the timings of the main tasks should be estimated through 
walk-throughs. For example, working out how long it would take the fire team to reach 
the helipad by actually walking the distance. Although this is likely to be altered by the 
circumstances, it gives a realistic indication of the timing. However, for escalation of 
fires, the effects of mitigation and injuries, no real try-outs can be attempted. Therefore, 
it is necessary to rely on models and theoretical information. 
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Chapter 6 illustrates the main data that were collected for this research, including 
information on human performance, injuries and fire escalation and mitigation. Although 
there is much more information available, this is often difficult to extract from the 
relevant source; for example, the relevant medical information on survival time in relation 
to specific trauma injuries is recorded in medical journals. This describes case studies of 
exceptional survival as well as unexpected death due to complications. However, without 
an in-depth understanding of the description of the injuries as well as the understanding 
of the medical techniques, it is difficult to recreate this in a form that is usable for the 
TPRC model. Even where models are available, they are often inaccurate due to the 
effects of personality and individual differences. For example, there is a model predicting 
survival time from cold-water immersion (Tikuisis 1995, Tikuisis & Keefe 1996, Tikuisis 
et al 1997, Tikuisis 1998). This uses information on clothing, ambient temperature, sea 
state, level of immersion and information about the subject, such as fitness and body fat 
content. As stated in Section 6.4.2, their original model predicted a survival time much 
shorter than that of the surviving passengers of the Estonia disaster. This suggests that 
the TPRC model's use of distributions to represent variability is an important asset. 
However, it creates problems when choosing the correct values to be used, as will be 
discussed in Section 10.7.4.1. 
Similarly, the behaviour of fire is changed by the amount of fuel, oxygen, weather 
conditions, ambient temperature and the effects of mitigation. Although there is a large 
body of information about particular types of fire, there is no model that provides all- 
encompassing rules for escalation. 
Therefore, the data collection technique relies on extracting the information from 
the correct sources. This often requires considerable understanding about the relevant 
subject areas - including medical, biological, chemical or engineering information. Even 
then, not all of the relevant information has been collected by the various disciplines. As 
research continues in these areas, overall knowledge increases. Therefore, as this model 
relies on external data, it is limited by the progress of other research. Although this 
guarantees a certain degree of flexibility and an ability to incorporate new ideas and new 
models, it also applies limitations to its current use. 
SECTION 10.7: CRITIQUE OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
10.7.1 CRITIQUE OF THE MATHEMATICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE TASK 
PERFORMANCE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
The TPRC model is based on mathematical theories such as calculus and 
statistics. Therefore, it has been assumed that there are no weaknesses in mathematical 
validity or reliability. However, in its current role, there are a number of inadequacies 
when representing the emergency management situation. 
244 
10.7.1.1 Multiple Tasks and Multiple'Resources 
Firstly, the TPRC model is only capable of modelling a single task progress rate 
and a single resource consumption rate. These must both be linear, and are sampled from 
the same distribution for the whole analysis. However, the nature of emergency 
management is such that there may be a change in progress speed for the task. For 
example, the speed of a person escaping from a fire may be affected by his injuries. First 
there is likely to be a delay, while he becomes aware of the situation and decides what to 
do, then he may travel quickly through the fire, then may become hindered by his injuries 
due to the fire and smoke. In certain circumstances, he may become too seriously injured 
to continue and may then be rescued by someone else. For this, the task progress rate 
would be similar to Figure 66. 
Figure 66: Task Progress Rate of Escaping the Fire 
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Although there is variability in task progress speed used in the model, these values are 
taken from the same distribution. To be accurate, each of these sub-tasks should be 
represented by different speed distributions. Because the TPRC model cannot yet 
represent sub-tasks, it also cannot represent multiple tasks working towards the same 
goal. For example, if we use the same example, the performance objective is to get the 
person (the casualty) to safety. If the casualty travels only half the distance to safety, they 
will not be successful in the task. If the rescue team travels only half the distance towards 
the casualty, it will not be successful in the task. However, putting these two tasks 
together results in a high probability that the rescue team will find the person and the 
task will be completed, as shown in Figure 66. These two tasks are independent of each 
other and would be represented as such on a TPRC graph. Modelling this using the 
current TPRC model would require prior processing of the information to obtain one 
progress rate to represent both tasks. Ideally, the TPRC model should be capable of 
considering such situations. 
This problem is further complicated by the use of dependent tasks. For example, 
multiple tasks that work towards the same goal but produce an additive effect. These 
would include having extra people in a search and rescue team (therefore decreasing the 
area that each person must search) or using more than one fire control system, like 
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deluge and hoses. These might be represented on TPRC task'graphs similar to those., 
shown in Figures 67 & 68. 
Figure 67: Task Progress Rate of Search and Rescue 
1 person searching (or 4 
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Figure 67 represents the effect of numbers of people in a search team on the 
search progress rate. If the four people all move round the area together, they would be 
searching the area at the same rate as one person searching. If they all split up and each 
take a section of the area, their individual task rate would be the same but the amount of 
work to be achieved by each is a quarter of the original total. However, if TPRC models 
are carried out on the tasks of individuals, searching different areas, we might assume 
that only one of them would successfully find the casualty. As these tasks are dependent 
on each other, they should be added together so the group performance is considered. In 
the current TPRC model, this would be calculated by multiplying the original task rate by 
the number of people searching. However, this assumes that all people move at the same 
speed and have the same proportion of the area to cover. It also would be difficult to 
estimate the effects of adding extra searchers later in the process. In the current TPRC 
model, there is no method of inserting the individual task progress graphs into the model 
and having it produce a probability of success curve based on the combination of these 
data. 
Figure 68: Task Progress Rate of Fire-fighting 
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Figure 68 shows an example of how different types of methods can be used to 
fight a fire. The progress rates in the graph show how the progress would be for each 
individual task - not the combination of the two tasks together. The deluge is activated 
right at the start of the fire, but only has a limited effect. However, the fire team take a 
long delay, as they collect equipment and travel to the incident site. Once they start the 
hoses, their impact on the fire is significant. If these were considered in this way, it 
would appear that it is pointless to use deluge, as fire hoses are more effective. Clearly, 
this is not the case. Unlike the previous search and rescue example, the two fire-fighting 
methods cannot easily be added to represent the increased task progress rate. In this 
case, the current TPRC model would have to use one task progress rate to represent the 
whole process. This relies on the knowledge of the user to estimate the effect of the 
combined tasks and to have a task progress rate that reflected this estimation. 
The next point considers the limitations on the resource consumption rate. This 
value produces the time available to complete the task and is a linear variable. This may 
not be an accurate representation of resource consumption. For example, fires are known 
to escalate in area, temperature and toxic gas production in a non-linear manner 
(Peacock et al 1996,1998; Bukowski 1997, Lie 1989, Chamberlain 1996). Currently, 
this is catered for by the TPRC model by allowing the user to calculate the time at which 
the fire would have reached an "escalation point". This converts the escalation 
distribution into the linear concept of time. 
It should be possible to reproduce the results of fire models as resource - 
consumption rates or to, at least, obtain more accurate distribution types, such as the use 
of exponential distributions. These would represent a more accurate view of the 
situation, which would be reflected in the TPRC results. 
Apart from this, there may also be multiple resource constraints - similar to the 
concept of multiple tasks, as shown in Figures 67 and 68. For example, the task may 
involve rescuing a person from a fire before he dies of his injuries. Therefore, the 
resource limit is the point at which the person is incapacitated (or killed) by the effects of 
smoke and fire. Figure 69 represents possible, albeit simplistic, resource consumption 
rates of both factors (based on information from Purser 1988,1989). 
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Figure 69: Resource consumption rates of smoke inhalation and fire injuries 
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Both concepts are more complex than can be shown in Figure 69. However, this 
adequately demonstrates the problem. Like the example shown in Figure 68, these two 
issues cannot be considered in isolation. In the early stages of escalation, incapacitation is 
caused more quickly by smoke inhalation than by bum injuries. However, as the fire 
escalates, incapacitation by bum injuries becomes faster - and therefore is of greater 
concern. Obviously, this suggests that non-linear graphs should be used in the resource 
consumption rate but also that both issues should be considered. As the escalation time 
progresses, it is necessary to consider the main factor contributing to incapacitation 
(initially smoke inhalation then bum injuries). As both factors act on the individual at 
risk, it is necessary to produce a resource consumption rate that can incorporate the 
effects of all the factors involved. 
10.7.1.2 Interaction between Task and Resource 
In Section 5.3.5.5, it was stated that the dependence of the task performance and 
resource constraint model was removed from the original model described in Loa (1997). 
This was to cater for the independence in emergency management tasks observed in 
many examples. However, it was noted that often there is an interaction between task 
and resource and therefore this should be something that the model is capable of 
incorporating. 
For example, if the task involves putting out a fire and the resource limit is 
defined by the "point at which the fire becomes unbearable for the fire-fighters", the two 
factors interact. Therefore, they cannot be seen as independent issues. If the task is 
carried out early in the escalation process, the escalation limit point is extended 
(delayed). However, if the task is delayed, the escalation limit is brought forward, 
making the point at which the fire becomes unbearable earlier. Therefore, the relationship 
between the two factors should be established prior to processing. Unlike the original 
model, it could not always be an "inverse relationship" between the two rates. Therefore, 
generally, this concept should be avoided in the TPRC model until the relationship can be 
calculated then input into the model. 
The resource consumption rate is defined by the fire escalation. Therefore, as the 
task involves fire fighting, this escalation is also implied within the task. Therefore, to 
model this example using the current version of the TPRC model, the escalation must be 
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assumed to be such that no task was attempted (i. e. the worst case scenario). Although 
this would artificially result in a lower probability of success function, in most cases, this 
is preferable to assuming low risk associated with the task. However, it does run the risk 
of being overly pessimistic about the probability of success in emergency management 
situations - which was a criticism for many of the other HRQ methods. 
10.7.1.3 Sources of Variance 
There is also some concern over the source of the variance used in the inputted 
distributions. Distributions can be used because the data can be any value within the 
distribution or can be used to represent the user's uncertainty about the inputted value. 
For example, the distributions of performance parameters represent a known distribution 
of values - from which the value can be chosen. However, the user may not know the 
appropriate value to be used in the model. To compensate for this lack of knowledge, the 
user picks a possible value and chooses a distribution to cater for all the reasonable 
values - thereby introducing the problems of subjectivity into the process. Both could 
result in the same inputted distribution for different reasons. This emphasized the issues 
of uncertainty and variability. Bartlett et al (1996) clarifies the difference as follows - 
"Uncertainty represents ignorance about the precise value of a particular parameter... 
variability represents inherent variation in the value of a particular parameter within the 
population of interest". Currently, these are both represented by the same distribution 
parameters. To indicate the quality of the results, these should be separate in future 
versions of the model. 
10.7.1.4 Conditional Probability 
Currently, the TPRC model is capable of modelling tasks and resources that are 
independent. However, many tasks are only carried out because previous tasks failed or 
succeeded - therefore, there should be a link between their respective probability of 
success curves. In our example, we assumed that the crane driver tried to escape before 
he was'driven back to the crane to await rescue by the fire-team. He was unable to 
remain there so jumped into the sea, awaiting rescue from the fast rescue craft. Each of 
the subsequent tasks is based on the failure of the previous task. If the first task was 
successful, there would have been no need to consider the other two tasks. 
Using single point probabilities in the laws of conditional probability, it is possible 
to work out the probability of a particular event given that another event has occurred, 
using the product rule. For example, the event tree shown in Figure 42 gives the 
maximum probabilities of success for each of the three tasks - these could be multiplied 
together to produce an overall probability of success - however, this only represents the 
maximum - not the full scope of the function. 
Therefore ASSUMING that the escape and rescue failed and that he jumped into: 
the sea, what is his probability of sea rescue? Using the TPRC model, this would be 
difficult to calculate. The model produces probabilities for events that relate to time and 
each curve may be started at a different point in time. Therefore there is no point value of 
probability that could be chosen. Similarly, considering the Fault Tree shown in Figure °, 
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55, what is the overall probability of the Crane Driver's death? Of course, additional data , 
are necessary to establish this - including the probability of making the decisions to 
attempt to escape over the deck, for the fire team to attempt a rescue or for the crane 
driver to jump into the sea: However, assuming these data are available, the calculation 
of (A+B) - probability of failure to reach the safe haven with respect to time - is still not 
an easy process. If this calculation is possible, it is unlikely that it could be represented as 
a simple function - but is more likely to be calculated as the addition of probability 
functions with respect to sections of time. 
This will create problems if the TPRC model is to be used to provide a whole 
probability function for other techniques, such as event or fault trees, as shown in 
Sections 8.2.2 and 8.4.1. 
10.7.1.5 Conclusion 
Overall, these issues are the only inadequacies that are to be found with the 
mathematical design of the model itself and are only relevant if an "ideal" version of the 
TPRC model was desired. In most cases, the problems can be resolved through the 
application of subjective techniques - for example, the estimation of task / resource 
consumption speed under particular circumstances - which introduces an element which 
is not desirable in such an approach. The next set of issues involve the application of the 
model to human performance and emergency management, which will be discussed in the 
next few sub-sections 
10.7.2 CRITIQUE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL AS A HUMAN RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE 
There are a number of problems with using the TPRC model as a human 
reliability assessment technique. During this project, only its application in the assessment 
of emergency management tasks had been explored - not its potential as a general HRQ 
technique, if this was required in the future. However, certain problems that are likely to 
arise include specific features of the task, lack of human error identification and 
reduction techniques and dependence on cognitive decisions. These will be discussed in 
turn. 
10.7.2.1 Features of the Task 
In this model, the main features involve completing the given task within a time 
limit. The goal involves an objective target and task progress is measured over time. 
However, there is not yet any indication of the quality of the task progress. For example, 
consider a task that involves writing a university report. It may be specified in terms of 
word length and hand-in date. Therefore, these specify performance goals and time 
available. Therefore this can be measured on the TPRC model. However, if the 
specification is to hand in a good report (a subjective definition), this becomes more 
difficult to model. For example, the task progress may be good, in terms of the words 
being produced. Each unit sentence may be very good - but this does not indicate that 
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the final result is acceptable. Even given unlimited time resources, the writer may not 
produce a good report. This would indicate a great deal of uncertainty about the 
performance goal to be produced. The assessor may be able to define exactly what the 
requirements are. However, it would still be difficult to determine the task progress 
speed. Therefore, producing the "probability of success" function for writing a good 
essay would be difficult. Where quality of a task is a critical issue, it is difficult to use the 
TPRC model. For example, performing heart surgery can be measured in terms of its 
outcome. A novice surgeon may complete all of the prescribed tasks, but without the 
precision of an expert. Both may go outside of the definition of "perfect" surgery. 
Therefore, the lowered precision of the novice would decrease his probability of success. 
However, because the TPRC model does not measure "precision", the curves of the 
expert and novice would be identical. The TPRC cannot take account of variables that 
are not prescribed in the task particularly if they are subjective to the participants or 
assessors. Up to this point, this has not been found to weaken the TPRC model's use in 
assessing emergency management as it used physical measures of outcome. I 
10.7.2.2 Lack of Human Error Identification Techniques 
The TPRC model was not actually intended to be a complete HRA methodology:: 
Its only focus was the quantification aspect of the process. Nevertheless, other than using 
alternative methods of HRA, there is no clear method of expanding the TPRC model to 
include HEI. The TPRC model is based on tasks and resources that were identified by a 
user. This then uses the values to produce probability of success curves. For example, 
although the effects of "action too late" are clearly shown by the model, "wrong action 
must be identified by the'user. For example, the TPRC model is capable of producing a 
probability of success for "running around the control room 3 times before the power 
fails". However, just because the probability of success is high does not mean that it is an 
effective strategy. Therefore, at this point, it requires some subjective judgment to 
identify the tasks and resources that are correct and implicitly linked. 
For example, the TPRC model can also calculate the Probability of Success of 
rescuing the casualty before blowdown is complete. However, this task may not be 
related to this resource limit. Rescuing the casualty before he dies, or before the fire 
escalates, are more relevant resource limits if it is intended to produce a meaningful 
result. In general, the tasks and resources should be defined by experts with 
understanding of the critical situation-specific factors in the scenario. In emergency 
management, these would involve the occurrence of undesirable and irreversible 
consequences. For assistance with identifying the human error aspects of each situation, 
the author recommends the use of lists of "error modes" such as those used in THERP 
(Swain & Guttman 1983), SRK (Rasmussen et at 1981) PHECA (Whalley 1988) & 
HAZOP (Kletz 1974) - others cited in Kirwan (1992,1998a, 1998b). However, if it is 
intended that the TPRC model will be objective, this should be taken into account when 
choosing HEI technique. 
-s 
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10.7.2.3 Lack of Human Error Reduction Implications 
Like human error identification, the model provides little contribution to the field 
of human error reduction. Although, this was not one of the original intentions of the 
model, it is generally considered important if the model is to be applied in general HRA. 
In the TPRC model, the lowered success curves can be attributed to high escalation or 
low task progress rate. Therefore the main implications for an emergency manager would 
be to attempt speedy progress without delay. These implications do not provide any 
great insight into the subject, as most emergency managers would know this anyway. 
Similarly, the main implications for designers are to speed up task progress and to slow 
escalation, which again is not surprising. Therefore, the main implications are for the 
emergency manager to organise his team in such a way that he can ensure efficient 
progress. This involves ensuring that the relevant communication is flowing and that the 
emergency manager can keep track of the complex array of tasks and events. However, 
the emergency manager's main responsibility is to decide on the best course of action, 
which is a factor that will be considered in the next sub-section. However, one important 
consideration in identifying an error recovery methodology is to ensure its consistency 
with the TPRC model. If, as intended, the methodology is to be completely objective - 
ideally the error recovery mechanism should also be objective. 
10.7.2.4 Dependence on Cognitive Decisions 
Currently, the TPRC model uses tasks and resources. Each task has been based 
on a decision to carry out this task. However, despite the decision-making aspect being a 
critical aspect, this is not modelled explicitly - or represented within the numerical results 
obtained. This contributes an initial "condition" to the process - given that the decision 
to act (X) has been made, the probability of success in the action is Y. Based on the laws 
of conditional probability, unless the probability of making the decision was 1 (an 
extremely unlikely occurrence), this would act to reduce the overall probability of 
success in every case. 
For example, the TPRC model is capable of calculating the probability 
distribution of rescuing a person before he dies. This assumes that someone makes the 
decision to actually attempt the rescue. However, although it may include the delay 
caused by making the decision, the TPRC model does not include the probability of 
making the decision itself. Therefore, the probability of success curves may be somewhat 
optimistic when we assume that the probability of making the decision has not been 
incorporated. However, the probability of making the decision may be linked to the 
objective probability of success. It seems reasonable to assume that the decision to'act 
will be based on the actor's perception of their likely probability of success - if they 
believe that they are certain to succeed, this will increase their likelihood of choosing this 
option - if they believe they are certain to fail, they are unlikely to choose this as their 
first solution. This is a process that occurs not only at the beginning of the action - but 
continues right through it - as an actor decides whether the chosen course of action is 
STILL correct - or whether they should give up, change action or change some of the 
characteristics of the action, for example, speed up. It seems reasonable to assume that 
these beliefs are based to some degree on the objective characteristics of the situation. 
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However, it is not known whether a) the estimations of perceptions of success orb) the 
amount of objective information on which these beliefs are based - either involve rational 
processes. Therefore, the relationship between the calculated probability of success in the 
tasks and the probability of decisions to act can not yet be established. 
As this issue of the contributed of cognitive aspects to probability of success is: 
beyond the scope of this research, this problem could be rectified, for the time being, by 
using current HRA methods that identify and quantify the probability of cognitive errors 
(examples cited in Kirwan 1998a). Many quantification techniques rely on expert opinion 
and therefore would bring a certain degree of subjectivity into the process (Kirwan 
1999), and unlike the TPRC, the quantification methods usually only produce a single 
point value to represent the human error probability. Therefore, our probability of 
success function could be multiplied by the relevant cognitive error probability, using the 
product rule. This would result in the probability of successfully making the right 
decision and the responding actions resulting in the desired outcome. However, ideally, 
the cognitive error probability should also be represented as a function with respect to 
time - which obviously complicates the technique. Here the decision to attempt task / 
continue attempting task or give up on task could change over time - and this should be 
represented in the model. 
10.7.3 CRITIQUE OF THE USE OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINT MODEL TO ASSESS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DATA 
There are a few issues that are particularly relevant to emergency management 
that are not apparent for other aspects of HRA. Firstly, there is the problem of 
considering tasks that worsen the situation, and then there is the issue of "psychological" 
emergencies. These will be considered in turn: 
10.7.3.1 Tasks that worsen the situation 
Even in a domestic situation, it is reasonable to assume that pouring water on a 
fire will help to put it out. However, many chip-pan fires have resulted in serious injuries 
for people making this erroneous assumption. Similarly, in an industrial context, there are 
actions that will worsen the emergency. This situation is difficult to model in the TPRC 
model, as it is often the resources that are affected rather than the actions. If the task of 
"putting water on a chip-pan fire" is modelled with respect to putting out the fire, it 
actually has a negative gradient - resulting in more effort being required to put out the 
fire. This can be shown in Figure 70. 
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Figure 70: Task Progress rate for Actions that Worsen the Situation 
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However, as mentioned earlier, it is not possible to model multiple tasks in the model. 
Therefore, the rectifying "originally correct" performance cannot be performed following 
the wrong performance. Therefore, the TPRC model normally assumes the erroneous 
action has been carried out and then estimates the probability of success in rectifying it - 
with the increased escalation of the fire. If the mathematical aspects of the model can be 
adjusted, then this type of issue can be taken into account. 
10.7.3.2 "Psvchological" Emergencies 
The scenarios that were used in the competency assessment mostly involved 
physical and technological emergencies. These include helicopter crashes, search and 
rescue, casualty management, process incidents etc. However, there are other types of 
emergencies that are not related to physical phenomena. These include terrorism, 
hijacking, bomb scares, sabotage or attempted suicide. The emergency management 
tasks that are required involve psychological and social skills - such as understanding 
when obedience or risk-taking behaviour is necessary, negotiation skills, out-thinking, 
empathy and many more. These are tasks that are impossible to define in objective terms 
and it is unlikely that a general probability of success is an appropriate measure for these 
situations. The resource consumption rate is often defined by humans (for example, time 
limit given before a hostage is murdered) and can be affected by mood or impulsive 
action. There may be no tasks that can mitigate the circumstances - such as suicidal 
person who cannot be dissuaded or physically stopped. However, it should be noted that 
the competency assessment is designed to test scenarios of this nature. Therefore if 
scenario data are available, a TPRC can be carried out comparing the "observed task 
time" with the "observed resource time" using a large value for the variance when it is to 
be applied to other situations. Also, if the scenario-specific performance parameters can 
be built into distributions, these can be applied in the same way. However, due to the 
difficulty in obtaining reliable objective measures of the outcomes of these types of 
emergencies, it would be difficult to use the TPRC for novel or theoretical situations. 
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10.7.4 CRITIQUE OF THE USER ASPECTS OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
Up to this point, the criticisms have focused on the functions of the TPRC model 
rather than its interaction with the user. In general, the user is expected to be someone 
with knowledge of mathematics (to understand the variance being used in the inputted' 
distributions) and computing (to cope with using the 3 types of files involved in the 
modelling process). Normally, the users are expected to include those who require 
results to assist in emergency management decisions or design choices; and those who 
have a theoretical or practical interest in risk and reliability. For these reasons, there are 
two main weaknesses in the TPRC model - the subjectivity and the program design. 
These will be considered in turn 
10.7.4.1 Subjectivity in the TPRC Model 
In general, there are a number of elements of subjectivity in the TPRC model at 
this point. One main issue is choosing the relevant tasks and resource consumption rates 
- that are both significant in measuring the outcome of the emergency, and are inherently 
linked. For example, outcomes that are concerned with the survival of casualties or 
extinguishing fires are obviously important. Outcomes that are more concerned with non- 
emergency issues - such as keeping production active or, in the case of the onshore 
scenarios, ensuring residents are informed are informed about the incidents - are not as 
much of a priority. 
The linking between tasks and resources 'are also important in the application of 
data in the TPRC model. For example, consider the crane driver example. Given that he 
has jumped into the sea, the logical indication of a successfully managed event is his 
survival - hence the use of the rescue by the fast rescue craft. The escalation of the fire 
on the platform no longer critically affects his chances (unless it leads to platform 
collapse! ). Therefore considering the combination of tasks and resources in the TPRC 
model, "time to be rescued" should be limited by his survival time - not a fire escalation 
point. Although both could produce equally good TPRC results - only the former is 
meaningful. Therefore, these choices require some application of expert judgment. 
Likewise, there is some subjectivity in applying the numbers to the process. 
Firstly, identifying whether the decisions are linked to the events (reactive) - or were 
based on an estimation of future events (proactive). This creates problems when applying 
the delay parameter as it requires some interpretation whether a decision was induced by 
a past event (therefore giving rise to a delay) or was attempting to mitigate a future 
possibility (indicating that a delay parameter is an inappropriate representation of the 
cognitive process). 
Given that the user is likely to be affected by the results of a risk assessment - 
either financially (designers), physically or psychologically (operators at risk) - there will 
also be the temptation to bias the results in favour of the user's opinion. In general, this 
would be difficult in the TPRC model as it mostly uses objectively defined parameters, 
such as distance and human movement speed. However, from this research, it is clear 
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that the delays of management have a large impact on outcome and; even when using 
observational data from scenarios, these may be biased by subjectivity. It was this reason, 
among others, that lead to the collection of performance parameters. 
The TPRC model's use of variance is one of the issues that makes the model 
preferable to other models, yet it also gives rise to a weakness. Although variance can be 
objectively displayed, it is not as easily understood as a mean value. Earlier in Section 
10.7.1.3, it was mentioned that variance was used to represent both variability as well as 
uncertainty. Therefore, as long as the mean values are correct, it is likely that the 
inputted variance would not be closely examined in an audit. As shown in Figure 62, 
increased variance can actually work to improve the probability of success. Therefore an 
unscrupulous person could use this in his favour - claiming that the broader distribution 
was used to represent his ignorance and uncertainty in the values. By presenting the 
results from an objective methodology such as this, it is unlikely that the reliability of the 
inputted values will be questioned. One option is to automate the variance - by allowing 
the program to estimate the values. However, this would remove an important feature of 
the program for those who have expertise in this area. Therefore, the main 
recommendation is to ensure the user is objective - perhaps by being an independent 
auditor. 
10.7.4.2 Program Design 
Currently, the program is not very user-friendly. Firstly, there is no visual 
representation of the distributions of inputted variables. Although the program gives 
numerical values for certain percentiles of the distributions (e. g. 95% or 99%), a plotted 
distribution would be more understandable. This would decrease errors or potential 
biases if this could be shown prior to the calculation of the probability of success. Once 
the distributions of the inputted variables have been accepted, there should be no return 
to the input screen to adjust the values in the user's favour. 
Secondly, the use of three separate files is cumbersome. It is possible to design 
software to input the data, show the distributions of the inputted variables then process 
the data producing probability of success/failure curves. Some of these features were 
used in an earlier version of the TPRC model but it was necessary to revert to the 
original system when the program was updated for this research. Other improvements 
are suggested in Chapter 12. 
10.7.5 VALIDITY OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINT MODEL 
Overall, the Task Performance Resource Constraint Model shows a high degree 
of validity as a process. It has also been used with real data from the Piper Alpha disaster 
so has demonstrated that it has the potential to represent such a situation. In comparison 
with other methods of HRQ, it represents more consistency with current knowledge of 
emergency management and its impact on outcome - to produce outcomes that are of 
more use to Quantitative Risk Assessment. This is because the outcome of an emergency 
is measured in terms of physical characteristics - for example, survivors, assets etc. These 
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physical characteristics are influenced by physical events - for example, escalation, 
mitigation and evacuation; which are influenced by physical capabilities. Many HRQ 
methodologies focus on non-physical characteristics, such as levels of stress or training 
and experience, therefore are incapable of representing the critical aspects that influence 
the outcome of an emergency - and by association, the risk that is reduced by emergency 
management. Although these methods may be useful at quantifying the probability of 
error (human unreliability) in events where the reliability is not strongly influenced by 
physical aspects, they do not produce reliable results when being applied to those that 
do. Often this is due to the issue of considering human unreliability as the probability of 
error as opposed to the probability of task failure - the latter being more appropriate to 
Quantitative Risk Assessment than the former. Whilst it is important to consider how and 
why human error arises, it is not always easy to consider how this impacts on the 
consequences in specific situations. In this way, the TPRC model does not yet 
incorporate the probability of errors, therefore it is not appropriate to compare the TPRC 
model and earlier HRQ methods as they are examining different aspects. 
However, the model is only as good as the data used. As some of these were 
simulated data, (some of which were assumed due to the scenario arrangements), the 
quality of these data is questionable. Also, using the TPRC model in this role could lead 
to confusion in its objectives. The data are provided by scenario information, using 
assumed resource limits. In the scenario, it is possible to identify whether the task 
succeeded or failed - as these later events are also recorded. Therefore, it seems illogical 
to base a probabilistic analysis on information where the probability of success is already 
known to be 0 or 1. However, the main focus of this research was to produce a method 
that could use simulated or real data to objectively quantify the impact of emergency 
management on risk. In theory, the initial task would to be to prove that emergency, 
management made some difference to risk - then to try and quantify the extent of this 
difference by comparing it with other levels of performance - as shown by comparing 
Figure 39 with Figures 43,44, and 45. It is not important whether the tasks were failures 
or successes in the scenario - the objective is to calculate the probability of failure or 
success and to see if these are consistent with real-life knowledge about emergencies. As 
shown later in Figure 53, the model is used to speculate on the probability of success that 
could have been achieved if the circumstances had been different - and if different 
actions had been taken. This was the goal of the model and can be used to analyse past 
circumstances or to test future options. These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 
11 
SECTION 10.8: CRITIQUE OF THE PERFORMANCE 
PARAMETERS 
There are three main criticisms with the concept of performance parameters; the 
quality of the data, the lack of cognitive data and the problems in application. 
10.8.1 QUALITY OF THE DATA 
Like the TPRC model itself, the performance parameters are only as good as the 
quality of the simulation that produced them. In this case, there were only two 
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emergency management teams - one for the onshore industry, one for the offshore' ,;; industry. In total, there were 4 emergency management candidates -2 for each industry. 
3 out of 4 candidates were assessed as being "competent", the other had . "notable 
shortfalls". Therefore, in terms of the contributing data, it would be difficult to determine 
whether these are representative and predictive of all emergency managers and can be 
extrapolated to other industries. Ideally, statistical tests should be carried out to identify 
whether these showed significant differences between the groups for each of the 
performance parameters. However, for the scenario-specific performance parameters, 
there was usually only one piece of data for each. In the case of the generic performance 
parameters, it would be interesting to identify whether there were differences between 
the levels of competency (to see if certain tasks were performed faster by more 
competent crews - indicating efficiency - or slower by more competent crews - perhaps 
indicating quality and carefulness); the offshore and onshore crews (to identify whether 
there were differences in particular skills between the two industries) and pre- and post- 
scenario data (to show how the emergency situation affects the time spent on various 
tasks). This sort of analysis should probably be carried out in future research when more 
data are available. 
In terms of the scenario-specific performance parameters, these were already 
known to have limitations. Until the scenarios or specific parts of the scenario have been 
repeated many times, it would be impossible to identify whether the parameters were 
reliable. Apart from this, many of the parameters were based on assumptions, rather than 
reliable information. For example, escalation points (such as the fire impinging on the 
diesel tanks) were imagined and may not have been based on real fire models. The 
observer/recorder must assume when these events occur to record them in the transcript. 
This brings a source of subjectivity into the process. Even the scenario organiser may not 
know when the fire is likely to impinge; therefore the events of a scenario may be very 
unrepresentative of a real situation. In general, it is recommended that the TPRC user 
refers to physical models of the events being examined (human movement, fire 
escalation, system shutdown) and to only use the scenario-specific performance 
parameters where no other data are available. In this case, the scenario-specific data 
should be used with caution. However, it could be assumed that these represent one 
possible point on a distribution; therefore the only problem lies in assuming what part of 
the distribution this is. Therefore, there is an increased reliance on expert judgment for 
the variance when using the scenario-specific parameters. 
There are also limitations with the use of the generic performance parameters. 
Therefore, care should be taken to ensure that the most representative distribution should 
be used when trying to represent a novel situation in the TPRC model. However, as 
these distributions are based on so few data categories, they may not be entirely 
representative. Even so, these data are sometimes based on assumptions. These include: - 
Phone call length: It cannot be observed when the scenario organisation team pick up 
or put down the phone. 
" Information known in SOT - EMT told: This is based on an assumption of when the 
SOT (scenario organisation team) know the relevant information 
" Any data that assume a time between the incident and any other event: This incident 
is often an assumed event. 
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However, these are not always based on assumptions. For example, it may be obvious 
that the incident has'occurred, for example, while having a normal radio conversation, 
the external caller suddenly screams that he has been sprayed with chemicals. It may be 
obvious that the emergency management team has determined the length of the phone 
call - by picking up the phone and slamming it down when they've finished speaking. In 
some cases, it may be obvious when the scenario organisation team (representing the on- 
scene commander or others) become aware of certain situations. For example, if one 
external team tells another external team, who passes this information onto the control 
room, it is obvious when the second external team learn this information. 
In general, these problems can be rectified by adding data from scientifically designed 
simulations (as will be defined in Chapter 12) and, ideally, real emergencies. 
10.8.2 LACK OF COGNITIVE DATA 
One main criticism of the performance parameters is the lack of cognitive data, 
such as the timings involved in decision-making. The performance parameters involve 
observable tasks, which therefore excludes a separate category for cognitive tasks. This 
is unfortunate as the cognitive processing is one of the critical parts of emergency 
management. Currently, the performance parameters include many of the main 
management tasks involved in an emergency. These include communications and control 
room operations. However, the time taken in making a decision is, as yet, unknown. To 
make assumptions about the timings involved would not be able to take account of the 
complexity of the decision. Therefore, it is recommended that the scenario-specific 
performance parameter that is closest to the relevant decision may be used as a guideline. 
If desired, the action and communications timings could be removed from the 
performance parameters to leave only the estimated time taken by the decision. Also, the 
scenario-specific performance parameters could be categorised in terms of the 
complexity of the decisions involved, such as the SRK approach used by Moieni et al 
(1994). Some of these problems may be rectified using solutions suggested in Chapter 
12. ... 
10.8.3 APPLICATION OF PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
This section is concerned with the application of the performance parameters - 
with particular regard to their use in the TPRC model. Some of the problems have 
already been discussed - with regard to subjectivity in choosing tasks and resources 
appropriate to the issues (as described in Section 10.7.4.1). However, the use of 
performance parameters brings additional issues such as: - 
" Identifying the scenario-specific performance parameters appropriate to the situation. 
" Knowing what generic performance parameters should be included when building up 
a task. 
" Choosing the point value (i. e. the mean) and the levels of variance for unknown 
tasks. 
The first of these is concerned with the choice of parameter that best fits the 
situation under test. For example, if the task specifically involves the time taken to drag a 
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casualty out from a helicopter - could this best be approximated by the time taken to :"- 
drag a casualty out from a helifuel fire?, or a crane? The former would best represent the 
fuel involved (and possibly the intensity of the fire) whereas the latter incorporates the 
idea that the casualty is trapped in a "vehicle". As with Section 10.8.1, this can be 
rectified by the collection of more performance parameter data - or, ideally, greater use 
of theoretical data and models. 
The second of these relies on building up structures of emergency management 
tasks - in which the performance parameter data is used. Currently, this relies heavily on 
the structures that were used in the scenario - focusing on the tasks that were closest to 
those required by the analysis - as shown in Figure 63. However, this again introduces 
subjectivity into the technique and could be carried out using a structured framework - 
for example, a task or timeline analysis - to identify what performance parameters 
contribute to tasks. For example, for a competent emergency management team, what is 
the probability that the external team will be told to "standby" before being allowed to 
deliver a message? This information could identify the most probable structure for a task 
to ensure this is objectively defined. For example, this may include a typical number of 
informational / non-informational radio messages, delays and internal announcements 
before a particular physical task is initiated. 
The third of these issues is similar to the problem of choosing a value for variance 
as described in Section 10.7.4.1. Because it is not yet known whether the performance 
parameters are representative of a population of emergency managers (either onshore or 
offshore), both the use of the current median values and variance of the distribution may 
introduce errors into the process. For example, consider the event whereby the current 
data are biased towards lower (faster) values of radio calls/announcements etc. then 
these values are applied in the TPRC model (or as raw data in a timeline or other 
analysis). Given that the whole distribution is affected, the median and slower values may 
be optimistic. Therefore, if an emergency planner or designer assumes the tasks can be 
carried out within these times and base their conclusions on these results, then they may 
be introducing risks into the equation. 
SECTION 10.9: CONCLUSIONS 
There are a number of criticisms that can be associated with the research. Many of 
these do not remove any value from the results and conclusions that were generated from 
the research. Many of these result in recommendations for future research and therefore 
suggest alternatives or easier methods than those that were chosen. In summary, the 
main issues include: 
" There were inadequacies in the scenario arrangements - The procedure was fixed by 
external organisations so could not be adapted for the research. Therefore there was 
no recording of scenario organisation team data and the collection of subjective data 
was limited. Also, there was no guarantee that the scenario event timings were 
accurate. The number and type of scenarios were limited by availability and the use 
of external organisations. However, due to the emphasis on probabilistic approaches, 
each scenario represents one possible series of events and outcomes in an emergency 
situation, therefore provided a valid test of the methodology. 
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", The TPRC model was limited in that it could not easily be adapted for multiple tasks 
and multiple resources, non-linear progress rates or exclusively cognitive tasks. Most 
of these could be rectified by "rethinking" the task and defining it in different terms. 
Also, although the model provides a structure to be a totally objective technique, due 
to the lack of available data, this is not yet possible. 
" The Performance Parameters were limited again by, the scenario arrangements - by 
the numbers and types of scenario, the reliability of the scenario timings and the use 
of assumptions where observed data were not available. There was also the notable 
absence of cognitive data - as although this would be useful, it is essentially 
unobservable. Also, application of performance parameters in the TPRC model or 
elsewhere is somewhat reliant on subjective techniques. 
Overall, some of these problems can be rectified by suggestions shown in this chapter 
and in general, do not take any credit away from the actual positive contribution of the 
research as will be shown in the following chapter. Other recommendations for future 
research are shown in Chapter 12. Therefore, taking these into consideration, this thesis 
will move on to the analysis of the results. 
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Chapter '11 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
SECTION 11.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter involves an in depth examination of the results shown in Chapters 8 
and 9. This will start by looking at the Task Performance Resource Constraint Model, 
then will continue with an examination of the use of the performance parameters 
SECTION 11.2: IMPLICATIONS OF THE TASK PERFORMANCE 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL RESULTS 
11.2.1 WHY WAS THE TPRC MODEL CHOSEN? 
Traditional methods of Quantitative Risk Assessment involve the estimation of 
frequency and consequence of events. This usually produces a single point value to 
represent risk. There are many authors who consider this to be a dangerous oversight of 
the true nature of risk as often it is not clear whether the average or highest value has 
been taken (Richardson 1996, Power & McCarty 1996, Bartlett et al 1996). Quantitative 
Uncertainty Analysis attempts to rectify these inadequacies by providing a whole 
distribution of risk values. It is apparent that the concept of risk is too sensitive to be 
represented by single point values. However, it is rare that this influencing factor is 
incorporated into the analysis. 
Risk is calculated from the probability (or frequency) of an event and the 
consequences of such an event. The Task Performance Resource Constraint Model 
examines one side of this equation - the probability of an event occurring, based on 
success or failure of particular tasks. This also incorporates influencing factors, 
particularly focusing on the effect of time on risk. Like the Quantitative Uncertainty 
Analysis techniques, it uses distributions of input values as opposed to single point 
values. Originally, this model was used to assess the effects of fatigue in stress-strain 
relationships - producing a function representing risk related to time. Following on from 
this, it was decided that this concept could also be used to test reliability (or probability 
of success) in human tasks by comparison of the time required and time available for 
certain tasks. Therefore, from being a probabilistic model of reliability, the TPRC model 
could now provide an input to the field of Human Reliability Quantification. 
Apart from being able to represent distributions (and therefore taking account of 
some of the variability surrounding the values), the TPRC also manages to produce 
results where other HRA techniques are lacking. Firstly, as it uses generic user-defined 
tasks and resources, it can incorporate specific contexts'. Secondly, the types of tasks are 
not limited by set criteria - but, apart from those examples identified in Section 10.7.3 
(such as psychological emergencies), can potentially be any physically-defined human 
behaviour 2. Thirdly, and most importantly, as the distribution is related to a time base, it 
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can represent the importance of time in the human reliability equation3'4. These features` 
deal with some of the criticisms of other HRA techniques listed by Dougherty (1993) 
Blackman & Byers (1995) 2, Reer (1994) 3, Kim & Bishu (1996) 4. 
However, two of the key objectives of this project were to obtain objective data 
from emergency scenarios on management performance then develop a methodology to 
use these data to assess the probability of success in emergency management tasks. 
As time is one of the critical aspects of an emergency, it was necessary to choose a 
model that could assess human reliability with respect to small changes in time. Most of 
the Human Reliability Assessment techniques would consider time as a categorical as 
opposed to a continuous variable - for example "too early" and "too late". One of the 
best attempts to represent the continuous nature of time is shown in TESEO (Bello & 
Colombari 1980) - as discussed in Sections 2.4.4.2.7. However, this used pre-determined 
choices of "time available" - 2,10,20 seconds for routine tasks and 3,30,45 and 60 '` 
seconds for non-routine tasks. Therefore, these were fixed time values and could not use 
variable times as required by the user. It also was unable to assess the success of tasks 
over durations longer than 1 minute - such as some of the physical tasks that are present 
in an emergency. In comparison, many other HRA techniques would represent an 
emergency through application of "Performance Shaping Factors" (PSFs) (Swain & 
Guttman 1983) or "Error Producing Conditions" (EPCs) (Williams 1986). These would 
include such items as "time pressure", "unfamiliarity", "low signal to noise ratio", 
"complexity" and "duration of stress". These effects are usually assumed to be additive, ' 
which is reflected in the estimations of probability of failure. Consequently, most of these 
methods give pessimistic estimations of success for most emergency management tasks 
(Kirwan 2000). On the other hand, Reer (1994) developed a model using the concept of 
an "available time window". This compared the required time with available time for ', 
various tasks and based the probability of success based on this comparison. This model 
showed great potential for being developed into a emergency management assessment 
technique. However, it was based on decomposition of tasks to a specific number sub- 
tasks and therefore could not easily represent novel or complex tasks. Moieni et al 
(1994) progressed this by using data from simulations. However, their model produced 
the point values that are contradictory to the concept of risk as described at the 
beginning of this section. Given these facts, the TPRC Model appeared to have good 
potential for an emergency management assessment technique. 
The Task Performance Resource Constraint Model provides a flexible time base ' 
to be chosen by the user. This could be used to express fatigue effects over years - but 
could also express probability of success in tasks that take seconds (for example, starting 
the deluge system before a gas leak ignites) minutes, or hours (completing evacuation 
before the installation collapses). It could include variances associated with the inputted 
values, which was highly appropriate to represent the variability evident in an emergency 
situation. Finally, despite the criticisms expressed in Section 10.7, it could also 
incorporate most types of task, whether carried out by machines or people. Also, given 
enough data from theoretical knowledge and scenario-specific knowledge - the TPRC 
model had the potential to be completely objective. For these reasons, the TPRC model 
appeared to be the most promising technique for the research. 
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11.2.2 HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE TPRC IN ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ON RISK? 
To see whether this model had the potential to assess the effect of emergency 
management on risk, it was necessary to use it and examine the results. This could be 
carried out using data from accident investigations, which give the specific context and 
time data on particular failures and any attempted mitigation. However, our project 
intended to focus on data from simulations. As discussed in Section 10.5 - as simulations 
are considered sufficient to identify whether a person was competent in emergency 
management, they should also be capable of assessing whether a person's intervention is 
likely to have an impact on the simulated incident. That is, although the situation is 
artificial, it should contain all the important factors from a real incident - so a model 
assessing real emergency management and risk should also be able to assess a simulated 
version. It has been debated whether a scenario is "externally valid" producing a realistic 
estimation of behaviour in an emergency. In most research circumstances, the simulation 
technique is the best possible approximation of behaviour in a real-life incident - 
especially if it is designed based on a set procedure with a high degree of fidelity. 
The following sections discuss the results that were obtained in the model - as 
shown in Chapters 8 and 9. 
11.2.2.1 Initial TPRC Results 
Chapter 8 illustrated the TPRC assessment of three emergency situations taken 
from a simulation. In the incident, a crane driver reports that a methanol tote tank 
dropped onto the methanol laydown area, resulting in a leak, which then ignites. The first 
situation is based on the assumption that, after a specified delay, he attempts to escape 
across the methanol laydown area. The second situation is based on the assumption that 
he waits for rescue by the fire team. It should also be noted that these are independent 
situations - he may have waited for rescue with or without the initial attempt to escape. 
Finally, the third situation is based on the fact that the heat becomes so overwhelming 
that the crane driver is driven to jump into the sea. He then awaits rescue by the fast 
rescue craft, which is launched from the standby vessel. 
The first graph (shown in Figure 39) shows a probability of success function with 
respect to time for the crane driver's escape from the crane. Using timings estimated 
from the dedicated simulation, design data, escalation data and information on human 
movement speed, this function gave a maximum probability of 0.13. This indicates that 
attempting to escape under these circumstances would involve a substantial risk. The 
second graph (shown in Figure 40) showed the corresponding function for the fire 
team's rescue of the crane driver. This gave a maximum probability of 0.013. If we just 
compare maximum values, rescue involves 10 times more risk than attempting to escape. 
However, in the scenario, these involved two different time frames. The time to perceive 
the risk is likely to have produced a substantial delay in the escape task, whereas the 
rescue involves the fire team meeting at the control room before heading to the methanol 
laydown area to attempt the rescue. The third graph (shown in Figure 41) used 
information on expected survival time in the water, as well as estimated speed of the fast 
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rescue craft. In this, the maximum probability of success was 0.59. These three graphs 
have shown that the TPRC model can represent different types of task involving different 
types of inputted data. In each case, a probability of success curve has been produced 
representing the maximum probability as well as the variance with respect to time. 
The TPRC method is the only technique that can represent probability of success 
functions with respect to time for specific tasks including pre-determined variability 
parameters, based on either real, simulation and theoretical data - or a combination of all 
three. Therefore, the results are difficult to validate. Initially, the emphasis was on 
obtaining face validity. For this, it was necessary to show that where the inputted 
variables are adjusted, that the probability of success function changes in the expected 
manner. That is, where the time required to carry out a task is reduced, the probability of 
success values will increase. Likewise, where the time available is reduced, the 
probability of success values will decrease. Similarly, different strategies can be applied 
to the same problem - and the probability of success values can be calculated for each, 
identifying the best solution. Therefore it was necessary to examine this task using such 
changes. 
Figures 43 to 46, aim to show this through using the examples with different 
parameter values. For example, in Figure 43, the escape is modelled with no delay 
compared with the delay that was observed in the scenario. Logically, no delay would 
result in an earlier attempt to escape the area. This earlier attempt would result in 
crossing through the fire before it had enough time to escalate to a dangerous degree, 
increasing the probability of success and decreasing the risk. This is consistent with the 
results that are shown in Figure 45 - where "no delay" increases the maximum probability 
of success up to 0.99. Therefore, this indicates that the model's use of delays is 
consistent with knowledge about real-life emergencies. 
Figure 44 represents the impact of a change in average speed of the crane driver's 
escape. Consider, for example, if the crane driver is significantly fitter than average. This 
may increase his speed up to a degree where he has a significant chance of escaping the' 
area before the fire has escalated to a dangerous degree. The model uses 0.7 m/s, which 
is a possible human movement speed, and this increased his maximum probability of 
success from 0.13 to 0.3. Although this is still not ideal, it may mean the difference 
between life and death. Again, the model's results are consistent with current knowledge 
about real-life emergencies. 
Figure 45 does not involve any different action on the part of the crane driver but 
a change in escalation rate of the fire - hence increasing the time available to safely 
escape. This could represent a design change - for example, the application of better 
passive protection such as firewalls or, external control of the fire by use of the deluge. 
In this case, it is merely defined as taking 189 seconds to reach an unbearable 
temperature instead of 84 seconds. Consistent with knowledge about real-life 
emergencies, the model produces a higher maximum probability of success for longer 
escalation time than it does for a shorter escalation time. 
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In each of these cases as well as the examples shown in Section 8.3 (Figures 46 
to 52), the model demonstrated an appropriate change in the probability of success 
curves. This suggests that the TPRC model provides a valid assessment of the impact of 
emergency management on risk. However, up to this point, this has only really discussed 
the maximum values. If these were the only issue, there would be little point in 
representing the whole curve. Consider, in particular, Figures 43 & 45. After the peak 
value, both return to 0 at the same point in time. Both of these results showed changes in 
the task performance rate (in which the delay is included) - not the resource consumption 
rate. Therefore the time available was not changed by the faster actions of the crane 
driver. Again, this is consistent with the general concept of emergency management. 
These issues will be discussed again in Sections 12.2.2.3 and 12.2.2.4. 
Figure 42 attempts to show how the results from the TPRC model could be 
applied in another methodology - in this case, the event tree. However; this figure only 
shows the maximum probability of success for each function - not the entire function: 
Therefore if it was intended that this should be used as a total methodology, each 
function should be multiplied with respect to "real-time" - that is, the time at which each 
calculation was started should be brought together on one time axis. In this case, the 
probability of survival in the sea is conditional on failures in the other tasks (but 
obviously not catastrophic failure or the crane driver would not have lived to be able to 
jump! ). Therefore, the functions shown in Figures 39 and 40 must also be inverted to 
produce probability of failure functions. This, consistent with the concept of the nature 
of risk as discussed in Section 11.2.1, would produce a function with peaks at the point 
when the maximum success of each progressive task occurs. 
11.2.2.2 Comparison of TPRC Results with Questionnaires - 
The TPRC technique was also used to model the probability of success for tasks 
that were subjectively assessed in the questionnaires as shown in Appendix 9. As 
discussed in Section 10.5, the questionnaires were too brief to collect a large amount of 
subjective data on the scenarios. However, they were able to collect information, in F 
particular, on the competency levels awarded and the assessor's opinions with regard to 
the speeds and quality of individual decisions. However, it must be stated that the 
probability of success in the tasks did not numerically relate to subjective competency 
ratings. As will be discussed later, this is probably because the two techniques were 
designed to assess different aspects of the same issue, as shown in the following points- 
" The TPRC was designed to assess risk - and any mitigation that can be brought about 
by emergency management. The Competency Assessment Technique is designed to 
identify people who will make good and timely decisions in a real incident. 
" The TPRC can identify the probability of success and failure in independent specified 
tasks. The Competency Assessment Technique can identify the skills of trying the 
right tasks in the right order at the right time. 
" Whereas the TPRC model awards success based on the outcome, the Competency 
Assessment Technique awards success based on the attempts made. 
Ideally, both methods should be supportive of each other. As discussed in Section 
10.7.4.1, The TPRC model relies on expert judgment to recognize whether the decisions 
were dependent on certain events. Likewise, the Competency Assessment should involve 
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some estimation of the probability of success and failure of the emergency manager's 
attempts based on the time taken to initiate communication and actions. Some of these 
issues will be discussed in Chapter 12. 
11.2.2.3 Use of the TPRC model with Performance Parameters 
" Next; the TPRC model was used together with the Performance Parameters that 
will be discussed in Section 11.3. In Figure 63, the use of minimum, maximum and 
average delay values were compared with the values estimated from the scenario and 
more realistic than the zero value used in Figure 43. Again, these were found to be 
consistent with current knowledge about emergencies. However, this graph also 
represented a change in dimension that had not been considered in the earlier graphs - the 
use of the distribution spread parameter. In this case, the scenario delay of 61 was used 
with a more variable (0.2) and less variable (0.05) distribution. From the results, the 
more variable value gave a maximum probability of success of 0.13 whereas than the less 
variable value gave 0.08. This indicates that the delay chosen from a broader distribution 
resulted in a shorter delay overall when modelled. Although knowledge of the effect of 
variance could not easily be used to predict the direction of the outcome, some difference 
would be expected. Therefore, this is still consistent with knowledge about the effects of 
variance of inputted values on outcome. As the user only specifies the mean and variance 
of the distribution, the model chooses the values from the given distribution. As this is 
now using the normal as opposed to Weibull distribution for its inputted parameters, 
there is no reason to suggest that it would tend towards the upper values (longer delays) 
rather than the lower values (shorter delays). 
Finally, Figure 64 represents the effects of a design-change that affects both task 
and resource consumption. The change involves either an increase or decrease in 
distance of the area across the methanol laydown area. Therefore, the change would 
affect the distance across which the crane driver had to travel to reach safety. It would 
also affect the distance across which the fire has to spread to prevent the crane driver's 
escape. In this case, it was assumed that the escalation acted at a slow constant rate - for 
example, a slow spreading fire. Figure 65 represents how an escalation would affect the 
task if this was independent of design. For example, rather than a spread over an area, 
this may be an explosion. In both cases, it was not known by the author whether this was 
a realistic estimation of methanol leak/ignition behaviour. To produce a realistic example 
would require greater knowledge of chemicals and fire behaviour. Therefore, this 
example represents how such a situation could be modelled rather than an exact 
representation of a known situation. Nevertheless, the results show that an increased, 
distance increased the probability of success in the task. This suggests that the slower 
escalation of the fire results in the initial delay becoming a less significant factor, when 
the person is moving at a speed defined by this specific speed distribution. Although this 
did not use exact escalation data, the model behaves appropriately in the situation - 
indicating that known escalation behaviour can be applied in the model interacting with 
design changes. 
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11.2.2.4 Use of the TPRC Model for examining the Piper Alpha Disaster 
Section 8.3.4 represents how real data could be applied in the TPRC model by 
showing the probability that the first helicopter arrived at the platform before certain 
escalation events occurred. Using the known distance from Lossiemouth to Piper Alpha 
and the known speed of a Sea King helicopter, the task could be applied in the TPRC 
model. The delays were provided by the time between the incident and the point at which 
the helicopter was airborne - adding up to 22 minutes. The events from the incidents 
shown escalation points determined by the rupture of the different risers - Tartan, MCP- 
01 and Claymore respectively. Therefore, it was possible to use these values in the model 
to assess the probability of helicopter arrival (and therefore a means of evacuation or 
rescue) before the incident had escalated to a critical degree. I 
The TPRC model was successful in this analysis task. It shows that there was 
little possibility of getting the helicopter to the platform before the first escalation 
(rupture of Tartan riser) - as supported by the real events that were observed. This was 
something that the OIM should have known - and should have incorporated into his plan 
of action - by either attempting to apply cooling to the risers or by preparing for a sea 
evacuation. In comparison to this first value, the probability of success functions of the 
first helicopter arriving before the other ruptures are massively increased. However, 
much of the damage had been done at this point and the helideck was now dangerous to 
approach and use. Also, these escalations were likely to have been caused, or at least 
speeded up, by the initial rupture and are not independent of it. However, this was 
consistent with real-life - in that the helicopters had arrived by this point in time. 
As stated in Section 8.3.4, the Cullen (1990) report suggests that these ruptures 
could have been delayed by up to 3 hours, if not prevented altogether, by applying. 
cooling to the risers. Therefore, using the figures suggested as a potential resource 
consumption rate, the probability of success of getting the helicopters to the site - 
BEFORE the ruptures could now be calculated (given that cooling has been applied). 
This would demonstrate how the TPRC model could compare actual events with the 
events that "could have been" if different actions had been taken. - Clearly, as shown in 
Figure 53, this gives a high maximum probability of success - suggesting that, with the 
use of cooling, the platform could have been approached by a helicopter safely - 
potentially leading to a safe evacuation with minimal losses. 
Again, this represents the model's potential in quantifying p(success) in real and 
imagined tasks. The results obtained were consistent with the real events, but this also 
shows how the tasks could be combined to make decisions. For the emergency manager, 
this indicates that he must make some intervention to avoid catastrophe - as the 
helicopters could not be relied on to make a clear evacuation before escalation in the 
given (real) situation. For emergency procedures' writers and planners, this indicates 
how early helicopters should be called in an incident - and the importance of self- 
sufficient emergency management - in this case, the application of cooling. It also brings 
together the importance of linking the concepts - that if the risers are cooled, this should 
give adequate time for the helicopters to arrive - something that, although is implicit in 
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the Regulations and recommendations, is only made explicit, when analyses such as these 
are presented. 
In terms of the relationship with risk, it should be noted that each of the 
progressive escalation points resulted in a more serious outcome. Therefore, it should be 
noted that although the probability of failure for these will be nearly the same, the 
consequences will be different - resulting in an overall different value for risk. 
11.2.2.5 Comparison of the TPRC Model with other IIRO Techniques 
In Section 8.4, the tasks described in the crane driver scenario were analysed 
using two other techniques of HRQ, to compare the results with those obtained using the 
TPRC model. This comparison brought light to the issue of the definition of human 
unreliability - was it probability of failure (therefore being equivalent to the engineering 
definition of reliability) or the probability of error (more generally considered within the 
sphere of human reliability)? - and what was the relationship between these factors? The 
TPRC model considers unreliability as "probability of TASK failure" and it was only by 
carrying out these comparisons that the differences between TPRC and other methods 
became apparent. .I 
It was observed that HAZAN produced a typically pessimistic view of emergency 
management - starting with the concept that there is a1 in 1 probability of failure when 
"complex and rapid action is needed to avoid a serious incident". Section 8.4.1 
demonstrated that this would lead to an overall probability of failure of 1 when applied in 
the Crane Driver example. 
-Although this result may lead risk assessment techniques to consider the initiation 
of an emergency as such a serious issue so to focus on preventing the initiating events; 
this also suggests that no intervention will produce a successful outcome. Therefore, by 
association, it would be assumed that no improvement of emergency management skills 
would produce a significant impact on the risk so there is no motivation to consider this 
as a viable option. In reality, this is clearly not the case. I 
However, this discovery should not lead to a "re-invention of the wheel" to 
identify techniques suitable for such analyses and fortunately, it was also demonstrated 
that the TPRC model could provide the probability of success functions to apply in a 
fault tree or event tree. In this example, the TPRC model was used to produce an 
equation to represent the overall probability of the crane driver's survival or death. 
Using the same tasks, HEART gave distributions of values for p(error) from 0.0196 to 1. 
These were altered using changes in subjective, usually psychological, parameters - such 
as time pressure and ambiguity about performance - and expert judgments of their 
influence. The probability of error was not linked to the original physical factors that lead 
to these psychological factors - such as escalation speed, delays in the task or the 
definition of the task to be completed. Due to its disregard of physical data to calculate 
the probability of human unreliability in particular, tasks and circumstances, again this did 
not seem to encompass the critical aspects of the emergency situation. It should be 
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reiterated here that failures in emergencies may not necessarily be due to errors (for 
example, fast escalation leading to no opportunity for intervention). Errors may or may 
not lead to failure in the outcome (some things are due to luck! ). HEART focuses on 
"error" - which does not consider the outcome of an error - therefore error quantification 
techniques, such as HEART, are not always appropriate to compare with an outcome- 
based risk methodology. 
For example, many of the results obtained in the "crane driver" example give the 
probability of error as 1. From this, it can be assumed that the error is certain but in the 
context of applying these results into a more global quantitative risk assessment, it is not 
clear how this could be incorporated. Therefore, this result could even be seen as 
creating more problems than it solved. If there is a "certain" error, does it occur within 
the decision-making, communication or action processes - what is the nature of the 
error? Consider the following interpretations. 
If it is assumed that there is a certain error in the decision making, this could be a 
complete failure to make a decision (something that would be difficult to define - even 
the absence of action could be due to a conscious decision! ) or that he makes precisely 
one error within the decision. 
In our example, this may mean that the crane driver will fail to make any decision and so 
it must be assumed that he stays in the crane OR he makes an error in the decision- 
making, for example, chooses the wrong direction. The former "absence of a decision" 
may eventually turn out to be the right decision - and by "unconsciously" relying on 
others to rescue him, he remains in the most obvious place to be rescued. This 
guaranteed error may lead to a higher probability of success in the rescue! 
Therefore, neither of these errors give any indication to the probability of survival of the 
crane driver - The probability of error may be 1, but 
because there is no clear definition 
of how these errors manifest themselves or the circumstances in which the decision was 
made, the probability of survival is still unknown. 
On the other hand, this error could be in the physical process. This may involve a trip or 
a slip - which if serious, could result in a total failure of the escape process or could 
delay the process slightly. Again, this does not necessarily constitute failure in the task - 
but may increase the probability of it. Ultimately, HEART has not provided the answer 
to the question - in this situation, what is the probability that the crane driver escapes or 
is rescued? Whilst HEART may provide a more deeper representation of the probability 
of error, it can not fulfil the requirement of a Quantitative Risk Assessment where the 
probability of task failure is the necessary input. 
However, whether considering errors or failure, if it can be considered (as 
discussed in Section 10.7.2.4) that the actor would based his probability of survival on 
his perception of the physical situation and his estimation of the solution that optimised 
his chance of success, then this decision should be linked to the probability of task 
success such as that produced by the TPRC model. Based on this, the method of 
quantification in HEART would appear to also be inconsistent with the real-life 
knowledge of emergencies. For example, in a rescue task, would an error-producing 
condition (such as a low signal-to-noise ratio) have as much impact on the risk as 
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whether the distance to the casualties is =10 metres or ý 100 metres? Even at a cognitive 
level, the physical attributes of a situation have an impact on the outcome - the stress 
caused by physical differences in the task are likely to influence the probability of error 
more than "global" error-producing conditions. Also, considering the lists of error- 
producing conditions, the quantitative influence of these may change within an 
emergency situation - for example, in general, "No obvious way to keep track of 
progress during an activity " currently assigned a weighting of 1.4, is likely to be more 
important than "a means of suppressing or overriding information which is too easily 
accessible" assigned a weighting of 9. Users may argue that these influences should be 
modified by the "proportion of effect". However, this almost defeats the purpose of 
having pre-specified values for error-producing conditions at all. It is likely that the 
values should be re-assessed for emergency situations. Similarly, HEART has many 
subjective parameters that could actually be represented by physical parameters - for, 
example, time pressure can be measured through the relationship of time required and 
time available - possibly producing some formula of how this relates to perception of 
time pressure. Also, "ambiguity about performance standards" could be represented by 
uncertainty about the goal standard required. 
In contrast, the TPRC model considers human unreliability as a failure - an error 
that has an objective and measurable impact on the outcome. Therefore the methods 
appear to be inconsistent with each other. In general, this makes it difficult to compare 
between methods " or to identify a method with the potential to validate against the 
TPRC model. Overall, this suggests that compared with these techniques, the 
functionality of the TPRC model is more consistent with the real probability of success in 
emergency management tasks as it considers physical parameters and is outcome-based. 
11.2.2.6 Conclusions 
Overall, it can be seen that the TPRC model can represent the impact of changes, 
in variables on probability of success in various tasks. The results from all the changes 
described in Section 11.2.2 were shown to be consistent with the current knowledge 
about emergencies. For example, long delays, slow work progress and increase 
escalation (reduced time available) were all found to have an adverse effect on the, 
probability of success of the task. 
This helped to indicate the sensitivity of the concept of risk to particular , 
variables. Risk is not a fixed concept but is changeable according to the details of a 
situation. In an emergency, probability of success is influenced by the events and 
circumstances of the situation, the actions taken and the timings. Often, even the 
maximum speed of the task is not sufficient to make an impact on the probability of 
success curve (As shown in Figure 44, the difference between 0.7 m/s and 1 m/s would 
not produce a maximum value tending towards 1). However, the "delay before taking 
action" appears to be much more significant. Although both of these factors influence the 
time taken to complete the actions, the initial point at which the gradient starts to rise (as 
defined by the delay) made more impact on the probability of success curve than the 
actual degree of the gradient (as defined by the task speed). Although, these examples 
only demonstrated limited changes, in reality, it is more likely that the delay will tend to 
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zero than the speed will tend to maximum. For example, if this related to human speed, 
this would indicate the speed of an Olympic runner. The implications of this is that is it 
more important to start a task early than to carry it out quickly - indicating the important 
of "good and timely" decision making. As far as the resources are concerned, the 
conclusions are similar. The greater the length of time available, the greater the 
probability of success in the task. 
As stated earlier, there was no model which could be directly compared with the 
TPRC model and so could be used to validate this technique. Therefore, initially, the 
main criteria of the model was to assess its ability to represent a large variety of different 
emergency tasks and to show face validity in the results. In this report, the author 
believes that this has successfully been completed. The Task Performance Resource 
Constraint model is logical in its construction - relating the times required for tasks and 
the times available. Where these timings produce a only small time window of 
opportunity, the resultant probability of success is small. Where the window of .. 
opportunity is large, so is the probability of success. However, in addition to this face 
validity, the TPRC model also showed its ability in assessing real data from the Piper 
Alpha disaster and was compared favourably other methods of HRQ - namely, HAZAN 
and HEART. 
In general, the TPRC Model has the potential to provide an objective assessment 
of performance based on specified distributions of physical values. The probability of 
success that results from these values is based on mathematical equations. Currently, as 
noted in Section 10.7.4.1, there is a risk of bias through subjectivity in: 
" choosing the task performance / resource constraint parameters to be measured. 
" choosing the mean values and the degree of variance to be applied to each parameter 
where it has not been objectively specified 
However, if a strict framework can be identified (specifying tasks that were known to be 
linked to resource constraints) and enough numerical data can be collected to build up 
distributions of performance parameters, both of these problems can be eliminated and 
the approach can be totally objective. 
In this report, the model successfully demonstrated the probability of success in a large 
number of different emergency management tasks. Although the results were based a 
collection of simulation, theoretical and design data, the model successfully managed to 
produce a probability of success function relating to time. Where emergency 
management provided no or little intervention, the probability of success would be low. 
If emergency management provided appropriate and timely intervention, the probability 
of success would be high. Therefore, this application of the TPRC model can be 
considered to have successfully achieved the objectives of this research. 
SECTION 11.3: IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF 
PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
The concept of performance parameters was brought about to define timings for 
human activities based on the observation of dedicated simulations. These could 
therefore be used in planning, design as well as within the TPRC model - hence reducing 
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the reliance on expert judgment. These were intended to be predominantly management 
activities as opposed to physical activities that could be ascertained from drills and walk- 
through simulations. However, to aid in the processing of the TPRC model, the timings 
of physical activities that were used in the simulation were also included in data 
collection. Therefore, as the timings were considered reasonable enough to provide a 
realistic test for an emergency manager, they should also be reasonable enough to be 
used in preliminary data analysis. 
For this reason, there were two types of data collection: 
" Generic - timings of tasks that were not context-dependent, were observed frequently 
and could be expected to occur in any scenario 
" Scenario-Specific - timings of tasks that were context-dependent, were usually only 
observed to occur once and would only occur in scenarios with a similar context. 
As mentioned in Chapter 10, the timings of the scenario-specific tasks and events 
were based on the Scenario Organiser's imagination, organisational skills and knowledge 
of the process. The values were intended to represent the timings of tasks and events in a 
real emergency. However, as the physical events in the emergency were simulated, it was 
not known how realistic these timings were. This introduces a great deal of subjectivity 
into the data, which in turn makes the validity and reliability questionable. As this 
research is based predominantly on dedicated simulation data, which is a "subjective" 
representation of a real incident, it may seem unreasonable to particularly note the 
subjectivity of this aspect. However, these simulations were only intended to provide a 
reasonably realistic test for the emergency management candidate. If it is the intention of 
the TPRC user to model novel situations or new designs, it would not be advisable to use 
these data for this reason. They should therefore be used only as a last resort - when 
timings cannot be estimated from any other source. In this situation, the TPRC results of 
such analyses should not be used to make critical decisions - in terms of design, 
emergency management or any other factor. However, if it can be ascertained that the 
data ARE realistic and DO represent the specific task/resources as required by the 
analysis - they have some potential. It should be noted particularly that the total timing 
incorporate the time taken to make a decision - something that it not obviously captured 
by the use of the generic performance parameters. 
However, this section will focus on the use of the generic performance 
parameters. These were not subject to the same criticisms as the scenario-specific 
performance parameters, because mainly: - 
" they rely on observable tasks; 
" they consist of management communications and actions as opposed to physical or 
technological behaviour 
but particularly, 
" they are in greater numbers so unusual timings are noticeable as they probably 
represent the "tails" of the distribution rather than being taken as the average value. 
Consider that if only one piece of data was recorded (as in the Scenario-specific 
performance parameters), this could represent an outlier, the median or some other 
point on the distribution. Building up a distribution reduces the risk of getting biased 
data. 
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This resulted in a set of 46 generic performance parameters (as defined in Appendix 7) - 
including the delays, times to carry out communications and times to pass on 
information. For each of the generic performance parameters, the data were collected 
into distributions. These distributions were collected with respect to: - candidates, pre vs. 
post incident, competency level of the scenario, as awarded by the assessor; and onshore 
vs. offshore; as shown in Appendices 10 and 11. 
As discussed in Section 10.8, at this time, there are not enough data to be confident in 
the reliability of the generic performance parameters. They were from 2 teams - one 
offshore, one onshore. Therefore, although many of the parameters form distributions 
approximating to a "normal" shape, they cannot be assumed to be representative of the 
population of emergency managers and their teams for either industry. No statistics 
comparing the groups were carried out at this stage. However, it was possible to 
examine the distributions using a Weibull plot - to assess whether they fitted particular 
distribution shapes. This analysis found that most of the data tended towards being 
"random" as opposed to deterministic, which is what we would expect from human 
behaviour. Some of the frequency distributions were apparently logarithmic rather than 
normal. Often this was due to the low numbers (eg. delays of 0 or I second) in the 
parameter. Some of the parameters contained small numbers of data, therefore it would 
be beneficial to collect more data to ascertain the nature of the distribution. However, for 
the distributions obtained through large numbers of data, it is likely that these are a true 
reflection of the task. In general, these distributions could be used, either alone or in 
combination, to estimate the delays taken up in particular actions. These delays can then 
be used when designing systems to withstand hazards for a particular length of time, e. g. 
firewalls. They can also be applied to the emergency planning process - to assess whether 
certain actions would be effective if carried out after the minimum or most likely delay - 
or if, by this time, the actions are likely to fail. 
When applying the distributions to other situations - whether in the TPRC model 
or other techniques, the choice of distribution is very important. In general, it is 
recommended that the user chooses the distribution closest to the required situation - for 
example, if one wishes to know the average time taken by a highly competent emergency 
manager to make a tannoy within an onshore emergency - it is best to choose the 
information from the onshore post-incident highly-competent data set. This is 
comparable to the recommended technique for using specific data. If the description of 
the data is vague, it is best to choose the highest level possible to ensure a broad 
spectrum of data. For example, if it could be a petrochemical incident of unknown type 
and could apply either onshore or offshore, it is best to choose it from the data obtained 
from the large total (post-incident) distribution, to ensure that the total variance is taken 
into account. As the larger distribution has been obtained from a larger amount of data, it 
is more likely to represent the population than a small potentially-biased sample, 
Chapter 9 illustrated an example of how the performance parameters could be 
used in the TPRC model. To assess the performance by one particular emergency 
management candidate in one particular situation does not require the information about 
every other candidate in any other situation. However, if the TPRC model is to be used 
to assess design changes or novel situations, it would also be necessary to estimate the 
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"average" response as well as the best and worst responses. This can be established 
through use of the performance parameters. The TPRC model uses a distribution for 
each inputted parameter. Therefore, when assessing novel situations, the management 
intervention (usually represented by an initial delay) can also be inputted as a distribution. 
For example, in one scenario, it may have taken 26 seconds to receive a message. 
However, using 26 seconds to receive a message in all future TPRC models would 
potentially lead to errors. If it was known that 26 seconds was a short time to receive a 
message and the average time was actually 60 seconds, this adjustment could be made. 
Therefore, this really acted to show that the TPRC model could use such data 
rather than assessing the performance of the data themselves. The combination of model 
and performance parameters worked together to produce results that are consistent with 
knowledge of real-life incidents. Therefore, although there are some limitations, as were 
discussed in Section 10.8, it appears that the performance parameters (both generic and 
scenario-specific) are applicable in this research. As shown in Section 10.5, the 
performance parameters also have the potential to be used outside of this research 
project. For example, designers can assess how long an emergency evacuation can take 
using physical models. However, up until now, there was no information on what sort of 
delay could be expected by the passing of information. Therefore, if a design is given 
physical criteria (for example, survival time of 5 minutes), it can be established whether it 
is possible to carry out both management and physical tasks in this time. 
SECTION 11.4: CONCLUSIONS 
To summarise: 
" The Task Performance Resource model demonstrated its success when assessing the 
impact of emergency management on risk. The relationship between an emergency 
management task and the escalation can be used to calculate a probability of success 
function with respect to time. If favourable changes in this relationship occur, this 
increases the probability of success respectively as has been shown for numerous 
simulation tasks and an example from the Piper Alpha disaster. 
" The TPRC model is preferable to other methods of HRQ when assessing emergency 
management tasks for a number of reasons. Most HRQ techniques do not represent 
variability in the inputted variables and are restrictive when considering the effects of 
time. Also, some major emergencies have been managed successfully, yet many HRQ 
techniques remain pessimistic about the success of emergency management tasks or 
do not represent the physical values that most influence the outcome of the incident. 
" The data from the questionnaires (as shown in Appendix 9) indicate that competency 
is strongly linked to the number of good decisions that are made in the scenario. As 
one scenario was marked as "competent" when there were 4 decisions considered to 
be "poor", this indicates that other emergency management behaviour (e. g. 
leadership, delegation) has a strong influence on assessment results. 
" The Performance Parameters provide distributions for tasks and events that occur in 
an emergency. The reliability of the specific timings of events is dependent on the 
skills of the scenario organizer and there are generally only single examples of each 
one. The generic performance parameters involve observable management tasks and 
large distributions of these can be produced. 
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" The TPRC model can use the Performance Parameters to represent "poor", 
"average" and "good" times for a particular task. This can be used in novel situations 
or environments as well as using designs that are still at an early stage of 
development. Care should be taken to choose the most appropriate distribution for 
the situation. 
This thesis will now move on to discuss the implications of these results, the contribution 
to knowledge as well as possible future research. 
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Chapter 12 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
SECTION 12.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the implications of the results - both in terms of their 
contribution to knowledge as well as their practical application. This chapter also 
includes suggestions for future research. These will be split into sections according to the 
relevant area of the research - scenario arrangements, data collection, the TPRC model, 
questionnaires and performance parameters. Next there will be a general discussion to 
summarise the research, then finally the conclusion. 
SECTION 12.2: SCENARIO ARRANGEMENTS 
Ensuring that training simulations are as effective as possible as well as ensuring 
that quality data are obtained relies on a solid proceduralised method. Therefore, the 
structure of the scenario arrangements should be optimised to produce good results. As 
yet, there is no recommended procedure for planning and running dedicated simulations. 
As there is such variety in the type of simulation required, this is usually implied in the 
literature. As discussed in Section 3.5.3.4, UKOOA (1997a, 1997c) specify the 
frequency of simulations, some of the tasks that should be assessed as well as the 
qualifications of the assessors. OPITO (Institute of Petroleum 1998) specify the types of 
scenario as well as the performance attributes that should be examined. However, during 
this research, it became apparent that there were recommendations that could be made in 
terms of the scenario arrangements. Therefore, how the scenarios should have been 
arranged in this research (and therefore should be arranged for future research) will be 
described in this section. 
The scenario arrangements should model the emergency manager's environment 
as closely as possible. All the relevant equipment and personnel should be available for 
use, or appropriate substitutes should be supplied. For example, in the current research, ' 
the alarm systems were simulated using a tape-recorded version. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to spend large amounts of money to produce an identical system where cheap 
alternatives are sufficient. 
As discussed before, the scenario organization team should consist of people who 
are familiar with the particular installation. As a minimum, the Scenario organizer should 
carry out the following tasks: - 
Clarify the purpose of the scenarios - to identify if particular skills must be assessed - 
for example, team or individual assessment, testing of the emergency plan etc. 
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" Clarify the scope of the scenarios - define the number of scenarios that are required 
to fulfil this purpose. 
" Collect relevant information about the installation including Quantitative Risk 
Assessment, Emergency Procedures, Installation Description and scale diagrams - 
and from this, identify a number of key emergency scenarios while referring to the 
purpose and scope as defined above. 
" ''Talk to the installation personnel in different roles (those not included in the 
Emergency Management Team under test). Clarify details of scenarios including 
particular concerns associated with the scenarios as well as predicted courses of 
action. 
" Estimate the timings associated with tasks and escalation. This could be carried out 
using a walk-through technique or through observation of platform drills (e. g. 
musters). 
" Document the results. This could be carried out using an event tree approach as 
described in Section 2.4.3.5. The possible actions are then associated with certain 
task and escalation timings. A transcript of the timings of the events (escalation 
points) must then be produced, which should be accurate to the nearest second. As 
the timings of intervention are dependent on when the emergency management team 
order an action to take place, the duration of the relevant tasks should be recorded. 
" At this point, it would also be useful to identify criteria for good / poor performance. 
That is, for each event or action, define details of what would reasonably be expected 
of a team and what would be considered an optimal performance. 
" Verify that the scenario is realistic and a good test of emergency management skills 
using documentation and conversations with installation personnel (as before, those 
not included in the Emergency Management Team under test). 
Therefore, the actual running of the scenario would consist of working to the 
transcript and event tree. Once particular tasks have been ordered, the scenario organiser 
can refer to the expected duration of the task and note the time that it is expected to end. 
For example, if blowdown is expected to occur 20 minutes after it was initiated, the 
scenario organiser should note down the time at which it was ordered and record its end 
time 20 minutes later. 
Therefore, it is necessary for the scenario organiser to use a clock or stopwatch 
to keep track of the time. When particular events occur, the scenario organiser should 
make them known to his team to ensure that the intended information is returned to the 
emergency management team. This would therefore result in a realistic simulation. 
Currently, the methodology only allowed the use of video recording in the 
emergency management team room. This was sufficient to note how the emergency 
management team deal with the information that they are given. However, certain 
aspects of the information may have been lost, through unintelligible radio calls or details 
of phone-calls that are not passed on to the rest of the emergency management team. In 
this research, it was necessary to assume when the events occurred, based on the actual 
messages that were sent to the emergency management team. Using a video camera in 
the scenario organization team room would assist in clarifying this process. If the 
scenario organizer was to announce the point at which events occurred, these could be 
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made specific in the transcripts, and used in the TPRC model. Also, as discussed in 
Section 10.6, the quality of information sent from the scenario organization team is not 
always the same quality that is received. For example, sometimes the scenario 
organization team intend a fuzzy radio message to be sent to the emergency management 
team - for example, to represent a noisy environment or serious injuries. However, 
sometimes the message would be distorted unintentionally. The current transcripts only 
record one side of the phone conversations. Therefore, the quality of information in a 
phone call may be lost as the message is passed on to the rest of the team, like in a game 
of "Chinese Whispers". Noting any differences in the quality of the information that was 
sent and received may affect the judgment of the quality of the emergency management. 
For example, an emergency management team member may answer the phone and, after 
a long conversation, will deliver critical information to the rest of the team. Using the 
current methodology, it is not known whether the critical information was given at the 
beginning of the call or as an afterthought. From the video recording of the scenario 
organization team room, this information can be established. If it was at the beginning, 
the emergency management team member should have realized this and forwarded it to 
the team immediately, rather than continuing the conversation. If it was at the end, it 
could be for two reasons. Either the emergency management team should have predicted 
the important content of the phone-call and should have asked for it earlier; or the 
information was an unexpected progression of the incident. In the latter case, this was 
often used as a deliberate delay and was thrown in by the scenario organization team as 
an extra "test". Therefore, getting the view of things from the scenario organization 
room would be an important contribution to the research. 
Ideally, it would be possible to identify any weaknesses in the emergency 
management process at any point in time. Therefore, it would be necessary to focus on 
each member of the emergency management team and stop the scenario at various points 
and interview individual team members. This may be useful in cognitive research, but 
would be disruptive to the emergency management process. Therefore, the use of head- 
mounted cameras might be useful, as has been suggested for studying naturalistic 
decision making (Omodei et al 1997). This would allow the assessment of each person's 
actions at the end of the emergency. The views from the camera should help to jog the 
memory of the individuals and this could help to identify weaknesses in the individual as 
well as general problems in emergency management. Overall, the scientific nature of the 
scenario organization is the important issue for any research. 
As stated in Section 10.5, the fact that there was one main assessor involved in 
the assessment process was problematic. Any human may make an error, and the 
assessor is not exempt from this. Therefore, there should be no main assessor - just a 
number of assessors with equal contribution to the assessment process. Each should have 
some form of official endorsement - perhaps also in the form of a competency 
assessment. Determining the standards for assessors would be difficult. The definition of 
emergency management competency in terms of the subjective opinions has not been 
defined within this project. Therefore, it is required to objectively define competency 
then ensure that all assessors are able to identify particular characteristics (both desirable 
and undesirable) under test. 
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This assessment could be carried out by preparing videos of simulations of- --; 
candidates of varying levels of competency. The assessor should be able to identify good 
and poor decisions; decisions that are too early, early, timely, late and too late; lapses in 
communication, unexpected responses etc. If their assessment is consistent with the 
previously-defined criteria, then he can be deemed a "competent assessor". 
Also, as stated in Section 10.5, the assessor was sometimes biased by the fact 
that he knew the nature of the incident, which was likely to affect his judgment of the 
emergency manager's performance. In future, to make this a more realistic assessment, 
this should be a "blind" test. The assessor should be given only the information that the 
emergency manager is given and then they can watch the emergency unfolding from the 
same perspective. The assessor should be encouraged to record in real time any 
discrepancies between the responses that were made and the responses he would expect 
to be made. This would ensure that only the assessor's knowledge of emergency 
management would come into play - not his prior knowledge of the incident. 
Ordinarily, in scientific study, the scenarios should be repeatable at a high level of 
accuracy. Unfortunately, as they involve an interaction between teams, this would be 
impossible. For example, if the scenario organisation team were given a script of 
messages to communicate to the emergency management team, it would not be long 
before the emergency management team would ask a question that was outside of the 
scope of the script. Therefore, the scenario should be repeatable in terms of the major 
events and the timings. The research could then be broadened to compare the differences 
between "incompetent" and "competent" candidates in one specific scenario. This would 
help to define "competency" in objective terms. It could also be used to assess the 
difference between a candidate at the beginning and end of training - to learn the true 
value of training or to identify whether emergency management is innate in the person or 
can be learnt. This would suggest whether the efforts should go into selection or training 
when choosing an emergency manager. This could also be used to compare different 
training techniques, for example, to find if cognitive or physical training result in the best 
performance. Changing the physical arrangements of the emergency management room 
and noting the impact of this can be used to assist in planning and designing. Finally, 
each scenario can be used with people in different roles or using different numbers of 
people, to see if these aspects change the level of performance. 
Once the scenario arrangement technique has been formalised, there are few 
limits to the scope of this research. This process can be used with different teams of 
differing competency, different scenarios, different installations and different industries. 
For this research, this could identify whether performance parameters and TPRC results 
are affected by such factors. It also would ensure that there is less variation in the 
inputted data - for example, it would be possible to identify exactly how long it takes for 
information to get from the scenario organisation team to the whole of the emergency 
management team. 
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SECTION 12.3: DATA' COLLECTION 
12.3.1 DATA COLLECTION FROM SIMULATIONS 
As discussed in Section 10.6, another problematic feature of this research is the 
intensive effort that must be applied if behavioural data are to be extracted from 
simulations. The criticisms of this data collection methodology focus mainly on the time 
that is required to produce a transcript. Due to the length of time taken by the process, it 
was not possible to have an independent verifier repeat the process to identify any errors. 
Further to this, Section 12.2 suggested a wider use of video cameras in the process. 
These included a video camera in the scenario organization room as well as head- 
mounted cameras on each of the emergency management team. These would both 
increase the workload involved in transcription. 'However, these problems could be 
rectified by the use of an automated system. 
There is software available that changes the spoken word into the typed word. 
This is generally used to speed up the typing process. However, if it could be used to 
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be carried out during the scenario itself, rather than lowering the acoustic quality of the 
information by using the video. However, this would not provide the timing information. 
However, the field of Exploratory Sequential Data Analysis (ESDA) may be able to 
assist in this process. MacSHAPA (Sanderson 1997) was developed to enter video data 
including time codes into a computer for analysis. Although, this is not yet able to 
automatically extract the speech, identify the speaker and to record the timings at which 
this started and finished, there is the possibility that the technique may be capable of this 
in future. If the transcription (including timings) could be carried out automatically, this 
would greatly improve the efficiency of the total TPRC methodology. There is also the 
possibility that data could also be produced in a way where they can be fed automatically 
into the TPRC model and/or produce or add to the Performance Parameter distributions. 
For example, the user could highlight the data in terms of type (for example, scenario 
organization team informational call). The software could calculate the time taken by the 
task, and then the data point could be forwarded into a database for the relevant 
parameter. The user could highlight the relevant data in the same way and input this 
information into the TPRC model. For example, the user could specify a context-based 
start point, a point at which the resources have run out, the delay and the task time. The 
user could use the transcript or external information to specify the variability surrounding 
the values, or adapt them at his discretion. Other suggestions are shown in Section 13.4. 
12.3.2 DATA COLLECTION FROM OTHER MODELS AND THEORETICAL 
INFORMATION 
The interdependence between the physical events in an emergency and the Task 
Performance Resource Constraint model was a critical factor in the analysis. Initially, the 
external data were simplified. However, to obtain reliable results from the TPRC model, 
it was necessary to obtain reliable information on the objective aspects of an emergency. 
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Therefore, this required research into survivability, human tolerance, fire escalation and 
other physical parameters. 
As discussed in Section 10.6.2, the main problems with using other models and 
theoretical data were the amount of data available or the complexity in producing it in a 
useful form. Therefore, the main focus of future work should be to obtain clear data from 
a wide variety of sources. Dhillon (1990) and Taylor-Adams (1994) have noted some 
resources that are helpful in this task. Some research is clearly focused on emergency 
intervention; some may not seem to make any life or death differences. For example, 
exercise physiology studies the speed of human activities. This may include studies of 
people of different age and fitness moving over different distances. This may not appear 
to have much impact in an emergency. However, if you apply these values in a TPRC 
model of a rescue, the information becomes valuable. This can also find a more positive 
use of information that was disregarded due to its outdated methods. For example, the 
work of Taylor (Pheasant 1987) involved time and motion studies that were used to push 
humans to the limits of their potential. Now these data can be applied for a more positive 
and beneficial purpose - to establish the upper limits of a pressured performance. This 
should also consider the data for teamwork. How much quicker can a fire be put out 
using 4 fire fighters rather 3? How effective is rescue when the more complex tasks are 
assigned to an expert medical professional rather than one of his team? Many of these 
data are collected but are not reproduced in a form where they are available for public 
use. 
Therefore, it should be noted that data collection is not a simple task. Some data 
can only be obtained by starting from first principles - that is, trying to estimate the 
timings and probabilities from observation of the tasks and events themselves. For 
example, timing how long it would take to apply a compression bandage may require 
observation of people carrying out this task. Some data can be established from literature 
but they are very widespread. For example, assessing the likely survival time from 
particular trauma injuries involves assessing both deaths and survivals by type of injury, 
then looking at the times at which intervention was attempted, the type of intervention 
and any complications. This would probably involve the examination of medical records, 
which would require understanding of the terminology. In a similar way, the research on 
fire escalation could only really be interpreted by someone with expertise in this area. In 
conclusion, providing the accurate data for use in the model often requires specialist 
knowledge in the area of concern and considerable effort to locate and collate - if indeed, 
the relevant information is available! Therefore, future work should concentrate in 
producing these data so that they can be applied in the TPRC model by those who do not 
have great depth of knowledge in all of the relevant fields. 
SECTION 12.4: THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE, 
CONSTRAINT MODEL 
The Task Performance Resource Constraint model is a key feature of this 
research. Despite the criticisms described in Chapter 10, it has fulfilled three out of the 
four objectives of the research, as follows: 
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1. To develop a method of obtaining objective data from emergency scenarios on 
management performance 
2. To develop a methodology to use these data to assess the probability of success in 
emergency management tasks. 
3. To demonstrate how these methods can be used to evaluate the impact of changes in 
emergency management skill and design on risk values. 
The TPRC model has shown that it is capable of using simulated data to assess 
the probability of success over time for emergency management tasks. It is also capable 
of using prototype or design information to test the probability of success in novel 
situations. 
The results have shown good face validity with respect to real-life emergencies 
and in comparison with other models of HRQ - possibly because these examine "human 
error" as opposed to the system-focused attitude of human unreliability as "human , failure". ; With care, the results could be applied in other QRA techniques, such as the 
event tree and fault tree approaches. Added together, these factors place the model in a 
unique position. This model facilitates the idea that risk is a "fluid" concept, reflecting 
situation escalation as well as human intervention. It also emphasises the importance of 
emergency intervention - something that human factors approaches tend to avoid or 
evaluate in a simplistic way by attempting to prevent the original initiating events rather 
than considering the escalation control. Within this approach, it demonstrates how the 
different types of intervention affect the probability of success as well the impact of 
numerical changes in the parameters. 
Overall, some future changes in the TPRC methodology have been implied in 
Chapter 10 by the weaknesses in the current methodology. Table 24 shows, in brief, how 
the problems could potentially be rectified. 
Table 24: Possible Development of the TPRC Model to rectify Current Weaknesses 
Problem Possible methods of recovery 
Multiple tasks and resources Reprogramming the model to incorporate 
more complex variables: 
" Internal performance limits before the 
ultimate performance limits 
" Capability to incorporate non-linear 
variables 
Interaction between task and resource Reprogramming the model to incorporate 
more complex variables: 
" Including a means of representing 
degrees of interaction between 
parameters 
Uncertainty / Variability Incorporating these aspects as separate 
numbers (recording this in the outcome), 
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perhaps by providing an option of terms 
for users who may not understand the 
concept (e. g. Subjective parameters like 
"reasonably certain") - "very certain" , 
though it should be noted that this 
rectification would reduce the reliability of 
the model. 
Conditional Probability Providing a facility within the program to 
link certain tasks together with respect to 
"real-time" and produce an overall 
probability of success function for the sum 
of the tasks 
Quality of Performance Estimation Defining quality criteria in both the 
performance standard to be attained and 
the progress rate. For many tasks, this may 
not apply. 
Human Error Identification / Reduction Identify a current methodology that is 
consistent with the TPRC approach or 
develop a new one to incorporate the 
critical aspects. 
Cognitive Aspects Identify a current methodology for 
Cognitive Failure Probability (possibly 
through prior calculation of Cognitive 
Error Probability) and integrate this into 
the approach - or - design a new 
methodology based on the criteria laid 
down in the TPRC methodology 
Tasks that worsen the situation Either use the worsened condition as the 
starting point and work towards recovery - 
or - use the multiple tasks approach as 
shown at the top of this table with a 
negative gradient for the initial task 
"Psychological" emergencies Using real and some simulation data, 
performance parameters distributions could 
be built up and applied using large 
variances for uncertainty and variability 
until there is such a point where these 
could be defined in more absolute terms. 
Subjectivity Reliance on expert judgment could be 
reduced and possibly eliminated by: 
" More theoretical data and external 
models 
" Building up distributions of scenario- 
specific data 
" Increasing the distributions of generic 
data 
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"° '' Formulating a framework for response 
patterns for delays in various situations 
" Automating the identification of tasks 
and resources that should be applied in 
the TPRC model. 
Program Design The program could be adapted to be more 
user-friendly - using a object-oriented 
approach, designed according to human 
factors principles, 
Validity This should be done through: 
Additional comparison of TPRC models 
with other risk and human reliability 
quantification models 
Use of TPRC model with more scenarios 
and tasks - real-life, simulated and 
imagined. 
Continually re-evaluating the validity after 
changes have been made to the model 
(such as those described in this table). 
Most of these changes can be rectified with reprogramming the model, 
clarification of the use of variance as well as the collection of quality data. Some will be 
quite difficult. Beyond making the suggestions shown in Table 24, details as to how the 
changes that should be implemented are beyond the scope of this project. Clarification of 
the variance and collection of quality data could be improved with the use of the 
recommended scenario arrangements and data collection method, as shown in Sections 
12.2 and 12.3. Therefore, the next few sections will focus on the incorporation of 
external data, validation of the TPRC model and the development of Performance 
Standards. 
12.4.1 'THE INCORPORATION OF EXTERNAL DATA 
Currently, the TPRC model requires the user to identify the correct data to be 
inputted into the model. Often these are based on the scenario information. However, 
some data are re-used frequently and it would be recommended if they could be added 
into the model. For example, human movement speed, helicopter speed. These data 
could be recorded in an external database for use by the model. As the TPRC also has 
the potential to be used as a design tool, the performance parameters could be used in 
the same way using a framework of the actions that were likely in each type of task. 
Therefore, if the program is to be used to assess scenario data, the management timings 
and relevant design information can be inputted into the program. This could then be 
compared with management timings estimated from the performance parameter database. 
However, if the program is used to assess a new design, the relevant design information 
can be inputted and assessed using performance parameter data. Figure 71 shows an 
example of how this could work. 
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Figure 71: Suggested Expansions to the TPRC Model Program 
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In Figure 71, it can be seen that the Task Performance Resource Constraint 
Model can be used in two different ways as shown by the bold and dotted lines. The 
theoretical data and the possible automatic task/resource matching tool are used for both 
purposes. The theoretical data may include examples of particular task speeds or delays, 
for example, time to scramble helicopters. It may also be developed to integrated 
complex models - for example the hypothermia model developed by Tikuisis et al (1995, 
1996,1997,1998), injuries caused by fire (Purser 1988,1989) or fire escalation models 
(Peacock et al 1996,1998, Bukowski 1997, Lie 1989, Chamberlain 1996). 
Given this, the bold lines represent the use of the TPRC to assess emergency 
management from simulations. In this, the design is known and the actual timings taken 
to make decisions can be observed. These can also be compared with data produced 
through estimation of the responses made by a "possible" emergency manager - as 
defined by the cognitive predictions and the performance parameters. The scenario- 
specific performance parameters (once built into distributions of values) could represent 
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known events - and, using a framework of standard response patterns, the generic 
performance parameters could be built for novel events. 
ýý 
The dotted lines represent the use of the TPRC as a design tool. This helps to 
identify what impact the design would have on an emergency situation. This time, the 
design data can be hypothetical ideas sketched out on paper - for example, a map of an 
installation. As there are few data on the management of such an incident, the 
information must be assembled from performance parameters - using the smaller 
distributions of scenario-specific data or the larger distributions of generic data built 'up 
using a specified framework for the standard response pattern both using the cognitive 
prediction tool where required. This can give an estimate of the performance of the 
average emergency manager (or even a very poor one), which can be used in the TPRC 
model. This can then be compared with the effects of other designs, to identify the one 
that results in the lowest risk in an emergency situation. That is, the design that best. -, 
facilitates the success of emergency management is the most acceptable design. It should 
be noted that the scenario data need not be from simulations but can also be from real 
incidents - possibly recording these as a separate set of real scenario-specific and generic 
performance parameters (with greater reliability than the simulated set but less likelihood 
of building up large distributions). Real data can be used with changes in emergency 
management speed and design changes to identify which would have had the greatest 
impact on the outcome. 
To reduce the reliance on expert judgment; in the future, it is possible that this 
system could be developed with more "intelligent" features incorporating a task/resource 
matching tool and a cognitive framework. For example, rather than the scenario defining 
the decisions that could be made for management, a tool somewhat similar to a decision 
support system could produce suggestions then assess their impact on the outcome using 
the TPRC model. Another intelligent system could identify the tasks and resources that 
best "match" each other to give meaningful results. This could also potentially include a 
severity assessment to indicate the levels of risk produced by each event or compare the 
obtained results against a set performance standard, as will be discussed in Section 
12.4.3. Given that the risk could be calculated; the system could work on decisions in 
parallel, simultaneously comparing decisions that could be made in response to a given 
event. Ideally, this could prioritise the decisions or work out which combinations of 
decisions would be best in which order to maximise the outcome.. Similarly, this could be 
used to work out the best combination of design features - or the combination of human 
and design choices. Overall, this would produce a useful tool for emergency planning, 
designing and possibly as real-time decision support in an emergency itself. 
Although this is expected to result in a large program, this could ideally be used on a 
stand-alone PC for use by designers, emergency managers, assessors and safety . 
personnel. However, these suggestions probably represent the distant future in the 
development of the TPRC model and for now, it is necessary to return to fundamentals - 
in particular, the model's validity. 
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12.4.2 VALIDATION OF THE TPRC MODEL 
During this project, there was no obvious method available to compare with the 
TPRC model, due to its unusual use of probability of success functions relating to time. 
This creates problems for validation. Currently, although the results indicate good 
validity, to gain full scientific endorsement, there should be external validation through 
the use and support of alternative methods. As the model is based on mathematical 
principles, some scientific support can be guaranteed. However, in its "raw state", the 
model is unable to produce results, therefore the quality of the outputted results rely on 
the quality of the inputted data. Consequently, at this point, the user introduces some 
subjectivity. 
Ideally, the model should be validated using real emergency data. For example, 
the recorded delays, physical measurements, escalation points and times at which tasks 
were completed in the Piper Alpha disaster could be applied in the model. As stated in 
Section 3.3.2, the emergency manager was criticised due to his lack of control over the 
situation as well as because his decisions were poor, late and often not communicated to 
the relevant people (Cullen 1990). In general, the absence of decisions is modelled in the 
TPRC using a null task progress rate. However, some of the platform personnel may 
have carried out tasks without being given orders - indicating that some emergency 
intervention was attempted. Section 8.3.4 gave an example of how the TPRC model 
could be used to model the probability of success of helicopters arriving at the platform 
before certain escalation (ruptures of risers) takes place. Using the conclusions by Cullen 
(1990) that the ruptures could have been delayed by 1 to 3 hours by cooling, the TPRC 
results suggest that if this emergency action had been carried out, the helicopters would 
easily have reached the platform before escalation occurred. Although this may seem 
logical based on the information known about emergencies and their intervention, there 
is no model that connects the two issues to produce a probability of success function 
with respect to time. Therefore, the model has shown its capabilities in analysing both 
real incidents and simulations. 
The data produced by the model could also be compared against the data 
obtained from other risk assessment / human reliability assessment techniques. Again, 
this is problematic as this model produces a time-dependent probability of success 
function whereas most other techniques produce point values. However, identifying that 
the point values lie within the probability of success values would be an important 
discovery and would indicate the relationship between the methods. Within this research, 
the TPRC results of the crane driver scenario were compared with HAZAN and HEART 
- as these methods gave quantification values for reliability/risk and incorporated relevant 
emergency management parameters, such as time pressure and/or recognised the fact 
that some activities were non-routine or under emergency circumstances. However, this 
comparison, identified the critical differences between the probability of error and 
probability of failure - whilst methods such as HEART are capable of producing values 
for the probability of error - it is not clear how this impacts on the probability of failure 
as required in a Quantitative Risk Assessment. Therefore, the methods used to validate 
should be chosen carefully - to ensure consistency between the types of results. 
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In general, the TPRC model has shown its ability to analyse both simulation and 
real-life emergency data. It has been compared with a few methods of HRQ but the 
results are inconclusive - mainly due to the focus on physical outcome-based assessment 
of task success in comparison to the mainly psychological study of errors. Due to its 
consistency with what is known about real-life emergencies, it is likely that the TPRC 
model has, at least, a high degree of face validity. However, it has not yet been proved in 
terms of predictive validity. This issue of validation is something that needs to be further 
studied. 
12.4.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
There is the possibility that TPRC model can be involved in the development of 
Performance Standards. Normally, Performance Standards provide numerical 
benchmarks of performance - for example, a firewall that survives less than 1 hour is 
unacceptable. 
Similarly, "acceptable" values of maximum probability of success can be defined 
in the same way that acceptable levels of risk are identified. For example, using the 
probability of success curve, it may be decided that only a maximum probability of 
success above 0.9 would indicate an acceptable task (one that can be carried out 
successfully in a real-life situation). Therefore, returning to the example of the crane 
driver's escape - none of the tasks would be deemed to have been successful. This ,, implies that to reduce risk to an acceptable level involves better emergency management 
than the scenario example - or a better design. In Figure 43, it can be seen that reducing 
the delay to 0 allows the crane driver to escape over the deck with a maximum 
probability of success of 0.99. Therefore this would be deemed an acceptable solution. 
However, guaranteeing such a small delay would be difficult. This could be carried out 
by including this in the emergency procedures - for 
example, "If a crane driver drops a 
methanol tank and it is seen to leak, he must move to the muster point immediately" (if 
probability of ignition is known to be high). Similarly, an increase in time resources also 
increases the probability of success to an acceptable level (0.997). Time resources are 
usually increased by alternative intervention (e. g. fire-fighting by deluge) or by design 
changes. This would imply that the improvement in time resources is necessary to give an 
acceptable result. Therefore, if this analysis had been carried out on a new design, it 
would imply that the design is acceptable. 
In general, if acceptable levels of probability of success can be established, it is 
possible to use them as criteria. Designers should use the standards to ensure an 
acceptable design. Assessors should ensure that emergency managers are trained to 
produce acceptable results. Safety managers should ensure that procedures are written 
according to the criteria. This could also produce valuable input into the definition of 
competency for emergency management training and assessment. Overall, the results of 
this research have enormous potential to be included in the "Performance Standards" 
criteria that are now encouraged in the offshore industry by legislation. 
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SECTION 12.5: FUTURE QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
Although it was not a key feature of the research, the questionnaire study (as 
shown in Appendix 9) did provide some valid conclusions for the research. Its scope was 
limited by the nature of the scenario arrangements. Therefore, using simulations that are 
specifically designed for research purposes should facilitate the use of more detailed 
questionnaires. 
As well as the factors that were recorded in this study, some of the factors that should be 
investigated include: 
" Personality factors linked to good emergency management practice - leadership, 
stress control, delegation skills etc. 
" The Emergency Manager's predicted outcome of actions 
" Cognitive aspects - what lead the decision-maker to choose that decision at that time. 
Questions might include - Did you make the decision yourself? What exact 
circumstances triggered it?, Were there other considerations in making this decision? 
What change in circumstances would have lead you to make a different decision? 
Was this decision made based on written procedures? What was the worst thing that 
you predict could happen in response to this decision? 
" Situation awareness - overall awareness of events, tasks and details of the 
emergency. These should be open-ended rather than fixed response - to capture the 
clarity and extent of the details. Questions may include - What happened at the 
beginning of the exercise? How did this happen?, What happened next?, What did 
you do and what happened when you had done this? 
" Weighting of decisions - How difficult was it to make this decision? Did this decision 
require a large amount of thinking? Which decisions were deemed to have had the 
most impact on the emergency and why? 
Ideally, some of the questions could also be posed while the decisions are still in 
the mind of the decision-maker. This could be done by interrupting the scenario to ask 
questions or possibly using some sort of hand-held monitor, where the team could 
provide a brief indication of their thoughts at that point in time. However, as suggested 
in Section 12.2, these methods are not recommended as they may lead to detriments in 
performance due to the interruption. Therefore, the use of "head-mounted cameras" as 
suggested in Section 12.3.1 could be used. The recordings could be shown at the end of 
the simulation to prompt responses. 
These recommendations should help to identify what factors are really linked 
with good emergency management. As stated many times during the report, emergency 
management decisions are rated in terms of their outcome. However, unlike the TPRC 
model, an assessor can identify what actions should be attempted - whether or not they fail - therefore considering cognitive errors as discussed in Section 12.4. Therefore, the 
questionnaire can help to identify what makes a good emergency manager and what 
makes a person particularly skilled at identifying actions that may make a positive impact 
on an emergency. Also, this could assess which features of the situation or of the person 
lead him to make a poor decision. The results of the questionnaires (as shown in 
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Appendix 9) gave a small but positive (0.08) correlation between the number of bad 
decisions made in a scenario and the level of competency awarded by the assessor. This 
suggests that bad decisions do not adversely affect the competency assessment at this 
time. 
Therefore, the main conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that 
assessment must be based on attributes that may not be as closely linked to good 
emergency management as it was first thought. These include leadership skills, 
delegation skills, control of stress in self and others etc. These are generally thought to 
be important, as they are believed to promote "good and timely" decision-making and 
ensuring that the decisions are implemented. However, without the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process itself, the attributes are useless. 
The communication and action factors can be assessed objectively through 
observation, as has been used in this project. However, the cognitive processes that go 
into the decision-making require further investigation. This research would greatly 
contribute to the understanding of decision-making under pressure, perhaps by giving 
weight to the current theories of cognition, such as naturalistic decision-making: 
SECTION 12.6: FUTURE COLLECTION OF PERFORMANCE 
PARAMETERS 
Originally the performance parameters were only introduced into the research to 
support the Task Performance Resource Constraint Model. These data could be 
collected to provide "average" responses of a person, which could be used in TPRC 
analysis of novel (non-simulated) situations. These novel situations could also include the 
use of designs - so that the probability of success could be estimated in a task on an 
installation that was not even built! The distributions of data could also be used to show 
the maximum and minimum values for each task - therefore providing the fastest and 
slowest delays for use in TPRC analysis. Given the amount of data that were collected, 
this facilitated the collection of onshore and offshore distributions, pre-incident (normal 
conditions) and post-incident (emergency conditions) as well as distributions with respect 
to the competency level that was awarded by the assessor. Currently, it is not known 
how representative these data are - of all onshore and offshore emergency management 
teams on various types of installation. In the future, when more data are available, it 
would be useful to perform statistical analysis on the distributions to identify whether 
there are differences between these groups. These may assist in identifying training issues 
(for example, if one team is slower than average at using a radio, they may need to build 
confidence in this area), competency standards (if it is discovered that a highly competent 
team take noticeably longer than a team with notable shortfalls to carry out particular, 
tasks, this could be used as a benchmark), and the effect of the emergency situation on 
performance (assisting with research into stress in emergencies, and for indicating 
possible design changes that could be made to compensate for certain delays). 
Given that the performance parameters were used successfully in the TPRC 
model, there was also further potential for their use. They could be used independently of 
other models - as Performance Standards in their own right to be applied in emergency 
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planning or design. For example, using the distributions shown in Appendix 11, it is, , 
possible to establish the fastest, slowest and average times for particular tasks: These can 
be used as a benchmark on which emergency management candidates (and their teams) 
can be objectively assessed. Whereas the competency assessments are more subjective 
and based on complex scenario-specific information, this type of assessment could 
establish whether a team was noticeably slower in particular tasks - therefore providing 
feedback on the performance. - 
These can also be used for designers and emergency planners. Without using the 
TPRC model, they can make assumptions of how long it takes to carry out the relevant 
management tasks, then how long it takes to carry out the physical tasks, therefore 
implying how long systems should withstand fires or extreme conditions. At the design 
or re-design stages, this could ensure that the average human response (including delays) 
would promote an "acceptable" outcome in an emergency. Similarly, for emergency 
planners, delays in action can be incorporated into the plan, therefore ensuring that the 
plans are realistic and result in a positive outcome. 
In general, the main focus of future work in the area of performance parameters 
should be to widen the collection of data and to collect data on cognitive tasks. This 
work should also draw on the theoretical information (as described in Section 12.4.1) - 
for example, results from time and motion studies. The theoretical data could also be 
represented in terms of distributions. For example, distributions of all the possible 
distances of offshore platforms from land, distributions of the times taken in shutdown or 
blowdown. Therefore, rather than using specific point values, distributions can be used 
to represent the total range of values. In future, this could be built up to be a dynamic 
version of human and system data. For example, Pheasant (1986,1987,1991) provided, 
an enormous contribution to the field of human factors by recording the important 
measurements of the human body in terms of population distribution. Taylor (1964) 
recorded the time taken by humans in particular tasks. However, these were normally, 
used to maximise performance rather than simply to record a distribution of slowest to 
fastest performance timings. This approach is not recommended by ergonomics as it 
forces people to work at their optimal level at all times - potentially leading to accidents 
and injury. Using performance parameters, this study has started looking at the time 
taken by communications and control room operations in an emergency situation. 
Previously, the times taken by such tasks were not recorded in decompositional (generic) 
and whole (specific) terms. It was not known how long it would take to give a message 
by radio, or to give information to the rest of the group. Therefore, this information 
could potentially be very useful not only for this research but for work outside of it. 
Because delay has such a critical influence on outcome in emergency 
management tasks, it is also possible that performance parameter distributions can be 
used like generic error probabilities. Instead of considering the generic probability of 
failure, the times taken for each component of the task could be added to produce an 
overall distribution of delay times - which could then be used in the TPRC model to 
produce the probability of success function. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to 
calculate the human error probabilities for emergency management situations (which is a 
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difficult task and is often subjective), now that the times taken (which are easier to obtain 
and are objective) can be used. 
The cognitive aspect is more problematic. However, as shown in Section 12.5, 
questionnaires have attempted to probe what criteria are used to identify a good 
emergency management decision. These criteria could then be linked to the observed 
time taken in making the decision - therefore producing a performance parameter for 
decision-making (and linked to the cognitive prediction tool shown in Figure 71). These 
could be categorised in terms of complexity - such as the skill, rule, knowledge type 
categorisation used in HCR (Hannaman & Worledge 1988). Therefore, the main 
recommendation for this part of the research is to obtain data from scientifically designed 
simulations and real emergencies. These should be from different teams (of different 
levels of competency if this has been defined), from different installations, different, 
companies and difference areas of work. 
Overall, these performance parameters fulfil the fourth and final objective of the research 
as follows: II. 
To use the above methodology and data to define performance parameters that can be 
applied to generic emergency situations. 
SECTION 12.7: CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH WITH 
RESPECT TO PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE 
As shown in the Chapter 2, there are many areas of study that can be linked to 
this research. Consequently, this research has contributed some knowledge for each field. 
Despite our knowledge that human behaviour is a contributory factor to 
accidents as well as to preventing them (van der Schaaf 1999) and the obvious 
importance of aiming to prevent further disasters such as those that have occurred in the 
past, there has been very little research into the contribution of emergency management 
to reducing risk. Traditionally, Human Reliability Quantification techniques generally 
associate most emergency management tasks with a high probability of error - or, by` 
extrapolation, as a low probability of success. However, this is not always the case. 
Many major incidents have been managed with some degree of success, where success 
can be defined in terms of survivors, escalation that has been controlled or assets that 
have been saved. This is probably due to the difficulties in equating "error" with "failure" 
- whereby errors may not necessarily result in poor outcomes and failure is not 
necessarily due to error (as discussed in Section 12.4). Given that emergency 
management can be measured objectively in these terms, it seems reasonable to design a 
technique that can measure the impact of emergency management on risk in the same 
way. Although the TPRC model was not demonstrated to be completely objective (as 
discussed in Chapter 10); with further emphasis in the development of performance 
parameters, it has the potential to be this in the future. Due to it being based on 
mathematical equations of physical phenomena as opposed to experience of human error 
and performance in other situations, the TPRC model clearly has stronger internal 
validity that most other models of human reliability. Its validity and reliability rely mostly 
on the data that are supplied - which can be improved through further research. 
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Although it only represents the quantification aspect of a Human Reliability . - 
Assessment technique, the TPRC model shows a number of advantages to previous 
models. Firstly, it relies mainly on objective outcome-based information, therefore is not 
as reliant on "expert judgment". It examines the "total" task- of incorporating the time 
taken by cognitive and physical actions - and its impact on the outcome. Therefore, it 
looks as human reliability as a total "system" issue - rather than error at specific points in 
the process. It can represent most tasks and resources incorporating important issues 
from the specific context. They can be from real-life, simulated or imagined incidents - 
past or future - depending on the requirements of the user. It incorporates a level of 
variance into the inputted values, rather than being restricted by point values. It produces 
a distribution of probabilities relating to a time-base chosen by the user. Therefore, as 
expected, in comparison to other models of HRA (HAZAN & HEART), the TPRC 
model is better at representing the impact of the contextual situation on success through 
its dynamic use of time - therefore producing more appropriate results for use in a wider 
context. As yet, no other HRQ technique can claim to have all of these attributes. 
Therefore, this could be a massive step forward in fully integrating HRQ into the 
PSA/QRA process. 
The concept of time required and time available as used in the TPRC model is 
also consistent with the concept of stress. An imbalance between perceived capability 
and perceived demand is said to lead to stress (Sharit & Malon 1991, Cox & MacKay 
1976). In the TPRC model, if the perceived imbalance results from "demand being 
greater than capability", probability of failure is increased. Stress has an influence on 
human error. Therefore, these two concepts are inherently linked. Failure may be due to 
a narrow margin of success caused by the physical timings of the task and the resource 
consumption rate. However, the physical timings also may lead to the perception of the 
imbalance between the two timings, leading to stress, which may result in human error, 
leading to failure. Therefore, the failure occurs through either the actual problems 
inherent in the situation or through the psychological reaction to them. This may suggest 
that those with a very high perception of risk would not make good emergency managers 
- as they would expect the tasks to fail and therefore would not try them. This could be 
useful as a screening technique for potential emergency managers. 
Given this, the TPRC model may also be used to quantify the objective 
contribution of a situation to stress. If the probability of success is high but the stress 
associated with the task is also high, this may indicate that this person would not be well 
equipped to deal with risky situations. Consequently, to optimise the probability of 
success, the stress should really reflect the optimal level of performance - which 
according to Yerkes & Dodson (1908) would be a "middle" level of stress. For example, 
low stress may indicate slow reactions to the situation, whereas high stress may result in 
poor decision-making and a high probability of error. 
The research in human error may also help to explain the contribution of 
simulation training to emergency management skill. Many of the physical emergency 
management tasks are not used on a day-to-day basis. For example, tannoys, deluge 
activation and use of hand-held radios. Using the SRK theory (Rasmussen & Jensen 
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1974), the simulations help these physical skills be transferred from rule-based to skill 
based actions. This allows the team to focus more on cognitive demands of the task. For 
example; looking at the data distributions shown in Appendices 10 and 11, this may 
explain the delays between radio calls being longer for the onshore team than the 
offshore team - as they are less familiar with using hand-held radios. Also, training 
provides an emergency manager with "psychological resources" - the experience of 
dealing with particular situations - which perhaps increases the probability that these will 
be recognized as "typical", as in the Recognition Primed Decision Model (Klein 1989), 
and leading to less likelihood of cognitive error. - In relation to the literature discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, this reinforces the concept that simulations should be as realistic as 
possible (eg. the dedicated simulations as used in the offshore industry) to identify any 
problems in skill-based tasks in parallel with the more complex problem-solving tasks. 
The TPRC model may also be useful in the development of decision-support 
systems for use in an emergency. For example, an emergency manager may be able to 
estimate the escalation of the fire and the estimated time of the helicopter and then make 
a decision to wait or to evacuate by lifeboat. However, the emergency manager has many 
important decisions to make; therefore assistance with the calculations (incorporating all 
the variability) would be useful. The TPRC model may indicate that the helicopter is 
unlikely to arrive on time. This would guide the emergency manager towards planning a 
boat evacuation rather than letting the situation force him to do this at the last minute 
therefore increasing the risk. 
The TPRC model could also be useful in design. For example, it could help 
identify which mitigation system is the most effective. For example, is it more useful to 
get a fire team on to the site (involving an initial delay but stronger impact on the fire) or 
activating a deluge (involving no initial delay but having a lesser impact on the fire). This 
also could have implications for the emergency procedures, by determining what the ! ,: 
priority actions should be. Good design, like training, may also affect the probability of 
success through psychological influences. For example, if an emergency manager is 
confident in the reliability or effectiveness of a system, he is less likely to delay in 
initiating this system. The same issue applies for resources such as procedures. 
Therefore, this research has bridged the gap between design and emergency 
management. 
'The common-sense objective approach of the TPRC to 'assess the impact of 
emergency management on risk does not confirm or contradict the current theories of 
decision-making, leadership or the various styles of emergency management. Currently, 
the contribution of decision-making is not supplied by the model itself - but by its user. 
As for emergency management style, any actions that are taken that change the physical 
state of the emergency can be modelled: The means by which these actions are promoted 
is currently to the discretion of the emergency manager. It is possible that these styles 
could be compared in objective terms using the same scenario. However, as this was not 
carried out within this research project, no conclusions can be drawn as yet. 
With regard to emergency action, one of the recommendations that was brought 
forth in the Safety Case (1992) Recommendations in response to the Piper Alpha disaster 
295 
was the introduction of "competency assessments". This required training and -' 
assessment of the OIMs and their teams in physical tasks (lifeboat & muster drills etc. ), - 
and emergency management. This created problems for the decision-making aspects as it 
was difficult to define objective criteria for a complex cognitive task.. Therefore, OPITO 
(1998) proposed a number of requirements, on which the assessors could base their 
judgments of competency (shown in Appendix 1). 
Other research attempted to identify what the ideal characteristics of an 
emergency manager were. These were generally found to include leadership qualities, 
delegation skills and dealing with stress in oneself and others. 
However, these findings may have drawn the attention away from the important 
issues. The main focus of emergency management should be on managing the 
emergency. This is a physical set of events, which changes over time. A fire is not put 
out if the emergency manager is a great leader. A suffering casualty does not recover if 
the emergency manager is good at delegating tasks. The leaking valve is not isolated if 
the emergency management team are all excellent at the skill of managing stress. The 
o attributes that make a difference in an emergency are those that have an impact on 
the physical events. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the competency assessments in this 
project were found to be based on other aspects as well as the quality, timeliness and 
communications and responses to the decisions. Currently, it appears that the focus of 
competency assessment is placed on "behaviour that is believed to correlate with 
successful emergency response implementation" rather than the successful 
implementation itself. This makes it very difficult to produce industry-wide criteria for 
emergency management performance. 
Therefore, OPITO should be encouraged to develop techniques that ensure 
reliable assessment of emergency management. This may include competency assessment 
of the assessors or use of objective assessment techniques. As stated in the literature 
review, offshore accident statistics have not improved as much as was hoped since the 
"step change in safety" was introduced in 1997 (Gibb 1999b). It should be noted that the 
competency of offshore emergency managers could never be guaranteed by using 
simulations and subjective techniques, if at all! The TPRC model could be a useful tool 
in this issue - to objectively demonstrate to the emergency managers the extent of the 
risk they produced or averted - and over a number of scenarios, the degree of 
improvement they made. However, it should be emphasized that although the TPRC 
model represents an objective assessment of the impact of emergency management on 
risk, this is no substitute for the competency assessment. The competency assessment 
should examine not only whether the decisions are successful, but whether the 
emergency manager attempted all the possible interventions. However, The TPRC model 
has successfully contributed to bridge the gap between the areas of human reliability, 
emergency management and quantitative risk assessment in an objective and probabilistic 
technique. 
Apart from this, there are implications for other fields outside of the research 
area. The TPRC relies on modelling from many areas of study. Exercise physiology, 
Biomechanics and Anthropometry provide some information in the area of human 
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physical performance, but this is very sporadic. The estimated escalation of injuries is a 
controversial area of research but could be collected from various case studies. However, 
due to the specific descriptions used in these reports, it is recommended that this should 
be carried out by someone with specific medical knowledge. The technical information 
on independent systems (for example, helicopters, standby boats) is generally very good. 
However, obtaining the performance and reliability information for dependent systems 
(linked processing plant equipment) is usually difficult due to their complexity. In terms 
of a petrochemical emergency escalation, the information usually required is concerned 
with fires or gas-leaks. Although there is a great deal of research in this area, it is rarely 
tailored to produce the data required for input into the model. Therefore, further 
research in all of these areas would contribute to the successful use of the TPRC model. 
SECTION 12.8: CONCLUSIONS 
12.8.1: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
This section will describe the objectives, the extent to which they were met and why. 
Objective 1. To develop a method of obtaining objective data on management 
performance from emergency scenarios 
A method of data-collection was developed to be flexible enough to cater for changing ' 
circumstances in scenario organisation and design. Data were collected from emergency 
management scenarios using video-recording and formulated as transcripts including the 
relevant timing information. However, due to the organisation of the scenarios being 
outside of the control of the author, certain data could not be collected - such as the 
information being transmitted by the scenario organisation team. Also, the data were 
subject to interpretation where the recording and/or the original information were not-` 
clear - therefore some subjectivity was introduced into the process. Despite this, in the 
main, Objective 1 was deemed to have been met successfully in that adequate data were 
available for the achievement of Objective 2. 
Objective 2. To develop a methodology to use these data to assess the probability of 
success in emergency management tasks. 
A method was developed to address this objective that incorporated the use of a TPRC 
model as follows. The scenario-transcripts were interpreted in terms of their description 
of the physical events and emergency management team actions that impacted on the 
outcome of the emergency. These data were inputted into the TPRC model - purpose- 
adapted for this process - but additional data were required to support the process 
collected from literature-based sources. As this objective was primarily mathematical in 
its basis, the output from the model of probability of success functions with respect to 
time deemed that this objective was successfully achieved to completion. The main 
difficulty in this process occurred in the post-hoc collection of additional data from 
literature sources. If, as recommended previously, scenario design develops into a more 
scientific process, these data should be collected at the scenario-design stage and 
therefore reduce the reliance on post-hoc research. 
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Objective 3. To demonstrate how these methods can be used to evaluate the impact of 
changes in emergency management skill and design on risk values. 
Given that Objective 2 was successfully achieved, it was then required to provide 
substance to its results by demonstrating that it could appropriately represent the impact 
of change on risk - by showing that differences in emergency management skill and . design would influence the probability of success in emergency management tasks in the 
expected way. This demonstration was carried out by identifying the attributes that were 
observed as making a difference in real emergencies, interpreting their impact on the 
parameter values in the model and using them in the method. This was carried out for a 
number of different scenarios and tasks, including real tasks from the Piper Alpha 
disaster. The resulting change in the probability of success functions demonstrated' 
success in this objective. However, the degree of success could only be established by the 
interpretation of these results and their applicability for use in risk assessment. When 
used in conjunction with event trees and fault trees, and in comparison with other 
methods, namely HAZAN and HEART, it was notable that the TPRC model catered 
neither for the impact of cognitive aspects on task success - nor the conditional 
probability of previous events. In a theoretical sense, this provided valuable insight into 
the divide between the definitions of unreliability used by the Human Reliability and 
Engineering communities - that of the differences between "human error" and "failure". 
For this goal, the TPRC model's results for "emergency management task success" may 
go some way to drawing together this divide, but whilst it does not incorporate the 
critical aspect of decision-making, it does not wholly fulfil the requirements of Risk 
Assessment. This aspect was beyond the scope of this research and, as recommended 
previously, should be a key objective of future research in this area. 
Objective 4. To use the above methodology and data to define performance parameters 
that can be applied to evaluate generic emergency situations. 
To be able to use the model for testing such changes as those occurring with designs, it 
is desirable to be able to carry out this without relying on scenario data - therefore 
aiming for a foreseeable future where the TPRC model can be carried out at the design 
stage of an installation to test the survivability of emergencies and the feasibility of 
emergency plans and procedures before any construction has taken place. For this 
reason, it was decided to re-use the scenario-transcripts - re-interpret the timings, 
categorise the timings in terms of specific events and actions as well as decomposing 
them into component parts identified as generic categories - these were called 
performance parameters. For the generic performance parameters, these produced 
distributions of timings. Using the structures of events observed as a pattern (situational 
awareness, decision, communication, action, response), these were then reapplied in the 
model to represent the impact of the fastest, average and slowest examples of each type 
of action/communication on the probability of success function. These produced results 
that could not only indicate where the observed scenario performance lay within a range 
of "possible" performances, but also allowed imagined scenarios and designs to be tested 
with realistic timings for human performance. All of the available scenarios within the 
research were decomposed to their full extent to produce these distributions. However, 
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as consistent with the scope of this objective, it is notable that these performance 
parameters may not apply to other industries, installations, emergency management 
teams or emergency situations. Therefore, further data collection in other domains is 
required to establish a more representative set of data for future analysis. 
This concludes the overview of the achievement of objectives. 
12.8.2: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH 
Therefore, the research has contributed to knowledge in the following ways: 
" Providing insight into the nature of risk as well as the' factors that influence it in an 
emergency - through the production of probability of success functions. - 
" Providing a generic and flexible method of assessing human reliability in emergency 
management tasks - that has the potential to be totally objective in the future. 
" Identifying that human unreliability may be assessed in terms of psychological (error) 
and system (failure) factors - and these are not necessarily linked. 
" Using simulation data to validate the method and obtain a probability of success 
curve for the observed tasks. 
" Using real-life data to show how this method can represent and analyse incidents and 
make recommendations for future changes 
" Proving that this method can be used at the design stage of an installation and for 
novel situations. , 
" Providing performance parameter data including responses that can be used as a 
benchmark for emergency management performance, in the TPRC model or as a. 
planning, design or assessment tool. 
299 
'Chapter 13 
REFERENCES 
Adamson, Janusz. (1999) Tutor - Assessment of Threat Management. DERA 
Publication, Sevenoaks, Kent. 
Adelman, Leonard. Tolcot. Martin A. & Bresnick, Terry A. (1993). "Examining the 
effect of information order on expert judgment". Organisational Behaviour and Human 
Decision Processes. Vol. 56, No. 3,348-369. 
Andrews, Huw (ed. ) (1999). Croner's Health and Safety in Practice: Risk Assessment. 
Croner Publications Ltd. London. 
Armstrong, I. J. Haston, W. S. & Maclean, J. R. (1998). Telepresence for Medical 
Decision Support Offshore. http: //www. rgu. ac. uk/subj/rgit/research/ofshore. htm (29`h 
July 1999) 
Arnold, John. Robertson, Ivan T. & Cooper, Cary L. (1991) Work Psychology: 
Understanding human behaviour in the workplace. Pitman Publishing, London 
Asmolov, V. G. (1997) "Development of the methodology and approaches to validate 
safety and accident management". Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 173,229-237. 
Baldwin, Richard. (1994). "Training for the management of major emergencies". 
Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 3, No. 1,16-23. 
Baron, Robert A. & Byrne, Donn. (1991). Social Psychology: Understanding Human 
Interaction. Allyn & Bacon, Boston. 6th edition. 
Barrell, A. (1992). Control of major hazards offshore - implementing Lord Cullen's 
recommendations. In: Symposium on Major hazards onshore and offshore, 20-22 Oct 
1992, UMIST, Manchester. 
Bartlett, S. Richardson, G. M. Krewski, D. Rai, S. N. & Fyfe, M. (1996). "Characterizing 
Uncertainty in risk assessment - conclusions drawn from a workshop". Human and 
Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 1,221-23 1. 
Bea, R., Holdsworth, R. & Smith, C. (1996). Introduction to human and organizational 
factors in the safety of offshore platforms. In: 1996 International workshop on human 
factors in offshore operations, December 1996, University of California, Berkeley. 
300 
Bellamy, Linda J. (1994). "The influence of human factors science on safety in the 
offshore industry". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 7, No. 4, 
370-375. 
Bellamy, Linda J. & Brabazon, Philip G. (1993). Problems of understanding human 
behaviour in emergencies. In: Conference on Response to Incidents Offshore. 8-9 June 
1993, Aberdeen. 1-19. 
Bellamy Linda J& Geyer, Tim A. W. (1991). ' Incorporating human factors into formal 
safety assessment: the offshore safety case. In: 3'd International Conference on 
Management and Engineering of Fire Safety and Loss Prevention, Aberdeen, Scotland, ' 
18-20 Feb 1991. Ch. 25,55-63. 
Bellini, James. (1986). High Tech Holocaust. David & Charles, Newton Abbot. 
Bello, G. C. & Colombari, V. (1980). "The human factors in risk analyses of process 
plants: the control room'operator model `TESEO"'. Reliability Engineering, Vol. 1,3- 
14. 
Bergman, David. (1999). The safety debate: Corporate Killing. The Safety and Health 
Practitioner. March 1999.18-22. 
Beroggi, Giampiero E. G. Waisal, Laurie. & Wallace, William A. (1995). "Employing 
virtual reality to support decision making in emergency management". Safety Science, 
Vol. 20, No. 1,79-88. 
BHP. (1994)., Private Correspondence. 
Blackman, Harold S& Byers, James C. (1995). Development of a behaviourally based 
human reliability analysis method. In: 39`h Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society. 9-13 Oct 1995; San Diego, CA. Ch. 273,1006-1010. 
Bley, Dennis. Kaplan, Stan. & Johnson, David. (1992). "The. strengths and limitations of 
PSA: where we stand". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 38, No. 1,3-26. 
Boating Basics (1999). Accidents: Hypothermia. At: 
http: //boatsafe. com/nauticalknowhow/boating. 8_8. htm (3rd January 1999). 
Boef, W. J. C. (1992a). "Launch and impact 'of free-fall lifeboats: part 1, Impact theory". 
Ocean Engineering, Vol. 19, No. 2,119-138. 
Boef, W. J. C. (1992b). "Launch and impact of free-fall lifeboats: part 2; Implementation 
and applications". Ocean Engineering; Vol. 19, No. 2,139-159. 
Bolsover, Andy J. Skramstad, Erik. & Lyon, Angus M. (1998) Uncertainty in QRA. In: 
ih Annual Conference on Offshore Installations: Hazard Management. I' December, 
London, UK. 
301 
Booth, Simon. (1990). "Interactive simulation and crisis management training". 
Contemporary Crises, Vol. 14,381-394. 
Bradley, Edgar A. (1995). "Determination of human error patterns: the use of published 
results of official enquiries into system failures". Quality and Reliability Eng ngieering 
International, Vol. 11, No. 6,411-427. 
Brand, J. (1988). "Sea Survival". Safety Practitioner, September 1988,32-33. 
Brandie, E. F. (1995). Offshore operations - an emergency management process map. In: 
IMECHE Conference on Emergency Planning and Management. 21-22 Nov 1995, 
London, England. Ch. 10, No. 6,41-47. 
Breznitz, Shlomo & Ben-Zur, Hasida. (1997) Enhancing effective decision making by 
information management techniques. In: Flin, Rhona, Salas, Eduardo, Strub, Michael & 
Martin, Lynne (1997) Decision making under stress: emerging themes and applications. 
Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Brown, Colin. (1997) Six Disasters; 368 people dead; no successful prosecutions. Now 
the Government acts. The Independent newspaper. 2 "d October 1997. 
Bukowski, Richard, W. (1997). Fire hazard analysis. In: Cote, A. E. et al (1997) Fire 
Protection Handbook. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. 18th Edition, 
Section. 11, Ch. 7,70-77. 
Burke, Eugene. (1997). Psychological research and development in the London fire 
brigade. In: Flin, Rhona. Salas, Eduardo. Strub, Michael. & Martin, Lynne (1997). 
Decision making under stress: Emerging themes and applications. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Burmaster, David E. (1996). `Benefits and costs of using probabilistic techniques in 
human health risk assessments - with an emphasis on site-specific risk assessment". 
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 1,35-43. 
Butler, David J. (1992). "An experimental investigation into the effects of uncertainty on 
rational behaviour in two-person symmetric games". Journal of Behavioural Decision 
Making, Vol. 5(4), 283-301. 
Carrington, Clark D. (1996). "Logical probability and risk assessment". Human and 
Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 1,62-78. 
Carrol, George. & Kidd, Stewart. (1991). Emergency training inside industry. In: 3'd 
International Conference on Management and Engineering of Fire Safety and Loss 
Prevention. 18-20 Feb 1991, Aberdeen. 145-156. 
Carter, A. D. S. (1986). Mechanical Reliability. Macmillan Press, London. 
302 
Cassidy, K. (1988). "Emergency planning for major hazards". The Safety Practitioner, 
June 1988.15-17.1 
Catton, Ivan &Lim, Hakkyu (1994). "The impact of phenomenological uncertainties on 
an accident management strategy". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 45, 
No. 1-2,175-194. 
Chamberlain, Geoff A. (1996). "The hazards posed by large-scale pool fires in offshore 
platforms": Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 74, B2, p. 81-87. 
Chamberlain, Geoff A. (1998). Advances in Understanding Offshore Fire Hazards: An 
Extended Abstract. 'In: 7th Annual Conference on Offshore Installations: Fire and 
Explosion Engineering. 2nd December 1998. Church House Conference Centre, London. 
UK. 
Christen, P. Bohneblust, H. & Seitz, S. (1994). "A methodology for assessing 
catastrophic damage to the population and environment -A quantitative multiattribute 
approach for risk analysis based on fuzzy set theory". Process Safety Progress, Vol. 13, 
No. 4, 
. 
234-238. 
Clemmensen, Torkil (1995). Observation in maritime emergency management. In: 6h 
IFA C/IFIP/IFORS/IEA Symposium on analysis, design and evaluation of man-machine 
systems. 27-29 Jun 1995, MIT, Cambridge, MA. Ch 117,655-660. 
Coastguard Agency, The. (1997). The Coastguard Agency: Press Release 51-97. 
http: //www. coastguard. gov. uk/pandp/1997/51-97. htm (7`h August 1998). ., 
Coastguard, HM. (1996). Statistics 96. http: //www. coastguard. gov. uk/hmcg/stat96. htm 
(21" January 1998). 
.), C- 
Cohen, Marvin S. Freeman, Jared T. &Wolf, Steve. (1996). "Metarecognition in'time- 
stressed decision making: recognizing, critiquing and correcting". Human Factors, Vol. 
38, No. 2,206-219., 
I 
Cojazzi, Giacomo. (1996). "The DYLAM approach for the dynamic reliability analysis of 
systems". Reliability Engineering and nd System Safety, Vol. 52,279-296. 
Cox, R. A. & Miles, A. (1991). Treatment of escalation mechanisms in the quantitative 
risk assessment of offshore platforms. In: 3'd International Conference on Management 
and Engineering of Fire Safety and Loss Prevention. 18-20 Feb 1991, Aberdeen, 
Scotland. 15-26. 
Cox, Sue. & Flin, Rhona. (1998a). "Editorial: Safety culture". Work & Stress, Vol. 12, 
No. 3,187-188. 
Cox, Sue. & Flin, Rhona. (1998b). "Safety culture:. philosopher's stone or man of 
straw? ". Work & Stress, Vol. 12, No., 3,189-201. 
303 
Cox, Tom. (1993). Stress. MacMillan Press, London. 
Cox, T. & Mackay, C. J. (1976). "A psychological mode of occupational stress". A paper 
presented to Medical Research Council meeting Mental Health in Industry. November, 
London. 
Crawley, F. K. & Grant, M. M. (1997). "Concept risk assessment of offshore hydrocarbon 
production installations". Transactions of IChemE. Vol. 75, Part B., August 1997,157- 
163. 
Cullen, The Hon Lord. (1990). The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, 
HMSO, London. 
Daniel, Jeremy & Westwood, John. (1997) Standby ships: the true cost. Offshore 
Engineer, May 1997,45. 
Danielsson, Mats. and Ohlsson, Kjell. (1997) Models of decision making in emergency 
management. In: Harris, Don (ed) (1997) Engineering Psychology and Cognitive 
Ergonomics, Vol. 2. Job Design and Product Design, Ashgate, Aldershot. 
David, Glyn. (1996). Lessons from offshore aviation - towards an integrated human 
performance system. In: Flin, Rhona. & Slaven, Georgina (1996a) Managing the 
offshore installation workforce. Penwell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
Davoudian, Keyvan, Wu, Jya-syin & Apostolakis, George. (1994a). "Incorporating 
organizational factors into risk assessment through the analysis of work processes". 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 45,85-105. 
Davoudian, Keyvan, Wu, Jya-syin & Apostolakis, George. (1994b). "The work process 
model (WPAM)". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 45,107-205. 
Department of Health. (1996). The Patient's Charter. Crown Copyright. Cited on 
http: //www. doh. gov. uk/pcharter/patient4. htm (1" March 1999) and 
http: //www. surreyweb. org. uk/wsha. health5. html (1" March 1999). 
Devooght, Jacques. & Smidts, Carol. (1996). "Probabilistic dynamics as a tool for 
dynamic PSA". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 52,185-196. 
Dhillon, Balbir S. (1990). "Human error data banks". Microelectronics and Reliability, 
Vol. 30, No. 5,963-971. 
Dhillon, Balbir S. & Rayapati, Subramanyam. (1988). "Human performance reliability 
modelling". Microelectronics and Reliability, Vol. 28, No. 4,573-580. 
Doheny, J. G. & Fraser, J. L. (1996). "MOBEDIC -a decision modelling tool for 
emergency situations". Expert systems with applications, Vol. 10, No. 1,17-27. - 
304 
Dougherty, Ed M. (1993), "Context and human reliability analysis". Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 41, No. 1,25-47. 
Dougherty, Ed M. (1997). "Is human failure a stochastic process? " Reliability 
Engineering and nd System Safety, Vol. 55, No. 3,209-215. 
Dougherty, Ed M. & Collins, E. P. (1996). "Assessing the reliability of skilled 
performance". Reliability Engineering and nd System Safety, Vol. 51, No. 1,35-42. 
Dowell, J. (1995). "Coordination in emergency operations and the tabletop training 
exercise". Travail Humain, Vol. 58, No. 1,85-102. 
Dowell, John. Pidgeon, Nick & Long, John. (1995) ColTrain: the Collaborative 
Training Project. http: //www. soi. city. ac. uk/homes/jdowell/ColTrain/html#staf (3d Oct 
1997). Main author can be contacted at Centre for HCI Design, City University, London. 
Dumire, Russell. & Peitzman, Andrew B. (1999) Field Management and Priorities in 
Trauma Patient Resuscitation. 
http: //www. emsmagazine. com/articles/emsarts/priorities. html (1" Mar 1999) 
Ellison, P. G. Monson, P. R. & Thomas, W. A. (1992). Severe accident containment risk 
assessments: severe accident management & training. In: 9h International Simulators 
Conference. 6-9 Apr 1992, Orlando, FL. Vol. 4, Ch. 63, No. 4,323-326. 
Embrey, David E. (1986) SHERPA: A systematic human error reduction and prediction 
approach. In: International Topical Meeting on Advances in Human Factors in Nuclear 
Power Systems, Knoxville Tennessee. 
ý. i 
Embrey, David E. & Reason, James T. (1986) The application of cognitive models to the 
evaluation and prediction of human reliability. In: Advances in Human Factors in 
Nuclear Power Systems, 21-24 Apr 1986, Knoxville, Tennessee. 292-301. 
Endsley, Mica R (1994). Situation Awareness in dynamic human decision making: 
Theory. In R. D. Gilson, D. J. Garland & J. M. Koonce (Eds. ) Situation Awareness in 
Complex Systems. 27-58. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press, Daytona Beach, 
Florida. 
Faith, Nicholas. (1999) Blaze. The Forensics of Fire. MacMillan Publishers Ltd. 
London. 
Falker, J. M. & Nickerson, W. (1996). "A new direction for safety policy: The Offshore 
Oil Industry and Safety Regulation of Technology. Technology in Society, Vol. 18, No. 
4,503-510. 
Fennell, Desmond (1988) Investigation into the King's Cross Underground Fire. 
Department of Transport, HMSO, London. 
305 
Fielder, F. E. (1978). Contingency Model and the Leadership Process. In., L. Berkowitz -I 
(Ed. ). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 11). Academic Press, New 
York. 
Finucane, M (1994). "The Adoption of Performance Standards in Offshore Fire and 
Explosion Hazard Management". Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2,171-184. 
Fleming, Mark. Flin, Rhona. Mearns, Kathryn & Gordon, Rachael. (1998). "Offshore 
workers' perceptions of risk". Risk Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 1,103-110. 
Flin, Rhona. (1998) Safety condition monitoring: Lessons from Man-Made Disasters. 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1998,88-92. 
Flin, Rhona. Mearns, Kathryn. Gordon, Rachael. & Fleming, Mark. (1996). "Risk 
perception by offshore workers on UK oil and gas platforms". Safety Science, Vol. 22, 
No. 1-3,131-145. 
Flin, Rhona. & Slaven, Georgina. (1995). "Identifying the right stuff. Selecting and 
training on-scene emergency commanders". Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1995,113-123. 
Flin, Rhona. & Slaven, Georgina. (1996a). Managing the offshore installation 
workforce. Penwell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
Flin, Rhona. & Slaven, Georgina. (1996b).; "Personality and emergency command 
ability". Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 5, No. 1,40-46. 
Flin, Rhona. Slavin, Georgina & Stewart, Keith. (1996). "Emergency decision making in 
the offshore oil and gas industry". Human Factors, Vol. 38, No. 2,262-277. 
Flin, Rhona. Slaven, Georgina & Whyte, Fiona. (1996). Selection for hazardous 
occupations: offshore oil installations. In: Smith, Mike. & Sutherland, Valerie. (eds. ) 
(1996) International Review of Professional Issues in Selection and Assessment, Vol. 2. 
John Wiley, Chichester. 
Forland, Arild (1992). Simulation of evacuation, escape and rescue. In: Symposium on 
Major Hazards Onshore and Offshore, 20-22 Oct 1992, UMIST, Manchester. 679-687. 
Forster, Mel. (1996). Training for stressful environments: Implications for the Royal 
Navy. British Crown Copyright/DRA, HMSO. 240-245. Author can be contacted at 
Psychology Department, Centre for Human Sciences, DRA, Portsmouth. - 
Fraser, Ramsay & Wilkie, Iain. (1998). Recent practical examples of structural response 
to blast loads. In: 7rh International Conference on Offshore Installations: Fire and 
Explosion Engineering. 2 °d December 1998, London, UK. 
306 
Free, F. W. (1987). The Use of Helicopters for the Emergency Evacuation from Offshore 
Installations. Unpublished report for the Department of Energy. 
Füredi, Frank. (1997) The dangers of safety. 
http: //www. informinc. co. uk/LM/LM92/LM92_Safety. html (4`" Nov 1997). 
Furuta, Kazuo. & Kondo, Shunsuke. (1992). "Group reliability analysis". Reliability 
Engineering and nd System Safety, Vol. 35,159-167. 
Gertman, D. L. Haney, L. N: & Sui, N. O. (1996). "Representing context, cognition and 
crew performance in a shutdown risk assessment". Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety, Vol. 39, No. 1,25-34. 
Gibb, Bob. (1999a). Safety offshore found wanting. The Safety and Health Practitioner, 
September 1999,9. r 
Gibb, Bob. (1999b).: Safety Step Change debated at Offshore Europe. The Safety and 
Health Practitioner, October 1999,6-7. 
Gibb, Bob. (2000). Devotional rescue: Safety in the North Sea. The Safety and Health 
Practitioner, October 2000,22-24. 
Granlund, Rego. (1999) Web-based micro-world simulation for emergency management 
training. In: International Conference on Web-based modelling and simulation 1999. 
http: //www. ida. liu. se/-reggr. (7t` Aug 1999). Author can be contacted at Dept of 
Computer and Information Science, Linköping University, Sweden_ 
Graziano, Anthony M. & Raulin, Michael L. (1989) Research Methods -A process of 
inquiry. Harper & Row, New York. 
Gudmestad, 0. (1996) The role of human and organizational factors in the construction, 
fabrication and installation of offshore production facilities. In: 1996 International 
workshop on human factors in offshore operations. December 1996, University of 
California, Berkeley. Working Group B. 1-47. 
Hales, K. (1995). "Insurance Piper Alpha "et al". Energy Exploration and Exploitation, ' 
Vol. 13, No. 2-3,253-260. 
Hannaman, G. W. & Worledge, D. H. (1988). Some Development in Human Reliability 
Analysis Approaches and Tools. In: Accident Sequence Modelling: Human Actions, 
System Response, Intelligent Decision Support. (eds: Apostolakis, G. E. Kafka, P. & 
Mancini, G. ) Elsevier Applied Science, London. 
Harrald, J. R. Mazzuchi, T. A. Spahn, J. Van Dorp R. Merrick, J, Shrestha, S. & 
Grabowski, Martha. (1998). "Using system simulation to model the impact of human 
error in a maritime system": Safety Science, Vol. 30,235-247. 
307 
Health and Safety Executive. (1992). Occupational Exposure Limits: Criteria Document 
Summaries. EH64 / 92. HSE Books, London. 
Health and Safety Executive. (1993). A guide to the offshore installations (safety case) 
regulations 1992 Guidance on Regulations, HSE Books, London. 
Health and Safety Executive. (1996a). Health and Safety Re lagu tions. (HSC 13). HSE 
Books, London. http: //www. open. gov. uk/hse/regulat. htm 
Health and Safety Executive. (1996b). Proposal for Regulations implementing the 
Directive on the Control of major accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 
Consultative Document, CD 128, HSE Books, London. 
Health and Safety Executive. (1997a). Offshore hydrocarbon releases statistics 1997 - 
OTO 97 950, HSE Books, London. 
Health and Safety Executive. (1997b). Offshore accident and incident statistics report 
1997 - OTO 97 951. HSE Books, London 
Health and Safety Executive. (1998a). Carbon monoxide: health hazards and 
precautionary measures. EH43 / 98. HSE Books, London. 
Health and Safety Executive. (1998b). Occupational Exposure Limits. EH40 / 98, HSE 
Books, London. 
Health and Safety Executive. (1998c). "Design Performance Indicators Project aimed at 
risk reduction". Offshore research focus July 1998,2. HSE Books, London. 
Health and Safety Executive. (1998d). Safety Statistics Bulletin 1997/98. HMSO, 
London. 
Health and Safety Executive (1998e). The Offshore Safety Division (OSD). 
http: //www. open. gov. uk/hse/osd. htm (8t' July 1998). 
Health and Safety Executive. (1999). Safety Statistics Bulletin 1998/99. HMSO, 
London. 
Heyes, A. G. (1995) "PRA in the nuclear sector, quantifying human error and human 
malice". Energy Policy, Vol. 23, No. 12,1027-1034. 
Hockey, G. Robert J. (1997) "Compensatory control in the regulation of human 
performance under stress and high workload: A cognitive-energetical framework". 
Biological Psychology, Vol. 45, No. 1-3,73-93. 
Hollnagel, Erik. (1993). Human Reliability Analysis: Context and Control. Harcourt 
Brace & Co. London. 
308 
Hollnagel, Erik (1996). "Reliability analysis and operator modelling". Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 52, No. 3,327-337. 
Hollnagel, Erik (1997). "Reply to "A practitioner's view on the state of HRA 
methodology'"'. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol. 55,261-262. 
Hollywell, Paul D. (1996). "Incorporating human dependent failures in risk assessments 
to improve estimates of actual risk". Safety Science, Vol. 22, No. 1-3,177-194. 
Holt, Allan St. John. & Andrews, Huw. (1993) Principles of Health and Safety at Work. 
IOSH Publications, Wigston. 
Hope, Jenny. '(1999). Miracle of the Ice Girl. In: DailyMail. October 8`, 1999. p. 31. 
Howell, David C. (1987). Statistical Methods for Psychology. 2"d Edition, PWS-Kent 
Publishin& Boston. 
Hsueh, Kae-Sheng & Mosleh, Ali. (1996). "The development and application of the 
accident dynamic simulator for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment of nuclear power 
plants". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 52,297-314. 
Idzikowski, Chris & Baddeley, Alan D. (1983) Fear and Dangerous environments. -In: 
Hockey, G. R. J. (1983) Stress acid fatigue in human performance. John Wiley & Sons, 
London. Ch. 5; 123-144. 
Institute of Petroleum. (1998) Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation. 
http: //www. petroleum. co. uk/opito. htm (9t` October 1998). 
Johannesen, Leila. (1997) Going behind the label "Human Error": 
http: //www. dtic. dla. milrac/cseriac/gv394err. html (8`h Oct 1997). Author can be 
contacted at: Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, Department of Industrial and 
Systems Engineering, Ohio State University, Columbus. 
Johnson, C. W. & Telford, A. J. (1996). "Extending the application of formal methods to 
analyse human error and system failure during accident investigations". Software 
Engineering Journal.. Vol. 1, No. 6,355-365. `. 
Jones, A. V. (1995). Emergency planning: a regulator's perspective. IMechE Report 
C507/002/95. 
Jones, Simon. Kirchsteiger, Christian. & Bjerke, Willy. (1999). "The importance of near 
miss reporting to further improve safety performance". Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, Vol. 12,59-67. 
Journal of the American Medical Association (1992). Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation and Emergency Care. At: http: //hypothermia. orgrjama. htm (16th Feb 
1999). 
309 
Kaemp, George L. & Militello, Laura G. (1992). "The problems of decision-making in 
emergencies". Fire International, Vol. 135,38-39. 
Kaemp, George L. Klein, Gary. Thorsden, Marvin. and Wolf, Steve. (1996). 'Decision .,; i 
making in complex naval command and control environments'. Human Factors, Vol. 38, 
No. 2,220-231. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1972). "Subjective probability. a judgment of 
representativeness". Cognitive Ps, cy hology, 3,430454 .1 
Kelly, G. N., Ehrhardt, J. & Shershakov, V. M. (1996) Decision support for off-site 
emergency preparedness in Europe. Radiation Protection Dosimetry, Vol. 64, No. 1-2, 
129-141. 
Khan, Faisal I. & Abbasi, S. A. (1997). "OptHAZOP -. An effective and optimum 
approach for HAZOP study". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
Vol. 10,3,191-204. 
Khan Faisal I. & Abbasi, S. A. (1998). "Techniques and methodologies for risk analysis in 
chemical process industries". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 
11,261-277. .s 
Khan, Faisal I. & Abbasi, S. A. (1999) MAXCRED -a new software package for rapid 
risk assessment in chemical process industries. Environmental Modelling & Software, 
Vol. 14,11-25. 
Kim, Byungjoon. & Bishu, Ram R. (1996). "On assessing operator response time in 
Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) using probabilistic fuzzy regression model". 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 52, No. 1,27-34. 
Kirchsteiger, Christian. (1997). "Impact of accident precursors on risk estimates from 
accident databases". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 10, No. 3, 
159-167. 
Kirwan, Barry. (1992a). "Human error identification in human reliability assessment. Part 
1: Overview of approaches". Applied Ergonomics, Vol. 23, No. 5., 299-318. 
Kirwan, Barry (1992b). "Human Reliability Assessment". in: Wilson, John R. & Corlett, 
E. Nigel. (1992). Evaluation of Human Work: A Practical Ergonomics Methodology. 
Taylor & Francis, London. 
Kirwan, Barry. (1994). A Guide to Practical Human Reliability Assessment. Taylor & 
Francis Ltd. London 
310 
Kirwan, Barry. (1996a). Evolving Human Factors in Offshore Operations. In: 1996 
International workshop on human factors in offshore operations. December 1996. 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Kirwan, Barry. (1996b). Human Reliability Assessment in the UK Nuclear power and 
reprocessing industries. In: Stanton, N. (Ed). Human Factors in Nuclear Safety. Taylor 
& Francis, London. 277-311. 
Kirwan, Barry. (1997). "The development of a nuclear chemical plant human reliability 
management approach: HRMS and JHEDI", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 
Vol. 56, No. 2,107-133. 
Kirwan, Barry. (1998a). "Human error identification techniques for risk assessment of 
high risk systems - Part 1: Review and Evaluation of Techniques". Applied 
Ergonomics, Vol. 29, No. 3,157-177. 
Kirwan, Barry. (1998b). "Human error identification techniques for risk assessment of. 
high risk systems - Part 2: Towards a framework approach". Applied Ergonomics, Vol. 
29, No. 5,299-318. 
Kirwan, Barry. (1999). Some developments in Human Reliability Assessment. In: 
Karwowski, W. '& Marras, S. (eds. ). The Occupational Ergonomics Handbook. CRC 
Press, London. 643-666. 
Kirwan, Barry. (2000). Private correspondence. Feb 17`h 2000. 
Kletz, Trevor A. (1974). HAZOP and HAZAN- Notes on the Identification and 
Assessment of Hazards. Institute of Chemical Engineers, Rugby. 
Kletz, Trevor A. (1988) Learning from accidents in industry. Butterworth & Co. 
Tiptree. 
Kletz, Trevor A. (1996). "Inherently safer design: the growth of an idea". Process Safety 
Progress, Vol. 15., No. L, 5-8.. 
Kletz, Trevor A. (1999). HAZOP and HAZAN. - IChemE, Rugby. 40, Edition. 
Kontogiannis, Tom. (1996). "Stress and operator decision making in coping with 
emergencies". International Journal of Human Computer Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1,75-104. 
Kosyachenko, S. A. Kuznetsov, N. A. Kul'ba, V. V. & Shelkov, A. B. (1998). 
"Emergency management, models, methods and automation". Automation and Remote 
Control, Vol. 59, No. 6,765-806. 
Kowalski, Kathleen Madland. (1995) "A human component to consider in your 
emergency management plans: the critical incident stress factor". Safety Science, Vol. 20, 
No. 1,115-123. 
311 
Kvwrner Oil & Gas Ltd. (1996) QRA of Judy - Joanne Development. Private 
Correspondence. 
Kverner Oil & Gas Ltd. (1997) QRA of Jade field development. Private 
Correspondence. 
Lagadec, Patrick. (1993). Preventing chaos in a crisis. McGraw-Hill, London. 
Lancaster, John (1996). Engineering catastrophes: Causes and effects of major 
accidents. Abington Publishing, London. 1' edition. 
Lane, J. R., Renwick, R. D. & Al-Hassan, T. (1994). "The HSE offshore fire and 
explosion research programme". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
Vol. 7, No. 4,3 76-3 81. S-i 
Larken, E. S. J. (1995). Practical Emergency Management. IMechE Report C507/010/95. 
Leach, John. (1994). Survival Psychology. MacMillan, Basingstoke. 
Lee, Kang W. Higgins, James J. & Tillman, Frank A. (1988) "Stochastic modeling of 
human performance reliability". IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. 37, No. 5,501- 
504. 
Lees, F. P. (1994). "Major Accident Inquiries - Lawyers or Engineers? " Process Safety 
and Environmental Protection, Vol. 72, B1,10-14. 
Lerner, Ken. (1991). "Government Negligence Liability Exposure in Disaster 
Management". Urban Lawyer, Vol. 23, No. 3., 333-353. 
Liang, Gin-Shuh & Wang, Mao-Jiun. (1993). "Evaluating human reliability using fuzzy 
relations". Microelectronics and Reliability, Vol. 33, No. 1,63-80. 
Lie, T. T. (1989). Fire temperature - time relations. In: Dinenno, Philip J. Beyler, Craig 
L. & Custer, Richard L. (eds) (1995) The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection 
Engineering (HFPE-95) National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. (2d 
edition). Section. 3, Ch. 5. 
Lin, Dyi-Yih M. & Su, Yuan-Liang. (1998). "The effect of time pressure on expert, 
system based training for emergency management". Behaviour and Information 
Technology, Vol. 17, No. 4,195-202. 
Lipshitz, R. (1993) Converging themes in the study of decision making in realistic 
settings. Klein, G. A. Orasanu, J. Calderwood, R. & Zsambok, C. E. (Eds. ) (1993) 
Decision making in action: Models and Methods. Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey. 
I 
312 
Lloyd, D. J. & Hunter, P. C. (1991). The assessment and control of offshore safety: 
prescriptive vs objective requirements. In: 1991 Symposium of the Safety and Reliability 
Society, 18-19 Sep 1991, Sutton Coldfield, England. Ch. 20,1-11. 
Loa, Wei-Whua. (1997). Quantitative Prediction of Human Reliability using a Task 
Requirement - Resource Constraint Model. Unpublished PhD thesis, Cranfield 
University. 
Loa, Wei-Whua & Strutt, John E. (1995) Development of Human Reliability Prediction 
Methods Part 1: A survey of Human Reliability Assessment Techniques. In: Jsr 
Symposium of Chinese Institute of Engineers in UK, 1-2 April 1995, Cambridge, UK. 
Loa, Wei-Whua. Strutt, John E. & Allsopp, Keith (1996). The Development of a Model 
for Predicting Human Reliability in System Operations. In: 5th International Conference 
on Human Aspects of Advanced Manufacturing: Agility and Hybrid Automation, 7-10 
Aug 1996, Maui, Hawaii. 
London Ambulance Service. (1999). Current Performance. at: http: //www. lond- 
amb. sthames. nhs. uk/http. dir/service/performance/current/perf now. html (1' March 
1999). 
Lucas, Deborah (1992). "Understanding the human factor in disasters". Interdisciplinary 
Science Reviews, Vol. 17, No. 2., 185-190. 
Lyons, Melinda N. Strutt, John E., Allsopp, Keith. Larken, E. S. J., Heels, Robin. (1998). ' 
"Development of a Methodology to Assess the Impact of Design Performance , 
Parameters on Offshore Emergency Management". In: 7`h Annual Conference on 
Offshore Installations: Hazard Management. 1" December, London, UK. ERA 98- 
0957. 
Malone, Tom. (1996). Reduction of human error through the application of human and 
organizational factors in design and engineering. In: 1996 International workshop on 
human factors in offshore operations, December 1996, University of California, 
Berkeley. Working Group A. 
Mansfield, D. P. (1992). Proposed offshore safety cases -a comparison with onshore 
CIMAH safety cases. In: Symposium on Major Hazards Onshore and Offshore, 20-22 
Oct 1992, UMIST, Manchester, England, Vol. 130, Ch. 45, No. 130,39-48. 
Marseguerra, M. & Zio, E. (1996). "Monte Carlo approach to PSA for dynamic process 
systems". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 52,227-241. 
Matlin, Margaret, M. (1989). Cognition. Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc. Fort Worth. 
McIntyre, R. M. & Salas, E. (1995) Measuring and managing for team performance: 
emerging principles from complex environments. In R. Guzzo & E. Salas (Eds. ) Team 
313 
Effectiveness and Decision Making in Organisations: Jossey Bass, San Francisco. 149- t 
203.3 
McWhirter, Norris. (1999). The Guinness Book of Records. Guinness, London. 
Mearns K. J. & Fenn C. E. (1993). Diet, health and the offshore worker -a pilot study, 
Offshore Technology Report, OTO 93 399, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, HSE 
Books, London. 
Mearns, Kathryn. & Flin, Rhona. (1995). "Risk perception and attitudes to safety by 
personnel in the offshore oil and gas industry: a review". Journal of Loss Prevention in 
the Process Industries, Vol. 8. No. 5.299-305. 
Mearns, Kathryn. Flin, Rhona. Gordon, Rachael. & Fleming, Mark. (1998). "Measuring 
safety climate on offshore installations". Work & Stress. Vol. 12, No. 3,238-254. 
Meister, David. (1995). "Cognitive behaviour of nuclear reactor operators". International 
Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, Vol. 16, No. 2,109-122. 
Miller, Gerry. (1996). Further development of standards, specifications, and guidelines 
related to human and organizational factors (HOF) to reduce human error in offshore 
facilities operations. In: 1996 International workshop on human factors in offshore 
operations. December 1996, University of California, Berkeley. 
Miller, K. (1994) An offshore gas field safety strategy and quantitative risk assessment 
model. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Vol. 7, No. 4,331-336. 
Mills, F. & Coleshaw, SRK. (1998). Evacuation of Casualties using Freefall TEMPSC. 
http: //www. rgu. ac. uk/subj/rgit/research/cashand. htm (29th July 1999). 
Mitroff, Ian I. (1988) Crisis management: cutting through the confusion. Sloan 
Management Review, Vol. 29, No. 2,15-20. 
Montiel, Helena. Vilchez, Juan A. Arnaldos, Josep & Casal, Joaquim (1996). "Historical 
analysis of accidents in the transportation of natural gas". Journal of Hazardous 
Materials, Vol. 51,77-92. 
Moore, Dwayne R. J. & Elliot, Barbara J. (1996). "Should uncertainty be quantified in 
human and ecological risk assessments used for decision making? ". Human and 
Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 1,11-24. 
Morris, Mark. Miles, Alan. & Cooper. John. (1994). "Quantification of escalation effects 
in offshore quantitative risk assessment". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, Vol. 7, No. 4,337-344. 
Muir, Helen C. (1997). Stress and stress management. In: Introduction to Human 
Factors in Aviation. One week short course, 17-21 Feb 1997, Cranfield University. 
314 
Muir, Helen C. (1996). "Research into the factors influencing survival in aircraft 
accidents". Aeronautical Journal, May 1996,177-181. 
Muir, Helen C. Bottomley, David M. & Marrison, Claire. (1996). "Effects of motivation 
and cabin configuration on emergency aircraft evacuation behaviour and rates of egress". 
The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1,57-77. 
Murphy. Kevin R. & Davidshofer, Charles 0. (1991) Psychological Testing. Principles 
and Applications. Prentice Hall Publishing, London, 2"d edition. 
Neal, David M. & Phillips, Brenda D. (1995). "Effective emergency management: 
reconsidering the bureaucratic approach. " Disasters, Vol. 19, No. 4,327-337. 
Nelson, Harold E. & MacLennan, Hamish (1988) Emergency movement. In: Dinenno, 
Philip J. Beyler, Craig L. & Custer, Richard L. (eds) (1995) The SFPE Handbook of Fire 
Protection Engineering (HFPE-95). National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. 
(2"a edition). Part. 2, Ch. 6,106-115. 
NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health). (1994). NIOSH Pocket 
Guide to Chemical Hazards. NIOSH, Diane Publishing, Cincinnati, OR 
Odell, P. R. (1995) Britain's North Sea Oil and gas production: A critical review. In: 
British Institute of Energy Economics Conference. 11-12 Dec 1995. University of 
Warwick. t 
O'Donnell, Kevin. & Smallman, Hugh. (1993). The role of QRA offshore. ' In: 4th 
Internnatiönal Conference on Offshore Loss Prevention. 3-5 Mar 1993, Aberdeen. 3-19. 
Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (OPITO)(1992). Standards of 
competence for managers of offshore installations. Montrose. 
Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (OPITO)(1998). Offshore Petroleum 
Industry Training Organisation. Montrose. at: http: //www. petroleum. co. uk/opito. html 
(9th October 1998). 
Omodei, M. Wearing, A. & McLennan, J. (1997). Head Mounted Video Recording: a 
methodology for studying naturalistic decision making. In: Flin, Rhona. Salas, Eduardo. 
Strub, Michael. -& Martin, Lynne (1997). Decision making under stress: Emerging 
themes and applications. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Orasanu, Judith. (1995) Situation Awareness: Its Role in Flight Crew Decision Making. 
In: 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. In: 8`h International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology. 1995, Ohio State University, Columbus, OR 
http: //olias. arc. nasa. gov/publications/OSU Orasanu/AvPs-SA. txt. html (8th Oct 1997). 
315 
Orasanu, Judith. (1997). Stress and naturalistic decision making: strengthening the weak 
links. In: Flin, Rhona, Salas, Eduardo, Strub, Michael & Martin, Lynne (1997) Decision:; 
making under stress: emerging themes and applications. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Orasanu, J. & Connolly, T. (1993). The reinvention of decision making. In: Klein, G. A. 
Orasanu, J. Calderwood, R& Zsambok, C. E. (Eds. ) (1993) Decision making in action: 
Models and Methods. Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey. 
Orasanu, Judith & Salas, Eduardo. (1993). Team decision making in complex 
environments. In: Klein, G. A. Orasanu, J. Calderwood, R& Zsambok, C. E. (Eds. ) 
(1993) Decision making in action: Models and Methods. Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey. 
Pape, R. P. (1992). The role of QRA in offshore safety cases. In: Symposium on Major 
Hazards Onshore and Offshore, 20-22 Oct 1992, UMIST, Manchester, England. 593- 
605. 
Paris, Carol R.; Salas, Eduardo & Cannon-Bowers, Janis A. (2000). "Teamwork in 
multi-person systems: a review and analysis". Ergonomics, Vol. 43, No. 8,1052-1075. 
Park, Kyung S. & Jung, Kwang T. (1996). "Considering performance shaping factors in 
situation-specific human error probabilities". International Journal of Industrial 
Ergonomics, Vol. 18, No. 4., 325-331. 
Parkes, K. R. (1992). Human factors, shift work and alertness in the offshore oil industry. 
Offshore Technology Report OTH 92 389. HMSO, London. 
Pate-cornell, M. Elisabeth. (1993). "Learning from the Piper Alpha accident: a 
postmortem analysis of technical and organizational factors", Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, 
No. 2,215-232. 
Pate-cornell M. Elisabeth. (1995). "Managing fire risk onboard offshore platforms: 
Lessons from Piper Alpha and Probabilistic Assessment of Risk Reduction measures". 
Fire Technology, Vol. 3 1, No. 2., 99-119. 
Pate-cornell M. Elisabeth. & Murphy, Dean M. (1996). "Human and management factors 
in probabilistic risk analysis: the SAM approach and observations from recent 
applications". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 53, No. 2,115-126. 
Paterson, Tony (1993) Offshore fire safety. Penwell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
Pauls, Jake. (1988). Movement of people. In: Dinenno, Philip J. Beyler, Craig L. & 
Custer, Richard L. (eds) (1995) The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering 
(HFPE-95). National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. (2d edition). Part. 1, Ch. 
15,246-268. 
Peacock, Richard D., Reneke, Paul A, Forney, C. Lynn & Kostreva, Michael M. (1998). 
"Issues in the evaluation of complex fire models". Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 30,103-136. 
316 
Peacock, Richard D., Reneke, Paul A. & Jones, Walter W. (1996). Evaluation of 
complex fire models. In: 13`h Meeting of the UJNR Panel on Fire Research and Safety, 
13-20 Mar 1996, Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD. Vol. 2,81-89. 
Perrow, Charles. (1984). Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. Basic 
Books, USA. 
Petty, Mikel D. Slepow; Mary P. & Horsley, Michele. (1996). "PLOWSHARES: an 
emergency management training simulation". Simulation, Vol. 66, No. 6,357-373. 
Pheasant, Stephen T. (1986) Bodyspace - Anthropometry, Ergonomics and Design. 
Taylor and Francis, London. 
Pheasant, Stephen T. (1987). Ergonomics: Standards and Guidelines for Designers. PP 
7317, British Standards Institution, London. 
, 
j., - 
Pheasant, Stephen T. (1991). Ergonomics, Work and Health. MacMillan, London. 
Pitblado, Robin. (1994). "Quality and offshore quantitative risk assessment" Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 7, No. 4,360-369. 
Power, M. & McCarty, L. S. (1996). "Probabilistic Risk Assessment:. Betting on its 
future". Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 1,, 30-34., ' 
Presidential Conunission (1986). Report on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. 
Government Printing Agency, Washington DC. 
Purser, David A. (1988) Toxicity assessment in combustion products. In: Dinenno, Philip 
J. Beyler; Craig L. & Custer, Richard L. (eds) (1995) The SFPE Handbook of Fire 
Protection Engineering (HFPE-95). National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. 
(2nd edition). Part. 1, Ch. 14,200-245. 
Purser, David A. (1989). "Modelling toxic and physical hazard in fires". In: Fire Safety 
Science - Proceedings of the 2"d International Symposium. 391-400. 
Quarantelli, E. L. (1988). "Disaster crisis management: a summary of research findings". 
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4,373-385. 
Quin, S& Widera, G. E. O. (1996). "Uncertainty analysis in quantitative risk assessment". 
Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology - Transactions on the ASME 1996, Vol. 188, 
No. 1,121-124. 
Ramabrahmam, Boppana, Sreenivasulu, B. & Millikarjunan, M. (1996). "Model on-site 
emergency plan - case study - toxic gas release from an ammonia storage terminal". 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 9, No. 4,259-265. 
317 
Ramsay, Cameron G., Bolsover, Andrew J., Jones, Richard H. & Medland, William G. -. 
(1994). "Quantitative risk assessment applied to offshore process installations. 
Challenges after the Piper Alpha disaster". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, Vol. 7, No. 4,317-330. 
Rasmussen, J. & Jensen, A. (1974). "Mental Procedures in real-life tasks: A case study 
of electronic troubleshooting". Ergonomics, 17,293-307. 
Rasmussen, J. Pedersen, O. M. Camino, A. Griffon, M. Mancini, C. & Gagnolet, P. 
(1981). Classification system for reporting events iiwolving human malfunctions. 
Report Riso-M-2240, DK-4000, Roskilde, Riso National Laboratories, Denmark. 
Read, Richard, G. (1995). The BP group approach to crisis management. In: 1995 
Symposium on Management of Safety (MANOSAF 95), 22 Feb 1995, Soc. Chem. Ind, 
London. Ch. 6,1-5. 
Reason, James. (1990) Human Error. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Redmill, Felix, Chudleigh, Morris & Catmur, James (1999). System Safety: HAZOP and 
software HAZOP. Wiley, Chichester. 
Reed, John H. Rogers, George 0. & Sorensen, John H. (1991). Establishing functional 
requirements for emergency management information systems. In: Multiconference on 
Simulation in Emergency Management and Engineering and Simulation in Health Care. 
23-25 Jan 1991, Anaheim, CA. Ch. 35,168-175. 
Reer, Bernhard (1994). "A probabilistic method for analysing the reliability effect of time 
and organizational factors". European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 75, No. 3, 
521-539. 
Reilly, T. Secher, N. Snell, P. & Williams, C. (Eds. ) (1990). Physiology of Sports. E& 
FN Spon. London. 
Reinertsen, Rune. (1995). "Risk measures in practical use: risk reduction has its price, 
but is it known? ". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 49, No. 1,47-50. 
Richardson, Bill. (1994). "Crisis management and management strategy - time to "loop 
the loop'"'. Disaster Prevention and Management. Vol. 3, No. 3,59-80. 
Richardson, Bill (1995) Socio-lechnical disasters: profile and prevalence. Disaster 
Prevention and Management. 
http: //www. mcb. co. uk/services. articles/liblink/punarti/dom. richards. htm (12th Mar 1998) 
Author can be contacted as Sheffield Business School, Sheffield, UK. 
Richardson, G. Mark. (1996). "Deterministic versus probabilistic risk assessment: 
strengths and weaknesses in a regulatory context". Human and Ecological Risk 
Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 1,44-54. 
318 
Robertson, J. L. M. Smart, D. & Al-hassan, T. (1996) "Offshore North Sea pipeline and 
riser loss of containment study (PARLOC) - Applications and Limitations in the 
Assessment of Operating Risks". Journal of Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering 
- Transactions of the ASME 1996, Vol. 118, No. 2,115-120. 
Rogers, Martin. (1998). The Case for an Extended Life Temporary Refuge. In: ih 
Annual Conference on Offshore Installations: Hazard Management. T4 December 1998, 
London, UK. 
Rolfe, John M. & Taylor, A. Frank. (1989). "The training and management of personnel 
who will respond to aircraft disasters". Disaster Management, Vol. 1, No. 3,36-41. 
Rosenthal, Uriel & Pijnenburg, Bert. (1990). "Simulation-oriented scenarios - an 
alternative approach to crisis decision making and emergency management". 
Contemporary Crises, Vol. 14, No. 4,277-283. 
Roth, Emilie M. & Mumaw, Randall J. (1992). Enhancing the training of cognitive skills 
for improved human reliability: lessons learned from the cognitive environment . 
simulation project. In: S`h Conference on Hunian Factors and Power Plants, 7-11 Jun 
1992, Monterey, CA. Ch. 104,496-498. 
Rundmo, . Torbj, rn. 
(1996). "Changes in risk perception among North Sea offshore 
personnel in the period 1990-1994". Safety Science, Vol. 21, No. 3,205-221. 
Rundmo, Torbjom. & Sjöberg, Lennat. (1998). "Risk perception by offshore oil 
personnel during bad weather conditions". Risk Analysis. Vol. 18, No. 1. - 
Samuels, S. W. (1997). "Ethical and metaethical criteria for an emerging technology: risk 
assessment". Occupational Medicine, Vol. 47, No. 4,241-246. 
Samurcay, R. & Rogalski, J. (1993). "Cooperative work and decision making in 
emergency management". Travail Humain, Vol. 56, No. 1,53-77. 
Sanderson, Penelope (1997). MacSHAPA... software for observational data analysis. 
University of Illinois. 'At: http: //www. csse. swin. edu. au/macshapa/index. html (14th July 
1999) 
Schaaf, Tjerk van der. (1999). "Humans kill 80% of all known errors - dead! ". The 
Safety and Health Practitioner. April 1999,6. 
Schwarz, Catherine (ed. ) (1991) Chambers Concise Dictionary. W&R Chambers Ltd, 
Edinburgh. 
Sea-Marshall homepage: (1999). At: http: //www. seamarshall. demon. co. uk/fimain: htni 
(1' October 1999). 
319 
Selby, C. A & Burgan, B. A. (eds. ) (1998) Blast and fire engineering for topside 
structures - Phase 2. Final summary report. The Steel Construction Industry, Ascot, 
Berkshire. 
Shafir, Eldar. (1994). "Uncertainty and the difficulty of thinking through disjunctions": 
Co nig tion, Vol. 50, No. 1-3,403-430. 
Sharit, Joseph. & Malon. David M. (1991). "Incorporating the effects of time estimation 
into human reliability analysis for high risk situations". IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 
1991, Vol. 40, No. 2,247-254. 
Shaw, Stephen J. (1992). "Use of risk assessment as an offshore design tool". Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Vol. 5, No. 1,10-17. 
Shen, S-H., Smidts, C& Mosleh, A. (1997). "Methodology for collection and analysis of 
human error data based on a cognitive model: IDA". Nuclear Engineering and Design, 
Vol. 172, No. 1-2,157-186. 
Shrivastava, Paul. Mitroff, Ian I. . Miller, Danny. & Migliani, Anil. (1988). = 
"Understanding industrial crises". Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4,285- 
299. 
Siegel, Gilbert B. (1985). "Human resource development for emergency management". 
Public Administration Review. 52,135-145. 
Simard, A. (1997). Global Emergency Management. 
http: //www. ispo. cec. be/g7/projects/theme7. html (3`d October 1997) 
Skinner, David. Driscoll, Peter. & Earlam, Richard. (1996) ABC of Major Trauma. BMJ 
Publishing, London. 
Skriver, Jan & Flin, Rhona. (1997). Emergency decision making on offshore installations. 
In: Harris, Don. (ed) (1997) Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics, Vol. 2,, 
Job Design and Product Design, Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Slovic, P. Fischhoff, B. & Lichtenstein, S. (1977). "Behavioural decision theory". Annual 
Review of Psychology, 28,1-39. 
Smith, Denis. (1990). "Beyond contingency planning: toward a model of crisis 
management". Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4,263-275. 
Smith, Denis. (1994). "Managing Behemoth. Crisis preparedness in the prison service". 
Prison Service Journal. 91,37-45. 
Smith, Denis. (1995). On a wing and a prayer? The human component of failure in 
complex s, sy tems. Unpublished report. Author can be contacted at the Liverpool 
Business School at Liverpool John Moores University. 
320 
Smith, E. J. (1995). "Risk management in the North Sea offshore industry: History, status 
and challenges". Acta Astronautica, Vol. 37,513-523. 
Smith, Mike. (1996). Selection in high risk and stressful occupations. In: Smith, Mike & 
Sutherland, Valerie (eds. ) (1996) International Review of Professional Issues in 
Selection and Assessment, Vol. 2. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. Ch. 6,60-80. 
State of Alaska (1996). Cold It juries and Cold Water Near Drowning Guidelines. (Rev 
01/96). at: http: //www. sarbc. org/hypo2. html (1' March 1999). 
Stewart, Keith. (1994). Command team performance in simulated offshore emergencies. 
In: Yd European Seminar in Human Factors in Offshore Safety. 27-28 Sep 1994, 
Aberdeen, Scotland. 
Stewart, M. G. (1992) "Modelling human error rates for human reliability analysis of a 
structural design task". Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 36, No. 2,171- 
180. 
Stewart, Stanley. (1992) Emergency. Crisis on the Flight Deck. Airlife Publishing Ltd, 
Shrewsbury. f 
Streger, Matthew R. (1998) Prehospital Triage. 
http: //www. emsmagazine. com/articles. emsarts/triage. html (1" Mar 1999) 
Author can be contacted at Greenville County (SC) EMS. 
Strutt, John E. (1994). Reliability. Risk analysis and Safety cases. ases. Subsea Engineering 
Level 2. A3 day intensive course. 1-3 Nov 1994. IBC Technical Services Ltd. 
Strutt, John E. (1995). Limit State Concept. Internal Lecture Notes, CISR, Department 
of Marine Technology, Cranfield University, Beds, UK. 
Strutt, John E. (1999). Development of key design safety performance indicators. 
Internal Report. 
Strutt, John E: (2000). Private Correspondence. CISR, Department of Marine 
Technology, Cranfield University, Beds, UK. 
Strutt, John E. & Lakey, John R. A. (1995). ýEducation, training and research in 
emergency planning and management. IMechE Report C507/009/95. 
I 
Strutt, John E. Loa, Wei-Whua. & Allsopp, Keith. (1996). Progress toward the 
development of a model for predicting human reliability. In: 120' Advances in Reliability 
Technology Symposium (ARTS), 16-17 Apr 1996, Manchester, UK. 
321 
Strutt, John. E. Lyons, Melinda N., Allsopp, Keith., Larken, E. S. J., V trees, Ragnar. 
(1997). "Development of Models and Data for Quantification of Human Reliability on 
Emergency Management". In: Conference on Risk Assessment of Offshore Installatioiu 
18th November, London UK. ERA 97-0993. 
Strutt, John E. Sharp, John. Busby, Jerry, Dealey, Peter. Tourle, Neil, Yates, Graeme. 
Miles, Robert. (1998). Development of design performance indicators for improved 
safety offshore. In: 7" Animal Conference on Offshore Installations. - Heard 
Management. 1" December 1998, London, UK. 
St. John Ambulance Association and Brigade, St. Andrew's Ambulance Association; The 
British Red Cross Society. (1997). First Aid Manual. Dorling Kindersley, London. 
Subramaniam, Chandran (1996) Adding a surveillance subsystem to the emergency 
management decision support (EMDS) system. In: 12`h International Conference on 
Interactive I formation and Processing Systems for Afeteorology; Oceanography and 
Hydrology/S`" Symposium on Education. 28 Jan -2 Feb 1996, Atlanta, GA, Ch. 136, 
207-212. 
Sullivan, James D. (1989). On the future of computer simulation in emergency 
management. In: SCS Westeni Multicoi ference on Simulation in Emergency 
Management and Technology. 4.6 Jan 1989, San Diego, CA. Ch. 24,120-121. 
Sutherland, Valerie & Cooper, Cary L. (1996). "Stress in the offshore oil and gas 
exploration and production industries: an organizational approach to stress control". 
Stress Medicine, Vol. 12,27-34. 
Swain, A. D. & Guttman, II. E. (1983) A handboo of liumatý cliabili y Ana ysis with 
emphasis on nuclear powc plant applications NUREG/CR-1278, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission-Washington DC. 
Taylor, Frederick W. (1964). Scientific Management - Comprising Shop Management, 
The principles (! f Scientijrc Management and Testimony before the . Special House 
Committee. I Harper & Row, London. 
Taylor, P. (1989). The Ilillshorough Stadium Disaster Interim 1? q orl. I IAMSO, London. 
Taylor-Adams Sally E. (1994). Development of human error taxonomy for use with a 
human error database. In: Ergonomics Society 1994 Annual Conference - Contemporary 
Ergonomics 1994: Ergonomics for all. 19-22 Apr 1994, University of Warwick, 
Coventry. Ch. 84,329-334. 
Tikuisis, P. (1995). Predicting snn ival lime for cold exposure. Report Number. 
DCIEM-95-02 CA_ACR. Author can be contact at: Defence and Civil Inst of 
Environmental Medicine, Downsview, Ontario, Canada. 
322 
Tikuisis, P. (1998). Shivering capacity and prediction of sun'ival time. Report Number: 
DCIEM-98-TM-45 CA_ACR. Author can be contact at: Defence and Civil Inst of 
Environmental Medicine, Downsview, Ontario, Canada. 
Tikuisis, P. Belyavin, A. J. Buxton, A. C. Coleshaw, S. R. K. Higgenbottam, C. et al 
(1997). Prediction of Body Cooling. Report Number. DCIEM-97-TM-47 CA_ACR. 
Authors can be contact at: Defence and Civil Inst of Environmental Medicine, 
Downsview, Ontario, Canada. 
Tikuisis, P. & Keefe, A. A. (1996). Prediction of Sea Survival Time. Report Number. 
DCIEM-96-R-12 CA_ACR. Authors can be contact at: Defence and Civil Inst of 
Environmental Medicine, Downsview, Ontario, Canada. 
Trbojevic, V. M., Bellamy, L. J., Brabazon, P. G., Gudmestad, T. & Rettedal, W. K. 
(1994). "Methodology for the analysis of risks during the construction and installation 
phases of an offshore platform". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
Vol. 7, No. 4,350-359. 
Trbojevic, V. M., Bellamy, L. J., Gudmestad; T., Rettedal, W. K. & Aarum, T. (1997). 
Risk Assessment in the Design Process. In: 6'' International Conference on Risk 
Assessment of Offshore Installations. 18'b November 1997, London, UK. 
Tweedale, H. M. (1992). `Balancing quantitative and non-quantitative risk assessment 
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol. 70, No. B2,70-74. 
Ujita, Hiroshi. Kawano, Ryutaro. Yoshimura, Sandanori. (1995). "An approach for 
evaluating expert performance in emergency situations". Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, Vol. 47, No. 3; 163-173. 
UKOOA (1986) Medical aspects of fitness for offshore work -a guide for the examining 
physicians. UKOOA Ltd. London, Oct 1986. 
UKOOA (1995a) Management of emergency response for offshore installations. 
UKOOA Ltd. London, April 1995. 
UKOOA (1995b) Guidelines for fire and explosion management, UKOOA Ltd. London, 
May 1995 
UKOOA (1997a) Management of competence and training in emergency management 
response. UKOOA Ltd. London, January 1997. 
UKOOA (1997b) Guidelines for the management of offshore helideck operations, 
UKOOA Ltd. London, August 1997. 
UKOOA (1997c) A step change in safety. UKOOA Ltd, London. September 1997 
323 
UKOOA (1998a) Employment summary. 
http: //www. ukooa. co. ukrinfornemployment. html (20`h July 1998) 
UKOOA (1998b) Historical perspective. http: //www. ukooa. co. uk/inform. factfig. html 
(12th August 1998) 
UKOOA (1998c) Piper Alpha Media Briefing 
http: //www. ukooa. co. uk/news/releases/19980626. htm (20th July 1998) 
U. S. Army. Material Safety Data Sheets. http: //www. apgea. army. n iVsafety/msds/ (14's 
July 1998) 
Vinnem, J. E. (1989). Offshore platform safety - control of jet fires by deluge systems. In: 
2"d International Conference on Fire Engineering and Loss Preirtilioti bi Offshore. 
Petrochemical and other Hazardous Applications. Jun 1989, Brighton, England, Ch. 22, 
261-270. 
Vivalda, Claudia & Carpignano, Andrea. (1997). An integrated risk based approach to 
design and operate offshore installations. In: 6M International Conference on Risk 
Assessment of Offshore Installations. 18`h November 1997, London, UK. 
Vroom. V. H. & Yetton, P. W. (1973). Leadership and Decision Making. University of 
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
Watson, Milton If. (1995). Disasters at Sea. Every ocean going pxaxsenger ship 
catastrophe since 1900. Patrick Stephens Ltd. Sparkford, Somerset. 2"4 edition. 
Weick, Karl E. (1988). "Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations". ]ourna of 
Management Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4,305-317. 
Weightman, Gavin. (1996) Rescue. The History (! f iiritaiin's I: mcrgc»cy Scrrjces. 
Boxtree Ltd. London. 
Wells, Celia. (1998). Corporate Manslaughter: A cultural anxllegal form. http: //www. - 
camlaw. rutgers. edu/crimlawforum/col6num I /wells. html 
Wenk, Edward. (1996). Safety, corporate culture and corporate character. In: 1996 
International workshop on human factors in offshore operations. December 1996, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Whalley, S. P. (1988). Minimising the cause of human error. 1n: 1(/ Adwmccs in 
Reliability Technology Symposium. Libbcrton, G. P. (ed), Elscvicr, London. 
Whittingham, Barry. (1991). The assessment of safety management systems for effective 
loss prevention. In: Yd International Catference on Management wi ! Englncering (! f 
Fire Safety and Lou Prevention. 18-20 Feb 1991, Aberdeen. 
324 
Whyte, David, Tombs, Steve & Smith, Denis. (1995). Offshore safety management in the 
"new era" perceptions and experiences of workers. In: 2"d Conference on Major 
Hazards Onshore and Offshore. 24-26 Oct 1995, UMIST, Manchester. 
Whyte, Patrick J. (1989). "Stress offshore". The Safety & Health Practitioner. August 
1989,20-21. 
Williams, J. C. (1986). HEART -a proposed method for assessing and reducing human 
error. In: 9h Aalvances in Reliability Technology Symposium (ARTS). University of 
Bradford. 
Wilson, C (1991) A review of the safe evacuation of personnel from offshore 
installations by totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft (TEMPSC). In: 3'a 
International Conference on Management and Engineering of Fire Safety and Loss 
Prevention. 18-20 Feb 1991, Aberdeen. 
Wingerden, Kees van. Hansen, Olav. Foisselon & Lemousy, Thomas., (1998) Effect of 
Deluge on Explosions: FLACS Simulations compared to Full Scale Experiments. In: 7`h 
Annual Conference on Offshore Installations: Fire and Explosion Engineering. 2d 
December 1998, London, UK. 
Winterfeldt, D. Von. & Edwards, W. (1986). Decision Analysis and Behavioural 
Research. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Woo, G. & Muirwood, Q. (1986). North Sea Seismicity. Offshore Technology Reports. 
OTH86-219. 
Woods, David D. (1993). Process-tracing methods for the study of cognition outside of 
the experimental psychology laboratory. In: Klein, G. A. Orasanu, J. Calderwood, R. & 
Zsambok, C. E. (Eds. ) (1993) Decision making in action: Models and Methods. Ablex, 
Norwood, New Jersey. 
Woods, David D., Pople, Harry E. & Roth, Emilie M. (1992). "Cognitive environmental 
simulation: a tool for modelling intention formation for human reliability analysis". 
Nuclear Engineering and Design. Vol. 134, No. 2-3,371-380. 
Yahoo! News. (1998). "01/Industry learned little from Piper Alpha". Yahoo! News. 
http: //www. yahoo. co. uk/headlines/980702/news/899341422-8. html 
Yerkes, R. M. & Dodson, J. D. (1908). "The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of 
habit formation". Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 18,459-482. 
Yoon, Wan C. Lee, Yong H. & Kim, Young S. (1996). "A model-based and computer 
aided approach to analysis of human errors in nuclear power plants". Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 51,43-52. 
325 
Laws 
Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COAMH)(1999) 
Control of Industrial Major Accident Ha:. ards Regulatios(CIMAll) (1984) 
Diving at Work Regulations (1997) 
Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) 
Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations (1992) 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (1992) 
Manual Handling Operations Regulations (1992) 
Minerals Working Act (1971) 
Offshore Electricity and Noise Regulations (1998) 
Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management anal Administration: ) 
Regulations (1995) 
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction etc) Regulations (1996) 
Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response) 
Regulations (1995) 
Offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations (1992) 
Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 
(1989) 
Offshore Safety Act (1992) 
Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations (1992) 
Pipelines Safety Regulations (1996) 
Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (1992) 
Reporting of h juries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
(RIDDOR)(1995). 
Workplace (health, Safety and IVe fare) Regulations (1992) 
326 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: OPITO CHECKLIST TO ASSESS EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE - (OPTTO (1992) and Flin, Slawen & Stewart 0 996) 
Evaluate situation Maintain Delegation of Deal with stress Demonstration of essential 
and anticipate communication - authority in self and others knowledge 
needs Process Information 
All relevant All essential personnel and Appropriate tasks Symptoms of Sources of help in an emergency 
information organisations immediately delegated within developing (Coastguard, sector club, vessels, 
obtained, evaluated notified of the emergency Command Team; tasks excessive stress in helicopter, emergency response 
and confirmed clear and unambiguous self and colleagues vessels) and their facilities, methods 
are recognised of communication and response times 
quickly 
Valid interpretation Installation staff updated Appropriate Appropriate action Sources of information on the 
made of evidence at appropriate intervals responsibilities is taken to ensure properties of on site materials 
and information delegated off-platform;, the continuance of, 
from all relevant Standby Vessels and the activities 
sources Helicopters utilised 
effectively; 
responsibilities clear 
and unambiguous 
Valid decisions Essential onshore Satisfactory task -Action is taken to Location and operation of emergency 
made on the basis of personnel and agencies control and monitoring reduce the stress in systems (fire/gas detection, fire- 
information received updated at appropriate channels established oneself and fighting, eomms, life saving 
intervals and maintained within whenever possible appliances, escape systems, lifeboats) 
Command Team in colleagues 
Appropriate actions Appropriate Satisfactory control Layout of installation including 
ordered in the light communications and monitoring location and functions of major 
of information maintained channels established pieces of equipment 
received beyond command team 
Potential outcomes Alternative Command team tasks Potential dangers resulting from 
of the emergency communications methods and responsibilities activities in each area of the 
reviewed against established and understood and installation 
consequences/ maintained where unambiguous; 
probabilities (worst, appropriate Command Team effort 
most likely, best) co-ordinated 
ellixtivel 
Objectives clear and Information prioritised Overload situations Safety Management Systems in 
unambiguous and processed relevantly monitored; duties operation and installation Safety Case 
to the demands of the reallocated where 
situation and operational necessary 
requirements; irrelevant 
information discarded 
Resources allocated Information presented to External resources All relevant sources of energy to 
and deployed to facilitate effectively monitored and co- prime movers 
adnieve the most decision making ordinated effectively as 
appropriate outcome recording requirements appropriate 
met also. 
Emergency Drain, flare and vent systems 
Response teams 
directed and oo- 
ordinated in an 
effective manner 
Potential effects of crisis 
Purpose of si ificant control systerm 
Cause and effects of significant 
alarms and trips 
Effects of loss of any utility and its 
reinstatement 
Effects of the environmental 
conditions on emergency response 
Potential effects of the emergency on 
diving operation 
Amcrgwcy Procedures 
Marine search and rescue rocedures 
Causes, identification and 
management of stress 
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APPENDIX 2: PILOT STUDY - THE INITIAL, MtETIIOI) 
SFCFION 1, INTRODUCTION 
The idea for this pilot study as based upon the computer simulations used to analyse evacuation %%bcre 
people are represented as dots moving toasrds exits similar to that shown in Figure A Initially, this was to be a 
simple desktop simulation %hich could represent different outcomes of an emergency in response to different 
decisions made by an emergency manager, for example, an escalating fire in a one floor building with nine rooms 
and containing 5 people (including the emergency manager). It was intended that this eventually could be developed 
to incorporate complex environments, different sorts of incidents and varying behaviour on the part of the 
emergency manager and his staff. This could therefore be used to compare inexperienced and experienced, trained 
and untrained emergency managers. 
Figure A: Example evacuation mode dial 
Although representation of human behaviour in this way has been criticised as being too mechanistic 
(Faith 1999), it was deemed possible that the desktop simulation could be developed enough to incorporate a 
random element wfiere people can behave in a number of different ways, including panicking, ignoring warnings 
and continuing with normal tasks, responding to warnings correctly, acting sensibly but inadvertently producing a 
more risky situation - all possible reactions to an emergency. 
As discussed in the main report, obtaining the "big picture" of the emergency and responding with good 
and timely decisions is believed to be the esiernce of good emergency maunagement. Therefore the desktop 
simulation focused on these aspects in the following way. 
The "big picture" of the emergency is the description of the actual physical emergency, the cause, the 
escalation and the personnel involved. To represent this as a desktop simulation, it was necessary to use two 
boards. One board is controlled by the "scenario o rganiscr", who is aware of the "big picture" and knows all aspects 
of the real emergency. This board is not revealed to the other player. the emergency manager. until the end of the 
simulation. This is similar to the game "Battleships" whereby people must bomb grid references and, until they get 
a "hit", they do not know where the ships are located. The othcr board is controlled by the emergency manager. 
Initially, they only have information as to their own location on the board, plus information on the general l ayvut of 
the building and some idea of the people ado are present. Informaation as to the escalation of the emergency and the 
number and location of personnel are aspects which must be obtained by the emergency manager as the simulation 
progresses, by travelling around the board to get information for himself or speaking to people ohs his "token" 
meets. 
A "good and timely decision" is more difficult to pre-define. as in reality. it is olden defined by the 
outcome of the decision. I however, in an emergency, there are certain decisions that can be assumed as NOT goad 
and timely, for example, to ignore the situation and to continue with normal behaviour. Tfaerefore. it is necessary to 
represent the time in the simulation as well as developing a mechanism where "gaol" or "find" decisions can be 
identified by their outcome. 
To represent the time aspect of the emergency, one unit of time is taken to be one "stove". The emergency 
manager can use his moves in a number of ways, including walking. speaking to people face-lichee, speaking to 
people on a tannoy or fire fighting. Also, to avoid too much complexity in the organization of the game (although it 
again can be criticised as a mechanistic view of human behaviour), once the emergency manager has slx)kcn to 
people, they can use "moves" in the same way but must obey his orders explicitly. As moves can be taken up by 
speaking, this is limited by the number of words used so it is recommended that the emergency manager is concise 
in his orders. I towever, if the meaning of the order is vague, for example "go and see if there is a fire in Room C" 
would result in the person doing this but then returning to his normal activity once the order has been completed. 
The order "go and ace if there is a fire in Room C then return here" woxuld take up more "moves" to any but would 
result in the intended behaviour. This allows for "errors in communication" to have an impact an the outcome of the 
emergency. If the emergency manager knows from the rules that his explicit orders will he obcyc d and it appears 
that they are not, his view of the big picture will be confused and he may be forced to re-examine his 
communications to identify why the confusion occurred. 
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To test whether decisions are "good" requires more careful scientific analysis of the impact of the 
decision on the outcome. Ideally, this would require variations on the decisions to be tested against the outcome to 
identify the optimal decision in a specific scenario. In a desktop simulation situation, this requires the scenario to 
have pre-specified starting conditions as well as strict rules for escalation and movement of personnel. This 
responsibility again rests with the scenario organiser. The emergency manager token is controlled by the emergency 
manager, who can respond to the alarm as he pleases, which will be the first decision of the game. The other 
personnel tokens will continue in a pre-determined direction until ordered otherwise. In the given example, the 
scenario involves a fire, though a gas leak or different type of incident could also be used. The fire starts in a fixed 
starting position and escalates at a pre-determined rate (which need not be constant) in a pre-determined direction 
or direction(s). If the fire injures a person while they are carrying out their tasks, they will try to avoid it using pre- 
defined rules. If a fire continues to injure a person for a pre-specified number of moves, they will be initially slowed 
down by it and finally killed. Similarly, the fire can be fought using pre-determined rules. This strict use of rules 
allows numerous decisions to be tested against the same scenario and, as the outcome can be quantitatively 
evaluated by considering numbers of people injured or killed as well as number of "squares" of damage, the 
decisions can be retrospectively analysed as "good" or "bad", based on the outcome they achieve. Therefore the 
following desktop simulation resulted. 
SECTION 2: METHOD 
2.1 EQUIPMENT USED IN THE DESKTOP SIMULATION 
The Rules (as given to the emergency manager - specified in 2.2) 
Scenario Organiser's notes and recording table (as specified in 2.3) 
Stopwatch 
2 desktop boards (one showing the numbers assigned to each square - given to the emergency manager, the other 
also including the pattern of escalation - given to the scenario organiser and as shown overleaf) 
10 two-sided name token -2 each of "You", "John", "Paul", "George" and "Ringo". one side white, one side red. 
20 safety equipment tokens 
225 two-sided risk/danger tokens 
2.2 THE RULES 
1. You are the emergency manager of Cranfield Block. In an emergency, the safety of the people in the building is 
your key responsibility. The structural integrity of the building is also considered to be your responsibility. 
2. Cranfield Block has nine walled rooms surrounded by corridors. 
3. The people in the building will follow your explicit orders if they are able. However, some of them are not 
focused on the risks involved in an emergency and may not behave sensibly without such orders, and once your 
instructions have been completed as requested, personnel may not always continue to respond in a safe manner. 
4. When a personnel piece reaches an exit (square I or 225), they are deemed to have left the building and therefore 
are safe. They may not re-enter the building but they can give radio instructions to those left inside. 
5. Except for squares I and 225, only one person may occupy a square at one time. 
6. The piece marked "you" represents your position on the board. You may place the personnel pieces on the board 
when you locate them, either through seeing them or through speaking to them or assuming their location: white 
side up represents an uninjured person, red side up represents an injured person. The "risk" pieces are to place 
where you estimate the danger to be. Once you are sure of the location of the danger, you can turn the "risk" pieces 
over, which shows the word "danger". If you make assumptions, which are later, found to be incorrect, the scenario 
organiser can place, remove or relocate tokens to show their real location. 
7. The simulation is ended when either 
a) all personnel have left the building 
b) the emergency has been stopped 
c) the building has been destroyed 
8. If you do not make a move every 20 seconds, a move is taken without any action by yourself. That is, the danger 
will escalate uncontrolled. 
9. Time is represented by moves. As time is limited in an emergency, it is a critical factor. Therefore moves can be 
used as shown in Table A. 
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Table A: Use of Moves in the Desktop Simulation 
ACTIONS NUMBER OF MOVES 
NB. Movement can be in any direction (including diagonals) but not through 
office walls. 
No Movement can be performed by dead personnel. 
Movement of one square, if not injured (NB - movement is not restricted by 
carrying safety equipment) 
I 
Movement of one square if injured 2 
ACTIVE EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
Fighting one square of danger 2 
COMMUNICATION 
NB. Face to face communication requires people to be within 6 squares distance of 
each other. 
Personnel do not need to stop movin when listening to P. A. messages 
Up to 5 words spoken either face to face, via radio or P. A. in and to safe 
environments 
1 
Up to 5 words spoken either by radio or face to face in or to a dangerous 
environment 
2 
GATHERING SAFETY EQUIPMENT 
Collecting and putting on safety equipment 2 
Taking off safety equipment 2 
(So a change in equipment take 4 moves 
All Emergencies escalate over time so to represent this, the number of moves from the first indication of danger (i. e. 
an alarm) can show the number of squares that the danger occupies, as shown in Table B. 
Table B: Escalation moves in the desktop simulation 
Move number (from start) Moves before escalation 
when danger-fighting 
occurs 
Squares occupied 
0 +8 0 
8 +7 1 
15 +5 2 
20 +4 3 
24 +3 4 
27 +3 5 
30 +2 6 
32 +2 7 
34 +2 8 
36 +2 9 
38 +1 10 
39 +1 11 
as above +1 as above +1 
As active danger fighting occurs, the danger can be reduced in the number of squares that it occupies. In this case, it 
will have one move at the same number of squares (i. e. where it does not escalate) then will continue to escalate at 
the respective speed for the number of squares occupied. For example, if reduced to 4 squares size, at the next move, 
the danger will still occupy 4 squares then will increase to 5 squares 3 moves later. If reduced to 0 squares, the danger 
is deemed to have been eliminated. However, in the case that the danger was about to escalate on the move at which 
it was fought off, the danger will STILL escalate to that square, then not escalate for the next move but continues 
escalating the move afterwards at the rate corresponding to that number of squares. So if it was just about to escalate 
to 7 squares, it escalates to 7 squares then remains at this for 2 moves before escalating to 8 squares (giving 3 moves 
at 7 squares in total). If the danger is escalating faster than the speed at which it is being controlled, the fighters are 
driven back until they can focus their attempts on the same square at once (multiplying the fighting power by the 
number of people fighting the fire). 
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Longevity of Safety Equipment 
This depends on the amount of danger to which you are exposed. 
Whether or not they are wearing safety equipment, unless explicitly ordered to travel into or through the danger area, 
personnel will try and avoid the danger, though attempts may not occur until the danger occupies the space next to the 
one on which they stand. 
If not wearing safety equipment (or if this is now redundant), you are injured if danger fills 3 squares next to or 
including the square on which you stand. This does not affect your ability to move away, though at the injured rate of 
movement. 
If not wearing safety equipment (or if this is now redundant), and standing in a corridor, if the danger fills 9 squares 
of danger next to or including the square on which you stand, you are killed. 
If not wearing safety equipment (or if this is now redundant), and standing in a room, if the danger fills 5 squares of 
danger next to or including the square on which you stand, AND blocking the exit, you are killed. 
Table C: Duration of EcLuipment use 
NB Safety equipment incorporates both active danger fighting as well as protective clothing for the user 
Equipment Duration 
Danger fighting - must be standing next to the square Can eliminate 3 squares of danger 
which you are fighting which must be a "safe" square - i. e. 
no danger currently occupies that square. 
Safety equipment Can move through 6 squares of danger without injury - 
after this injury is sustained as though no safety 
equipment was used. 
Table D: Equipment and Exit location 
Equipment / Exit Location 
4 sets of safety gear (breathing apparatus, protective clothing, danger- 
fighting equipment etc) 
58,184 
6 sets of safety gear (as above) 114 
P. A. 113 
Radio transmission and receiver stations 1,43,113,183,225 
Exits from the building 1,225 
Doorways to each room 49 (A), 53(B), 57(C), 107 (D), 98(E), 119(F), 
169(G), 173(H), 177(1) 
Initially there are 5 people in the building including yourself. 
2.2 PROCEDURE 
2.2.1 Scenario Organiser's Notes and Recording Table 
These are the instructions as to the initial positions of the people - they are stationary until ordered otherwise - or 
forced to move by the fire. This also shows the escalation pattern of the fire as shown earlier. Where the spiralling 
pattern would imply that the fire goes outside the building - the danger spreads to the next square on the grid where 
the pattern would predict, thus making spreading arch-patterns around the source of the fire. 
Table E: Personnel and Danger starting positions 
Personnel / Equipment Location 
You 188 
John 117 
Paul 57 
George 155 
Ringo 91 
Fire 105 (followed by 120,119,104,89,90,135,134 etc. using a spiralling ttern 
2.2.2 Desktop simulation procedure to be used by the scenario organiser 
The emergency manager was presented with a board (as shown earlier in Appendix 2) and his location was 
revealed to him by the placement of his "token' on position 188. He is also given a number of tokens, including 
"people token", "equipment tokens" and "token pieces" which may be placed on the board when he locates them, or 
once he has enough information to make assumptions about how a person or the incident is acting, he can place the 
tokens on the board to represent his assumptions. This board is therefore the physical representation of his idea of the 
big picture. 
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Out of sight from the emergency manager, the scenario organiser is given a board, which is identical to that 
of the emergency manager and prepared as according to their instructions. Once both the emergency manager and 
scenario organiser have prepared their boards, the scenario organiser says "You are just having your coffee break 
when you hear a loud bang appearing to be from the North East. This is Move I- What do you choose to do? ". If the 
emergency manager does not choose to make a move within 20 seconds, the scenario organiser will say "This is 
Move 2- what do you choose to do? ". This procedure will continue if the emergency manager does not make a move, 
every 20 seconds, this will continue. 
2.2.3 The scenario organiser's recording table 
The scenario organiser must record the action of the player and the results on a grid and notes down the specific 
content of any communication made. A example of the grid is shown in Table F. 
The symbols are as follows: 
M. 113 - Move to square 113 
M- Move 
F 119 (fire fight square 119) 
FS - Put on (or remove) fire safety gear 
TR - Talk on radio 
T(PA) - Talk on PA 
T- Talk face to face 
L- Listen 
Table F: Recording Grid from Desktop Simulation 
Moves EM John Paul George Ringo Fire 
cov 
Fire 
dam 
Num at 
exit 
Num 
injured 
Num 
dead 
I M 0 0 
2 M 0 0 
3 T L 0 0 
4 T L 0 0 
5 T L 0 0 
6 M M 0 0 
7 M M 0 0 
8 M M 1 1 
9 M FS 1 1 
10 M FS 1 1 
11 M. 113 M' 1 1 
12 T(PA) L M. 155 L L 1 1 
13 T(PA) L M L L 1 1 
14 T(PA) L M L L 1 1 
15 T(PA) L M L L 2 2 
16 M. 43 M. 144 M. 76 M. 118 2 2 
17 L TR M M. 61 M 2 2 
18 TR L M M. 46 M. 135 2 2 
19 L TR M M31 M. 150 2 2 
20 M. 58 M M. 16 M. 165 3 3 
21 FS M. 149 M. 1 M. 180 3 3 1 
22 L FS M. 135 TR M. 195 3 3 
23 TR M. 57 FF119 L M. 210 3 3 
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SECTION 3: RESULTS OF DESKTOP SIMULATION 
This methodology was used initially by trying out theoretical views of possible methods of coping with the 
emergency to assess its face validity. If the outcome of strategies used in the desktop simulation were comparable 
with those used in a real emergency, it is conceivable that this could be developed into a valid technique of 
quantifying the impact of emergency management decision-making. 
Using the recording of moves on the scenario organiser's grid, it was possible to quantify the success of a 
strategy in terms of the percentage of building damaged and the percentage of people evacuated with respect to time. 
As shown in Table F, there are 3 units of damage at time point 23 and 1 person evacuated. 3 units damaged out of a 
total of 225 gives a percentage of 1.33.1 person out of a total of 5 in the building gives a percentage of 20. Therefore 
at time point 23, there is 1.33 percent damage and 20 percent people evacuated. 
A successful outcome would be to evacuate all the people but given this, credit is given for strategies with 
the least damage to the building. A strategy where the building is saved but the people are injured is considered a 
poor strategy. 
Therefore five strategies were included: 
1. People-focused, whereby the emergency manager focused mainly on the safety of the personnel in the building, 
aiming to evacuation all of them safely but showing no extra concern for the structural integrity of the building. 
2. Building-focused, whereby the emergency manager focused mainly on maintaining the structural integrity of the 
building. This involved getting all the people involved to focus on controlling and putting out the fire then evacuating 
the building. 
3. Kamikaze, whereby the emergency manager aimed to put out the fire himself and only asked for support from 
people who he met along the way. 
4. Denial, whereby the emergency manager makes no effort to do anything until injured himself, then will attempt to 
escape from the building and will urge anyone he meets to do the same. 
5. Selfish, whereby the emergency manager leaves the building as soon as the alarm is given but makes no effort to 
encourage anyone else to do the same. 
Obviously, a decision is assessed on the basis of its outcome and we would assume that if someone is 
focused on getting people out of a building safely that this is what would happen. However, in real emergencies, the 
best of intentions do not always result in the best of results. In this game, this is also true - if one focuses only on 
evacuating people and does not consider the controlling the escalating incident, there is a chance that someone will be 
trapped by the fire. Consequently, if one sends people in to fight the fire, they are also being put at risk of injury. And 
so, as in a real emergency, weighing up the options in the given situation is necessary. 
In the strategies listed above, the people-focused and building-focused strategies are generally considered 
as good approaches to follow. However, if they are initiated too late, it may be impossible to end up with a good 
outcome as the fire has escalated to a degree where much of the building is damaged and people may be trapped. So, 
as in a real emergency, even a good strategy must be timely to result in a good outcome. The Kamikaze strategy 
involves the active fire fighting and rescuing of personnel by the emergency manager. Here, he does not fulfil his role 
of coordinator and in a real emergency, this would normally be considered a poor strategy. However, the worst 
strategies are the Denial and Selfish strategy. In Denial, the emergency manager treats the situation as normal and so 
allows all the other personnel to continue work as normal, putting themselves as risk. In the Selfish strategy, the 
emergency manager saves himself and leaves the other personnel to suffer. 
3.1 RESULTS OF PERCENTAGE SAFE AREA AND PERCENTAGE PERSONNEL EVACUATED WITH 
RESPECT TO TIME 
From the moves taken up in these strategies as shown on the scenario organiser's recording grid, we can 
establish % safe area and % people evacuated in relation to the number of moves taken (time). The following pages 
show graphs of the impact of strategy on % safe area in the building and % people evacuated with respect to time. 
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Figure B: Percentage sate area and people evacuated with respect to time in the people-focused strategy 
The first graph shows the people-focused strategy, whereby the priority is to get all the people out, including if this 
requires rescuing some of them. There is a 100% success rate in people evacuated, which is completed in 50 moves. 
I lowever, due to lack of consideration of the state of the building, once the person has been rescued, the building is 
tell to burn so is totally destroyed. 
Figure C: Percentage safe area and people evacuated with respect to time in the building-focused strategy 
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The second graph shows the building-focused strategy. I lere, the rescue of people is important but more the critical 
focus is on reducing the effect of damage to the building. In this, there is only minimal damage to the building 
(I. 7S%) and all the people are evacuated safely in 60 moves, which clearly results in a very good strategy. 
Figure D: Percentage safe area and people evacuated with respect to time in the Kamikaze strategy 
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The third graph shows the Kamikaze strategy where the emergency manager chooses to rescue the people and fight 
the fire himself. This actually resulted in a very good result with approximately 1.78% damage to the building (the 
same as the building-focused strategy) and all personnel evacuated safely after 51 moves. This is therefore the best 
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strategy out of the top three - which is not normally representative of the outcome of a real emergency. However, the 
possible reasons why this was the case will be pointed out in the discussion. 
Figure E: Percentage safe area and people evacuated with respect to time in the denial strategy 
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The fourth graph shows the Denial strategy. Here the emergency manager does not bother to do anything until the fire 
is directly affecting him. This shows the effect of a severe delay in action and in this case, the fire has escalated to 
such a degree that there is probably no action that could be taken by the remaining members of personnel that could 
stop it. One member of personnel was killed by being trapped in a room. All the others eventually get to an exit, this 
taking 137 moves. 
Figure F: Percentage safe area and people evacuated with respect to time in the selfish strategy 
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The fifth graph shows the Selfish strategy. Here the emergency manager rushes for the exit, arriving there after 8 
moves. The building is left to burn and one member of personnel is trapped in a room and killed. The other members 
of personnel manage to make it to the exit after 247 moves. 
3.2 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF SUCCESS USING PERCENTAGE SAFE AREA AND PERSONNEL 
EVACUATED 
One way of evaluating the overall success of each method was to multiply the two percentage values (taken 
as decimals) - people evacuated x safe area. Although saving the people is the priority, this still may indicate the 
optimal strategies. A strategy where the people are evacuated slowly or not at all and the building is destroyed over 
time would clearly be a poor outcome. 
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Figure G represents the product of the two percentage values with respect to time li)r all 5 strategies. 
Figure G: Graph to compare strategies in terms of people evacuated x safe area over time 
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Figure G shows peaks and troughs for each strategy. The peaks indicate that there are a high number of people 
evacuated and a large amount of safe area - the troughs indicate low numbers of people evacuated and small amounts 
of safe area. A value of 0 indicates that either no people have been evacuated or that there is no safe area available. 
From this, we can assess which strategy has the most successful outcome. Both the Kamikaze and Building-focused 
strategy peak at 0.9822 -a highly successful result. However, because the Kamikaze strategy peaks earlier - this 
indicates that it is the best solution. The People-focused strategy is also very effective - peaking at 0.92. The denial 
strategy peaks at 0.4125, which is quite poor. The late response means that the safe area has decreased - ell ctively 
increasing the risk. One of the personnel fails to evacuate - reinforcing this view. The selfish strategy can generally be 
considered as the worst strategy. It peaks early at 0.1991 - and being the first to result in a successful evacuation may 
lead to the wrong impression about its et%ctiveness. As the safe area gradually decreases, the other personnel are 
forced to evacuate, again leading to one member being trapped in the building. Overall, the product of % personnel 
evacuated and % safe area with respect to time is an effective means of assessing the strategies. In this simulation, it 
was relatively easy to evacuate the personnel if this was the only focus - to save the building as well is a particular 
challenge. Of course, the emergency manager does not know how easy the evacuation will be. I lowever, the maxim 
"hope for the best and plan for the worst" would probably be advisable. If an emergency manager had first attempted 
to control the tire then if finding this impossible resorted to evacuating the personnel, this would have resulted in our 
two most effective strategies. This type of interaction graph with respect to time may be a key factor in designing a 
method of quantifying the impact of emergency management decisions on risk. 
3.3 USE OF TIME RESOURCES BY THE EMERGENCY MANAGER 
Given that time was a limited resource, it was thought that it would be useful to compare the strategies in 
terms of the emergency manager's use of time. If it could be identified that the more successful strategies (as 
determined by the outcome) tended towards a particular use of time, this would suggest that the management role 
should be orientated towards these factors. Therefore, another assessment was carried out to examine the percentage 
of time (number of moves) that was taken up by the emergency manager in doing certain activities. The following bar 
charts show a breakdown of the time taken. 
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Figure H: Use of time by Emergency Manager in People-focused strategy 
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Figure J: Use of time by Emergency Manager in Kamikaze Strategy 
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Figure K: Use of time by Emergency Manager in denial strategy 
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Figure L: Use of time by Emergency Manager in selfish strategy 
8- 
ý EG+ 
FI 
ýý. 
.. 
E: 2 
0 
ýý öý 
ýý 
ý 
E-- 
' cc 
ýf 
M. ä ý 
Actions 
L 
f 
rß 
AýV 
II 
ý, 
ý 
.., ,ý 
These bar charts show some indication of how the better strategies used the resources available. It is notable that all 
three of the better strategies use some communication, in particular the P. A system. whereas the other strategies use 
little or no communication. However, these bar charts only represent how the time was taken in terms of activity type 
and does not make any judgement on the content of the activity type, for example, running away from or into the tire, 
ordering people specifically what to do or being vague about instructions. In future use of the game, it is likely that 
there should be categorisation of the content of the activities to identify any weaknesses in strategy, decision-making 
or use of communication. 
SECTION 4: DISCUSSION OF THE DESKTOP SIMULATION 
Although simple, the method may provide a useful way of representing the impact of decisions and attitude 
on the outcome of an emergency. For each strategy, it has produced a quantitative output of % damage of the building 
and % people safely evacuated, which are key factors in a real emergency. However, it is not possible to base strong 
conclusions on such small amounts of data and theoretically designed strategies. Therefore this discussion will 
comment on the implications of the results, criticisms of the method and recommendation for future work. 
To evaluate the methodology in more detail, it should really be considered as two separate sections: - 
1. the desktop simulation itself - which should be a realistic representation of an emergency, and 
2. the evaluation mechanism, which having proved itself in providing a valid assessment of the emergency 
management in the simulation could potentially be used to evaluate real emergency management. 
4.1 DISCUSSION OF THE DESKTOP SIMULATION 
In general, the desktop simulation is currently too simple to represent a real emergency situation. The grid 
is two-dimensional and represents a basic structure of a building. However, the implications of stairs, doorways, 
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narrow corridors, ladders and elevators would be difficult to represent. Also, most of the emergencies that require 
modelling in industry involve complex technological processes. For example, a petrochemical or nuclear installation 
has features that must be represented according to their function rather than being represented merely as a 
geographical feature on a map. In the current simulation, rooms are only represented as barriers to crossing the grid or 
preventing the personnel from seeing the whole grid. In reality, features have more meaning than this - perhaps 
indicating areas of greater or lesser risk of escalation. 
In terms of personnel, again the desktop simulation is unrealistic. In our simulation, the building has 5 
personnel - one of which is the emergency manager. This may not be abnormally low in a domestic situation but in a 
hazardous industrial setting, this would be unusual. Also, the rules governing the people's behaviour are very 
simplistic. Assuming that a person will not react until it is required is a mechanistic view of human behaviour. 
However, any simulation of this kind would have to use strict rules governing human behaviour - to ensure that the 
evaluation of the emergency management skill is a reliable one. If human behaviour is as unpredictable in the 
simulation as in real life, these inconsistencies can bias the outcome of the simulation hence giving biased evaluations 
of the emergency management. Apart from the unpredictable nature of human behaviour, the simulation could also be 
improved by representing the individual's particular skills. For example, if someone is particularly fit, they would be 
best chosen for physical tasks. If someone is particularly squeamish, they would not be a good choice to lead the 
medical team. In a non-industrial context, this may also be adapted to include babies, children, elderly people or 
people with impairments that are likely to affect their ability to react to the situation (e. g. deaf people who cannot 
hear alarms or public announcements). In addition, the simulation does not reflect the implications of being rescued. 
For example, there is no stage between injured and death -a stage of incapacitation would be more appropriate. This 
would enable the rescue or resuscitation of injured people to be added into the simulation. 
Apart from the location and the personnel, there are usually other factors that influence an emergency. For 
example, weather conditions play no part in the simulation. There is no form of external assistance - for example, 
emergency services. There are also no external distractions - for example, people who are unaware of the incident 
phoning into the control room. The type of emergency that is represented is currently only a problem that spreads 
over time and space - for example, a fire or gas leak. Some emergencies escalate without change in geographical size 
- for example, injured personnel waiting for rescue or structural damage to a 
building resulting in a collapse. 
Consequently, the goals in this incident are relatively simple - to evacuate the people before they are injured and to 
limit the damage to the building before the building is destroyed. In most real incidents, there are more goals and 
more limiting events than these. 
Despite these criticisms, the desktop simulation is a reasonable representation of an emergency. Before the 
five strategies were run, it was estimated that the building-focused and people-focused would be the best strategies. 
However, when the results were obtained, it was found that the Kamikaze strategy was one of the best strategies. 
Although this was unexpected, with hindsight, it was a reasonable result. Due to the small number of people in the 
building, the fact that even the emergency manager joined the group to fight the fire himself resulted in a much faster 
control of the incident. Normally, there would be more people available so that this would not be necessary. 
However, in this situation, it produced a favourable result. If the rules or the planned escalation were different to the 
current simulation, this outcome may have been different. 
The running of the simulation is also problematic. It is designed so that the pressure is on the emergency 
manager to make quick decisions - almost to the degree where one decision is made straight after the previous one. 
However, due to the complexity of organisational tasks, the scenario organiser is trying to note the moves used by the 
emergency manager in various tasks, the pattern and escalation (or mitigation) of the fire, the longevity of any safety 
equipment, any injuries being sustained and any movements being carried out by other personnel. For this reason, it is 
often more likely that the scenario organiser is put under pressure by the emergency manager - who has already 
planned his next move before the scenario organiser has completed his changes. The implications of these problems 
will be discussed in Section 4.3. 
In general, the desktop methodology provides a useful tool for running through emergency management 
exercises or assessing the impact of emergency management decisions on the outcome of the emergency. However, 
on its on, it provides no more than a cognitive exercise in emergency problem solving. It is the evaluation 
mechanism that provides us with a potential means of evaluating emergency management decisions in terms of 
quantitative reliable measures based on the outcome of the emergency. 
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4.2 DISCUSSION OF THE EVALUATION MECHANISM 
The evaluation mechanism was originally designed to consist of two features - the "use of time" and the % 
safe area /% people evacuated with respect to time. The % safe area /% people evacuated was designed to examine 
the effect of the strategy on the physical outcome. Consequently, the "use of time" was designed to analyse the 
emergency manager's own use of time. This could therefore identify whether time was wasted on particular tasks for 
the poorer strategies. However, due to the fact that the categories were very generic (moving, talking on the radio, 
listening etc), they did not take the context into account. For example, as stated earlier, the conversation could be 
about how they should rescue the casualties or about last night's football match. This could possibly be rectified by 
making the categories much more specific. However, to create a mechanism of representing every possible context- 
specific use of time would be problematic. For this reason, the "use of time" was not deemed to contribute to the 
evaluation mechanism. 
Therefore, the % safe area /% people evacuated was taken to be the main evaluation mechanism in this study. As 
stated in the previous section, this proved the Kamikaze strategy to be an unexpectedly successful strategy. Although 
the same amount of the building was damaged as in the Building-focused strategy, the people were evacuated much 
more quickly - leading to a complete evacuation after 51 moves (comparable to the 60 moves taken by the Building- 
focused strategy). However, with hindsight, this was a reasonable assumption due to the small number of people 
present to manage the emergency. The additional help of the emergency manager in fire fighting enabled the team to 
be organised more efficiently to evacuated soon after the fire had been put out. If the rules had been adapted so that it 
was easier to sustain incapacitating injuries - or if the fire had escalated in unexpected patterns, this may have 
resulted in an extremely negative outcome. 
Despite this fact, the two best strategies extinguished the fire and thus prevented escalation. If there is no further 
escalation in the building, there is no danger to personnel. Consequently, if there is no danger to personnel, there is no 
reason to implement a fast evacuation. 
For this reason, it was first thought that the area bounded by the two lines could be used to represent success (shown 
in Figures B-F). However, this was found to be unrepresentative of success in particular situations. For example, in 
the selfish strategy, it can be seen that 3 people are evacuated outside of the bounded area - therefore the area would 
be comparable with a strategy where these extra 3 people did not escape. This is clearly an unacceptable measure of 
success. For this reason, the product of % people evacuated x% safe area was calculated with respect to time, as 
shown in Figure G. This showed characteristic peaks when people were successfully evacuated and a zero value 
when there was either no safe area or no people had been evacuated. The maximum values shown by the peaks 
adequately represent the effectiveness of the success. Kamikaze and Building-focused strategy both achieved a 100% 
rescue of the personnel and prevented the escalation of the fire at an early stage. The People-focused strategy 
managed a 100% evacuation but no attempts to save the building were made. The Selfish strategy may have resulted 
in an early peak when the emergency manager reached the exit. However, one person was killed in the process. The 
Denial strategy also resulted in the loss of one person - so is really as bad as the selfish strategy in terms of outcome. 
However, this strategy results in a higher peak due to the fact that once the emergency manager admits there is a 
problem, he ensures that all personnel are informed - so that if they are able to evacuate, they do. The selfish strategy 
leaves the other personnel in the building until they are faced with the fire - increasing the risk that they will be 
injured. In conclusion, this indicates that the product of the two variables is the most promising method to be 
developed into an objective quantitative measure of the impact of emergency management on risk for the following 
reasons: 
" The values are based on measurable quantities (such as number of people evacuated and safe I damaged area) 
" The variables are based on physical outcome rather than abstract qualities (such as personality attributes) 
therefore the assessment of the decision is based on outcome not on subjective interpretation. This is a 
reasonably objective measure as it is based on fixed pre-specified rules. 
" The effects of different decisions or attitudes are reflected in the outcome. This type of simulation can be 
repeated with different decisions - for comparison. Therefore, it provides an objective means of benchmarking 
emergency management decisions and identifying the optimal strategies. 
" The results suggest that the assessment mechanism has reasonable fact validity given the scenario under 
examination. 
4.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
It is clear that both the desktop simulation and evaluation mechanism require some improvement. The 
evaluation mechanism cannot be tested fully without a number of desktop simulations that must differ in terms of 
complexity, scenario and environment. These improvements would help to identify any weaknesses in the evaluation 
mechanism. However, as stated earlier, the desktop simulation was somewhat problematic for the scenario organiser. 
to run. The complexity of the scenario organiser's tasks would make it difficult to improve the desktop simulation 
while keeping it in its current state. For example, even adding a small number of people to the board would cause 
organisational problems. Given this, any improvements to the desktop simulation would first need to consider the role 
of the scenario organiser. Obviously, the optimal solution is to automate. Depending on the degree of automation 
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required, the scenario organiser could use a computer to record the emergency manager's responses and to plot the 
progress of the incident or the whole simulation could be automated to a degree where a scenario organiser is no 
longer required. 
Some degree of automation would greatly improve this desktop simulation. However, it is necessary to 
establish whether the large amount of effort applied to such a project would be worth the eventual outcome. Such a 
project must be useful not only to a research project such as this - but must have a broader scope. Currently, the 
desktop simulation enables an emergency manager to apply his decisions to a given situation and then to obtain a 
quantitative indication of his success. As this process can be repeated ad infinitum, the emergency manager can 
identify which of his actions are most effective and any errors of judgement that were made. This can facilitate the 
direct comparison of novice and expert emergency managers over identical scenarios. This may then enable some 
degree of cognitive insight into how an emergency manager deals with a real situation - perhaps through meta- 
cognition - whereby the emergency manager can discuss why each decision was made. Also, by use of different 
scenarios, it could be tested whether skills learnt in one type of scenario are transferable to other scenarios - for 
example, are the skills situation-specific (and perhaps environment-specific) or are they general "emergency 
management skills! '- for example, would someone who is excellent in offshore emergency management still respond 
effectively when they are faced with a road accident? In this case, the desktop simulation could be used to test and 
train emergency managers in the cognitive aspects of the task. 
Emergency management is usually taught and assessed using a dedicated simulation, This requires the 
whole emergency management team to be available for the simulation so another team must be manning the real 
emergency control room. There must be another group of people available to play the roles of the scenario, 
organisation team. These are usually people who know the emergency management team, the installation and the 
problems that may occur in managing the prescribed emergency scenarios. They are guided by a scenario organiser 
who is usually an external consultant with specific expertise in running emergency scenarios. The scenario assessors 
often include internal senior managers and external consultants with expertise in training and assessment. The process 
requires at least 2 rooms, large amounts of equipment - sometimes technical panels identical to those used in the real 
control room. Also, the whole training and assessment process often takes a number of days. To summarise this, 
emergency management training and assessment is a costly process - and if the given emergency management 
candidate is simply unable to organise his thoughts, communicate or make decisions, it would have been a very 
expensive mistake. With a computer simulation (which as mentioned in Chapter 3 is currently not available to train 
general emergency management skills in the offshore industry), it could be quickly identified whether a potential 
candidate has the cognitive skills to either competently manage an emergency - or if he has the potential to learn it. 
This would also be beneficial to the candidate as they could identify their own skills and weaknesses before 
experiencing a dedicated simulation. If they can gain confidence in developing their cognitive decision making skills 
in a PC-based simulation, there is less risk of a humiliating and demoralising failure when they are faced with a 
dedicated simulation - or even a real incident. Consequently, if when they were given continued practise, candidates 
were still not able to cope with managing PC-based emergencies, they would be unlikely to put themselves forward 
for an emergency management role. This study does not in any way endorse the idea that PC-based applications 
could replace the dedicated or "real" simulations. However, they could provide an inexpensive means of educating 
the candidates in the cognitive side of emergency management. 
Apart from this, the software could also be used to record the candidates' responses as "reasonable 
responses". For example, one candidate may have decided to evacuate the building by door 1, whereas another 
candidate in the same situation may have decided to get all the people on to the roof. Both of these decisions were 
thought to be reasonable responses by the people who made them. However, when a building or an installation is in 
the design phase, the designer must try and estimate these reasonable responses - to ensure that his design will 
facilitate a safe outcome to an emergency. Through the use of this software, it is possible to set up an emergency 
simulation based around the design. This can then be used to obtain reasonable responses - and possibly to identify 
risks that had not previously been identified. Taking this process one step further, a database of "reasonable 
emergency responses" can be collected - therefore ensuring that designers may not need to use real emergency 
managers - but instead can apply the range of possible responses to the programmed incident. In both cases, this 
facilitates the identification of risks at the design stage - both being cost-effective and promoting inherently safer 
design. 
Given that automation is the key recommendation, it must be decided what form it should take. The main 
factors to consider are: 
" l. The Level of Automation - the degree of intervention of the Scenario Organiser 
" 2. The Level of Detail Required 
" 3. The Breadth of Scope Required 
" 4. The Format of the Presentation 
Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate on each of these factors. 
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1. The system may just be used to take account of the use of moves and to remind the scenario organiser of the 
progress of the incident; it may be a networked system involving terminals for use by the emergency manager and 
scenario organiser, or may be completely stand-alone, with the progress of the emergency to be defined by the 
software. The choice of these factors depends partly on its intended purpose as well as the expected investment into 
the project compared with the benefits that it could bring. If it is expected that a large number of people would 
require training, re-training and preliminary assessment, the stand-alone version is probably the best. If however, the 
system is to be a simple tool designed to assist a scenario organiser, it is preferable that it is designed to record and 
analyse the progress of moves. The networked version has the advantage that the emergency manager and scenario 
organiser need not be in the same place. Such tests could be run via the Internet giving a quick and easy indication of 
performance. Also, the software could potentially be expanded to include whole emergency management teams, each 
using a networked terminal. This could identify weak links in the team or overall problems in communication. 
However, the choice is also affected by the required level of complexity and scope of the simulations. The 
uncertain nature of an emergency situation provides problems for stand-alone software. It is possible to incorporate 
uncertainties through use of random response generation or artificial intelligence. However, during a dedicated 
simulation, an emergency management assessor may request that the incident escalates in a particular way in 
response to particular actions. Such post-hoc decisions would be difficult to incorporate if the system is completely 
autonomous. Software does not have such an agenda unless it is pre-specified before the scenario begins. Also, if 
software was to use random responses, it could result in unfair or unrealistic biases towards either favourable or 
unfavourable conditions. The purpose of the research was to produce a reliable methodology to assess emergency 
management skill. If the software itself is producing and responding to uncertainties, it would be difficult to 
guarantee its reliability as a repeatable test. 
Therefore, this suggests that the scenario organiser should remain as part of the desktop simulation - either 
through a network attachment to the console of the emergency manager - or by using the current desktop simulation 
with the assistance of software to record and analyse the moves taken. This decision is based on the chosen 
complexity of the simulation - the greater the complexity, the greater the workload on the scenario organiser. 
Therefore, for life-like simulations, the networked version is the final recommendation. This allows any post-hoc 
changes to be recorded plus any interpretations. For example, a scenario organiser can deliberately misinterpret a 
vague communication and respond by acting incorrectly, whereas to program a stand-alone computer to react in a 
"human" way to complex communications is currently impossible. The scenario organiser can also add distractions - 
for example, by providing wordy explanations of the status report to waste the time of the emergency manager. 
Obviously any post-hoc changes or deliberate deviations such as these must be recorded. Essentially, they provide 
randomness to the methodology, affecting its reliability. I iowever, as long as they are formally recorded, this ensures 
that they are repeatable and that biased simulations are not compared directly to unbiased ones in terms of the 
performance assessment. As this element can be incorporated specifically into the methodology, it should not affect 
its reliability. 
Ideally, the desktop simulation should also produce the "success/time" and `arse of time" graphs rather than 
just providing the data. By this addition, the implications of the decisions made can be observed soon after the 
scenario has been completed. This early feedback would be beneficial as a training aid to the candidates and would 
again facilitate the work of the scenario organiser / assessor. 
2. The level of detail that must be chosen for the computer again depends on its purpose and the importance of 
correctness. If the software is to be used as an initial test in cognitive skill, the level of detail can be reasonably low. 
If the software is designed to test an emergency manager's specific knowledge about his environment, the level of 
detail must be very high. 
In general, as software has developed, the level of detail has improved. Originally, it was only possible to represent 
people by use of a spot on the screen. Today's software allows us to identify individual people by their physical 
characteristics or voices, and they often have defined skills and personalities. To be extremely realistic, the behaviour 
of the people should be realistic. The roles and skills of people must also be considered (e. g. medical skills, fire- 
fighting skills) as well as physical and psychological weaknesses (e. g. physical strength, fitness or disabilities, fear of 
water, heights). The effect of injuries on people should be based on known medical information. Similarly, the 
escalation of an incident should be based around real or simulated escalation (perhaps obtained from other sources of 
software) rather than a simple set of rules as in the current desktop simulation. The environment should be 
represented as a Three-dimensional "virtual reality" building, accurate to a degree where the survival times of the 
firewalls are based on realistic information. The risks should be based on the known physical characteristics of the 
environment. Similarly, the performance of the safety equipment may be based on real information on longevity, 
probability of failure and its impact on the risks involved. To summarise, the amount of detail required to make a 
realistic scenario would be enormous and therefore would probably be limited by the capabilities of the hardware. 
Therefore, the level of detail should be prioritised and designed according to the purpose of the software. 
3. The breadth of scope relates to the scope of the software's use. If this is to be a research tool - for example, to 
identify whether emergency management skills are scenario or environment-specific or are transferable to other 
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situations - it is necessary to provide a large number of scenarios and environments. For example, scenarios in one 
environment may include acts of terrorism, natural disasters, contagious diseases, leaks of hazardous substances and = 
vehicle impacts. The different environments may include domestic settings, air traffic control towers, factories and 
nuclear power plants. If the software is aimed at a particular client group, for example, the offshore oil and gas 
industry, it should provide different types of software to fit all possible installation types. These may be mobile 
drilling rigs, large production platforms, service vessels etc. If the client requires a high level of detail for a specific 
installation, it is likely that the software would need to be purpose-designed for the client. This would still require a 
large number of scenarios but only one specific environment. 
4. The format of the presentation really refers to the format displayed to the emergency management candidate. The 
scenario organiser must have a multi-purpose screen - to enable him to view the emergency manager's opinion of the 
simulation, the real state of the simulation and other features, for example, progress of moves, number of people 
injured and the quantitative results. Therefore, the choice of visual formats for the emergency manager is between the 
following options: 
" the plan view of the grid 
" the virtual-reality approach 
" the multi-purpose approach 
The current desktop simulation uses the plan view of the grid, similar to many board games. This approach is also 
often used in emergency management simulations to work out the progress of people and the location of particular 
hazards. 
The virtual reality approach represent the view that is seen from the emergency manager's eyes in the actual situation 
- which may include reading procedures, looking at a plan view of the grid, observing people and hazards. 
The multi-purpose approach includes a number of screens - each referring to a different aspect. For example, there 
may be a plan view, a virtual reality view, and views showing information about the installation, the personnel, or 
even the candidate's progress in managing the emergency. 
The format of presentation should also take into account the communication aspects. In general, the simulation would 
have more ecological validity if it was representative of communication in a real emergency. In general, most 
emergency communication is audible - because it is faster to say something than to write it down. Therefore, if 
audible communication was incorporated into the simulation, this would allow some of the related problems to occur 
- fuzzy signals, overlapping messages, forgetting what has just been said and any specific features of the person's 
voice - for example, problems with unusual accents. However, some aspects of emergency management may include 
written communications or use of technology (e. g. activating switches). In this case, it should be represented in as 
close a manner to the real actions as possible. 
SECTION 6: CONCLUSION 
Overall, the methodology shows the potential to be improved into a valid test of emergency management 
decision-making. The desktop simulation aspect is somewhat lacking, due to the low level of detail used. It therefore 
requires much improvement to be a practical method of obtaining data to test the evaluation mechanism. In general, 
the key recommendation from this study is to automate. However, the evaluation mechanism already has some face 
validity and therefore has great potential for being used with real emergency data 
However, these current results suggest that using the simulation and evaluation mechanism together 
requires much improvement before this is a practical alternative to the current methods of assessing emergency 
exercises. Although use of a desktop simulation can never provide the realism of a full exercise or a real emergency, 
it could assist in the evaluation of thought-processes, which may give a valid indication of the candidate's ability in 
managing a real emergency. Emergency exercises are often expensive - requiring large numbers of people and 
expensive equipment. If a simple desktop simulation such as this can provide an adequate preliminary test or training 
for emergency managers, it would certainly be beneficial. 
However, shortly after this methodology had been completed to this stage, it became clear that there would 
be some access to dedicated simulations run for the offshore industry. Obviously, the data from such exercises are 
extremely valuable when developing a method to assess the contribution of emergency management to risk reduction. 
Therefore, due to the availability of these data and the need for considerable improvements for the desktop 
simulation to progress, the recommendations were not implemented within this project. However, many of the ideas 
that emerged during this pilot study were useful in developing an evaluation mechanism for the dedicated 
simulations. For example, the Performance versus Time concept is comparable to the TPRC analysis. The "Use of 
Time" analysis was carried out for the first offshore scenario - the helicopter crash as shown in Figure M. 
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Figure M: Use of Time in Dedicated Simulation oft lelicopter Crash 
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Like in the desktop simulation, this was not a particularly effective assessment technique. It does not represent the 
content of the conversations or actions. Also, the category marked as "listening" may be over-estimated, as it is not 
clear whether someone is listening to the action, reading boards or is concentrating on their ovii thoughts. In general, 
most of the communication made was internal to the group - whereas the radio transmissions and tannoys were 
minimal. This demonstrates that the "leader" function was providing an overview of the situation, whereas the other 
members of the team were responsible for the external conununications. This is generally considered to be a good 
strategy for emergency management. In this particular scenario, the tannoy was unavailable due to a Level 4 
shutdown (power cut) and so this may not be a true reflection of the use of tannoy in emergencies in general. 
however, on its own, this graph shows little information on the ideal strategy for emergency management 
and therefore the use of time" analysis is inadequate to represent quality in emergency management performance. 
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APPENDIX 4: FORMULAE USED IN THE TASK PERFORMANCE 
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
Appendix 1 from Strutt, Loa & Allsopp (1996) 
1. Task Progress Rate 
The task progress rate is represented by the amount of work completed by time t,,, 
where to is modelled as a time series, t= n. A to in which it is assumed that there is no 
correlation between time to+l 
and time t,,. The work completed at time t is given by: - 
n 
W(t) = E(ai. At + bi) + a. +,. (t-t. ) 
i=1 
n 
where tn_E At, 
i=1 
and t 2tZ t+1 (sic - see below) 
(whilst tn2 t2 t+1 is the formula quoted in Strutt et al (1996), it is intended to read 
t, :st: 5 t+1 representing the fact that t is any number between t and t+i ) 
The assumption is that work progresses by a series of random jump b; at random interval 
At with random rate of learning a; in between. Where the task is problem solving, work 
progress is understood to mean knowledge accumulation i. e. a learning process and a, b 
and At model the learning rate, bo is task start point of the initial level of knowledge ' 
learned from past experience. For each time interval (i), the values of a, b, At are chosen 
from the Weibull distribution at random with scale parameter 11 and shape parameter ß. 
These values are given by: 
1/13 
At= ill. (-In(Ri)) 
1/132 
a= T12" (-In(R2)) where R; is a random number between 0 and 1. 
1/133 
b= 113. (-In(R3)) 
2. Resource Consumption Process 
The resources used in task performance accumulates in time with the same time steps as 
those for task progresses. The resource consumption rate is also made dependent on r12 
and 02. This provides where appropriate a connection between the consumption rate and 
of resources is given by: 
n 
R(t) =E (Cri. At) + Crn+l. (t-t) 
i=1 
where 
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Cri = X. (1+2. R4. dc. 12 /a, ) 
1, 
The parameter C is considered as the steady (basic( rate of resource usage. Cr is the 
actual resource consumption rate at a particular time interval (i). The parameter dc is a 
fractional rate increase scale factor for extra resource usage. This fractional increase in 
the rate of resource usage is dependent on the work progress rate through the parameter 
a. This dependency is assumed to be inversely proportional to a, hence the factor 112/a. 
This strict proportionality is moderated through a further random factor 
R4. Rl -R4 are successive random numbers equally likely to be between 0 and 1. 
3. Prediction of Human Reliability *I 
The total amount of work (the work requirement) to complete a task or the information 
needed to solve a problem is modelled as a Weibull distribution with a scale factor rlw 
and shape factor (3w. The cumulative distribution of work completed (or useful 
information gathered) will be 
ßw 
Fw=1-exPl(W / Tlw) l 
The probability of success is represented by 
Ps(W, t) =I fL(t). Fwv . dt 
Where fL(t) is the pdf of work completed (amount learned) between t and (t+dt). The 
resources available to complete the task is also given by a Weibull distribution with a 
scale factor r1R and shape factor OR. The cumulative distribution of resources consumed 
will be 
ßR 
FR =1- egp {(R/tqR) ) 
The probability of failure due to resource restriction is then represented by 
P1(R, t) =I fc(t). FR . dt 
Where fc(t) is the pdf of the resources consumed between t and (t+dt). In this case, the 
probability of success is represented as 
Ps(R, t) =1- PKR, t) 
At a given time T, there exists a bivariate distribution f('W, R; t). The human reliability in 
completing the task is regarded as the product of the probability of success task in 
problem solving, and the expression is given by: - 
R(t) = !f f(W, R; t). F, %v. (1-FR). dW. dR 
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The Weibull Equation (cited in Loa 1997 Appendix B) 
Using a process that starts at t=0, the failure cumulative distribution function of the 
Weibull distribution is: 
F(t) =1- exp {- [t/rl]a) [ The Reliability function R(t) =1- F(t) ] 
(1 - F(t))" =[ 01 ]P 
lnIn(1-F(t))''=(3lnt-ßlnrl 
where ,n is the scale parameter and 0 is the shape parameter 
IF we let x= In (t) 
and y= In[-In(R(t))] this can be represented by a straight line of the form y=mx+c. 
If this case m=0 and c= -ß ln(rI). Therefore q= exp (-c/ß) 
For a given data set, the value of 0 and il can be calculated using the following steps. 
Let n be the total number of data points. 
Rearrange the list of data points, t, into increasing order in Column 1. 
In Column 2, number the data points from I to n- giving each of the original data points 
a "position" in the list, i. 
In Column 3, work out the probability, p, associated with this position, creating a new 
column of values using the equation i/(1+n). 
In Column 4, take logs of Column 1 to give In (t) 
In Column 5, use the values in column 3 to calculate in ( -ln(1-p)). 
Plot Column 4 against Column 5 using a scatter graph. 
If the graph approximately follows a straight line, the data can be modelled using a 
Weibull distribution. 
In this case, the slope of the line gives 0 and the intercept gives -ß ln(ri). 
To calculate the mean and variance of the Weibull distribution, we can use the 
following equations. 
g= E[t] = jo°° t. f(t). dt 
The result of this integration is: 
g=h"r(1+'/R) 
Where r is the Gamma function 
r(x) = fo°° tf". e'. dt 
with the stipulation that x>O. 
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The variance of a Weibull distribution is: 
02 = 
jp°D t2 
. 
f(t). dt 
- µ2 
Thus 
62 = T'12" PF( 1+ 
1/ 
P) - r2 (1+ 
l/ 
ß)) 
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APPENDIX 5: PROGRAM LISTING 
program Meldam; 
uses wincrt; 
var i, imax, no, noran : integer; 
Dsmean, DSCOV, Fulmean, Fu1COV, iTmean, iTCOV, 
delt, DSsc, DSsh, t, D, dt, a, b, c, dc, Fulsc, Fulsh, F, dF, Pd, iTsc, iTsh : real; 
Dam, Ful : extended; 
p, pW : array[ 1.. 6] of real; 
tt : array[ 1.. 100] of real; 
PLS, WeiP : array[ 1.. 100] of extended; 
indat, outdat, outdat2 : text; 
procedure Weiparam(mean: real; COV: real; var scale: real; var shape: real); 
FUNCTION gammln(xx: real) : real; 
CONST 
stp = 2.50662827465; 
VAR 
x, tmp, ser: double; 
BEGIN 
x := xx-1.0; 
tmp := x+5.5; 
tmp :_ (x+0.5)*ln(tmp)-tmp; 
ser :=1.0+76.18009173/(x+1.0)-86.50532033/(x+2.0)+24.01409822/(x+3.0) 
-1.23173 9516/(x+4.0)+0.12085 8003 e-2/(x+5.0)-0.53 63 8 e-5/(x=6.0); 
gammin := tmp+ln(stp*ser) 
END; 
FUNCTION fx(x: real): real; 
begin 
fx := ln(1+ sqr(COV)) + 2*gammin(1 + 1/x) - gammin (1 + 2/x) 
end; 
FUNCTION zbrent(xl, x2, tol: real) : real; 
LABEL 99; 
CONST 
itmax = 100; 
eps = 3.0e-8; 
VAR 
a, b, c, d, e: real; 
minl, min2, min: real; 
fa, fb, fc, p, q, r: real; 
s, toll, xm: real; 
iter: integer; 
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BEGIN 
a: = xl; 
b 
:= x2; fa 
.= 
fx(a); 
fb := fx(b); 
IF fb*fa > 0.0 THEN BEGIN 
writeln('pause in routine ZBRENT'); 
writeln('root must be bracketed'); 
readln 
END; 
fc := fb; 
FOR iter :=1 TO itmax DO BEGIN 
IF fb*fc > 0.0 THEN BEGIN 
c: = a; 
fc := fa; 
d: =b-a; 
e: =d 
END; 
IF abs(fc) < abs(fb) THEN BEGIN 
a: =b; 
b: = c; 
c: = a; 
fa 
.= 
fb; 
fb 
.= 
fc; 
fc: =fa 
END; 
toll ;=2.0*eps*abs(b)+0.5*tol; 
xm .=0.5 
*(c-b); 
IF (abs(xm) <= toll) AND (abs(fa) > abs(fb)) THEN BEGIN 
s := fb/fa; 
IFa=cTHENBEGIN 
P: = 2.0*xm*s; 
q: = 1.0-s 
END 
ELSE BEGIN 
q := fa/fc; 
r := fb/fc; 
p: = s*(2.0*xm*q*(q-r) - (b-a) * (r-1.0)); 
q: = (q-1.0)*(r-1.0)*(s-1.0) 
END; 
IF p>0.0 THEN q: = -q; 
p: = abs(p); 
mini :=3.0*xm*q-abs(toll*q); 
min2 := abs(e*q); 
IF mini < min2 THEN min := mini ELSE min := mi 
IF 2.0*p < min THEN BEGIN 
e: = d; 
d: = p/q 
 
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END 
ELSE BEGIN 
d: =xm; 
e: =d 
END . 
END 
ELSE BEGIN 
d: =xm; 
e: =d 
END; 
a: = b; 
fa := fb; 
IF abs(d) > toll THEN b b+d 
ELSE BEGIN 
IF xm >= 0 THEN b := b+abs(toll) 
ELSE b := b-abs(toll) 
END; 
fb := fx(b) 
99: 
END; 
begin 
end; 
begin 
END; 
writeln('pause in routine ZBRENT'); 
writeln('maximum number of iterations exceeded'); 
readln; 
zbrent: = b; 
shape := zbrent(0.5/COV, 1.5/COV, 0.001); 
scale := mean*exp(-gammin(1 + 1/shape)) 
assign(indat, 'a: \inMel. dat'); (Input file) 
reset(indat); 
assign(outdate, 'a: \oumelA. dat'); 
rewrite(outdat); 
assign(outdat2, 'a: \outmelB. dat'); 
rewrite(outdat2); 
readln(indat, imax); 
writeln(outdat, imax, ', '); 
writeln(outdat2, imax, ', '); 
readln(indat, delt); 
writeln(outdat, delt, ', '); 
writeln(outdat2, delt, ', '); 
readln(indat, noran); 
writeln(outdat, noran, ', '); 
writeln(outdat2, noran, ', '); 
writeln(outdat); 
353 
writeln(outdat2); 
read(indat, iTmean); 
readln(indat, iTCOV); 
Weiparam(iTmean, iTCOV, iTsc, Ish); 
writeln(outdat, iTmean, ', ', iTCOV, ', ', iTsc, ', ', iTsh, ', '); , 
writeln(outdat2, iTmean, ', ', iTCOV, ', ', iTsc, ', ', iTsh, ', '); 
fori: -lto3do 
begin 
read(indat, p[2*i - 1]); 
readln(indat, p [2 * i]); 
Weiparam(p[2*i - 1], p[2*i], pW[2*i - 1], pW[2*i]); 
writeln(outdat, p[2*i - 1], ', ', p[2*i], ', ', pW[2*i - 1], ', ', pW[2*i], ', '); 
writeln(outdat2, p[2*i - 1], ', ', p[2*i], ', ', pW[2*i - 1], ', ', pW[2*i], ', '); 
end; 
read(indat, DSmean); 
readln(indat, DSCOV); 
Weiparam(DSmean, DSCOV, DSsc, DSsh); 
writeln(outdat, Dsmean, ', ', DSCOV, ', ', DSsc, ', ', DSsh, ', '); - 
writeln(outdat2, Dsmean, ', ', DSCOV, ', ', DSsc, ', ', DSsh, ', '); 
read(indat, c); 
readln(indat, dc); 
write(outdat, c, ', '); 
writeln(outdat, dc, ', '); 
write(outdat2, c, ', '); 
writeln(outdat2, dc, ', '); 
read(indat, Fulmean); 
readln(indat, Fu1COV); 
Weiparam(Fulmean, FuICO V, Fulsc, Fulsh); 
writeln(outdat, Fulmean, ', ', FulCOV, ', ', Fulsc, ', ', Fulsh, ', '); 
writeln(outdat2, Fulmean, ', ', FulCOV, ', ', Fulsc, ', ', Fulsh, ', '); 
writeln(outdat); 
writeln(outdat2); 
close(indat); 
for i1 to imax do 
tt[i] := i*delt; 
Randomize; {Alternative random generation } 
{Randseed := 2} 
writeln ('Meldam running'); 
for no : =1 to noran do 
begin 
t := iTsc*exp(ln(-ln(Random))1iTsh); 
D: = 0; 
F: = c*t; 
a: =0; 
b: =0; 
for i :=1 to imax do 
begin 
if (tt[i] < t) and (D = 0) then 
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begin 
end 
else 
begin 
Fu1 c*tt[i]; 
Ful exp(ln(Ful/Fulsc)*Fulsh); 
if Ful > 1.0e4 then 
Ful :=0 
else 
Fu1exp(-Ful); 
Dam :=1.0 
while t< tt[i] do 
begin 
dt := pW[1]*exp(ln(-ln(Random))/pW[2]); 
a: = pW[3]*exp(ln(-ln(Random))/pW[4]); 
b: = pW[5]*exp(ln(-ln(Random))/pW[6]); 
dF := c*(1 + 2*dc*a*random/pW[3]); 
D. =D+a*dt+b; 
F :=F+ dF*dt; 
t: =t+dt 
end; 
Dam :=D- a*(t - tt[i]) - b; 
if Dam =0 then 
Dam: =0 
else 
Dam := exp(ln(Dam/DSsc)*DSsh); 
if Dam > 1.0e4 then 
Dam: =0 
else 
Dam := exp(-Dam); 
Ful :=F= dF* (t - tt[i]); 
Ful := exp(ln(fulFulsc)*Fulsh); 
if Ful > 1.0e4 then 
Ful :=0 
else 
Ful := exp(-Ful) 
end; 
if no =1 then 
PLS[i] := (1 - Dam)*Ful 
else 
PLS[i] := ((no - 1)*PLS[i] + (1 - Dam)*Ful)/no 
end 
end; 
for i :=1 to imax do 
begin 
if PLS[i] < 1. Oe-7 then 
begin 
if PLS[i] < 2.0e-13 then 
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WeiP[i] := -30 
else 
WeiP[i] := ln(PLS[i]) 
end 
else 
WeiP[i] := ln(-ln(1 - PLS[i])); 
if PLS[i] < 1. Oe-30 then 
PLS[i] :=0.00; 
writeln(outdat, In(tt[i]): 12, ', ', WeiP[i]: 12, ', '); 
writeln(outdat2, tt [i]: 12, ', ', PLS [i]: 12, ', ') 
end; 
close(outdat); 
donewincrt 
end. 
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APPENDIX 6: TRANSCRIPT 
TRANSCRIPT OF METHANOL TOTE TANK SCENARIO 
Time Event 
0: 00: 00 ASSUME INCIDENT OCCURRED 
0: 00: 01 CD: Control room, Deck 
0: 00: 03 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 05 CRO: Control, call back 
0: 00: 06 call ends CRO 
0: 00: 07 CD: Yeah, just to warn you, we've had a bit of a knock, moving these tote tanks around, the wind took 
the load and there was an edge-on, an edge-on knock, pretty hard, I'm just going to have a look now. 
0: 00: 18 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 18 PS: Okay, stop all hot work, please CRO on the tanno 
0: 00: 21 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 00: 22 CRO (tannoy): Attention all personnel, attention all personnel, all hot work is to cease immediately, all 
hot work is to cease immediately, all hot work permits to be returned to the control, return all hot work 
permits to the control room, thankyou. 
0: 00: 34 tannoends CRO 
0: 00: 34 PS: I'm removing all u. v. ask the OIM to come to the control room 
0: 00: 36 CD: Control room, Deck 
0: 00: 37 Phone rings 
0: 00: 37 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 38 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 00: 39 CRO tann : OIM report to the control room, OIM report to the control room 
0: 00: 40 u. v. detectors removed 
0: 00: 43 tannoends CRO 
0: 00: 45 ASSUME CD FINDS METHANOL HAS LEAKED 
0: 00: 45 CD: Control room Deck 
0: 00: 46 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 47 Phone stops (PS answered) 
0: 00: 47 PS (on phone ): R control 
0: 00: 48 CRO: Go ahead Deck 
0: 00: 49 Announcement ends (PS) - Phone call ends 
0: 00: 49 call ends CRO 
0: 00: 49 RO: That was him on the phone 
0: 00: 50 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 00: 50 OIM and FS arrive 
0: 00: 50 CD: Yeah, we've got a problem down here, there's methanol everywhere, we're going to start getting 
some hoses rigged out but wait there. 
0: 00: 56 OIM: What's the status? 
0: 00: 57 Announcement ends (OIM) 
0: 00: 58 call ends (CD) 
0: 00: 58 PS: Crane is lifting tote tanks, methanol, on the laydown area, top deck, and they've dropped it, and now 
. 
there's methanol everywhere, the crane driver's investigating, we've stopped all hot work, we've taken 
the u. v. detectors off the board and I think probably it might be a good idea if you want to muster people 
0: 01: 12 Announcement ends 
0: 01: 12 OIM: Yeah, do it 
0: 01: 13 CRO: Muster? 
0: 01: 14 Announcement ends O 
0: 01: 14 Announcement ends CRO 
0: 01: 15 PS: Yes please 
0: 01: 16 Announcement ends 
0: 01: 16 FS: Do you want me do%ýn there? 
0: 01: 17 Announcement ends (FS) 
0: 01: 18 OIM: First, get some people and try and get some foam, see what it's like across there 
0: 01: 21 Announcement ends OIM 
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0: 01: 21 FS: OK, I'll go over there on the workshop roof 
0: 01: 22 PS: Is there deluge on there ? 
0: 01: 23 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 01: 23 Announcement ends (FS) 
0: 01: 23 OIM: Yeah 
0: 01: 23 FS: And see if Ican get in that way. 
0: 01: 24 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 01: 24 Announcement ends (FS) 
0: 01: 24 OIM: Yeah, that's probably closest but mind you, the wind's this direction so you may be want to come 
through there so you can swing it through here. 
0: 01: 32 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 01: 33 FS: I'll do both 
0: 01: 34 Announcement ends (FS) 
0: 01: 34 OIM: O take 4 people with you 
0: 01: 36 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 01: 36 ASSUME FIRE IGNITED 
0: 01: 37 ALARMS GO OFF (indicating fire) 
0: 01: 41 ALARMS RESET PS 
0: 01: 42 OIM: Has the muster started? 
0: 01: 43 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 01: 43 PS: We've got a fire detected on the Mezz deck and the Weather deck on Johnson OIM, we've gone into 
a level 3, I've put the Weather deck deluge off and Johnson and the... 
0: 01: 52 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 01: 52 OIM: Put all the deluges on please 
0: 01: 53 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 02: 09 FS: Right, OIM, I've put them on the board there right, I'm taking them out now 2 mechies and 2 
oddies. 
0: 02: 10 Level 3 activated and deluge activated 
0: 02: 17 Announcement ends (FS) 
0: 02: 20 ASSUME FS LEAVES 
0: 02: 22 PS: All deluge on, OIM, apart from accommodation and GCD 
0: 02: 24 CRO (tannoy) Attention all personnel, attention all personnel, all personnel report to their muster 
stations, all personnel report to their muster stations, all hand-held radios to Channel 15, all hand held 
radios to Channel 15. 
0: 02: 26 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 02: 32 P arrives 
0: 02: 35 G arrives 
0: 02: 37 Tannoy ends CRO 
0: 02: 37 ASSUME MUSTER STARTED 
0: 02: 40 RO arrives 
0: 02: 41 PS: We've had a tote tank dumped on the top laydown area on the Weather deck, there's methanol 
everywhere, we've set the deluges off on every deck apart from gas compression, accommodation and 
helideck, we're in a level 3 shutdown situation 
0: 02: 55 Announcement ends 
0: 02: 58 D arrives 
0: 03: 01 CD: Control room come in 
0: 03: 02 call ends (CD) 
0: 03: 02 PS: Shut down, 12: 48 tote tank on the top la down area of the weather deck 
0: 03: 04 CRO: Control room call back 
0: 03: 05 call ends CRO 
0: 03: 06 CD: Can you get them to play some water up there, I can't get out of the cab, as soon as I open the door, 
it's scalding 
0: 03: 07 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 03: 11 call ends (CD) 
0: 03: 12 CRO: The crane driver's actually trapped in the crane, he can't get out of the cab 
0: 03: 14 Announcement ends CRO 
0: 03: 14 PS: Get on to the fire team 
0: 03: 15 Announcement ends (PS) 
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0: 03: 16 OIM: That's all we can do 
0: 03: 17 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 03: 17 CRO: Crane driver, just sta where you are for the moment, we'll get people to you as soon as we can. 
0: 03: 20 call ends CRO 
0: 03: 21 PS: 12: 48 
0: 03: 22 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 03: 22 FS: Control room, this is the field supervisor, we're on our way up to get some deluge water on to that 
crane, so just hold on. 
0: 03: 30 call ends (FS) 
0: 03: 31 CD: OK, I'll bring the crane around and put the tail out to sea with the back towards where the fire is, 
it's bloody roasting out here already. 
0: 03: 40 call ends (CD) 
0: 03: 42 PS: 12: 47, P amend that time 
0: 03: 44 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 03: 46 P: What's that, muster? 
0: 03: 47 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 03: 47 PS: No, the levels 
0: 03: 48 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 03: 55 OIM: 12: 48 
0: 03: 56 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 03: 58 RO: 12: 45 
0: 04: 00 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 04: 03 OIM: Time out 
0: 04: 04 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 04: 04 CRO: Time out everyone 
0: 04: 06 call ends CRO 
0: 04: 06 OIM: Right, the situation, we've got methanol spilt on the weather deck, we've confirmed fires on the 
Mezz deck and Johnson Weather deck, I've sent the field supervisor to investigate with a team of 4 and 
to rescue the crane driver from the cab, carry on. 
0: 04: 15 ASSUME FIRE TEAM ARRIVE ON SITE 
0: 04: 18 FS: Yeah, crane driver, crane driver, this is the field supervisor 
0: 04: 21 call ends (FS) 
0: 04: 23 CD: Go 
0: 04: 24 call ends (CD) 
0: 04: 24 FS: Yeah, can you stop swinging the crane, you're dragging the container on the deck, stop swinging the 
crane 
0: 04: 26 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 04: 30 call ends (FS) 
0: 04: 34 G: Is the POB complete? 
0: 04: 38 Announcement ends (G) 
0: 04: 43 CRO: Well, there's one missing, obviously 
0: 04: 45 Announcement ends CRO 
0: 04: 45 ASSUME FOAM CANNON ACTIVATED 
0: 04: 45 ASSUME CD JUMPS 
0: 04: 45 P: Is the POB complete? 
0: 04: 47 Announcement ends 
0: 04: 47 FS: Team leader, fire team leader, control 
0: 04: 50 call ends (FS) 
0: 04: 50 CRO: Control, go ahead 
0: 04: 51 call ends CRO 
0: 04: 52 FS: We have now got the foam cannon, the one situated underneath the crane rest, we have got that 
directed on to the methanol la down area, we will try and get access on top of the workshop. 
0: 05: 00 ASSUME POB COMPLETE 
0: 05: 00 ASSUME SB LAUNCHED 
0: 05: 04 SB: ... 
is on its way into the water now and we will be around the side 
0: 05: 07 call ends (FS) 
0: 05: 08 CRO: Copy that 
0: 05: 09 call ends CRO 
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0: 05: 13 RO: We have a man overboard apparently, on the North side of the platform 
0: 05: 15 call ends (SB) 
0: 05: 17 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 05: 17 P: Is that the crane driver? 
0: 05: 18 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 05: 18 RO: One man overboard, North side of the platform 
0: 05: 20 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 05: 20 ?: Right 
0: 05: 21 call ends (? ) 
0: 05: 22 OIM: Have they that? 
0: 05: 23 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 05: 23 RO: 332 is in the water going round 
0: 05: 24 Announcement ends RO 
0: 05: 25 Phone rings 
0: 05: 27 RO: Must be the crane driver, all other personnel are accounted for 
0: 05: 30 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 05: 39 Phone is answered (PS) 
0: 05: 40 PS: Hello (on phone) 
0: 05: 41 Announcement ends (on phone) (PS) 
0: 05: 43 PS: Yes (on phone) 
0: 05: 44 Announcement ends (on phone) (PS) 
0: 05: 45 PS: OK, thankyou (on phone) 
0: 05: 46 Announcement ends (on phone) (PS) - assume helicopters ordered 
0: 05: 47 Phone call ends (PS) 
0: 05: 47 PS: On the line OIM 
0: 05: 48 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 05: 48 OIM: Where's the POB? 
0: 05: 49 Announcement ends O 
0: 05: 49 PS: POB - one missing, the crane driver 
0: 05: 51 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 05: 52 OIM: Obviously can't be, I've got one man over the side 
0: 05: 54 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 05: 55 P: Unless, it's the crane driver 
0: 05: 56 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 05: 56 OIM: Somebody has to tell us 
0: 05: 58 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 05: 58 PS: Can you geton to the fire team leader 
0: 05: 59 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 05: 59 CRO: Fire team leader, fire team leader, call back 
0: 06: 01 call ends CRO 
0: 06: 05 FS: Yeah, can you wait one minute 
0: 06: 07 call ends (FS) 
0: 06: 14 P: Has the SB picked up that man overboard? 
0: 06: 17 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 06: 17 RO: I'm not aware of any up yet 
0: 06: 19 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 06: 19 P: Can you get in contact with him? 
0: 06: 20 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 06: 20 RO: Yeah 
0: 06: 21 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 06: 26 CRO: Fire team leader, call back 
0: 06: 27 call ends CRO 
0: 06: 27 SB: Call back 
0: 06: 29 call ends (SB) 
0: 06: 28 D: Yeah, I don't know what you want to do with this methanol store, we've got 4... 
0: 06: 33 Announcement ends (D) 
0: 06: 34 - P: What time is blowdown complete? 
0: 06: 35 METHANOL DUMP STARTED 
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0: 06: 35 SB: Yeah, we're coming into the platform ready to pick him up 
0: 06: 36 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 06: 40 call ends (SB) 
0: 06: 40 PS: Methanol dumped 12: 52 
0: 06: 42 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 06: 43 SB: Yeah, we've got him in sight and we're going to get him out of the water 
0: 06: 48 call ends (SB) 
0: 06: 50 ASSUME FS FINDS CD IS NOT IN THE CRANE AND 71 IAT IT IS HOT ON TI lE WORKSHOP 
ROOF 
0: 06: 51 OIM: Call the field supervisor and find out if the crane driver is there or its somebody else 
0: 06: 55 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 06: 55 CRO: Field supervisor call back 
0: 06: 56 call ends CRO 
0: 06: 56 RO: They've got the MOB in sight now 
0: 06: 58 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 06: 59 FS: Field supervisor control 
0: 07: 00 ASSUME CD IS PICKED UP 
0: 07: 01 call ends (FS) 
0: 07: 02 CRO: Can you confirm that the crane driver is still in the crane or is he the man who has gone overboard 
0: 07: 06 call ends CRO 
0: 07: 07 FS: It looks to me as if he's done a runner, it might be him who's gone overboard. I'll just give you an 
update whilst we're on the radio, I cannot get on top of the workshop roof, it's very hot, the foam is on, 
the one below the crane pedestal, that is on the methanol laydown area, I recommend we get across to 
gas compression deck and get some portable foam monitors across on to the methanol area, use the wind 
to direct it across. 
0: 0727 Phone rings 
0: 07: 30 Phone is answered 
0: 07: 39 call ends (FS) 
0: 07: 40 PS: Tell him "do that" yeah 
0: 07: 41 Announcement ends 
0: 07: 41 CRO: Copy that, do that 
0: 07: 42 call ends CRO 
0: 07: 46 FS: Team leader, control, can you get 4 people to carry portable foam drums and meet me on gas 
compression Mezz deck, gas Compression Mea deck. 
0: 08: 00 call ends (FS) 
0: 08: 00 P: How many le does he want? 
0: 08: 01 Announcement ends P 
0: 08: 01 PS: 4 
0: 08: 02 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 08: 03 CRO: despatching 4 people to you now, FS 
0: 08: 05 call ends CRO 
0: 08: 05 4 PEOPLE DESPATCHED TO GCD 
0: 08: 07 G: 4 despatched, P 
0: 08: 08 Announcement ends (G) 
0: 08: 09 P: 4, despatched 
0: 08: 10 Announcement ends P 
0: 08: 10 G: 4, despatched 
0: 08: 11 Announcement ends (G) 
0: 08: 14 P: Location GCD, Merl deck 
0: 08: 17 Announcement ends 
0: 08: 21 OIM: Time out 20 seconds 
0: 08: 23 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 08: 27 CRO: Time out in 10 seconds, FS 
0: 08: 28 call ends CRO 
0: 08: 32 P: Any update on the helicopter 
0: 08: 34 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 08: 39 RO: Ready in 20 
0: 08: 40 Announcement ends RO 
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0: 08: 41 P: Ready in 20 
0: 08: 42 Announcement ends P 
0: 08: 44 OIM: Time out, right, as I see it, the rescue of the crane driver has become a job for the standby boat and 
the FRC - that's their job, our job is actually to contain the fire, try and out it out, complete to level 3 
shutdown, that's my scenario for the moment, carry on 
0: 09: 00 ASSUME PEOPLE ARRIVE ON GCD, START SETTING UP FOAM 
0: 09: 03 FS: Team leader, control 
0: 09: 05 call ends (FS) 
0: 09: 09 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 09: 09 PS: End of time out 
0: 09: 11 call ends (PS) 
0: 09: 10 CRO: Come in fire team leader 
0: 09: 11 call ends CRO 
0: 09: 14 CRO: Fire team leader, go ahead 
0: 09: 15 call ends CRO 
0: 09: 16 FS: We're not setting up the portable foam, setting up the portable foam now on GCD weather deck in 
proximity to B compressor, we're also going to set another foam unit to direct on to the helifuel storage 
area. 
0: 09: 40 call ends (FS) 
0: 09: 41 CRO: Copy that 
0: 09: 42 call ends CRO 
0: 09: 42 OIM: Don't they have the deluges already on that anyway? 
Announcement ends (01M) 
0: 09: 48 CRO: Just for your info, fire team leader, the deluge is already on that area anyway, but continue if you 
feel it's necessary 
0: 09: 55 call ends CRO 
0: 09: 56 FS: Yeah, there's an immense amount of heat up here and there's a lot of heat so we'll put as much 
water on as ssible 
0: 09: 57 ?... 
0: 10: 01 call ends (FS) 
0: 10: 02 CRO: Copy that 
0: 10: 02 PS: We did, not on accom or GCD 
0: 10: 03 call ends CRO 
0: 10: 06 Announcement ends 
0: 10: 08 call ends (? ) 
0: 10: 11 OIM: I think you can put on the helideck and GCD as well, other than that area and we've got 
helicopters coming in - GCD has people in that area 
0: 10: 24 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 10: 24 PS: Yeah 
0: 10: 25 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 10: 28 OIM: How are the levels? 
0: 10: 29 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 10: 32 PS: Blowdown is 13: 03,10 minute away and we're still holding 40 bar 
0: 10: 35 ASSUME METHANOL DUMPED 
0: 10: 41 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 10: 41 OIM: OK 
0: 10: 42 Announcement ends (01M) 
0: 10: 42 P: How's the methanol situation PS? 
0: 10: 44 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 10: 44 PS: That's now dumped 
0: 10: 45 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 10: 45 P: Dumped 
0: 10: 46 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 10: 46 PS: The tank is empty 
0: 10: 47 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 11: 00 P: RO, has the SB picked up yet? 
0: 11: 02 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 11: 02 RO: Yeah, they've got him, he's not back to the main vessel yet 
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0: 11: 05 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 11: 05 P: How is he? 
0: 11: 06 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 11: 06 RO: He's in a bad wa 
0: 11: 07 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 11: 07 P: What? 
0: 11: 08 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 11: 09 RO: He's in a bad way but they're doing what they can 
0: 11: 12 Announcement ends (RO) 
0: 11: 13 P: Do a time out because all the challenges are out 
0: 11: 17 Announcement ends 
0: 11: 19 P: There's only one missing 
0: 11: 20 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 11: 26 P: Can you ask the fire team leader if he's got his 4 men? 
0: 11: 29 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 11: 29 PS: Yes, he has, they're at B turbine area, B compressor 
0: 11: 34 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 11: 36 -" CRO: If I contact anyone, ask for foam... 
0: 11: 41 Announcement ends CRO 
0: 11: 42 P: Need a doctor mobilised now 
0: 11: 44 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 11: 49 "- P: Mobilise a doctor from Humberside 
0: 11: 51 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 11: 51 RO: Suggest a paramedic on board on the helicopter 
0: 11: 54 Announcement ends RO 
0: 11: 57 PS: Have we of a Sea King? 
0: 11: 59 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 11: 59 P: Don't know yet 
0: 12: 00 Announcement ends 
0: 12: 02 P: The first Sea King comes in at 13: 20, I'm just asking for, I'm just asking to see if they've got any 
medical assistance 
0: 12: 07 - PS: G, has the standby boat recovered the man overboard 
0: 12: 08 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 12: 10 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 12: 10 G: Yeah, the little one has not the main boat yet 
0: 12: 15 Announcement ends (G) 
0: 12: 15 PS: OK 
0: 12: 16 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 12: 17 PS: How many totes of methanol were on that top la down, G, can you remember? 
0: 12: 20 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 12: 29 OIM (tannoy): Attention all personnel, attention all personnel, update on the situation, we've had a 
methanol spill on the Weather deck, on the methanol laydown area, we've confirmed fires on the 
Weather deck and the Mezz deck. We're fighting this at the moment, no cause for alarm, we have 
helicopters on the way to us, I'll keep you updated as it progresses, Thankyou 
0: 12: 54 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 12: 59 OIM: Time out 20 seconds 
0: 13: 00 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 13: 00 ASSUME MAN OVERBOARD IS IN THE STANDBY BOAT 
0: 13: 02 CRO: Time out in 20 seconds 
0: 13: 04 Call ends CRO 
0: 13: 04 SB: Got back on now 
0: 13: 06 call ends (SB) 
0: 13: 06 ?: Got a medic on 
0: 13: 07 call ends ? 
0: 13: 09 -?: 
28 
0: 13: 11 call ends ? 
0: 13: 12 . __ ?: Mobilised 0: 13: 14 
... call ends 
T 
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0: 13: 16 OIM: Time out, right standby boat has picked up the man although he's not back to the main boat, our 
biggest concern at the moment is to contain this fire, we've already dumped the methanol from the main 
tanks, complete the level 3 shutdown, which should be in about 8 minutes time. That's the situation as it 
is, carry on 
0: 13: 20 Phone rings 
0: 13: 25 Phone is answered 
0: 13: 38 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 13: 40 ASSUME PS IDENTIFIES NUMBER OF TANKS ON THE DECK 
0: 13: 42 P: Have you got on to 2 8, R. O 
0: 13: 43 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 13: 43 PS: I've just checked the records OIM and there's 5 full methanol tanks up there and 7 empty 
0: 13: 47 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 13: 49 P (start phone call) :... and I would like you to mobilise a helicopter from Humberside airport a. s. a. p to 
us. We need a paramedic in the helicopter, thankyou 
0: 13: 50 OIM: Get on to the field supervisor 
0: 13: 52 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 13: 58 Announcement ends (P) (on phone) 
0: 14: 00 ASSUME DIESEL FIRE STARTS 
0: 14: 00 ASSUME PARAMEDIC ORDERED 
0: 14: 06 FS: Fire team leader control 
0: 14: 08 call ends (FS) 
0: 14: 08 CRO: Go ahead team leader 
0: 14: 09 call ends CRO 
0: 14: 10 FS: Yeah, it just looks like the heat has caused the diesel tank or fuel tank or something to rupture in the 
crane, cause we've got a small fire in the crane now 
0: 14: 22 call ends (FS) 
0: 14: 23 CRO: Actually in the crane itself, in the crane cabin 
0: 14: 26 call ends CRO 
0: 14: 27 FS: In the crane cab, I don't think it's anything of immediate concern though 
0: 14: 31 call ends (FS) 
0: 14: 32 CRO: Copy that 
0: 14: 33 call ends CRO 
0: 14: 34 CRO: Fire in the crane cabin 
0: 14: 35 Announcement ends CRO 
0: 14: 59 D: Pressure? about 10 bar 
0: 15: 02 Announcement ends (D) 
0: 15: 03 Phone call ends (PS) 
0: 15: 03 PS: Yeah 
0: 15: 04 CRO: The man overboard, they still haven't got an ID on him 
0: 15: 05 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 15: 06 Announcement ends CRO 
0: 15: 07 G: Rescue 2 8,13: 32 
0: 15: 10 Announcement ends G 
0: 15: 10 P: Rescue 2 8,13: 32 
0: 15: 13 Announcement ends 
0: 15: 20 ASSUME FOAM MONITOR IS NOW OUT OF FOAM 
0: 15: 25 FS: Fire team leader control 
0: 15: 27 call ends FS 
0: 15: 27 CRO: Go ahead 
0: 15: 28 call ends CRO 
0: 15: 29 FS: Yeah, it looks like the foam monitor I've got going from below the crane pedestal has run out of 
foam, I'm going to make my way up there, right, and sort that out, but I'm going to leave these other two 
monitors with 2 personnel on GCD Weather deck to look after the foam on the fixed monitors that 
they've got up there. 
0: 15: 53 call ends (FS) 
0: 15: 54 CRO: Copy that 
0: 15: 55 call ends CRO 
0: 16: 07 PS: Field supervisor, field supervisor, this is control 
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0: 16: 10 call ends PS 
0: 16: 11 FS: Yeah, field supervisor 
0: 16: 12 call ends FS 
0: 16: 13 PS: Yeah, just for clarity, confirm please that it is the foam monitor under the crane boom rest and not 
the pedestal that you are proceeding towards that's the boom rest over 
0: 16: 22 Call ends (PS) 
0: 16: 23 FS: Yes, that's the boom rest below the helideck, the boom rest below the helideck 
0: 16: 28 call ends (FS) 
0: 16: 29 PS: Thank-you 
0: 16: 30 call ends (PS) 
0: 16: 55 OIM: Can you get an update from the field supervisor exactly how the fire and that 
0: 16: 57 CRO: Field supervisor, call back 
0: 16: 58 Announcement ends O1M 
0: 16: 59 call ends CRO 
0: 17: 01 FS: Yeah field supervisor 
0: 17: 03 call ends (FS) 
0: 17: 03 CRO: What's your situation please? 
0: 17: 05 call ends CRO 
0: 17: 07 FS: Yeah, can you hold please? 
0: 17: 08 call ends (FS) 
0: 17: 09 CRO: Copy 
0: 17: 10 call ends CRO 
0: 17: 11 PS: Small fires now 
0: 17: 12 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 17: 16 G: There's one on the Mezz deck 
0: 17: 18 Announcement ends G 
0: 17: 22 PS: Not necessarily a fire 
0: 17: 24 P: 5 minutes to blowdown complete 
0: 17: 25 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 17: 26 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 17: 28 P: How many people have we got left? 
0: 17: 29 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 17: 48 FS: Yeah, team leader control 
0: 17: 49 call ends (FS) 
0: 17: 50 CRO: Go ahead 
0: 17: 51 call ends CRO 
0: 17: 52 FS: Yeah, just a concern I've got here, I'm running out of foam, can you get me the status on what we've 
of left over 
0: 17: 56 Phone rings 
0: 18: 00 call ends (FS) 
0: 18: 01 Phone stops 
0: 18: 01 CRO: Standby 
0: 18: 02 - call ends CRO 
0: 18: 02 P: Does he want more foam where he is 
0: 18: 04 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 18: 04 CRO: Do you require more foam up to where you are at the moment 
0: 18: 07 call ends CRO 
0: 18: 09 FS: Yeah, the lads on the GCD Weather Deck, they will need some more foam shortly and I'm going to 
try and set something else up on the CP Weather deck because it would appear that we've got a few 
more tanks there's certainly a lot of heat up here and a lot, so there's a big fire up there. 
0: 18: 27 call ends (FS) 
0: 18: 27 P: Has he got anything oin from the helideck? 
0: 18: 29 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 18: 30 OIM: One under the helideck 
0: 18: 32 Announcement ends (01% 
0: 18: 32 P. Has he got the helideck because they're werful 
0: 18: 34 Announcement ends 
0: 18: 38 CRO: Field supervisor, field supervisor, call back 
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0: 18: 40 call ends CRO 
0: 18: 40 D: Ile wasn't going to because of the wind 
0: 18: 41 Announcement ends (D) 
0: 18: 43 FS: Field supervisor 
0: 18: 44 D: It wouldn't with that wind 
0: 18: 45 Announcement ends (D) 
0: 18: 45 call ends FS 
0: 18: 45 CRO: Have you set off any the foam monitors from the helideck 
0: 18: 48 call ends CRO 
0: 18: 51 FS: Yeah, the wind's such that it's not really going to make it's quite windy up there, it's not going to 
make that on the methanol area. 
0: 18: 57 G: There's spare foam on side of - there is some there outside the lab, there's 10 spare drums 
0: 19: 00 call ends FS 
0: 19: 08 Announcement ends (G) 
0: 19: 11 G: There's also some on the South side 
0: 19: 15 Announcement ends (G) 
0: 19: 15 FS: Did you get that message, control? 
0: 19: 18 call ends S 
0: 19: 18 CRO: Yeah, we got that message 
0: 19: 19 call ends CRO 
0: 19: 20 O1M: Time out in 20 
0: 19: 21 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 19: 21 CRO: Time out in 20 seconds 
0: 19: 23 call ends CRO 
0: 19: 23 P: Despatch 3 guys to get over and get some foam to them, despatch 3 men to take some foam over to 
them 
0: 1929 PS: P, last reported fire was in the crane pedestal but there's obviously something major happening here, 
but this foam G is talking about is there. 
0: 19: 32 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 19: 38 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 19: 38 P: Yes 
0: 19: 39 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 19: 39 PS: So we could possibly get some 
0: 19: 40 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 19: 40 OIM: Time out, right, no change to my status, just an update, we're still continuing to fight and contain 
the fire, level 3 shutdown should be in about 3 minutes with blowing down, any update, any status from 
yourselves. 
0: 19: 50 ASSUME 3 PEOPLE ARE DESPATCHED TO GET FOAM 
0: 20: 00 Announcement ends OIM 
0: 20: 00 P: We're on the foam, we've just despatched 3 men to take some foam over to FS, secondary plan 
coming up is that we can actually despatch men up from the safe staircase going round where the back of 
the lab is and round to it right, so we'll despatch another 3 men now to do it and pull all the foam over 
to the safe area. 
0: 20: 25 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 20: 25 PS: So that's 6 men you're despatching in total 
0: 20: 27 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 20: 27 P: We've despatched 3 
0: 20: 28 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 20: 28 OIM: Carry on 
0: 20: 29 Announcement ends (011 
0: 20: 29 P: We'll do it now, next 3 
0: 20: 31 Announcement ends (P) 
0: 20: 32 PS: 2 teams of 3 
0: 20: 33 Announcement ends (PS) 
0: 20: 34 P: 2 teams of 3 
0: 20: 35 Announcement ends (P) 
020: 36 
L 
CRO: Field supervisor call back 
0: 20: 37 call ends (CRO 
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0: 20: 39 FS: Yeah, field supervisor, control 
0: 20: 40 ASSUME THAT 3 PEOPLE ARE DESPATCIIED TO GET FOAM 
0: 20: 41 call ends (FS) 
0: 20: 42 CRO: We've despatched 2 teams of 3 men in each top get foam and take it over to your men... 
0: 20: 48 call ends CRO 
0: 20: 51 FS: Yes, okay, the best route for GCD is obviously up by the cellar deck, uh, up by the Mezz deck for 
the CP Weather deck, you can come past the control room on to them stairs. 
0: 21: 03 call ends (FS) 
0: 21: 04 CRO: Copy that 
0: 21: 05 call ends CRO 
0: 21: 06 OIM (tannoy): Attention all personnel, attention all personnel, update, we have recovered the missing 
man, he is on the standby boat now, we are still fighting, containing the fire on the Weather deck, the 
field supervisor has 2 fire teams up there, although he has not put it out, he seems to have it under 
control, I'll come back to you later on with some further information thankyou. 
0: 21: 33 Announcement ends OIM - tannoy) 
END OF SCENARIO :: =: 
j 
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APPENDIX 7: DEFINITIONS OF GENERIC PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS ,. 
Type of measurement Description 
Scenario organisation team's calls Radio call from the scenario organisation team, either to the emergency 
- non-informational management team or to another member of the scenario organisation team (for the 
emergency management team to overhear). A non-informational call is one that 
does not give any other information about the emergency or one's actions - other 
than confirmation of a radio call, attempting to call another person or the 
completion of a radio call. Eg. "Fred, do you copy", "Joe, come in", "Copied that 
message, Paul". 
Scenario organisation team's As above, this is a radio call from the scenario organisation team. However in this 
informational calls case, the call provides additional information, either about one's actions, the 
situation or a question for other information. It therefore consists of any calls 
which do not fit into the above category. Care must be taken to ensure that where 
information is being passed that it is recorded as such. For example, if "copy that" 
is in response to "ill you go and check out the B condenser? " - this provides the 
information that the person involved will carry out this action so is an 
informational call. If "copy that" is in response to "I am going to check out the B 
condenser", it is merely a confirmation that the message has been confirmed and 
will therefore be considered as non-informational. 
Emergency management team's This is a call from the emergency management team to the scenario organisation 
calls - non-informational team. The criteria for non-informational calls is as described in the scenario 
o anisational team's non-informational calls. 
Emergency management team's This is a call from the emergency management team to the scenario organisational 
calls - informational team. The criteria for informational calls is as described in the scenario 
or anisational team's informational calls. 
Scenario organisation team's calls Both informational and non-informational calls grouped together 
Emergency management team's Both informational and non-informational calls grouped together 
calls 
Non-informational calls Both scenario organisation team's and emergency management team's calls 
grouped to ether 
Informational calls Both scenario organisation team's and emergency management team's calls 
grouped together 
Radio calls All radio calls 
Delays between radio calls The time taken to respond to a call - from the end of one person's call to the 
beginning of the responding person's call. 
Total time to deliver a message This must include a first initiating call (eg. "Charlie, come back"), and at least 
one informational call. They also will normally include a confirmation call that 
the message has been received. Repeat attempts to contact someone are not 
included in the time taken to deliver a message. Incomplete messages (for 
example, due to the stopping of the scenario) are not included at all. 
Announcements This is the time taken for one of the emergency management team to give an 
announcement to those present. This does not include taking on the radio, tannoy 
or telephone. This may be a question, confirmation of a question and may be part 
of an informal discussion between a few members of the team or a formal 
announcement to the whole group. As there is not normally the structure of radio 
calls where calling and confirmation are necessary, there is no categorisation of 
informational and non-informational announcements. 
Delays between Announcements This is the time taken for one member of the emergency management team to 
respond with an announcement to something said by another member of the team. 
This may be the time between "Charlie, are you listening? " and "yes". It could 
also be the time between "Which way is the wind blowing? " and "Urmmm, South 
East". 
Times between telling to standby This could be from either direction (SO to EMT or EMT to SO). This gives an 
and calling back to give indication of how long it takes to respond to an unexpected request for particular 
information information. The time is taken from the end of the call stating "standby" to the 
beginning of the message that delivers the requested information. Note that this is 
not the actual informational call giving the requested information but is normally 
the non-informational call for the relevant respondent 
Totally unintelligible calls This is self-explanatory in that it records the time taken in calls (almost always 
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those from the scenario organisation team) that can not be interpreted at all. This 
may be accidental due to poor reception, or deliberate, when trying to pretend the 
caller is talking through hazardous conditions or with serious injuries. This may 
also be affected in that it is somewhat subjective - it is interpreted from the video 
recording during the production of the transcript and may have been more 
intelligible during that actual scenario. They are represented in the transcript as 
Partially unintelligible calls These are similar to the category above except that some of the message can be 
deciphered. For example, "Must be regen... propane ... 
in circulation... " 
Time left between failed attempts This somewhat represents the patience of the caller but nevertheless provides an 
to call in/out additional delay in the management of an incident. If there is no response to an 
initiating call, eg. "Charlie, come back", the is the amount of time from the end of 
this call to when the caller start to try the call again. 
Delays to answer phone This is the time from when the phone starts ringing to when it is answered by the 
emergency management team. 
Time at which the phone stopped This is when the phone was not answered by the emergency management team 
ringing and is left to ring. It represents the patience of the scenario organisation team - 
and at what point vital information may be lost due to missing the phone call. 
This may indicate some disorganisation in the group but also is known to occur 
during "time-outs". 
Phone call length This is length of time taken by the emergency management team from answering 
the phone to putting the phone down. It also includes out-going phone-calls to the 
scenario organisation team but as the point at which the phone was answered by 
them cannot be observed, this was taken as the mid-point between the end of 
dialing and the first words spoken by the member of the emergency management 
team. This assumes that on answering the phone, the scenario organisation team 
member will be the first to speak. Again, we cannot assume at what point the 
scenario organisation team member ends the call, so this is based exclusively on 
the point at which the emergency management team member ends the call. 
Information passed from EM to SO Time from information being known in the Emergency Management team to be 
passed to the relevant external bodies (Scenario organisation team) 
Information passed from SO to EM Time from information being known in the Scenario Organisation team to be 
passed on tot he Emergency Management team. 
Time to initiate following orders This is the time taken from the completion of an order to carry out control panel 
(control panel work) work (usually given by a senior member of the emergency management team) to 
the initiation of the work. Eg. "Activate the deluge, Charlie" to the point at which 
the relevant button is pressed. 
Incident - control panel responds This is the time from when we know the incident occurs to the point at which the 
control panel (alarms etc. ) respond. 
Control panel response - operator In this case, the control panel exhibits a particular "behaviour" requiring the 
response operator to respond. For example, alarm goes off- operator resets alarm. 
Time to initiate following orders Similar to the orders given for control panel work, these orders involve either 
(moving / calling others outside) movement (usually outside of the control room) or for communication. For 
example, "Get over to the B generator'- visible leaving of the control room or 
reply "We're now heading over to the B generator". Alternatively, "call Charlie 
and let him know what's going on? " - "Charlie, we've got a problem... " 
Delays from being given This may involve the time between an phone-call providing vital information is 
information externally to drawing complete and the completion of passing this information on to the rest of the 
the attention of the group to it emergency management team. This again represents a delay whereby certain 
members of the team are acting without crucial information that is available 
internally. 
Time out announced - Time out It is normal that the chief emergency manager initiates the time out, as will be 
started described in more detail in the next section. This is done by announcing that a 
time out will occur within a particular number of seconds (usually 10 or 20). This 
is designed to give the emergency management team chance to finish their radio 
messages, phone calls or to organise themselves ready for a break in the action. 
Occasionally, the emergency manager leaves much longer than the 10/20 seconds 
specified, either due to unforeseen circumstances or because he was not - 
adequately organised to carry out the time out. Occasionally, the emergency 
manager does not give the 10/20 seconds warning that he offered and so the team 
are not completely ready for the time-out when it starts. This could lead to radio 
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or phone calls continuing during the time-out, providing a distraction, as well as 
removing a member of the emergency management team from the discussion. 
Therefore, these data record the time between the end of the announcement that 
announces that a time out will occur shortly and the initiation of the 
announcement starting the time out. Eg. "Time out in 20 seconds" - "Time out 
now gentlemen" 
Time out length Time-outs are a point in the exercise where actual management tasks stop (eg. 
radio and phone calls) and the emergency management team group together to 
listen to the chief emergency manager. This is designed to be brief but all- 
inclusive. This will establish the key tasks (all known as focus points) and a 
collation of any new and important information that is not known by the whole 
management group. Although, this process requires that any urgent radio calls or 
telephone calls are ignored (hence producing delays in response to them), it is. 
believed that the group knowledge and focus achieved by the time out will enable 
the team to work more effectively once emergency management is resumed. 
Therefore this records the duration of time outs. This not only indicates how long 
it takes for a group to be brought up to date on information and "re-focused" but 
also indicates the length of time for which the emergency management team are 
unavailable to answer phones or radio calls and hence are delaying in the actual 
initiation of tasks. 
Delays between time-outs This indicates the duration of time between time-outs. This therefore indicates 
times at which the team are focused on particular issues, until a new time-out 
brings new issues. Too frequent time-outs result in little progress being made 
before the teams are given new tasks and another interruption from the actual 
management. Too infrequent time-outs mean that emergency management team 
members may be unaware of critical factors known by other team members that 
could potentially affecting their tasks. That is, the team could "lose the big 
picture". This variable records the time between the end of one time out and the 
beginning of the next one. 
Incident - first time out starts This indicates the time taken for the Emergency management team, and particular 
the Chief Emergency manager, to be sufficiently aware of the situation to make a 
plan of action. The time is recorded from the initiating event (eg. explosion, crash, 
leak) to the moment when the time out is started- 
CCR (Central Control Room) Given that it may take some time for the Emergency management team to become 
aware of incident - First time out aware of the initiating event, this may be more indicative of their organisational 
starts skills than the time from the incident to the first time-out. Timings are recorded 
from the point at which the CCR are aware of the presence of an incident (even 
though they may not be aware of its cause or content) to the beginning of the time 
out. 
Em arrives - first time out starts This is the time from when the EM (OIM) arrives to the point at which the first 
time out is started. 
Incident - start first informational This is the time taken from the incident to the initiation of the first informational 
tannoy tannoy. An informational tannoy is defined as one that does not only call a muster 
or relevant personnel to act - but provides some details of the incident or the 
management actions that are being carried out. 
OIM arrives - start first As it is normal that the chief emergency manager (OIM) makes the informational 
informational tannoy tannoys, these values indicate the time taken for the OIM to assimilate the 
information to such a degree that he feels confident enough to present it to the rest 
of the installation personnel. 
Incident - Start first tannoy This is the time taken from the incident to the initiation of the first tannoy. This is 
usually carried out by the control room personnel as opposed to the OIM (who 
may or may not be present). It usually consists of a call to muster stations and 
rarely gives about the nature of the incident. It occasionally refers to particular 
personnel, for example, calling technicians to check out a possible leak. 
Tannoy length This is the duration of a tannoy. 
Time between tannoys This is the time between one tannoy and the next one. It therefore indicates the 
length of time that the installation personnel may be left without updated 
information. 
Incident - start of first call out from This indicates the time from the incident to the first active response by the EMT. 
CCR This response may be a radio call, a phone-call or an order to initiate control 
panels. 
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Incident - start of first call into This indicates the time from the incident to the first active response by the SO - 
CCR from incident site, this may initiate the contact which provides the EMT with information on the 
incident or may be requesting their action. 
Incident - start of first This is the first informational call into the CCR from the incident site. 
informational call into CR from 
incident site 
Incident - EM arrives This is the time between the incident and the arrival of the Emergency Manager - 
this may be not applicable if the emergency manager is already present at the 
beginning of the incident. 
Incident - call EM This is the time between the incident and the initiation of the call for the 
emergency manager to attend the control room (if applicable). This may indicate a 
delay for the control room staff to recognise the seriousness of an event and that 
they will require additional assistance. 
Call EM - EM arrives This is the time from the end of the call made to bring the EM to the control room 
to the point at which the EM arrives. 
EM arrives - EM's first response This indicates the time for the emergency manager to assert his influence on the 
situation. For example, from arriving to saying "what's going on? ". This is not 
applicable if the emergency manager is present at the start of the incident. 
Incident - EM's first response This indicates the time from the incident for the Emergency manager to get 
involved. He may leave the initial stages to the control room staff or may start 
controlling the incident straightaway. 
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APPENDIX 8: LISTS OF PERFORMANCE DATA 
Offshore Scenario 1- Helicopter Crash (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Incident - Muster alarm initiated 13 
Incident - Order to stop hot work given 33 
Incident - Start Level 3 shutdown 13 
Medical team requested - medical team sent 27,207 
Fire team r uested - fire team sent 98,24, 
Fire incident suggested - deluge started 58 
Incident - helicopters ordered 325 
Muster point 2 at risk - Ordered to relocated to muster point 3 277 
call OIM - OIM arrives 18 
Incident - first medical team sent 128 
Incident - first fire team sent 128 
Muster ordered - muster complete 178 
Fire team arrive on site - Fire team realise they need another team 36 
Medical team arrive on site - medical team realise they need another team 253 
2" Medical team needed - medical team leaves 217 
Fire teams meet - coordinate activities 33, 
Fire team leave - fire team arrive at incident 49,80,140 
Medical team leave - arrive at incident 273, 
Helicopters ordered - helicopters arrive Not recorded during scenario 
timing 
Helicopters ordered - helicopters mobilised Not recorded during scenario 
timing 
Activate level 3- blowdown complete 1344 
Time for control panel to respond to situation (fire detected after heli crash) I 
Helicopter crashes - FS suggests that they should expect no survivors 811 
Incident - escalation to level 4 shutdown 64 
Incident - start deluge 91 
Incident - dum methanol 801 
Incident - muster point 2 out of action 851 
Incident - bridge clear 1051 
Incident - helicopter smoking 1151 
Start deluge - bridge clear 950 
Fire team arrives on site - bridge clear 874 
Start deluge - helicopter smoking 1050 
Fire team arrives on site - helicopter smoking 974 
OFFSHORE SCENARIO 2- METHANOL TANK (COMPLETE WITH GENERIC 
PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) MEAN AND S. D. MIN, 
SUM MAX 
EMERGENCY 
Total time to deliver a message 17,13,39,12,22,70,60,27, 31.21429 17.30353 13,70 
(radio): must include fast call in/out, 30,23,15,39,41,29, (N=14) 
possibly a response and at LEAST one 437 
informational call. One-sided or 
incomplete conversations due to 
scenario end are not included or repeat 
attempts to call in/out 
Scenario organisation team's 11,8,5,8,9,6,15,11,5,5, 9.925926 7.482934 1,32 
informational calls 32,14,24,5,11,2,1,2,2,12, (N=27) 
4,24,5,8,18,9,12, 268 
Scenario organisation team's non- 2,1,1,1,3,1,3,1,2,2,2,2, 1.761905 0.70034 1,3 
372 
informational calls 2,2,1,2,1,1,2,2,1,2,1,1,2,3,2, (N=21) 
37 
Emergency management team's 3,4,1,2,7,3,9,2,3,3,6, 3.909091 2.42712 1,9 
informational calls =11 43 
Emergency management team's non- 1,1,1,2,1,1,2,1,1,1,1,1, 1.266667 0.52083 1,3 
informational calls 1,1,2,1,1,1,1,3,1,2,1,1, (N=30) 
1,2,1,2,1,1 38 
Scenario organisation team's calls 2,11,1,1,8,1,5,8,9,3,1,6, 6.354167 6.923563 1,32 
3,15,11,1,2,2,5,5,2,32, (N=48) 
14,2,24,5,11,2,1,2,2,2, 35 
12,4,2,24,1,5,2,1,1,8,18, 
2,9,3,2,12, 
Emergency management team's calls 1,1,1,3,2,1,1,2,1,1,4,1, 1.97561 1.753394 1,9 
2,1,1,1,1,7,1,2,1,3,1,1, (N=41) 
1,3,9,1,2,2,1,1,1,3,2,3, 81 
1,2,1,6,1, 
Non-informational radio calls 2,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,3,1,3,1, 1.470588 0.64352 1,3 
1,1,2,2,1,2,1,2,1,2,1,1, (N=51) 
1,1,2,2,1,1,2,1,1,3,1,1, 75 
2,2,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,3,1,2, 
1,2,1 
Informational radio calls 11,8,5,3,8,9,6,15,11,5,5, 8.184211 6.970421 1,32 
4,32,1,14,2,24,7,5,11,2, (N=38) 
1,2,2,12,3,4,24,9,5,2,8, 311 
3,18,3,9,6,12, 
Total Radio calls 2,1,11,1,1,1,8,1,1,5,3,8, 4.337079 5.640648 1,32 
9,2,3,1,6,3,1,15,11,1,1, (N=89) 
2,2,1,2,5,5,1,2,4,32,1, 386 
14,2,1,2,1,1,24,1,7,5,11, 
1,2,2,1,2,2,2,1,12,3,4,1, 
2,1,24,1,3,1,9,5,1,2,2,2, 
1,1,1,1,8,1,3,18,2,2,3,9, 
3,1,2,1,2,6,12,1, 
Delays between dependent radio calls 2,1,2,1,2,1,6,2,1,2,0,0, 1.581818 1.342895 0,6 
1,1,3,1,1,2,4,3,5,3,1,1, (N=55) 
6,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1, 87 
1,1,1,2,0,2,1,1,1,1,2,3, 
0,3,0,2,1,3,1, 
Times between calls telling to standby 2.40 21 26.87006 2,40 
and calling back to give information (N=2) 
42 
Totally unintelligible calls 11 11 =1 11 - 
Partially unintelligible calls 11,6 8.5 n=2 17 3.535534 6,11 
Time left between failed attempts to 8,3 5.5 (n=2) 3535534 3,8 
call in / out 11 
Delays to answer phone 10,14,3,5,5, 7.4 n=5 37 4.505552 3,14 
Time at which phone stopped ringing - - - 
(not answered) 
Phone call length 2 8,38, 16 n=3 48 19.2873 2,38 
Announcements (excluding tannoys 3,4,2.1,1,14.2,1,1,1,3,2, 3.251701 4.428803 1,25 
but including time outs) 1,1,1,8,1,2,1,9,1,8,4,14, (n=147) 
5,2,1,1,1,2,1,1,1,2,1,20, 478 
4,2,2,4,1,2,1,1,3,1,1,1, 
1,1,2,2,1,2,1,3,2,1,1,5, 
2,2,4,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,3,2, 
2,1,1,25,4,4,13,1,1,9,1, 
2,1,1,1,2,3,1,1,1,3,4,1, 
3,5,5,2,2,3,2,1,6,3,5,1, 
3,1,22,1,4,2,9,1,3,2,2,3, 
3,3,1,2,3,2,1,2,2,2,2,1, 
1,11,4,1,9,9,1,1,20,25,2, 
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1.1.2.1.1. 
I )elavs between dependent 
announcements 
I, 0, I, I, 0, 
1.10,15,0,0,0, O. I. 1.0. 
0,0,0.0,0,1. O, 1,0.3,0,0, 
0.0.0. O. 0.0.1.0.0.3.0.0. 
O, 3, I. 0,4,4,1.0,6,0,0,0, 
0,0.0, I. I. 
0.707692 
(n=65) 
46 
1.307706 0,6 
Intbnnation known in l MT - SOT told 716.58,8. 260.6667 
(n=3)782 
395.1219 9,71o 
Information known in SOT - FM'F told 18,13,10,22,30,15,49,40, 
22,33 
25.2 (n= 10) 
252 
12.58571 10,49 
Time to initiate k)llowing orders 
(control panel work) 
17 17 (n=1) 17 - 
Incident - control room response I I (n= I) I - 
Control panel response - Operator 
res onse (e g. resettin g alarms) 
4 4 (n= I)4 - 
'I inie to initiate killowing orders 
(calling others outside/leaving the 
room) 
1,70,59,5.126.7, 44.66667 
(n=6) 286 
49.72189 I. 126 
Delays from being given intbnnation 
externally - Drawing the attention of 
the group to it 
32.15,16.45.3.149.7.4. 33.875 (n=8) 
271 
48.73379 3.149 
lime out announced -'lime out started 21.16.19 18.66667 
(n=3) 56 
2.516611 16.21 
Time out length 20,25.22,49 29 (n=4 116 13.49074 20,49 
Delay between time outs 258,247.362 299(n=3)967 63.45865 247,362 
Incident - First time out starts 243 243(n=1)243 - 
OlM arrives - starts first time out 193 193 (n=1) 193 - 
CCR aware of incident - First time out 
starts 
225 225(n=1)225 - 
Incident - Start first informational 
tannov (eg. not calling for muster, just 
infnnin personnel of progress) 
749 749 (n=1) 749 - 
O1M arrives - starts first infornational 
tannoy 
699 699(n=1)699 - 
Incident - Start first tannov 22 22(n=1)22 - 
Tannoy length 12-4,13,25.27 16.2 (n=5) 81 9.628084 4.27 
Time between tannovs 5,101,592,492 297.5 (n=4) 
1190 
287.9404 5,592 
Incident - start of first call out from 
CR (first ACTIVE' res onse by EMT) 
5 
Incident - start of first call into CR 
from incident site 
1 
Incident - start of first informational 
call into CR from incident site 
7 
Incident -FM arrives 50 
Incident - call EM 43 
1'M arrives - EM's first response 
fq uestion / order) 
6 
Incident - EM's first response 56 
call 1'. M - EM arrives 7 
Incident - u. v. detectors removed 40 
Incident - methanol spill discovered 45 
Incident - order to stop hot work given 34 
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Incident - fire ignited 96 
Methanol spill discovered - fire ignited 51 
Fire ignited - deluge activated 34 
Fire ignited - level 3 shutdown started 34 
Incident - FS leaves to attend incident 140 
Fire ignited - FS leaves to attend 
incident 
44 
Methanol spill discovered - FS leaves 
to attend incident 
95 
Incident - muster started 157 
Methanol leak discovered - muster 
started 
112 
Fire ignited - muster started 61 
Muster started - Muster complete 
(minus 1) 
143 
Fire team leave - Fire team arrive on 
site 
115 
Fire team arrive - foam monitor 
activated 
30 
Fire ignited - crane driver jumps into 
water 
189 
Crane driver jumps - standby boat 
reports launching rescue craft 
15 
Incident - helicopters ordered 346 
Fire ignited - helicopters ordered 250 
Incident - methanol dump started 395 
Leak identified - methanol dump 
started 
350 
Fire ignited - methanol dump started 299 
Crane driver jumps - FS fords crane 
driver not in crane 
125 
Fire team arrive on site - FS fords 
crane driver not in crane 
155 
Fire team activate foam monitor - FS 
fords crane driver not in crane 
125 
Fire ignites - Fire team ford the 
workshop roof is hot 
314 
crane driver jumps - crane driver is 
picked up by rescue craft 
135 
standby boat launch rescue craft - 
crane driver is picked up 
120 
Fire team arrive on site - FS orders 4 
more people to the GCD 
225 
Fire team ford the workshop roof is hot 
- FS orders 4 more people to GCD 
70 
4 people despatched to GCD -4 
people arrive on GCD 
55 
Fire team requested - fire team leave 5,83 
Methanol spill declared - PS finds out 
how many tanks were there 
742 
Fire ignited - diesel fire starts 744 
Workshop roof hot - diesel fire starts 430 
Standby boat inform CR of someone in 
the water - helicopter with paramedic 
ordered 
525 
Foam monitor started - Foam monitor 
out of foam 
635 
Foam monitor out of foam -3 people 270 
375 
despatched to replace it 
Methanol dump started - methanol 240 
dumped 
Man picked up by rescue craft - man 360 
on board standby boat 
Man on standby boat - paramedic 60 
ordered 
Offshore Scenario 3- GCD Cooler (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Incident - muster started 29 
Muster started - muster complete 91 
Incident - level 3 started 27 
Incident - deluge started 27 
Incident - EMT identify location is Mezz deck GCD 130 
Incident - FS team leave 126 
Muster alarm started - FS team leave 97 
FS leaves - arrives on site and identifies that B inter cooler has gone 54 
Incident - FS identifies that B inter-cooler has gone 180 
Incident - casualty sheltering in GCD 225 
Casualty sheltering in GCD - request medical team 57 
Incident - deluge on CP 293 
FS arrives on site - can't get across Mezz deck 120 
FS arrives on site - can't get to West side 210 
FS cannot get across Mezz - cannot get on west side 90 
Incident - medical team mobilised 412 
Casualty sheltering in GCD - medical team mobilised 187 
Medical team requested - medical team mobilised 130 
FS leaves - FS gets to south side Mezz 329 
FS arrives on site - FS gets to south side Mezz 275 
FS can't get to West side - FS gets to south side Mezz 155 
FS can't get to Mezz deck - FS gets to south side Mezz 65 
Incident - assume production technicians despatched 510 
FS arrives - BA running out 365 
FS cannot get to west side - BAS running out 155 
FS cannot get across Mezz - BAs running out 245 
FS gets south side Mezz - BAS running out 90 
Production technicians despatched - arrives CP Mezz 60 
Production technicians arrive on CP Mezz - back at CP 60 
BAs running out - BA team leave 100 
FS at south side - FS discovers door too smoky 190 
FS at south side - FS discovers problems with handles 235 
FS discovers door too smoky - FS discovers problems with handles 45 
BA team 1 leave - BA team 2 arrive 75 
BAs running out - BA team arrive 175 
Incident - Fire subsiding 1225 
BA team I leave incident - BA team I arrive in CR 160 
FS discovers door too smoky - FS gain access 360 
FS discovers oblem with handles - FS gain access 315 
2 people requested to weather deck - despatched 45 
Stretcher carriers requested - despatched 66 
Stretcher team despatched - arrive on site 153 
Medical team mobilised - arrive 788 
Medical team arrive - understand casualty's symptoms 45 
Incident - Medics understand casualty's symptoms 1245 
Incident - situation coming under control -1260 
376 
Activate deluge - situation coming under control 1233 
Level 3 shutdown started - blowdown complete 1208 
Fire team requested - despatched 29 
Production team requested - sent 28 
Incident - isolation of GCD suggested 452 
FS gains access - FS now approach south east 195 
Offshore Scenario 4- HV Switchgear Room (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Event - PW gets to switch ear room 60 
Event - PW finds smoke in switch ear room 60 
Event - muster started 102 
Event level 3 shutdown started 126 
Muster started - finished (minus 3) 128 
Incident -I IV power failure 321 
Incident - FS leaves 327 
Incident - Despatched team to accommodation 405 
FS leaves - FS arrives on site 88 
Team requested - team despatched 13 
Incident - smoke in LV switch ear room 474 
HV power failure - smoke in LV switch ear room 213 
FS arrives on site - FS at LV switch ear room 95 
FS leaves - FS arrives at LV switch ear room 183 
FS in LV switch ear room - finds he needs backup 30 
Incident - Alarm (lab and stores) 531 
HV power failure - alarm (lab and stores) 210 
Smoke in LV switch ear room - alarm in lab and stores 57 
Team requested - team despatched 38 
Team despatched - team arrive 45 
FS arrives in LV switch ear room - FS decided to pull back as vis is zero 210 
BA decide to enter LV - FS decides to pull back as vis is zero 75 
Smoke in LV - FS decides to pull back as vis is zero 246 
FS arrives in LV - Ba out of air 630, 
Smoke inLV-FS arrives in LV 36 
FS need back - BA out of air 300 
1 BA team enter LV - BA team out of air 195 
FS decides to pull back as vis is zero - BA out of air 120 
BA team 3 despatched - Meet FS 545 
FS meet BA team 3- BA teams to 1V and accommodation 110 
BA team despatched to accom - BA teams to HV and accommodation 460 
BA teams on standby - BA teams to HV and accommodation 415 
PW to switch ear room - casualty found 1080 
BA team enter accommodation - casualty found 80 
BA enter HV switch ear room - BA team leave 165 
shutdown and blowdown start - completed 1204 
BA team out of air and returning - FS requires more bottles 530 
BA team enter HV and accommodation - need more bottles 310 
BA leave HV - FS outside stores 145 
BA enter accommodation - find 1 steward 365 
Alarm (lab and stores) - FS arrives 839 
BA requested - sent 45 
Incident - stewards found 1425 
Incident - whole side of switch ear room burning 1450 
HV power failure - whole side of switch ear room burnin 1129 
Smoke in LV - whole side of switch ear room burning 976 
Fire (lab and stores) - whole side of switch ear room burning 919 
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Vis zero in accommodation - whole side of switch ear room burning 736 - 
Incident - fire escalation 1533 
HV power failure - fire escalation 1212 
Smoke in LV switch ear room - fire escalation 1059 
Fire (lab and stores) - fire escalation 1002, 
Vis zero in accommodation - fire escalation 813 
Whole side of switch ear room burnin - fire escalation 83 
Team requested - despatched 15 
Team despatched - arrive 310 
Fire escalation - FS gets hoses working 192 
Whole side of switch ear room burning - Control room start to relocate 290 
Fire escalation - Control room start to relocate 207 
Vis zero in accommodation - control room start to relocate 1020 
Start to relocate - complete 69 
Relocated - fire reserve halon 156 
Onshore Scenario 5- Dropped Object (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Incident - start muster 13 
Incident - fire alarm activated 32 
Incident - shutdown started 69 
Fire alarm activated - shutdown started 37 
Incident - deluge started 90 
Fire alarm activated - deluge started 58 
Incident - FS arrives on site 150 
Muster started - muster complete 177 
Incident - CM finds that they are trapped on GCD 260 
FS arrives on site - FS returned to CRO 169 
CM finds they are trapped in GCD - CM return to GCD control room 90 
CM finds injured person - Injured person says he saw someone on the bridge before 
it collapsed 
270 
Incident -jet fire and explosion on slug catcher 434 
Fire alarm activated - jet fire and explosion on slug catcher 402 
FS leaves - FS arrives and starts setting up hoses on ESV valves 145 
FS leaves - FS finds lower bridge gone 160 
Injured person reports seeing someone on bridge - Standby boat looks for body in 
water 
70 
FS starts setting up hoses - hoses tied off 105 
People find they trapped on GCD - People start launching lifeboat 640 
People find injured person at GCD control room - People start launching lifeboat 550 
SB look for body in water - Search completed with no success 270 
FS ties off hoses - Fire diminishing 270 
Deluge started - Fire diminishing 930 
People start launching lifeboat - Lifeboat reports engines are not working 240 
FS ties up hoses - Fire under control 440 
Deluge started - fire under control 1100 
Fire diminishing - fire under control 170 
FS on site - FS returned to CR 67 
Shutdown and blowdown started - blowdown of CP com lete 1011 
Blowdown of CP complete - Shut subsea barrier 545 
Rigger sent to lower load - Shut subsea barrier 452 
FS leaves - FS arrives on site and identifies bridge is severely damaged 54 
378 
Onshore Scenario I- Hot Oil Leak (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds 
Incident - Order level 1 shutdown 51 
Incident - Muster ordered 56 
Muster ordered - Muster initiated 3 
Incident - Priority one and priority two calls ordered by OIM 143 
CCR informed that there are casualties and a fire - Priority one and priority two 
calls ordered 
35 
Incident - OIM orders fire truck to be sent to the forward muster point (in Time 
Out) 
293 
CCR aware of casualties - OIM orders fire truck to be sent to the forward muster 
point (in Time out) 
185 
Incident - OIM orders the outfall to be off (in Time out) 293 
Incident - OIM orders fixed monitors to be put on (in Time out) 293 
Incident - OIM ordering that security should take all calls from the public 596 
Phone call ends - OIM ordering that security should take all calls from the public 10 
Complete order for level 1- initialised 8 
Foam monitors requested (during time out) - confirmed that they were being 
initiated 
64 
OIM orders Priority I and 2- Assume they have been called 59 
Fire brigade arrives at gate - assume diverted to incident 52 
Ambulance arrives at gate - assume diverted to incident 82 
2 more fire engines arrive at gate - assume diverted to incident 93 
OIM orders outfall to be turned off (during time out) - Assume that it has been 
done 
2 
Report diesel and hot tanks threatened - OIM orders cooling 39 
OIM orders cooling - On-scene commanders informed of order 17 
Muster complete and EM team made aware that 2 are missing - OIM orders search 
and rescue (within time out) 
212 
OIM orders search and rescue - informed that casualties have already been located 4 
On-scene commander requests foam monitors to be turned off - Informed that it 
requires manual isolation 
10 
Incident - Assume JF is attempting rescue 59 
Assume JF is attempting rescue - First casualty rescued 608 
Assume JF is attempting rescue - second casualty rescued 1623 
First casualty out - Casualty in ambulance 738 
Muster alarm - Muster completed (minus casualties) 287 
OIM orders a fire truck (during time out) - Fire truck mobilised 214 
Foam monitors on - requested off to assist in searching for casualties 302 
Fire truck mobilised - Arrives on scene 145 
Priority one and priority two calls sent - Fire brigade arrives at gate 697 
Fire brigade diverted - Assume working on fire ?- never recorded 
Priority one and two calls sent - Ambulance and police car arrive at the gate 932 
Assume ambulance diverted - assume ambulance has picked the casualty 188 
Priority one and two calls sent -2 more fire en ines arrive at the gate 1203 
Told foam monitor is manually deactivated - Assumed that the team have turned it 
off 
10 
Assumed foam is turned off- Request that it is turned back on again 196 
Incident - Fire threatening the diesel and hot oil 980 
Manual hose ordered - Confirmed it will be done 11 
Assume monitors are running - Say they are beginning to make headway on the fire 810 
CCR informed that there are casualties - Assume PD rescued 1530 
CCR informed that there are casualties - JF at the forward muster point in shock 1498 
Incident - Making headway on the fire 1688 
Ambulance arrives at the gate - Assume that it has been diverted 
1 
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Ordered police car to tour village - Assume arrived ? (not noted in scenario - 
379 
possibly occurring outside of 
scenario time 
Ambulance arrived at gate - Ambulance arrived at casualties 178 
Priority one and priority two calls -2 more fire engines arrive at gate 1199 
2 more fire engines at gate - Assume diverted to incident 91 
Incident - Rescued PD from fire 1852 
On-scene commander informed of order to cool diesel and hot tanks - Assume that 
this cooling has been initiated 
27 
Diesel and hot oil threatened - EM team informed 14 
Level I ordered - Shutdown complete ? (not noted in scenario - 
possibly occurring outside of 
scenario time) 
Level 1 initiated - Shutdown ? (not noted in scenario - 
possibly occurring outside of 
scenario time) 
Level I initiated - Confirmed that there is no pressure 1781 
Order Level I shutdown - 
Confirmed that there is no pressure 
1789 
Onshore Scenario 2- Broken Leg On Regen Unit (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Incident - EM orders level 2 shutdown 29 
Incident - EM orders level I shutdown 233 
Incident - Muster ordered by OIM 29 
Incident - OIM orders priority I and 2 calls fire trucks and ambulances) 233 
Aware of casualties - OIM orders priority I and 2 calls (fire engines and 
ambulances) 
214 
EM aware of casualties - EM says fire truck required at forward muster point 452 
Incident - OIM says need fire truck at forward muster point 471 
Muster ordered by OIM - assume CRO ordered muster (on phone) (muster 
initiated) 
12 
Level 2 ordered - Shutdown started 12 
Level 2 ordered - OIM orders level 1 204 
Level I ordered - started 48 
Incident - EM orders the outfall to be put off Not specifi if carried out 
EM orders outfall to be put of- Assume outfall put off Not specified if carried out 
Incident - fixed monitors on 1354 
EM orders priority I and 2 calls - Assume calls 53 
EMT aware of people missing - EM orders search and rescue 190 
Assume rescue has been initiated - Rescue complete Not occurring in scenario 
time 
First casualty rescued - Casualty in ambulance Not occurring in scenario 
time 
Gas low - Team agree to use portable gas detectors 78 
Muster alarm - Assume Muster completed (minus casualties) 981 
Fire engines arrive - spray system in use 662 
Ambulance arrives at gate - Ambulance picks up casualty Not in scenario time 
Fire engine arrives at gate - Fire engine diverted to incident 60 
Ambulance arrives at gate - Ambulance diverted to incident 60 
Ambulance diverted - picks up casualty Not in scenario time 
Fire engine diverted - arrives at incident 215 
Fire engine arrives at the gate - spray system set up 358 
Crane starts rescue - Casualty down from column in excess of 315 
Casualty injured - assume helped by PD 115 
Muster started - MF arrives at muster point 65 
MF leaves Forward Muster point - Arrives at GSU 228 
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OIM orders fire truck to be mobilised - Fire truck mobilised 143 
Fire truck mobilised - Meets MF 200 
Fire truck meets MF -M arrive on site 43 
Fire truck ready - Route given and initiated 32 
PD helps casualty - casualty needs new air 610 
Crane available - Crane arrives 600 
W suggests despatch people to meet crane - Person meets crane 380 
Fire engines ordered - First fire engine arrives 842 
Police car ordered - Police car arrives 1693 
Ambulances ordered - First ambulance arrives 842 
Person meets crane - They move crane to rescue position 648 
Known that there is a missing cleaner - cleaner found 201 
Report casualty short of air - airline being put up 672 
EMT know about casualty - EMT ask if lifting gear is required 683 
EMT ask if lifting gear is required - Crane available 35 
Muster initiated - Fire truck mobilised 577 
Incident - Toxic alarms go off 281 
Incident - Gas in S+ SW 818 
Incident - Gas low indication 1571 
Incident - Depressurised column 2301 
Gas in S+ SW - Gas low indicated 754 
Toxic alarms SE - Toxic alarms - S+SW 537 
Shutdown - Gas low enough to use portable detectors 1831 
Toxic alarm - gas low enough to use portable detectors 754 
Level I- Gas low indication 1291 
Level I- Column depressurised 1960 
-Onshore Scenario 3- Tanker driver bangs his head (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in 
seconds 
EMT aware of wind direction - SOT ordered to relocate muster point 149 
ESV not closing - team ordered to work on it 125 
Event - Level I activated 78 
Event - deluge activated in refri 78 
Aware of event - level 1 activated 57 
Aware of event - deluge activated 57 
Event - terminal alarm (muster) started 78 
Aware of event - terminal alarm (muster) started 57 
Event - fixed monitors on 85 
Aware of event - fixed monitors on 64 
Event - outfall off 85 
Aware of event - outfall off 64 
Event - got foam down the drains 600 
Event - got cooling on tanker 600 
Security ordered to on back gate - assume its done 48 
Ambulance ordered - first arrives 738 
Ambulance ordered - second arrives 1183 
Cooling on tanker - fire dying 555 
Cooling on tanker - main fires out 850 
Foam down the drains - fire dying 555 
Foam down the drains - main fires out 850 
ESV closed - depressurised Not recorded in scenario 
time 
Identify someone is missing - Missing person found 250 
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Muster started - identify that someone is missing 582 
Muster started - Muster complete minus missing person 582 
Muster started - Muster complete, including missing person 832 
Event - ESV not closing 990 
ESV not closing - team working on it 210 
Team workin on ESV - ESV closed 150 
Team ordered to work on ESV - Assume team workin on it 85 
Event - fire - 98 
Fire - fireball 712 
Event - fireball 810 
Fire ball - fire dying 345 
Event - fire dying 1155 
Fire dying - main fires out 295 
Event - main fires out 1450 
Event - driver in ambulance 1280 
Event - driver rescued 98 
Driver rescued - driver in ambulance 1182 
Level 1 started - complete Not recorded in scenario 
time 
Deluge activated - fire dying 1077 
Fixed monitors activated - fire dying 1070 
Deluge activated: main fires out 1372 
Fixed monitors activated - main fires out 1365 
Fire engines ordered - first fire engine arrives on site 431 
Fire engines ordered - second fire engine arrives on site 738 . First fire engine arrives on site - in working position 207 
Second fire engine arrives on site - in worldng position 65 
Ordered to relocate muster point - muster complete (minus missing person) 371 
Onshore Scenario 4- Explosion at tail as unit (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Shutdown started - TGU flat 930 
Ambulance ordered - first arrives 810 
Ambulance ordered - second arrives 1109 
Muster started - first person at muster 60 
Muster point started moving - Muster point moved 360 
Muster start - muster complete 980 
Muster started - MW arrives 1290 
Muster complete - MW arrives 310 
Muster started - Muster point started moving 240 
Start search of building - complete search 90 
Event - order fire engines and ambulances 361 
Event - MAC alarm 17 
Event - MAC alarm 2 35 
Event - smoke seen 100 
Event - fire dying down 840 
Event - fire out 1140 
Event - TGU flat 990 
Event - water curtains up 900 
Event - Technician rescued 525 
Event -3 casualties found 360 
Event - someone arrives at fire truck 480 
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Casualties found - one in shock 720 
Casualties found - technician rescued 165 
Casualties rescued - at muster point 195 
Ambulance arrives at gate - casualties in ambulance 390 
Fire engines ordered - first fire engine arrives on site 359 
Fire engine at gate - fire engine at incident 120 
Fire engines arrive - water curtains up 60 
Fire out - start search for casualty 50 
Team hear about missing person - start search 11 
Onshore Scenario 5- Brown liquid emission (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Event - shutdown activated 156 
Aware of event - shutdown activated - 156 
Event - terminal alarm (muster) started 156 
Aware of event - terminal alarm (muster) started 156 
Ambulance ordered - first arrives at gate 370 
Ambulance ordered - second arrives 1390 
Muster start - muster complete (minus 3) 134 
Muster completed (minus 3- JW found 940 
Muster completed (minus 3) - PD at lab 920 
Muster completed (minus 3) - people in chemical suits 810 
Event - order fire engines and ambulances 500 
Fire engines ordered - fire engine arrives at gate 370 
Fire engines ordered -2 fire engine arrives at gate 865 
Priority l and 2 called - police car arrives 1230 
Event - security can smell gas 30 
Event - team aware of casualties 120 
EMT aware of casualties - start muster 36 
Event - muster completed (minus 3) 290 
Event - order fire engines and ambulances 500 
Event - outfall off 590 
Event - plant depressurised 1265 
Shutdown started - depressurised 1169 
Event - identify leak 1560 
EMT aware of F stuck in the lab -F out of the lab 760 
People in chemical suits - team go into solvent regen 380 
RP missing - RP found 135 
Leak identified - Leak isolated 360 
Leak isolated - Foam blanket on s 150 
Leak identified - foam blanket on s 510 
Event - EMT told that F stuck in the lab 640 
EMT aware of casualties - Priority I and 2 calls started 380 
Event -leak isolated 1920 
Onshore Scenario 6- leak on GSU B (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Event - shutdown activated 130 
Aware of event - shutdown activated 130 
Event - terminal alarm (muster) started 130 
Incident - Evoke offsite plan 408 
Aware of event - terminal alarm (muster) started 130 
Incident - gas alarms in GSU B 102 
Incident - MAC alarm 1 110 
Incident - MAC alarm 2 242 
383 
Incident - railway workers can smell gas 420 
Gas alarms in GSU B- rail workers can smell gas 318 
Muster started - Muster complete (minus two people) 740 
Level I started - finished (never announced) 
Incident - outfall off 408 
Incident - start depressurising GSU A and B 408 
Start depressurising - LP depressurised 1067 
Start depressurising - HP depressurised 1327 
Incident - priority one and two calls made 408 
Priority one and two calls made - first fire engine arrives at the gate 162 
Incident - foam monitors started 625 
Gas alarm initiated - foam monitors started 523 
Muster complete minus two - start search 150 
Priority one and two calls made - ambulance arrives at gate 432 
Fire engine arrives at gate - fire engine meets with PD 360 
Muster complete minus two -U found 440 
Start search -U found 290 
Ambulance at the gate - sent to casualties 430 
Priority one and two calls made - fire engines, ambulances and police arrive at gate 882 
Fire engine arrives - sent to incident 46 
Muster complete minus two - CD found 900 
Start search - CD found 750 
Railway workers smell gas - overcome by gas 480 
Railway workers overcome by gas - found by rescuers 745 
CD found - CD in ambulance 290 
U found -U in ambulance 750 
Railway workers found - in ambulance 205 
Onshore Scenario 7- Collapsed scaffolding (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR 
Incident - JF aware of scaffolding 
RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
20 
Incident - MAC alarm on GSA 61 
Incident - AE arrives at regen 80 
Incident - HVAC flammable gas and toxic gas detection 140 
AE arrives at regen - fmds the scaffolding is on the sales gas 60 
Incident - Lev 1 started 170 
Incident - PI and 2 calls made 170 
Incident - depressurising started 170 
Incident - muster started 189 
Incident - monitors started 218 
Incident - outfall off 270 
Muster start - move muster point to rgc 121 
Incident - turbine started shutting down 335 
Incident - shutdown complete 365 
Shutdown started - complete 195 
Incident - stop essential services 365 
Incident - water curtains started 365 
Incident - hot oil spill occurs 520- 
Incident - toxic gas detection stops 525 
Gas detected - toxic gas detection stops 385 
Incident - ESV shut 525 
Incident - find that tappings are broken 725 
Incident - ambulances arrive 855 
Pt and 2 calls - ambulances arrive 685 
Incident occurs - fire engines arrive 855 
Pl and 2- fire engines arrive 685 
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Fire engines arrive - on incident site 65 
Start d ressurisation - column depressurised 810 
Ambulances arrive - on incident site 235 
Muster started - complete minus 7 931 
Incident - start moving scaffolding 1160 
Muster complete minus 7- MI and HS located 100 
PI and 2 -police arrive 1140 
Muster started -2 more people are found 1296 
Muster complete minus 7-2 more people arrive 365 
Start moving scaffolding - casualties rescued 960 
P1 and 2- more fire engines arrive 1785 
Start moving scaffolding - find HS and Ml 60 
Start moving scaffolding - found last person 600 
Muster minus 7- found last person 640 
Hot oil spill - spill dying down 1170 
Incident - PD finds leak is air 1640 
Onshore Scenario 8- Spinal injury on column, icy weather (scenario-specific data 
onl 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Incident - MI with casualty 95 
Incident - Muster started 190 
Incident - priority one and two calls made 211 
Incident - order snorkel 211 
Muster started - PD at muster point with blankets 135 
Incident - AG going into shock 365 
Priority one and two calls made - ambulance arrives at gate 154 
Incident - crane drives into pipeline 575 
Incident - fire engine crashes into gate 575 
Incident - medic arrives at casualty 575 
AG going into shock - condition deteriorating 445 
Incident - AG's condition deteriorating 810 
Incident - shutdown started 820 
Incident - smell of gas 875 
PD at muster point - PD wearing BAs 550 
Crane on sales gas line - smell gas at plant 600 
Diesel pump failed - manual activation attempted and failed 206 
Incident - AG having breathing problems 1345 
AG going into shock - AG having breathing problems 980 
AG condition deteriorating - AG having breathing problems 535 
Priority one and two calls made - 2" ambulance at ate 1204 
Priority one and two calls made - fire engine arrives at gate 1264 
Incident - AG cardiac arrest 1655 
AG in shock - cardiac arrest 1290 
Condition deteriorating - cardiac arrest 845 
Breathing problems - cardiac arrest 310 
Fire engine crash - gates opened 1290 
Shutdown started - completed 1065 
Onshore Scenario 9- Leak At Dewpoint A (scenario-specific data only) 
BEHAVIOUR RAW TIMES (in seconds) 
Incident - flammable gas detection on d int A 18 
Incident - MAC alarm activated 25 
Incident - Level I shutdown started 42 
385 
Incident - Muster started 42 _ -.. r.. _ 
Incident - initiated monitors 42 
Incident - muster complete (minus missing people) 260 
Incident - priority one and two calls 260 
Muster complete - PD in BA 105 
Muster complete -2 on the fire truck 160 
Incident - gas cloud drifting 470 
Incident - monitor facing the correct direction 670 
Monitor initiated - monitor facing the fight direction 
628 
Muster completed - fire truck sent to muster point 
420 
Incident - MF fmds a body 
845 
2 on fire truck - fire truck sent to muster point 
260 
Priori one and two calls - fire engines and ambulances arrive 
690 
Incident - all 3 casualties found 
1040 
MF finds a body - all 3 (two more) casualties found 
195 
Casualties found - Casualties at muster point 
180 
Muster started -1 person missing 
1658 
Muster complete -1 person missing 
1440 
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APPENDIX 9: QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY 
SECTION 1: OBJECTIVES OF THE OUESTIONNAIRES 
Although the scenario was being adequately recorded using the video, initially the expert opinion of the 
performances was not. This meant that behaviour that was being observed may have exhibited a skewed view of 
emergency management performance and therefore the TPRC results based on these data may not be wholly 
representative. For example, if the candidates show excellence in emergency management including many good and 
timely decisions, the delays used in the TPRC model may be short. Without subjective feedback of performance, 
these timings may be used to represent "average" emergency management performance and thus any emergency 
manager may be erroneously expected to perform just as well. Consequently, the emergency manager may have 
made late or wrong decisions, resulting in a failure to prevent escalation and adverse consequences. This would 
give the impression that emergency management had very little impact on the outcome. 
Therefore a questionnaire was designed to record the opinions of the assessor(s). 
In general, the questionnaires included: 
" Assessment of overall performance in the scenario 
" Assessment of individual tasks - in terms of timeliness and content 
" Comparison of the observed performance with the optimal performance - what the assessor would have 
preferred to see 
They were structured so that they could be easily compared with the model inputs - including comments on the 
delays, communication, action and expected response - similar to the SADCAR concept mentioned in Section 
5.3.5.3 of the main report 
However, even when a group of assessors agree with each other, they may not be entirely correct. It is 
often considered a lot easier to watch someone else dealing with a problem than to have to deal with it yourself. 
Without the stress of the situation, it is possible to analyse the problem with a "clear head". The assessor is usually 
an expert in emergency management and has prior knowledge of the escalating situation. Therefore, based on his 
insight and experience, it is reasonable for him to expect a better performance than the emergency manager may 
give (as suggested in Section 2.3.6.2). For example, the assessor may have thought certain decisions were correct 
when the emergency manager believes they were not. As the emergency manager has the advantage in teens of on- 
site knowledge, it was decided that the questionnaires should also record the views of the emergency management 
candidate. The two questionnaires could then be compared with each other - to resolve any differences and identify 
any areas where either the assessor or emergency management candidate could be mistaken. The results could also 
be compared with the TPRC model - to see whether the desired performance has any impact on the emergency. 
However, this cannot be used as a validation mechanism for the TPRC - as any person's expert judgement may not 
be valid. 
The questionnaires that were designed are shown at the end of this Appendix. For each objective and each 
important decision that was observed, a copy of page a must be filled in. These might include objectives such as -- 
"put out fire" and "save casualties" and decisions such as "start deluge", "order ambulances and fire engines" and 
"isolate valves". Finally, page b was used to get an overall evaluation of the competence of the candidate. 
Therefore, both the assessor(s) and candidate were asked about the same decisions - to facilitate comparison 
SECTION 2: QUESTIONNAIRE PROCEDURE 
To ensure that the questionnaires examined the important and critical decisions, it was necessary to use 
an independent observer. This independent observer would watch the whole scenario and note down the critical 
objectives and decisions - that is, those any decision or actions that could change the flow or outcome of the 
emergency. These would be recorded in the appropriate spaces in the two sets of questionnaires. Finally, as soon as 
the exercise was complete and before there was any chance to discuss the scenario or debrief, the candidate would 
be taken aside and would be taken through the questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed to be filled in by the 
candidate. However, the independent observer would clarify questions as required - for example, if the question 
was not applicable or if their handwriting was illegible. However, it was stipulated that the independent observer 
could only read the questions - NOT the choice of answers. This was to ensure that the independent observer did 
not put emphasis on one of the answers, either accidentally or intentionally, leading to a biased response. 
Once all the candidate's answers were recorded, the assessor(s) would be individually taken through his 
questionnaire in a similar way. It was ensured that the assessor did not discuss his opinion of the candidate's 
performance before his questionnaire was completed. This was to ensure that their opinions of the performance 
were not biased by other people's views. Once both questionnaires were complete, the debriefing could then take 
place. The results of both questionnaires are discussed in the next section. 
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SECTION 3: QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
3.1 RAW DATA FROM QUESTIONNAIRES 
The questionnaires were given out to the candidates and the main assessor for 8 scenarios (4 scenarios for each 
candidate). This section will initially consider the overall assessments and comparison between scenarios data. 
For the assessor, the overall assessment was produced in response to the question "In your opinion, what was the 
overall level of competence displayed by the candidate in THIS scenario ONLY? ". They were then given the choice 
of "HIGHLY COMPETENT / COMPETENT / NOTABLE SHORTFALLS / NOT COMPETENT" and were 
encouraged to elaborate on why they made this choice. Following this, they were asked, "How does this compare to 
the previous scenarios managed by this candidate? " and were given the choice of "NOT AS GOOD AS BEFORE / 
SAME AS BEFORE / BETTER THAN BEFORE". 
The candidate was given an appropriately worded equivalent question (at the end of this Appendix). Therefore the 
results of overall assessments and comparisons are shown in table a. 
Table a: Results of overall assessments and comparisons 
Candidate l 
Scenario 1 Scenario 3 Scenario 5 Scenario 7 
Self- 
assessments 
Highly 
competent 
Competent 
Notable 
shortfalls 
Not competent 
Examiner's 
assessment 
highly 
competent 
Competent 
Notable 
shortfalls 
Not competent 
Scenario I Scenario 3 Scenario 5 Scenario 7 
Self-assessment N/A 
Better than 
before 
Same as before 
Not as good as 
before 
Examiner's 
assessment 
N/A 
Better than 
before 
Same as before 
Not as good as 
before 
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Candidate 2 14 
Scenario 2 Scenario 4 Scenario 6 Scenario 8 
Self-assessment 
Highly 
competent 
Competent 
Notable 
shortfalls 
Not competent 
Examiner's 
assessment 
Highly 
competent 
Competent 
Notable 
shortfalls 
Not competent 
Scenario 2 Scenario 4 Scenario 6 Scenario 8 
Self-assessment N/A 
Better than 
before 
Same as before 
Not as good as 
before 
Examiner's 
assessment 
N/A 
Better than 
before 
Same as before 
Not as good as 
before 
As shown in table a, all the questionnaires show pleasing results with regard to internal consistency (assessment of 
whether ratings are consistent when comparing them with previous scenario). The comparisons given as either 
"better than before", "same as before" and "not as good as before" do not result in contradictory ratings. The 
differences can all be explained as variations within categories - for example, "only just competent" and "not quite 
highly competent" may give assessments of "better than before" or "not as good as before" but still be "competent". 
In terms of the comparison between the examiner's and candidate's opinions, Candidate I gives a level of 
"competent" for all of his scenarios, whereas the examiner gives `notable shortfalls" for Scenario 1 and "highly 
competent" for Scenarios 3,5 and 7. This may indicate that the views on the level of competency are either 
assumed to cover a broad band of performance by the Candidate or a too narrow band of performance by the 
examiner. Out of these 4 scenarios, the examiner is shown to be more generous in his assessment than the 
candidate. 
Candidate 2 also gives a level of "competent" for all his scenarios. In this case, the examiner agrees with 
him except for Scenario 2, which is seen to have "notable shortfalls". In this case, the overall opinion is agreement, 
with a slight amount of leniency on the part of the candidate or strictness on the part of the examiner. 
Based on the assessments of these and one extra scenario for each candidate (not assessed with 
questionnaires), Candidate I was passed as a "competent" emergency manager. It was recommended that Candidate 
2 had further training as his overall assessment stated that he exhibited `notable shortfalls". This suggests that the 
average performance over all the scenarios should be competent or better to be awarded overall competency. As 
Candidate I showed a level of "Highly competent" and Candidate 2 showed a level of "Competent" in their last 
scenarios, this suggests that it is not sufficient just to prove that the level of performance has been achieved. 
Therefore, the overall assessment is apparently based on even the earliest scenarios - rather than the final level of 
performance attained. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the individual decisions and compare them with the overall 
assessments as well as comparing the views of the candidate and examiner. The actual questionnaire answers 
regarding the individual decisions are shown in Section 7. 
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Two types of comparison are relevant - firstly, the level of agreement between the examiner and 
candidate, then secondly, the extent to which the assessments of individual decisions agree with the awarding of 
overall levels of competency. To fmd out whether the results are statistically significant, it is necessary to obtain 
numerical values for at least one of the variables. This was carried out by counting the total number of decisions 
that were recognised as being made within the simulation (by the observer and added to by the assessor). Then for 
the agreement assessment, the candidate's answers would be compared with the assessor's answers. If both agree 
for one decision, the agreement rating is incremented by 1. When all the decisions have been compared in this way, 
there will be a total number of "agreed" opinions, which is converted into a fraction of the total number of 
decisions. For example, consider the situation where 10 decisions are identified in the scenario. The assessor 
believes 8 of them were "good" whereas the candidate believes that all 10 of them were "good" - the agreement 
will be 8 out of 10. This comparison would also be carried out for timeliness, communications and actions. These 
would be added together to produce an "overall agreement" number for the scenario and to produce an "overall 
agreement" number for the candidate for each of the 5 sections (quality, timeliness, communications, actions and 
overall rating). The results obtained are shown in table P. 
Table ß: Numerical Comparison between Examiner's and Candidate's Opinion 
Scenario agreement on 
decision (%) 
agreement on 
timing ("/. ) 
agreement on 
communication 
agreement on 
action ("/. ) 
overall 
agreement ("/. ) 
1 12/12 100 10/12(83) 11/12(92) 10/12(83) 43/48(90) 
3 14/14(100) 11/14(79) 14/14(100) 14/14(100) 53/56(95) 
5 14/15(93) 13/15(87) 14/15(93) 14/15(93) 55/60(92) 
7 21/22 (95) 22/22 100 21/22 95 20/22(91) 84/88(95) 
Candidate 1 61/63(97) 56/63(89) 60/63(95) 58/63(92) 235/252 (93) 
2 9/10(90) 8/10(80) 9/10(90) 9/10(90) 35/40(88) 
4 13/16 81 10/16(63) 11/16 69 12/16(75) 46/64(72) 
6 12/12(100) 11/12(92) 12/12(100) 12/12(l 00 47/48(98) 
8 10/10(100) 9/10(90) 10/10(100) 10/10(100) 39/40(98) 
Candidate 2 44/48(92) 38/48 79 42/48(88) 43/48(90) 167/192 87 
One hypothesis might be that the agreement should improve as the scenarios progress and as the 
candidate is learning more about the level of performance required of him by the assessor. If this is not the case, 
then perhaps the feedback of performance is either inadequate, or is not being fully understood by the candidate. 
As shown in the above table, Candidate I shows overall greater agreement with the Assessor than 
Candidate 2, showing a 93% agreement compared to 87%. However, Candidate 2 improves to a greater degree - 
showing a 98% agreement in his last 2 scenarios. The overall agreement is consistent with the overall level of 
competency awarded. 
The numerical values representing performance were prepared in a similar method as for the agreement 
assessment. This is based on a "digital" representation of performance, where either the performance is good or is 
bad. If the decision is judged as a poor one then, as in the questionnaire, it is assumed that reaction to it will be 
poor. It must also be noted for simplicity that an "early" decision is judged to be as good as a timely decision as it 
shows a degree of foresight. This is something that is encouraged by the emergency management training 
organisations. However, "too early" is not represented in the questionnaire, as this would be considered as a poor 
decision. Also, to facilitate the numerical analysis, "late" is judged to be the same as "too late". Neither of these are 
ideal compromises. However, "too late" was only used on 1 occasion and "early" was used on 4 occasions - out of a 
total of 111 questions. Therefore, this is unlikely to significantly affect the analysis. 
Again, the total number of decisions was used as the maximum value. However, this time, the 
performance number was incremented only if it was judged to be good. When all the decisions have been added in 
this way, there will be a total number of "good" results, which is converted into a fraction of the total number of 
decisions. For example, consider the same situation as described earlier - where 10 decisions are identified in the 
scenario. The assessor believed 8 of them were "good", therefore his value is 8/10. However, the candidate believed 
that all 10 of them were "good" - therefore his value is 10 out of 10. Again, this was used to produce an `overall 
assessment" number for each scenario and each candidate for each of the 5 sections (quality, timeliness, 
communications, actions and overall rating). The results obtained are shown in table X. 
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Table 7: Numerical Assessment of Performance Indications 
Person / 
Scenario 
good decision 
(%) 
good timing 
(%) 
good 
communications 
good actions (%) overall 
Assessor /1 12/12(100) 11/12(92) 11/12(92) 10/12(82) 44/48(92) 
Candl /1 12/12(100) 11/12(92) 12/12(100) 12/12(100) 47/48(98) 
Assessor /3 14/14(100) 14/14(100) 14/14(100) 14/14(100) 56/56(100) 
Candl/3 - 14/14(100) 14/14(100) 14/14(100) 14/14(100) 56/56 100 
Assessor /5 14/15(93) 12/15(80) 14/15(93) 14/15(93) 54/60(90) 
Candl /5 15/15(100) 14/15(93) 15/15(100) 15/15(100) 59/60(98) 
Assessor/ 7 22/22(100) 22/22(100) 22/22 100 22/22(100) 88/88(100) 
Candl /7 21/22(95) 22/22(100) 21/22(95 20/22(95) 84/88(95) 
Assessor / all 
Candl 
62/63 (98) 59/63 (94) 61/63 (97) 60/63 (95) 242/252 (96) 
Candl / all, 
Candl 
62/63 (98) 61/63 (97) 62/63 (98) 61/63 (97) 246/252 (98) 
Assessor /2 9/10(90) 7/10(70) 8/10(80 9/10(90) 33/40(83) 
Cand2 /2 10/10(100) 9/10(90) 9/10(90) 10/10(100) 38/40(95 
Assessor /4 12/16(75) 11/16(69) 12/16(75) 12/16(75) 47/64(73) 
Cand2 /4 15/16(94) 14/16(88) 14/16(88) 15/1694 58/64(91) 
Assessor /6 12/12 (100) 11/12(92) 12/12(100) 12/12(100) 47/48(98) 
Cand2 /6 12/12(100) 11/12(92) 12/12(100) 12/12(l 00 47/48(98) 
Assessor /8 10/10(100) 9/10(90) 10/10 100 10/10(100) 39/40(98 
Cand2 /8 10/10(100) 10/10(100) 10/10(10 0 10/10(100) 40/40(100) 
Assessor / all 
Cand2 
43/48 (90) 38/48(79) 42/48 (88) 43/48 (90) 166/192 (86) 
Cand2 / all 
Cand2 
47/48 (98) 44/48 (92) 45/48 (94) 47/48 (98) 183/192 (95) 
When considering the marks awarded by the assessor, Candidate I obtained a best overall mark of 100% 
for scenarios 3 and 7. Candidate 2's best mark was 98% - for scenarios 6 and 8. These breakdowns of these results 
in terms of decision, timing, communication and action are also shown, as well as the overall performance marks. In 
this case, Candidate 1 was given an overall performance mark of 96%, whereas Candidate 2's mark was 86% - 
again reflecting the overall competency levels awarded. 
However, it must be noted that Candidate 1 made more decisions per scenario than Candidate 2- 
progressing slowly to a peak of 22 in his last scenario, compared with 16 in Candidate l's second scenario. This 
may also influence the assessor's opinion. In any case, it is necessary to carry out some form of statistical analysis 
to identify whether the results are meaningful. Therefore, this will be described in the next section. 
3.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
Statistical analysis should identify whether there is a relationship between the levels of competency 
awarded and the examiner's opinions of the decisions. The levels can be ranked in order - from highly competent to 
not competent. It can also be assumed from the results that there is continuity within the levels (for example, when 
a candidate was judged as being "better than before" but was still considered "competent). It was therefore decided 
tiat Spearman's correlation coefficient for ranked data would be the best method. Unfortunately, there would not be 
enough data to clarify significance in every part of the analysis. Ideally, we would want 210 examiner's opinions of 
the scenarios, 210 candidates carrying out the same scenario and 210 scenarios (Howell 1987). Therefore, the 
analysis of the overall performance scores for which we have 2 values would certainly be inadequate. However, the 
analysis of the 8 scenarios is possible and therefore a Spearman's test is carried out on the relationship between the 
numerical values and the levels of competency as shown in tables a and X. 
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Three analyses were carried out - the relationship between the level of competency awarded by the assessor and the 
assessor's opinions on decision quality, decision timing and overall decision assessment. It can be hypothesised that 
there should be a positive correlation between these factors - better individual decisions correlate with higher levels 
of competency being awarded The analysis should identify whether the assessment is made predominantly on 
particular features of the decisions (e. g. timeliness) or an overall impression of the decisions. It should also identify 
if the assessor is consistent in his marking or if the overall assessment is based on features outside of the 
questionnaire. This was carried out using numerical representation of the levels of competency (where highly 
competent > competent > notable shortfalls > not competent) and the percentage values are shown in brackets in 
table X. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in table 5. 
Table S: Spearman's Correlation Coefficient for Ranked Data carried out on Assessor's Data 
Relationship tested Spearman's coefficient r, 
Level of Com petency against Decision Quality 0.34 
Level of Com petency against Timing 0.48 
Level of Com petency against Overall decision assessment 0.55 
As it can be seen, in each case, the correlation is positive. This indicates that it is unlikely that someone who makes 
consistent poor or wrongly timed decisions will be considered as competent. Similarly, it is unlikely that someone 
who makes consistently good and timely decisions will be considered as having notable shortfalls. However, the 
correlation coefficients are not particularly strong. This may be due to the small amount of data available or due to 
inconsistencies within the data. 
However, it was noted that there was an apparent relationship between the actual number of decisions made and the 
level of competency awarded. Therefore, a Spearman's calculations was carried out on these data obtaining a value 
of r, = 0.7. This was somewhat surprising as this was independent of whether the decisions were good or bad. 
Therefore, the correlation between level of competency and the number of good decisions was evaluated. This 
resulted in a value of r, = 0.86 for the 8 scenarios. This is the strongest correlation obtained between the data. It 
suggests that the key indicator of competency level is the number of good decisions made per scenario - ignoring the 
overall relationship of good to bad decisions indicated by the % score (which gave a correlation of 0.34 as shown in 
the table). To confirm this, a correlation between the number of bad decisions and competency was calculated. It 
might be expected that this would produce a negative correlation - that is, the more bad decisions that are made, the 
lower the level of competency. However, Spearman's rho gave a value of 0.08 for this calculation. This indicates 
that although the relationship was approximately random, it was positive. This suggests that bad decisions do not 
adversely affect the competency assessment. The possible reasons for this will be discussed in the Section 4 of this 
Appendix. 
This questionnaire was intended to add the subjective opinions to the objective analysis carried out using the TPRC 
model. This could indicate whether the simulation data were a representative sample of emergency management 
practice and were not skewed towards excellence or incompetence. Although, there are not enough data to provide a 
full distribution of competency, these results suggest that this is the case. 
SECTION 4: IMPLICATIONS OF THE OUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
The questionnaires were designed to capture the subjective assessments of the simulations. This could 
help to identify the key features that affect the levels of competency awarded to the candidates. It could also be used 
to collect the subjective expert opinions of the quality of each emergency management decision. It was also deemed 
necessary to collect the candidate's opinions of his own decisions particularly with regard to those that were site- 
specific or context-based. In this case, the assessor was external to the installation and therefore would not 
necessarily have detailed knowledge of the installation. However, the candidate was being assessed on emergency 
management performance, which must relate partly to his specialist knowledge about the installation. Therefore, it 
was likely that the assessor would make judgments about performance based on assumptions rather than on definite 
information about the installation - which could be identified with feedback from the candidate. 
It was only possible to use the questionnaires in the 8 onshore simulations so there are no subjective 
offshore data. However, from the results shown in Section 3 of this Appendix, it can be seen that these yielded 
some interesting results. 
4.1 Discussion of Overall Ratings 
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The overall ratings of each scenario were analysed in three different ways. Firstly, "competency rating" 
was assessed against "comparison with previous scenario rating". This was designed to assess the consistency of the 
answers. If the competency rating was based on solid foundations and strict judgments, these should be consistent, 
hence providing the technique with some level of reliability. 
Secondly, the competency ratings of the candidate and the assessor were compared. This was designed to 
assess whether they were similar - hence basing their judgments on the same information. If there were vast 
differences, this would suggest that their opinions were based on different criteria. Therefore, it would be important 
to resolve these differences before the candidate could be expected to work towards the performance that the 
assessor would want to see; or, before the assessor could identify the critical performance behaviour that was seen 
to be necessary by the candidate. Finally, it was necessary to compare the assessments of individual scenarios with 
the collective opinion given at the end of the course. 
Initially, the questionnaire demonstrated that there was consistency in the overall ratings. For example, 
there were no occasions where a rating of "better than before" resulted in a lower competency rating than the 
previous scenario. This applied to both candidates and the assessor. This indicates that the use of a 4-choice 
competency assessment system is acceptable. The candidates and the assessor are able to assign a competency 
indicator to a performance, with consistency over time. Therefore, this suggests that either the assessors and 
candidates are able to memorize all of their previous responses or they are using selfMined criteria on which to 
base the competency assessment. Therefore, if they can remember earlier performances, they can compare them 
with the current performance and make a comparative judgment using their criteria. 
The agreement between the candidates and the assessor is a different matter. Both candidates give a self- 
assessment of "competent" for all of the scenarios, whereas the assessor's results were more varied. This may have 
been due to a broad definition of the terms on the part of the candidates. The results suggested that Candidate I was 
more negative in his self-assessments than the assessor whereas Candidate 2 was more positive. Therefore, as all 
three people showed internal consistency in their marking, this may suggest that the assessor's results also showed 
consistency between candidates. The assessor was motivated to pass both candidates but had a responsibility to 
ensure that only the candidates that are capable are assessed as competent. Given this, Candidate I was considered 
"competent" and Candidate 2 was considered to have "notable shortfalls" in the overall assessment. It is assumed 
that this was based on an overall rating of the week's performance rather than the eventual level of performance 
achieved. In the last of their scenarios, Candidate 1 was rated as "highly competent" and Candidate 2 was rated as 
"competent". During the week's scenarios, their performance improved to these levels. Therefore, based on their 
final performance, it would appear that both were capable of successfully managing an emergency. However, it is 
possible that their overall ratings were lowered due to their earlier failures, which suggested a lack of consistency 
in their competency. Therefore, according to these results, it appears that the assessor must identify a consistent 
level of competent (And highly competent) performances to award competency to a candidate. 
4.2 Discussion of Questionnaire Assessment of Individual Decisions 
The assessments of individual decisions were compared in two main ways. The candidate's judgments 
were compared with the assessor's decisions - to assess the agreement between the opinions. The second analysis 
involves the comparison of performance in decisions with overall scenario performance. This could only be carried 
out for the assessor as the candidates gave a rating of "competent" for every scenario so no differences were shown. 
The answers were converted into numerical values, which facilitated the use of statistical analysis. 
Feedback is generally considered one of the important parts of learning - and most particularly in 
emergency management training (Carrol & Kidd 1991). The agreement of performance ratings indicates that the 
candidate and assessor are looking for the same types of performance. Therefore, if the candidate knows he was late 
making a decision, or that a decision was not communicated well to the appropriate parties - this will be identified 
in the questionnaire. If the candidate does not know that he erred, this suggests that he does not know the 
performance requirements of the assessor. The assessor should rectify this by providing feedback to ensure 
improvements in performance. In these results, it was discovered that Candidate 1 showed a higher level of 
agreement with the assessor than Candidate 2. This is consistent with the final competency level assigned. It would 
be expected that greater agreement indicates greater understanding of the requirements of the test, therefore 
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resulting in improved performance. However, these results showed greater improvements in agreement by 
Candidate 2. This may perhaps reinforce the idea that the competency assessment is based on the whole week of 
scenarios rather than the later ones. 
The second assessment involved the overall assessment of decisions. Instead of comparing the 
relationship between the assessor's judgment and the candidate's judgment, this obtains numerical results based on 
whether the ratings were "good" or `not good". Therefore, based on our understanding of emergency management, 
"early" and "timely" are both considered good, whereas "too early", "late" and "too late" are not. A large 
percentage indicated a large number of decisions that were "good". This was carried out for quality, timeliness, 
communication, action and an overall rating. Again, Candidate I achieved the better results - both in terms of self 
and assessor ratings - obviously making a greater percentage of good decisions. 
As suggested in Chapter 2, making "good and timely" decisions is a critical part of emergency 
management. Ensuring that these decisions are communicated successfully to the relevant people and that they are 
implemented are equally as important to ensure that the desired outcome is achieved. Chapter 2 and Appendix 1 list 
many attributes that are typical or recommended in an emergency manager. These included leadership, delegation, 
team working etc. However, these attributes are believed to make decision-making and the communication of 
decisions more effective and efficient. This in turn will make an impact on the emergency. Therefore, it may not be 
necessary to assess an emergency manager in terms of his attributes and behaviour - but to focus on his ability to 
make "good and timely" decisions and ensure that they are implemented. 
If this is the case, it should be possible to obtain a high correlation between the results of the decision 
analysis and the overall competency assessment of each scenario. Therefore, it was necessary to carry out statistical 
analysis, in the form of a Spearman's correlation coefficient test. The main factors were decision quality (good or 
bad), timeliness and the overall assessment (a value that incorporated judgments of quality, timeliness, 
communications and actions). These three factors were each correlated against overall scenario rating (notable 
shortfalls, competent, highly competent). Again, these would only be carried out for the assessor's ratings as the 
candidates gave a rating of "competent" for every scenario. Spearman's rho indicated a positive correlation for these 
three relationships. This indicated that the higher the quality of decisions, the more likely it was to receive a higher 
competency rating. However, although the correlations were positive, they were not very high (decision quality = 
0.34, timeliness = 0.48, overall = 0.55). The relationship between overall decision rating and competency indicated 
that there were other factors that were important. 
As it appeared from the results that competency was linked to the number of decisions that were made, 
this correlation was calculated. It was somewhat surprising that it resulted in a rho value of 0.7. As this was 
notably higher than the overall assessment of the decisions, it was decided that a further calculation should be 
carried out " between number of good decisions and competency. This resulted in a rho value of 0.86. From these 
statistical assessments, it would seem that competency is based partly on the number of good decisions made per 
scenario. Given that the relationship between competency and bad decisions was calculated as 0.08, this reinforced 
the idea that the assessment was focused predominantly on good decisions. It was initially thought that weighting 
the decisions might help to identify how the competency assessments could come up with this result. In the current 
system, there is no indication of whether the decision is bad because it adversely affects the outcome of the 
emergency or if it is just unnecessary. However, in Scenario 4, Candidate 2 made 4 bad decisions. The assessor 
recommended that he should have used full blowdown as opposed to a limited blowdown. He should not have 
ordered 10 ambulances and 10 fire engines when he did not really know the extent of the incident. Further to this, 
he did not protect the surrounding areas from column depressurisation, which should have been carried out at the 
beginning of the incident. The other decision was to move the muster point to the tail gas unit, which was not made 
by the candidate but was implemented nevertheless. The numbers of ambulances and fire engines were considered 
to be "overkill" but would not have provided further risk. However, the blowdown and column depressurisation 
were decisions that could potentially affect the outcome of the emergency. This scenario was said to have been 
managed "competently" whereas earlier scenarios with no bad decisions were said to have "notable shortfalls". 
This fact, together with the results of the correlations, suggests that the assessor may be influenced more by the 
apparent activities of the emergency manager than the expected impact of his actions. That is, perhaps leadership 
qualities and delegation skills may have been emphasized as being more important than their impact on the 
decision-making and emergency action. Clearly, it may seem illogical that the number of poor decisions resulted in 
a positive correlation with competency, however this reinforces the concept that the emergency management 
assessment techniques and risk assessment techniques focus on different factors. 
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SECTION 5: CRITIOUE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
5.1 Questionnaire Design 
As mentioned earlier, any changes to the questionnaire would have produced a disruption to the scenario 
procedure. As the simulations were run for the purpose of assessment rather than research, the scenario organiser 
indicated that they could only be short. Therefore, unfortunately there were many aspects that could not be 
investigated as is discussed in Section 13.5 of the main report. 
The questionnaire produced some illogical results - particularly relating the assessment of individual 
decisions in relation to the competency level awarded to that specific scenario. This could be due to the brevity of 
the questionnaire rather than weaknesses in the assessment process. Aspects that were critical to assessment, such 
as delegation skills, team organisation and efficient communication of information, may not have been adequately 
represented in the questionnaire. In general, the questionnaire was relevant to the TPRC model, rather than 
capturing the essence of emergency management assessment. The focus was on emergency management's relation 
to its outcome rather than the organisational skills promoting it. Therefore, this does may help to explain why the 
correlation between the number of bad decisions and competency was small but positive. 
5.2 Questionnaire Procedure 
Like the scenario arrangements, the questionnaire procedure relied on the availability of personnel. 
Therefore, only the main assessor and the emergency management candidate were available to answer 
questionnaires. This meant that any valuable data, from the scenario organiser or emergency management team 
members, were lost. Also, in the total research project, there was only information recorded for 8 scenarios - 
representing I assessor and 2 emergency management candidates. With such a small number of participants, these 
results can hardly be representative of candidates, assessors and scenarios as a whole. 
However, from the results, it can be seen that both candidates give a self-assessment of "competent" for 
all of the scenarios. This may have been due to a broad definition of the term. However, it may also be linked to 
experimenter effects - or in this case, assessor effects. Although the candidate was reassured that the answers would 
not influence their overall assessment, they may not have believed this and were trying to "impress" the assessor or 
bias him into giving them a good competency rating. It may also be due to biases or heuristics. Consider the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This involves basing future judgments on adjustments of the first judgment. It 
is likely that the candidates will use "competent" as their main answer for this reason. Overall, this suggests that an 
independent assessor should be used - someone who is not the same person who trained the emergency management 
candidate. This would ensure that the candidate is genuinely making effort towards effective emergency 
management rather than focusing on behaviour that will "please" the assessor. This will also ensure that the 
assessor is not biased by having built up knowledge of the candidate's management style or personality. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that because the questionnaire was given at the end of the scenario, some 
aspects will have been forgotten. For example, if the emergency manager makes a decision which is later realised to 
be erroneous. By the end of the scenario, the emergency manager will know this was poor and would be unlikely to 
say otherwise in a questionnaire. They may even forget what good reasons were evident for making the decision at 
the time. Therefore, giving the questionnaire at the end of the scenario produces results that are biased by the 
outcome. If the questions regarding each decision could be asked immediately after each decision (and before any" 
consequences could occur), this would produce a better understanding of emergency management decision-making. 
The main conclusions from this research are shown in the main report in Section 12.5 and comparisons between the 
questionnaires and the TPRC modelling are shown in Section 11.2.2.2. 
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SECTION 6: QUESTIONNAIRES 
Questionnaire for Examiners in Emergency Management Training Exercise (may be answered either 
individually or as a group) 
Examiner No (if required): ........................... Scenario Title / Number .............................. Date:....... /..... /...... 
Concerning The Objective :.......................................................................... 
Do you think the candidate successfully managed this aspect of the emergency? 
YES / NO 
Was the decision to ..................................................... 
A good one? 
YES I NO 
Underline the most appropriate word describing the 
timing of this decision 
TOO EARLY, EARLY, TIMELY, LATE, TOO LATE. 
If you believe the decision was mis-timed, when 
would YOU have carried out this decision (relate this 
to the events that occurred)? 
......................................................... 
......................................................... 
Was this decision communicated in such a way that 
the people who were designated to carry out the 
actions could respond immediately? 
YES / NO 
Did the people who were designated to carry out the 
action respond to the communication correctly and 
immediately? 
YES / NO 
If NO, why do you believe this was the case? 
..................................................................... 
..................................................................... 
ý 
Why was this not a good decision? 
And what would YOU believe to 
be the correct decision (please 
continue overleaf if required) 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
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In your opinion, what was the overall level of competence displayed by the candidate in THIS scenario 
ONLY? 
HIGHLY COMPETENT / COMPETENT I NOTABLE SHORTFALLS / NOT COMPETENT 
Please make brief comments to indicate why this level was awarded if they have not been covered in the 
previous sections 
........................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................... How does this compare to the previous scenarios managed by this candidate? 
NOT AS GOOD AS BEFORE / SAME AS BEFORE I BETTER THAN BEFORE 
.......................................... ................................................................................. 
........................................................................................................................... 
Thank you VERY much for your time in answering this questionnaire 
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Questionnaire for Candidates in Emergency Management Training Exercise 
Candidate No (if required): ........................... Scenario Title / Number .............................. Date: ....... /..... /1998 
Concerning The Objective :.......................................................................... 
Do you think you successfully managed this aspect of the emergency? 
YES / NO 
Was the decision to ..................................................... 
A good one? 
YES I NO 
Underline the most appropriate word describing the 
timing of this decision 
TOO EARLY, EARLY, TIMELY, LATE, TOO LATE. 
If you believe the decision was mis-timed, when 
should you have carried out this decision (relate this 
to the events that occurred)? 
Was this decision communicated in such a way that 
the people who were designated to carry out the 
actions could respond immediately? 
YES/NO 
Did the people who were designated to carry out the 
action respond to the communication correctly and 
immediately? 
YES/NO 
If NO, why do you believe this was the case? 
..................................................................... 
ý 
Why was this not a good decision? 
And what would you now believe 
to be the correct decision (please 
continue overleaf if required) 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
In your opinion, what was the overall level of competence displayed by yourself in THIS scenario ONLY? 
HIGHLY COMPETENT / COMPETENT / NOTABLE SHORTFALLS / NOT COMPETENT 
Please make brief comments to indicate why this level was chosen if they have not been covered in the 
previous sections 
........................................................................................................................... 
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........................................................................................................................... 
How does this compare to the previous scenarios managed by yourself? 
NOT AS GOOD AS BEFORE / SAME AS BEFORE / BETTER THAN BEFORE 
........................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................... 
Thank you VERY much for your time in answering this questionnaire 
SECTION 7: RESULTS FROM QUESTIONNAIRES 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated 
well? 
Action expected? 
Examiner's view 
Scenario I 
Activate level I good timely yes yes 
Isolate spillage good timely yes yes 
Direct assets down 
specific route 
good - timely yes yes 
Stop outfall good timely yes yes 
Get police to 
reassure villagers 
good timely yes yes 
Turn foam monitor 
off 
good timely yes yes 
cool diesel tanks good - timely yes yes 
contain problem good timely yes yes 
mobilise fire trucks good timely no - no indication of 
severity 
no - see comms 
send search and 
rescue team 
good timely yes no - problems in 
reporting in. 
call priority 1 and 2 
calls 
good late yes yes 
muster good timely yes yes 
Candidate's view 
Scenario 1 
Activate level I good timely yes yes 
Isolate spillage good timely yes yes 
Direct assets down 
specific route 
good timely yes yes 
Stop outfall good timely yes yes 
Get police to 
reassure villagers 
good . .. timely yes yes 
Turn foam monitor 
off 
good timely yes yes 
cool diesel tanks good late yes yes 
contain problem good timely yes yes 
mobilise fire trucks good timely yes yes 
send search and 
rescue team 
good timely yes yes 
call priority I and 2 good timely yes, yes 
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calls 
must muster gcx)d timely yes I yes 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated 
well? 
Action expected? 
Examiner's view 
Scenario 2 
muster good timely yes yes 
activate level I good timely yes yes 
pn on !X1 and 2 calls good late yes yes 
order crane good timely yes yes 
rescue AE using 
crane 
bad - recommend he 
waits for the fire 
brigade 
N/A N/A N/A 
get extra air for AE good timely yes yes 
assess cloud with 
portable gas 
monitors 
good timely yes yes 
make 1" PA good late yes yes 
make 2 PA good timely yes yes 
activate off-site plan good timely no yes 
Candidate's view 
Scenario 2 
muster good timely yes yes 
activate level I good timely yes yes 
priority I and 2 calls good timely yes yes 
order crane good timely yes yes 
rescue AE using 
crane 
good timely yes yes 
get extra air for AE good timely yes yes 
assess cloud with 
portable gas 
monitors 
good timely yes yes 
make I't PA good late yes yes 
make 2 PA good timel yes yes 
activate off-site plan good timely no yes 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated 
well? 
Action expected? 
Examiner's view 
Scenario 3 
activate level 1 ood early yes yes 
activate platform 
alarm 
good early yes yes 
muster good timely yes yes 
activate fixed 
monitors 
good timely yes yes 
order extra assets 
(PI calls) 
good timely yes yes 
move forward 
muster point 
good timely yes yes 
start 1" PA good timely yes yes 
-stop outfall 
good early yes yes 
get foam down 
drains 
good early yes yes 
get water curtains on 
tanker 
good timely yes yes 
isolate manual valve good timely yes yes 
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isolate leak good timely yes yes 
depressurise 
refrigeration unit 
good timely yes yes 
find missing person good timely yes yes 
Candidate's view 
Scenario 3 
activate level l good timely yes yes 
activate platform 
alarm 
good timely yes yes 
muster good timely yes yes 
activate fixed 
monitors 
good timely yes yes 
order extra assets 
1 calls) 
good timely yes yes 
move forward 
muster point 
good timely yes yes 
start 1 s" PA good timely es yes 
stop outfall good timely yes yes 
get foam down 
drains 
good timely yes yes 
get water curtains on 
tanker 
good timely yes yes .. 
isolate manual valve good timely yes 
isolate leak good timel yes yes 
depressurise 
refrigeration unit 
good timely yes yes 
find missing person good timely yes es 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated Action expected? 
well? 
Examiner's view 
Scenario 4 
Level I Shutdown good timely yes yes 
Limited blowdown bad - full blowdown 
necessary 
Priority I calls good timely es es 
Muster good timely yes es 
Set up forward good timely yes yes 
muster point - 
Order resources good timely- yes yes 
Order 10 bad - overkill, too - 
ambulances and 10 early to determine 
fire engines problem was this 
severe 
Depressurise tail gas good timely yes yes 
unit 
Move forward bad - not candidate's 
muster point to tail decision 
gas unit 
Move forward good timely yes yes 
muster point to gas 
sweetening unit 
Evoke off-site plan good timely es yes 
Search and rescue good -- 
timely yes yes 
missing person 
Divert ambulance to good timely yes yes 
workshop 
Move main muster good timely es yes 
401 
point to muster point 
2 
Not protecting the bad - protection N/A N/A N/A 
surrounding areas should have been put 
from column in place at the 
depressurisation beinnin 
Isolate source of fire good late yes yes 
Candidate's views 
Scenario 4 
Level I Shutdown good timely yes yes 
Limited blowdown good timely yes yes 
Priority I calls good timely yes yes 
Muster good timely yes yes 
Set up forward good timely yes yes 
muster point 
Order resources good time] yes yes 
Order 10 good timely yes yes 
ambulances and 10 
fire engines 
Depressurise tail gas good timely yes yes 
unit 
Move forward no - error on focus N/A N/A N/A 
muster point to tail board 
gas unit 
Move forward good timely no - errors from yes 
muster point to gas focus board 
sweetening unit 
Evoke ofd site plan good late yes yes 
Search and rescue good timely yes yes 
missing person 
Divert ambulance to good timely yes yes 
-workshop Move main muster good timely yes yes 
point to muster point 
2 
Not protecting the good timely (N/A) yes (N/A) yes (N/A) 
surrounding areas 
from column 
dcpressurisation 
Isolate source of fire good timely yes yes 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated 
well? 
Action expected? 
Examiner's view 
Scenario 5 
Activate level I Food timely es yes 
Muster good timely yes yes 
Get fire engine via 
Colliery road 
good timely yes yes 
Knock outfall off good timely yes yes 
Mobilise fire truck 
to forward muster 
-point 
good timely yes yes 
Send BAs to the men good timely yes yes 
Identify and contain 
leak 
good late yes yes 
Priority 1 calls good timely yes yes 
Use ambulance to bad - unnecessary N/A N/A N/A 
402 
rescue man and dog 
Direct R to make good timely yes yes 
calls 
Search/rescue good timely yes yes 
missing man 
Break into lab to get good timely yes yes 
BAs to F 
Get foam to spillage good late yes yes 
TPS 
Keep police car at good timely yes yes 
the gate to divert 
traffic 
Get 1 police car to 
- 
good timely yes yes 
tour the village 
Candidate's view 
Scenario 5 
Activate level I good timely yes yes 
Muster good timely es yes 
Get fire engine via good timely yes yes 
Colliery road 
Knock outfall off good timely yes yes 
Mobilise fire truck good timely yes yes 
to forward muster 
point 
Send BAs to the men good timely yes yes 
Identify and contain good timely yes yes 
leak 
Priority I calls good timely es es 
Use ambulance to good timely yes yes 
rescue man and dog 
Direct R to make good timely yes yes 
calls 
Search/rescue good timely yes yes 
missing man 
Break into lab to get good timely yes yes 
BAs to F 
Get foam to spillage good late yes yes 
. TPS 
Keep police car at good timely yes yes 
the gate to divert 
traffic 
Get I police car to good timely yes yes 
tour the village 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated 
well? 
Action expected? 
Examiner's view 
Scenario 6 
Make V PA good too late yes yes 
Isolate the rich 
amine sator 
good timely yes yes 
Manual isolations good ° timely yes yes 
Muster good timely yes yes 
Level I shutdown good timet yes yes 
Make priority l&2 
calls 
good timely yes yes 
Put outfall off good timely yes yes 
Evoke offsite plan 'good timely yes yes 
403 
Depressurise GSU A 
andB 
good timely yes yes 
Get foam down 
drains and TPS 
good timely yes yes 
Locate missing men good timely yes yes 
Send ambulances to 
railway 
good timely yes yes 
Candidate's view 
Scenario 6 
Make I' PA good late yes yes 
Isolate the rich 
amine separator 
good timely yes yes 
Manual isolations good timely yes yes 
Muster Rood timely yes yes 
Level I shutdown good timely yes yes 
Make priority 1 &2 
calls 
good timely yes yes 
Put outfall off good timely yes yes 
DE&MUS U40 A SSW 
and B 
Get foam down 
drains and TPS 
good timely yes yes - 
Locate missing men good timely yes yes 
Send ambulances to 
railway 
good timely yes yes 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated Action expected? 
well? 
Examiner's view 
Scenario 7 
Muster good timely yes yes 
Priority I&2 calls good timely yes yes 
Level I shutdown good timely yes yes 
Activate platform good timely yes yes 
alarms 
Activate fixed good timely yes yes 
monitors 
Outfall off good timely yes yes 
Move the forward good timely yes yes 
muster point forward 
Set the water good timely yes yes 
curtains up 
Shut the turbine good timely yes yes 
down 
Send the fire engines good timely yes yes 
through the colliery 
Ensure the fire good timely yes yes 
engines have cutting 
equipment 
Get tarpaulins to good timely yes yes 
protect casualties 
from hot oil 
Get someone to good timely yes yes 
reassure casualties 
Get assistance in good timely yes yes 
cutting to remove 
casualties 
Isolate leak good timely yes yes 
404 
Identify hissing good timely yes yes 
(further leak) 
Get police to tour, good timely yes yes 
village 
Get nitrogen purge good timely yes yes 
on sales gas 
manifold 
Mobilise crane good timely yes yes 
driver 
Depressurise line good timely yes yes 
Make 1`` PA good timely yes es 
Make 2 PA good timely es yes 
Candidate's view 
_ Scenario 7 
Muster good timely yes yes 
Priority I&2 calls good timely yes yes 
Level I shutdown good timely yes yes 
Activate platform good timely yes yes 
alarms 
Activate fixed good timely yes yes 
monitors 
Outfall off good timely yes yes 
Move the forward good timely yes yes 
muster point forward 
Set the water good timely yes yes 
curtains up 
Shut the turbine No - shouldn't have N/A N/A N/A 
down ha ed 
Send the fire engines good timely yes yes- 
through the colliery 
Ensure the fire good timely yes yes 
engines have cutting 
ui ent 
Get tarpaulins to good timely yes no 
protect casualties 
from hot oil 
Get someone to good timely yes yes 
reassure casualties 
Get assistance in good timely yes yes 
cutting to remove 
casualties 
Isolate leak good timely yes no 
Identify hissing good timely yes yes 
(further leak) 
Get police to tour good timely yes yes 
village 
Get nitrogen purge good timely yes yes 
on sales gas 
manifold 
Mobilise crane good timely yes yes 
driver 
Depressurise line Rood timely yes yes 
Make A good timely es yes 
Make good timely yes yes 
Decision Good/Bad Timing Communicated I Action expected? 
well? 
Examiner's view 
405 
Scenario 8 
Muster good timely yes yes 
Order crane to GSU 
B 
good timely yes yes 
Police car to tour 
village 
good timely yes yes 
Priority 1 calls good timely yes yes 
Shutdown level I good timely yes yes 
Send nurse to 
casualty 
good timely yes yes 
Send electrician to 
start fire water 
PUMPS 
good timely yes yes 
Outfall off good timely yes yes, 
Not to blowdown good timely yes yes 
Evoke off -site plan good late yes yes 
Candidate's view 
Scenario 8 _ 
Muster good timely yes yes 
Order crane to GSU 
B 
good timely yes yes 
Police car to tour 
village 
good timely yes yes 
Priority I calls good timely yes yes 
Shutdown level l good timely yes yes 
Send nurse to 
casualty 
good timely yes yes 
Send electrician to 
start fire water 
um 
good timely yes yes 
Outfall off good timely yes yes 
Not to blowdown good time] yes yes 
Evoke of site plan good timely yes yes 
406 
APPENDIX 10: NUMERICAL DISTRIBUTIONS PARAMETERS 
Post-Incident Offshore Data (E & C) 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of MEAN MA MI 
- SQUARES SQUARED X N 
scenario organisation 8.970297 202 1812 6.9259 25896 80.46623 39 1 
team's informational 85 
calls 
scenario organisation 1.768116 207 366 0.8891 810 3.126234 5 1 
team's non- 73 
informational calls 
emergency 5.09901 101 515 3.2573 3687 25.9999 16 1 
management team's 15 
informational calls 
emergency 1.351695 236 319 0.6710 537 1.827079 6 1 
management team's 09 
non-informational calls 
scenario organisation 5.325183 409 2178 6.0851 26706 28.35758 39 1 
team's calls 29 
emergency 2.474777 337 834 . 2.5354 4224 6.124523 16 1 
management team's 84 
calls 
non-informational calls 1.546275 443 685 0.8069 1347 2.390968 6 1 
29 
informational calls 7.679868 303 2327 6.2274 29583 58.98037 39 1 
62 
radio calls 4.037534 746 3012 5.0192 30930 16.30168 39 1 
85 
delays between 1.51277 509 770 1.9568 3110 2.288473 21 0 
dependent radio calls 01 
(question - answer) 
announcements - 3.315096 987 3272 4.4032 29964 10.98986 43 1 
31 
delays to 0.535109 413 221 1.0366 561 0.286342 7 0 
announcements 36 
Total time to deliver a 28.625 120 3435 16.211 129603 819.3906 115 9 
message (NB. does not 87 
include repeat attempts 
to call) 
Time from standby to 30.42857 - 7 213 20.040 8891 925.898 53 2 
calling back 44 
Totally intelligible 4 5 20 4.4721 160 16 11 1 
calls - 36 
Partially intelligible 11 26 286 8.8994 5126 121 39 1 
calls 38 
Time left between 15.39394 33 508 16.811 16864 236.9734 83 2 
failed attempts to call 34 
in/out 
Delays to answer 8.888889 27 240 7.7674 3702 79.01235 37 2 
phone 53 
Time at which phone 
stopped ringing (not 
answered) 
Phone call length 24.78571 14 347 16.816 12277 614.3316 64 2 
56 
Information known in 100.1613 31 3105 214.01 1685123 10032.28 102 5 
EMT-SO 89 2 
Information known in 33.79762 84 2839 23.923 143455 1142.279 117 1 
SO-EMT 46 
407 
Time to initiate 15.22222 9 137 14.069 3669 231.716 - 38 .' 1 ' following orders 27 
I 
(control panel work) 
, Incident - control 7.5 8 60 12.671 1574 56.25 29 0 
panels and instruments 68 
respond 
Control panel response 33.7 10 337 37.985 24343 1135.69 121 4 
- operator response 52 
Time to initiate 27.46341 41 1126 29.914 66720 754.2391 126 1 
following orders 96 
(calling others 
outsidelmovin 
Delays from being 34 57 1938 78.861 414160 1156 467 2 
given information 09 
externally - drawing 
the attention of the 
group to it 
Time out announced - 28.83333 18 519 14.345 18463 831.3611 69 11 
started 53 
Time out length 50.28571 21 1056 29.614 70642 2528.653 127 20 
43 
Delay between time 281.75 16 4508 102.21 1426834 79383.06 491 111 
outs 06 
Incident - first time out 230.2 5 1151 57.286 278087 52992.04 313 154 
starts 12 
CCR aware of incident 226 5 1130 56.780 268276 51076 312 153 
- first time out starts 28 
EM arrives - first time 165.2 5 826 29.727 139990 27291.04 193 122 
out starts 09 
Incident - start first 258.6 5 1293 338.61 793007 66873.96 749 15 
informational tannoy 38 
EM arrives - starts first 578.5 2 1157 170.41 698365 334662.3 699 458 
informational tannoy 27 
Incident - starts first 20.2 5 101 8.2885 2315 408.04 34 15 
tarn 46 
Tannoy length 16.66667 27 450 9.8253 10010 277.7778 40 1 
99 
Time between tannoys 282.0435 23 6487 249.61 3200347 79548.52 807 2 
16 
Incident - start of first 64.8 5 324 37.612 26654 4199.04 92 5 
call out from CR 5 
Incident - start of first 36.6 5 183 33.125 11087 1339.56 86 1 
call into CR from 52 
incident 
Incident - start of first 76.2 5 381 67.046 47013 5806.44 184 7 informational call into 25 
CR from incident site 
Incident - EM arrives 65 5 325 57.078 34157 4225 166 31 
89 
Incident - call EM 40 5 200 36.851 13432 1600 102 13 
05 
call EM - EM arrives 25 5 125 22.327 5119 625 64 7 
11 
EM arrives - EM's first 18.4 5 92 21.881 3608 338.56 56 2 
response 5 
Incident - EM's first 74.6 5 373 52.438 38825 5565.16 168 45 
response 54 
408 
Post-Incident Onshore Data (L & P) 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of MEAN MA MI 
SQUARES SQUARED X N 
scenario organisation 6.413386 508 3258 4.2771 30170 41.13152 25 1 
team's informational - 79 
calls 
scenario organisation 1.428571 525 750 0.7343 1354 2.040816 6 1 
team's non- 42 
informational calls .. 
emergency 5.766773 313 1805 3.9337 15237 33.25567 26 1 
management team's 36 
informational calls 
emergency 1.307554 556 727 0.7082 1229 1.709697 8 1 
management team's 63 
non-informational calls 
scenario organisation 3.879961 103 4008 3.9341 31524 15.0541 25 1 
team's calls 5 87 
emergency 2.913694 869 2532 3.2358 16466 8.489612 26 1 
management team's 39 
calls 
non-informational calls 1.366327 108 1477 0.7232 2583 1.866851 8 1 
1 48 
informational calls 6.16687 821 5063 4.1590 45407 38.03028 26 1 
54 
radio calls 3.438486 190 6540 3.6626 47990 11.82318 26 1 
2 77 
delays between 1.77745 135 2412 1.7189 8294 3.159329 16 0 
dependent radio calls 7 71 
(question - answer) 
announcements 4.49322 118 5302 6.9958 81526 . 
20.18903 59. 1 
0 76 
delays to 0.886194 536 475 1.4889 1607 0.78534 14 0 
announcements 36 
Total time to deliver a 24.90882 340 8469 13.653 274151 620.4495 107 6 
message (NB. does not 76 
include repeat attempts 
. to call) 
Time from standby to 38.09677 31 1181 77.773 226453 1451.364 436 1 
calling back 33 
Totally unintelligible 4.404762 42 185 4.2601 1559 19.40193 22 1 
calls 93 
Partially intelligible 7.482143 112 838 3.9318 7986 55.98246 20 1 
calls 11 
Time left between 10.17241 58 590 10.397 12164 103.478 60 1 
failed attempts to call 6 
in/out 
Delays to answer 4.550459 109 496 6.0667 6232 20.70667 46 0 
phone 37 
Time at which phone 21.5 6 129 7.6876 3069 462.25 32 14 
stopped ringing (not 52 
answered) 
Phone call length 24.31111 45 1094 12.383 33344 591.0301 61 7 
68 
Information known in 65.92157 51 3362 72.661 485616 4345.653 390 4 
EMT-SO 91 
Information known in 37.58242 91 3420 28.311 200670 1412.438 159 7 
SO - EMT 39 
Time to initiate 10.58824 17 180 13.252 4716 112.1107 48 0 
following orders 64 
409 
(control panel work) 
Incident - control 
panels and instruments 
respond 
Control panel response 0 1 0 (N/A) 0 0 0 0 
operator response 
Time to initiate 25.10638 47 1180 36.428 90668 630.3305 154 0 
following orders 15 
(calling others 
outsidelmovin 
Delays from being 25.06061 66 1654 38.980 140218 628.034 216 I 
given information 82 
externally - drawing 
the attention of the 
group to it 
Time out announced - 30.6 35 1071 13.797 39245 936.36 70 0 
started 27 
Time out length 68.54286 35 2399 21.946 180811 4698.123 132 28 
92 
Delay between time 458.8462 26 11930 266.10 7244278 210539.8 144 83 
outs 1 3 
Incident - first time out 245 9 2205 98.642 618067 60025 404 111 
starts 03 
CCR aware of incident 233.2222 9 2099 126.51 617585 54392.6 482 96 
- first time out starts 66 
EM arrives - first time 
out starts 
Incident - start first 620.25 8 4962 257.14 3540554 384710.1 963 166 
informational tann 74 
EM arrives - starts first 
informational tann 
Incident - starts first 527.8889 9 4751 305.95 3256845 
278666.7 963 104 
tannoy 03 
Tannoy length 18.66667 15 280 4.9809 5574 348.4444 29 13 
16 
Time between tannoys 1059 6 6354 606.72 8569442 1121481 193 299 
17 8 
Incident - start of first 10.66667 9 96 
6.8920 1404 113.7778 22 3 
call out from CR 24 
Incident - start of first 26.55556 9 
239 35.826 16615 705.1975 88 1 
call into CR from 36 
incident 
Incident - start of first 40.66667 9 366 52.995 37352 
1653.778 156 1 
informational call into 28 
CR from incident site 
Incident - EM arrives 
Incident - call EM 
call EM - EM arrives 
EM arrives - EM's first 
response 
Incident - EM 's fast 34.11111 9 307 45.468 27011 1163.568 152 5 
response 24 
410 
Pre-incident data (Onshore) 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of MEAN MA MI 
SQUARES SQUARED X N 
scenario organisation 4.96875 32 159 3.8309 1245 24.68848 16 1 
team's informational 8 
calls 
scenario organisation 1.44 25 36 0.6506 62 2.0736 3 1 
team's non- 41 
informational calls 
emergency 7.428571 14 104 4.6195 1050 55.18367 15 2 
management team's 95 
informational calls 
emergency 1.1818 22 26 0.5010 36 1.396694 3, 1 
management team's 81 
non-informational 
calls 
scenario organisation 3.421053 57 195 3.3803 1307 11.70358 16 .1 team's calls 39 
emergency 3.61111 36 130 4.1971 1086 13.04012 15 1 
management team's 27 
calls 
non-informational 1.3191489 47 62 0.5936 98 1.740154 3 1 
calls 76 
informational calls 5.7173913 46 263 4.1934 2295 32.68856 16 1 
5 
radio calls 3.494624 93 325 3.6967 2393 12.21239 16 1 
19 
delays between 1.957746 71 139 1.4778 425. 3.832771 
, 
8 0-,, 
dependent radio 04 
calls (question - 
answer) 
announcements 3.190476 21 67 3.3259 435 10.179138 14 1 
44 
delays to 3.307692 13 43 3.9662 331 10.94083 15 < 0 
announcements 03 
time to follow orders 5.5 2 11 6.3639 101 30.25 10 1 
61 
Total time to deliver 22.72222 18 409 6.1242 9931 516.2994 35 11 
a message (NB. does' 58 
not include repeat 
attempts to call) 
Pre-incident data (Offshore) 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of 
SQUARES 
MEAN 
SQUARED 
MA 
X 
MI 
N 
scenario organisation 3 1 3 (0) 9 . 9 3 3 
team's informational 
calls 
scenario organisation 
team's non- 
411 
informational calls 
emergency 
management team's 
informational calls 
emergency 
management team's 
non-informational 
calls 
scenario organisation 3 1 3 (0) 9 9 3 3 
team's calls 
emergency 
management team's 
calls 
non-informational 
calls 
informational calls 3 1 3 (0) 9 9 3 3 
radio calls 3 1 3 (0) 9 9 3 3 
delays between 
dependent radio 
calls (question - 
answer) 
announcements 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 
delays to 0 1 0 (0) 0 0 0 0 
announcements 
time to follow orders 
Total time to deliver 
a message (NB. does 
not include repeat 
attempts to call 
Post-Incident Onshore data (where rated as highly competent) 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of MEAN MA MI 
SQUARES SQUARE. X N 
D 
scenario organisation 5.925287 174 1031 4.3383 9365 35.10903 25 1 
team's informational 15 
calls 
scenario organisation 1.289308 159 205 0.5436 311 1.662316 4 1 
team's non- 16 
informational calls 
emergency 6.09434 106 646 4.9019 6460 37.14098 26 1 
management team's 5 
informational calls 
emergency 1.337209 172 230 0.8866 442 1.788129 8 1 
management team's 85 
non-informational 
calls 
scenario organisation 3.711712 333 1236 3.9148 9676 13.7768 25 1 
team's calls 79 
emergency 3.151079 278 876 3.8667 6902 9.9293 26 1 
management team's 59 
calls 
non-informational 1.314199 331 435 0.7412 753 1.72712 8 1 
412 
calls 59 
informational calls 5.989286 280 1677 4.5519 15825 35.87154 26 1 
57 
radio calls 3.456628 611 2112 3.8998 16578 11.94828 26 1 
95 
delays between, 1.786207 435 777 1.9243 2995 3.190535 15 0 
dependent radio 27 
calls (question - 
answer) 
announcements 4.222386 679 2867 6.2314 38433 17.82854 50 1 
53 
delays to 0.830816 331 275 1.5845 1057 0.690255 14 0 
announcements 14 
Total time to deliver 24.5431 116 2847 12.581 88077 602.3639 70 7 
a message (NB. does 14 
not include repeat 
attempts to call) 
Time from standby 34.91667 12 419 33.765 27171 1219.174 109 1 
to calling back 12 
Totally unintelligible 4.315789 19 82 3.9728 638 18.62604 14 1 
calls 61 
Partially intelligible 7.610169 59 449 3.8237 4265 57.91468 20 2 
calls 77 
Time left between 15.26667 15 229 17.762 7913 233.0711 60 2 
failed attempts to 19 
call in/out 
Delays to answer 3.83871 31 119 3.9841 933 14.73569 15 1 
phone 08 
Time at which phone 15 1 15 N/A 225 225 15 15 
stopped ringing (not, 
answered) 
Phone call length 25.21429 28 706 13.019 22378 635.7602 61 9 
52 
Information known 84.42857 14 1182 98.062 224806 7128.184 390 17 
in EMT-SO 55 
Information known 31.775 40 1271 19.944 55899 1009.651 120 8 
in SO -EMT 14 
Time to initiate 11.125 8. 89 12.229 2037 123.7656 31 1 
following orders 21 
(control panel work) 
Incident - control 
panels and 
instruments respond 
Control panel 
response - operator 
response 
Time to initiate 32.85 20 657 40.551 52827 1079.123 154 3 
following orders 82 
(calling others 
outside/moving) 
413 
Delays from being 18.70588 34 636 27.508 36868 349.91 136 2, - 
given information 16 
externally - drawing 
the attention of the 
group to it 
Time out announced 28.69231 13 373 15.781 13691 823.2485 70 12 
- started 76 
Time out length 83 13 1079 23.144 95985 6889 132 42 
47 
Delay between time 367.1 10 3671 173.05 1617171 134762.4 794 174 
outs 97 
Incident - first time 283.6667 3 851 96.572 260053 80466.78 378 185 
out starts 94 
CCR aware of 267 3 801 94.270 231641 71289 349 164 
incident - first time 89 
out starts 
EM arrives - first 
time out starts 
Incident - start first 409 3 1227 230.68 608277 167281 625 166 
informational tann 81 
EM arrives - starts 
first informational 
tann 
Incident - starts first 304 3 912 135.1 313752 92416 436 166 
tannoy 
Tannoy length 19.33333 6 116 6.1535 2432 373.7778 29 13 
9 
Time between 1239.667 3 3719 845.94 6041569 1536773 193 299 
tannoys 58 8 
Incident - start of 17 3 51 5 917 289 22 12 
first call out from 
CR 
Incident - start of 14.66667 3 44 18.717 1346 215.1111 36 1 
first call into CR 19 
from incident 
Incident - start of 26 3 78 29.816 3806 676 59 1 
first informational 1 
call into CR from 
incident site 
Incident - EM 
arrives 
Incident - call EM 
call EM - EM arrives 
EM arrives - EM'S 
first response 
Incident - EM's first 27.33333 3 82 12.055 2532 747.1111 40 16 
response 43 
Post-Incident Onshore data (where rated as competent) 
414 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of MEAN MA MI 
SQUARES SQUARE X N 
D 
scenario organisation 6.641975 162 1076 4.1262 9888 44.11584 18 1 
team's informational 94 
calls 
scenario organisation 1.5 202 303 0.7613 571 2.25 4 1 
team's non- 16 
informational calls 
emergency 5.326316 95 506 3.0716 3582 28.36964 15 1 
management team's 34 
informational calls 
emergency 1.28125 192 246 0.5734 378 1.641602 4 1 
management team's 64 
non-informational 
calls 
scenario organisation 3.788462 364 1379 3.7974 10459 14.35244 18 1 
team's calls 59 
emergency 2.620209 287 752 2.6375 3960 6.865496 15 1 
management team's 47 
calls 
non-informational 1.393401 394 549 0.6842 949 1.941566 4 1 
calls 89 
informational calls 6.155642 257 1582 3.8180 13470 37.89193 18 1 
16 
radio calls 3.273425 651 2131 3.3839 14419 10.71531 18 1 
74 
delays between 1.601322 454 727 1.3801 2027 2.564231 12 0 
dependent radio 17 
calls (question - 
answer) 
announcements 4.625 264 1221 7.7036 21255 21.39063 55 1 
05 - 
delays to 1.009346 107 108 1.4568 334 1.018779 8 0 
announcements 99 
Total time to deliver 23.36937 111 2594 10.310 72314 546.1274 70 6 
a message (NB. does 57 
not include repeat 
attempts to call) 
Time from standby 13.66667 6 82 16.451 2474 186.7778 46 2 
to calling back 95 
Totally unintelligible 3.454545 11 38 2.5045 194 11.93388, 8 1 
calls 41 
Partially intelligible 7.217391 23 166 4.5622 1656 52.09074 18 2 
calls 61 
Time left between 9.5 26 247 5.7567 3175 90.25 27 4 
failed attempts to 35 
call in/out 
Delays to answer 4.142857 35 145 3.7032 1067 17.16327 15 1 
phone 8 
Time at which phone 24 4 96 8.4852 2520 576 32 14 
stopped ringing (not 81 
415 
answered) 
Phone call length 21.73333 15 326 11.435 8916 472.3378 46 7 
95 
Information known 57.40909 22 1263 63.733 157809 3295.804 295 4 
in EMT-SO 57 
Information known 40.625 32 1300 31.742 84048 1650.391 159 9 
in SO - EMT 66 
Time to initiate 5 3 15 5.1961 129 25 11 2 
following orders 52 
(control panel work) 
Incident - control 
panels and 
instruments respond 
Control panel 
response - operator 
response 
Time to initiate 22.63636 11 249 24.299 11541 512.405 66 0 
following orders 27 
(calling others 
outsidelmovin ) 
Delays from being 31.6 20 632 47.602 63026 998.56 216 3 
given information 96 
externally - drawing 
the attention of the 
_group 
to it 
Time out announced 29.81818 11 328 11.898 11196 889.124 61 18 
- started 05 
Time out length 61.18182 11 673 17.290 44165 3743.215 83 28 
56 
Delay between time 551.875 8 4415 413.12 3631213 304566 144 83 
outs 14 3 
Incident - first time 264 3 792 146.93 252266 69696 404 111 
out starts 2 
CCR aware of 290 3 870 185.84 321374 84100 482 111 
incident - first time 13 
out starts 
EM arrives - first 
time out starts 
Incident - start first 730.3333 3 2191 222.76 1699411 533386.8 963 519 
informational tarn 74 
EM arrives - starts 
first informational 
tann 
Incident - starts first 730.3333 3 2191 222.76 1699411 533386.8 963 519 
tann 74 
Tannoy length 17.2 5 86 2.5884 1506 295.84 20 14 
36 
Time between 721.5 2 1443 256.67 1107009 520562.3 903 540 
tannoys 98 
416 
Incident - start of 10 3 30 7 398 100 17 3 
first call out from 
CR 
Incident - start of 34.33333 3 103 44.601 7515 1178.778 85 1 
first call into CR 94 
from incident 
incident - start of 62.33333 3 187 81.794 25037 3885.444 156 5 
first informational 46 
call into CR from 
incident site 
Incident - EM - 
arrives v 
Incident - call EM - 
call EM - EM arrives - 
EM arrives - EM's - 
first response 
Incident - EM's first 56 3 168 83.192 23250 3136 152 5 
response 55 
Post-Incident Onshore data (where rated as notable shortfalls) 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of MEAN MA MI 
SQUARES SQUARE X N 
D 
scenario organisation 7.574468 94 712 4.8714 7600 57.37257 25 1 
team's informational 43 
calls 
scenario organisation 1.443396 106 153 0.8056 289 2.083393 6 1 
team's non- 96 
informational calls 
emergency 5.376812 69 371 3.4645 2811 28.9101 21 1 
management team's 32 
informational calls 
emergency 1.246154 130 162 0.6356 254 1.552899 6 1 
management team's 53 
non-informational 
calls 
scenario organisation 4.325 200 865 4.5654 7889 18.70563 25 1 
team's calls 78 
emergency 2.678392 199 533 2.8757 3065 7.173783 21 1 
management team's 23 
calls 
non-informational 1.334746 236 315 0.7221 543 1.781546 6 1 
calls 57 
informational calls 6.644172 163 1083 4.4551 10411 44.14502 25 1 
radio calls 3.503759 399 1398 3.9006 10954 12.27633 25 1 
97 
delays between 2.010169 295 593 1.7813 2125 4.040781 10 0. 
dependent radio 94 
calls (question - 
answer) 
announcements 5.483871 124 680 9.8883 15756 30.07284 59 1 
88 
417 
delays to 1.25 44 55 1.4325 157 1.5625 5 0" 
announcements 94 
Total time to deliver 24.77333 75 1858 14.661 61936 613.718 104 9 
a message (NB. does 56 
not include repeat 
attempts to call) 
Time from standby 56.54545 11 622 126.29 194676 3197.388 4361 4 
to calling back 52 
Totally unintelligible 5.727273 11 63 6.0181 723 32.80165, 22 1 
calls 54 
Partially intelligible 7.684211 19 146 3.7572 1376 59.04709 14 1 
calls 54 
Time left between 6.142857 7 43 2.1157 291 37.73469 8 2 
failed attempts to 01 
call in/out 
Delays to answer 5.619048 21 118 11.011 3088 31.5737 46 1 
phone 25 
Time at which phone 
stopped ringing (not 
answered) 
Phone call length 23 1 23 N/A 529 529 23 23 
Information known 63.5 8 508 70,189 66744 4032.25 182 6 
in EMT-SO 54 
Information known 51.45455 11 566 42.748 47398 2647.57 ' 140 ' 14 
in SO - EMT 95 
Time to initiate 16.75 4 67 21.406 2497 280.5625 48 0 
following orders 77 
control panel work) 
Incident - control 
panels and 
instruments respond 
Control panel 0 1 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 
response - operator 
response 
Time to initiate 17.91667 12 215 43.571 24735 321.0069 148 1 
following orders 17 
(calling others 
outside/moving) 
Delays from being 34.81818 11 383 51.941 40315 1212.306 135 1 
given information 93 
externally - drawing 
the attention of the 
group to it 
Time out announced 34.375 8 275 15.963 11237 1181.641 49 0 
- started 69 - 
Time out length 56.5 8 452 16.707 27492 3192.25 89 35 
57 
Delay between time 424 6 2544 116.62 1146662 179776 547 222 
outs 42 
418 
Incident - first time 189 2 378 '21.213 71892 35721 204 174 
out starts 2 
CCR aware of 125.5 2 251 41.719 33241 15750.25 155 96 
incident - first time 3 
out starts 
EM arrives - first 
time out starts 
Incident - start first 915 1 915 N/A 837225 837225 915 915 
informational tann 
EM arrives - starts 
first informational 
tanno 
Incident - starts first 509.5 2 1019 573.46 848041 259590.3 915 104 
tannoy 36 
Tanno length 3 64 
Time between 1192 1 1192 
tannoys 
Incident - start of 3.5 2 7 0.7071 25 12.25 4 3 
first call out from 07 
CR 
Incident - start of - 44.5 2 89 61.518 7745 1980.25 88 1 
first call into CR 29 
from incident - 
Incident - start of 49 2 98 60.811 8500 2401 92 6 
first informational 18 
call into CR from 
incident site 
Incident - EM 
arrives 
Incident - call EM 
call EM - EM arrives 
EM arrives - EM's 
first response 
Incident - EM's first 23.5 2 47 4.9497 1129 552.25 27 20 
response 47 
Post-Incident Onshore and Offshore Data (E, C, L& P) 
(as shown in Appendix 11) 
BEHAVIOUR MEAN N SUM S. D SUM of MEAN MA MI 
SQUARES SQUARED X N 
scenario organisation 7.140845 710 5070 5.2928 56066 50.99167 39 1 
team's informational 24 
calls 
scenario organisation 1.52459 732 1116 0.7954 2164 2.324375 6 1 
team's non- 71 
informational calls 
emergency 5.603865 414 2320 3.7870 18924 31.4033 26 1 
management team's 15 
informational calls 
emergency 1.320707 792 1046 0.6972 1766 1.744267 8 1 
management team's 41 
non-informational calls -- 
scenario organisation 4.289875 144 6186 4.6897 58230 18.40303 39 1 
419 
team's calls 2 38 
emergency 2.791045 120 3366 3.0616 20690 7.789931 26 1 
management team's 6 55 
calls 
non-informational calls 1.418635 152 2162 0.7527 3930 2.012526 8 1 
4 19 
informational calls 6.574733 112 7390 4.8488 74990 43.22712 39 1 
4 02 
radio calls 3.607251 264 9552 4.0985 78920 13.01226 39 1 
8 01 
delays between 1.705252 186 3182 1.7903 11404 2.907884 21 0 
dependent radio calls 6 36 
(question - answer) 
announcements 3.956622 216 8574 5.9842 111490 15.65486 59 1 
7 02 
delays to 0.733404 949 696 1.3222 2168 0.537881 14 0 
announcements 98 
Total time to deliver a 25.87826 460 11904 14.439 403754 669.6844 115 6 
message (NB. does not 35 
include repeat attempts 
to call) 
Time from standby to 36.68421 38 1394 70.558 235344 1345.731 436 1 
calling back 81 
Totally unintelligible 4.361702 47 205 4.2345 1719 19.02445 22 1 
calls 65 
Partially intelligible 8.144928 138 1124 5.3743 13112 66.33984 39 1 
calls 79 
Time left between 12.06593 91 1098 13.241 29028 145.5868 83 1 
failed attempts to call 18 
in/out 
Delays to answer 5.411765 136 736 6.6393 9934 29.2872 46 0 
phone 56 
Time at which phone 21.5 6 129 7.6876 3069 462.25 32 14 
stopped ringing (not 52 
answered) 
Phone call length 24.42373 59 1441 13.407 45621 596.5185 64 2 
67 
Information known in 78.86585 82 6467 143.18 2170739 6219.823 102 4 
EMT SO 74 2 
Information known in 35.76571 175 6259 26.290 344125 1279.186 159 1 
SO - EMT 53 
Time to initiate 12.19231 26 317 13.446 8385 148.6524 48 0 
following orders 25 
control panel work) 
Incident - control 7.5 8 60 12.671 1574 56.25 29 0 
panels and instruments 68 
respond 
Control panel response 30.63636 11 337 37.441 24343 938.5868 121 0 
- operator response 35 
Time to initiate 26.20455 88 2306 33.383 157388 686.6782 154 0 
following orders 92 
(calling others 
outsidetmovin 
Delays from being 29.20325 123 3592 60.698 554378 852.8299 467 1 
given information 12 
externally - drawing 
the attention of the 
L-group to it 
Time out announced - 30 53 1590 13.873 57708 900 70 0 
started 05 
420 
Time out length 61.69643 56 , 
3455 26.385 251453 3806.449 132 20 
89 
Delay between time 391.381 42 16438 233.61 8671112 153179 144 83 
outs 38 3 
Incident - first time out 239.7143 14 3356 83.974 896154 57462.94 404 111 
starts 75 
CCR aware of incident 230.6429 14 3229 104.18 885861 53196.13 482 96 
- first time out starts 74 
EM arrives - first time 165.2 5 826 29.727 139990 27291.04 193 122 
out starts 09 
Incident - start first 481.1538 13 6255 332.15 4333561 2315094, 963 15 
informational tann 76 
EM arrives - starts first 578.5 2 1157 170.41 698365 334662.3 699 458 
informational tannoy 27 
Incident - starts first 346.5714 14 4852 348.35 3259160 120111.8 963 15 
tannoy 83 
Tannoy length 17.38095 42- 730 8.4042 15584 302.0975 40 1 
74 
Time between tannoys 442.7931 29 12841 466.13 11769789 196065.7 193 2 
47 8 
Incident - start of first 30 14 420 34.482 28058 900 92 3 
call out from CR 99 
Incident - start of first 30.14286 14 422 33.947 27702 908.5918 88 1 
call into CR from 6 
incident 
Incident - start of first 53.35714 14 747 58.511 84365 2846.985 184 1 
informational call into 81 
CR from incident site 
Incident - EM arrives 65 5 325 57.078 34157 4225 166 31 
89 
Incident - call EM 40 5 200 36.851 13432 1600 102 13 
05 
call EM - EM arrives 25 5 125 22.327 5119 625 64 7 
11 
EM arrives - EM's first 18.4 5 92 - 21.881 3608 338.56 56 2 
response 5 
Incident - EM's first 48.57143 14 680 50.235 65836 2359.184 168 
response 93 
Ll 
kf : >, 
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APPENDIX 11: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF PERFORMANCE 
PARAMETERS 
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Frequency distribution of time from control panel 
response to operator response 
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Frequency distribution of times between time out 
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Frequency distribution of time between incident and 
first time out 
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Frequency distribution of incident to first call into CCR 
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Frequency distribution for time between incident and 
calling the EM 
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Development of Models and Data for Quantification Human 
Reliability on Emergency Management 
I 
E Strutt, M Lyons and K Allsopp (Cranfield University, UK) 
J Larken (OCTO, UK) 
RJ Va; mes (NUTEC. Norway) 
ABSTRACT 
Effective emergency management is necessary to assure senior management and regulators that 
incidents and their escalation can be controlled and losses to personnel, plant and the 
environment can be mitigated. Industrial experience suggests that emergency management 
training is extremely effective in improving the capability of emergency management teams. 
However, quantification of the risks and benefits is difficult and limited by currently available 
techniques. Recently, a task performance - resource constraint model (TPRC) has been 
developed in which the probability of successfully performing a set of human tasks is 
formulated in terms of an incident scenario. Such models provide a capability to predict the 
probability of a success outcome under conditions of uncertainty and time stress. The paper will 
describe the TPRC model its application to major accidents and the testing of the model in 
emergency management training exercises in collaboration with OCTO and NUTEC. An 
example scenario will be described to show how the model can be used to quantify the impact 
of human reliability, escalation and emergency management variables on the probability of a 
successful outcome. Finally, the paper will discuss the key role of emergency management 
training as a means of generating model data and its relevance to quantitative risk analysis. 
1. Introduction 
Major accidents offshore, although rare, can and do occur. Accidents such as the loss of the 
semi-submersible Alexander Keilland and the fire and explosion on the Piper Alpha installation. 
serve to remind us of the risks faced by the offshore industry. Unless appropriate actions are 
taken to manage incidents and prevent escalation, minor incidents can become major accidents. 
It is now widely recognised that effective emergency management is necessary to assure senior 
management and regulators that incidents and their escalation can be controlled and losses to 
personnel, plant and the environment can be mitigated. Industrial experience suggests that 
emergency management training is extremely effective in improving the capability of 
emergency management teams. However, quantification of the risks and benefits is difficult and 
limited by currently available techniques. 
Various models have been considered for examining emergency management decision making. 
Klein (1995)' has developed a generic Recognition-Primed Decision model to focus on 
problem-solving in the real world. This involves examining familiar attributes of a situation and 
basing the response on previous experiences. Flin (1996)2 has collated emergency decision 
making research from a number of application areas and finds considerable support for the 
Klein Model. Both Orasano (1995)3, researching pilot decision-making and Fredholm (1995)', 
researching fire-fighter's decision-making, consider the importance of situation awareness and 
limitations in available time and resources. However, there has been little attempt in any of 
these studies to quantify the effectiveness of emergency management. 
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In this paper, we address the problem of assessing the impact of emergency management on risk 
reduction and introduce the concept of a task performance - resource constraint model (TPRC) 
to predict the probability of successful outcome of emergency management under conditions of 
uncertainty and time stress. For the purposes of modelling, a major accident is regarded as a 
sequence of critical events in an escalating incident, resulting in one or more outcomes 
quantified in terms of fatalities, damage to plant or damage to the environment. The frequency 
of major disasters depends on the frequency of initiating events, the probability of losing 
control, the probability of escalation and the probability of failing to evacuatelescape. Given an 
initiating event, the task of emergency management is to minimise the probability of loss by 
reducing the rate of escalation and increasing the likelihood of successful evacuation, escape or 
rescue. 
2. Model Concept 
The task of emergency management is considered to be a time and resource constrained 
decision making process, made by an emergency management team (EMT). Once an accident 
has occurred, this process generates prioritised actions intended to minimise the risk to , 
personnel, the public, the environment and plant assets. Emergency management decisions are, 
made with the intention of controlling future events such that a more desirable outcome is 
achieved. The interaction between the management team and the evolving scenario can be 
considered therefore as a control system as conceptualised in Fig. 1. 
Decisions are made by the emergency management team (EMT) based on their perception or 
(mental model) of an evolving and often complex accident scenario (the reality). Perception of 
reality is updated as new information and data on "the reality of the situation" are brought to the 
attention of the EMT. The reality may be dominated by factors outside the control of the EMT 
and the degree of control is likely to decrease with increasing rate of escalation. However, 
timely intervention can often lead to a decrease in escalation rate with a consequent gain of time' 
to organise evacuation, escape, rescue or physical damage limitation measures. The quality of 
decision making is crucially dependent on the perception of reality, hence accurate information, 
timely communication and clarity of situation assessment are vital to achieving a rapid and 
appropriate management, which in turn, is the key to risk reduction. yet, ... St'" 
2.1. The Task Performance - Resource Constraint Model 
The model, currently under development at Cranfield, is based on the limit state concept and 
provides a basis for assessing the impact of time stress, work load, decisions and message 
transmission. These are recognised as important error promoting features in human reliability 
research5'6.. 
The principal idea is that the probability of a successful outcome of a particular emergency 
management task, such as (but not limited to) evacuation, escape or rescue, depends on the 
difference between the time available and the time required to complete the task, as shown 
schematically in Fig. 2. The task succeeds if the time required to complete the task i. e. 
accumulate knowledge, make a decision and act on it, is less than the time available to perform 
the task., These two times need to be quantified if the risk is to be assessed quantitatively.. 
The time required is dominated by the management task to be carried out, and is modelled in 
terms of the task demand (task requirement) and its rate of execution or response, which in '' 
practice may be preceded also by a delay. The reliability of the management or the probability 
of successful completion, is the probability that the actions performed exceed those required to 
complete the task to the required level of adequacy. Given enough time, this probability will 
eventually reach unity. However if time is limited, then the probability will reach some 
maximum and then decrease when the available time has expired. 
I 
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The time available can be modelled as resource consumption, as escalation or simply as an 
imposed time constraint i. e. in terms of the following criteria : - 
Incident severity, S at time t is less than the tolerable severity, S* 
" Resource, R, consumed by time t, is less than the available resource, 
R* 
" Actual time consumed, t, is less than the available time t* 
Resource consumption rate and escalation rate have equivalent meaning in that either can be 
translated to calculate management response time availability. A rapid incident escalation rate 
or resource consumption rate will result in a shortage of available time, while a low escalation 
or resource consumption rate provides a larger time availability. 
The term "resource" is a general term which can refer to time or external physical resources, 
including personnel, machines and information generation systems, availability of safe haven 
for the personnel, ECC and Internal psychological and physical resources. In turn, psychological 
and physical resources can include such items as the level of prior knowledge, intelligence, 
physical strength, coping capacity etc. and so can influence both the time required and the time 
available. However, for certain incidents, the time available to complete a task may be 
dominated by the resource availability i. e. by the total resource available and its consumption 
rate 5 
2.2. Impact of time stress on probability of management success 
With reference to Fig. 3, the probability of success evolves with time. For a scenario in which 
there is an approximately linear response rate and a relatively slow escalation rate, the 
probability of task success can be expected to grow as illustrated in Fig. 3a. However, since 
escalation results in a decreasing probability of time availability (Fig. 3b), the joint probability of 
success exhibits a maximum, as shown in Fig. 3c. The time at which the maximum occurs and 
the maximum probability depends on the rate of task execution and the rate of escalation. The 
faster the rate of incident escalation, the greater the requirement for a rapid rate of knowledge 
accumulation and management to achieve task success. 
2.3. Situation Awareness, Decision, Communication, Action and, 
Response (SADCAR) 
Time is chosen as the key variable in the model and so the time to initiate a response and the 
speed of response relative to escalation rate will dominate the likelihood of reducing the risk. 
Significant events in the real world sooner or later lead to an awareness of the situation. The 
process of becoming aware then leads to a decision to respond so as to achieve a desired 
objective. The response itself is often initiated by a communication message or an instruction to 
perform a particular task which is then followed by an action which brings about the response. 
For instance, in an offshore context, awareness of a methanol leak should lead to a decision and 
an instruction to "stop all hot work". Likewise, awareness of an escalating fire might first lead 
to an instruction to send "personnel to muster stations" and later, if control of the situation is 
lost, an instruction to abandon the platform. The required action then involves the performance 
of the task which will invariably take time to execute e. g. switch off welding sets and initiate 
blow down, and finally the response of the system /situation (hot sources will take time to cool 
down and process system will take time to blow down). Thus, the time between the initial event 
and the management instruction, and the subsequent time taken to carry out instructions and 
generate a system response are parameters which have an important bearing on the probability 
of a successful outcome. 
In summary, the time between the initial event and the physical response involves the following 
stages: Situation Awareness, Decision to act , 
Communication of instructions followed by a 
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physical action which generates a response. The overall time to achieve the desired goal is the 
sum of these times. In the paper we shall refer to these as SADCAR timings. 
3. Example Scenario: Rescue of a Crane Driver 
Currently, emergency management exercises are being used to develop model concepts, 
generate model data and assess the impact of emergency management decisions on risk 
reduction. The following describes a typical offshore accident scenario which has been used as 
an emergency management exercise and is here used to demonstrate the utility of the TPRC 
method. 
3.1. Observed Events and Emergency Management Responses 
During a lifting operation a crane driver (CD) drops a methanol tote tank which is damaged 
causing methanol to leak. The crane driver reports the initiating incident to the control room 
immediately. After 31 seconds the control room operator sends a tannoy message to stop all hot 
work. A leak is confirmed after 56 seconds and after a further 20 seconds the deluge is activated 
on the surrounding areas. The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) is called 42 seconds into the 
incident and arrives almost immediately i. e. 6 seconds later. Fire is detected after 96 seconds. 
The OIM orders fire teams away to investigate and attempt to control the fire and asks the radio 
operator to order helicopters for evacuation of non essential personnel(NEP). NEP are called to 
muster stations with a tannoy after 153 seconds. After 192 seconds, some 96 seconds since the 
EMT became aware of the fire, the crane driver reports that the cabin is getting very hot and 
finds himself trapped by the escalating fire. The control room operator tells him "stay where 
you are, help is on the way". The OIM orders a second fire team to the helideck to reduce risk of 
fire interfering with helicopter evacuation should this be necessary. The heat of the fire around 
the crane driver's cabin continues to increase until, 83 seconds later and unknown to the EMT, 
the crane driver is forced to jump from the crane cabin into the sea. Luckily he is spotted by the 
stand-by vessel who reports a MOB to the EMT 44 seconds later and a fast rescue craft is 
launched to pick up the crane driver. It takes some time to work out that this is the crane driver. 
In the event, he is rescued alive, but unfortunately dies later in the Fast Rescue Craft (FRC). 
3.2. Post Exercise Analysis of EMT Performance 
The key question, is the extent to which the emergency management team is able to influence 
the progress of the incident and the outcome. If the risk reduction can be estimated then this can 
be used as a measure of performance of the team as well as providing a useful input to the QRA 
and the installations safety case. 
The post exercise analysis requires an estimate of the probability that the task is achieved within 
the time available and requires an estimate of the following data. 
1. Times to initiate management action 
2. Distribution of time required to achieve the goal/objective 
3. Distribution of time available 
Time to initiate management action: The first stage of analysis is to determine the SADCAR 
timings. These are obtainable from the exercise if it is carefully and continuously monitored 
(indeed the emergency management team itself has the task of recording this information) 
However, the exercise controllers must have accurate independent measurement of all timings 
to support this analysis. 
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Time required to achieve EMT Objective: The first stage is to identify the goals that the EMT 
were trying to achieve. There are a number of these throughout the incident, some specific and 
others more general. As the incident progresses, new situations emerge which generate new 
goals but each goal is associated with a desirable outcome which after the exercise can then be 
analysed to generate a decision tree. In the exercise the major goals identified by the EMT 
were: - 
1. Check to see if there is a methanol leak 
2. Prevent ignition of the methanol 
3. Prevent loss of life, given the ignition and fire 
4. Prevent escalation of the fire 
5. Rescue of the crane driver from the cabin 
6. Rescue of the MOB (crane driver) from the sea 
Each situation and goal has a corresponding set of SADCAR timings which must be completed 
within the time demanded by the particular circumstances. The analyst has the task of 
identifying and measuring these as inputs to the model. 
Check Methanol Leak: The first goal was to check whether the dropped tank had resulted in a 
leak. In this particular scenario there was no possibility of preventing the leak since it was 
decided that the leak would occur at the same instant the tank was dropped and it was also 
assumed that the leak rate could not be reduced. However, the action to check was worthwhile 
since it provided early evidence of the need for emergency management to prevent ignition and 
fire escalation. 
Prevent ignition : An important goal identified early in the exercise was to reduce the 
likelihood of ignition. Action was taken to stop hot work and moments later to initiate deluge 
which would have a large effect on preventing ignition. The impact of the leak 4 ignition 
SADCAR timings on risk reduction were estimated by measuring the management response 
times during the exercise and using this in combination with statistical data on the probability of 
ignition, with and without hot work in progress and with and without deluge. If such data are, 
not available for the installation in question then efforts should be made to obtain these data. 
However, for the purposes of an exercise, expert judgment can be used to estimate the 
probability as shown in Fig. 5. 
Reducing the potential loss of life. With a large number of POB (In this scenario, POB are 
assumed to be 40), should the fire escalate out of control, the potential loss of life would be 
significant. The OIM correctly ordered NEP to muster stations ready for evacuation should it be 
required and ordered helicopter support for evacuation. At this stage of the incident, none of the 
POB were considered to be immediately threatened by the fire. 
Prevent Escalation of the Fire: Once the EMT were aware that the methanol had ignited, the 
next goal was to prevent escalation of the fire. The EMT activated the deluge on the areas at 
risk. They also deployed a fire team to extinguish the fire or at least reduce its rate of escalation. 
Rescue of Crane Driver from the Crane cabin: The first time that the EMT became aware 
that the crane driver was at risk was when he reported that the cabin was getting hot some 192 
seconds into the incident and some 96 seconds since they became aware that the methanol had 
ignited. Interestingly, up to that time, the team, although theoretically aware that the crane 
driver would be exposed to and threatened by the fire, had appeared to forget that he was still in 
the cabin. Once 
, 
they were aware however, the EMT considered that the best approach was for 
the crane driver to stay put and hope to control the fire sufficiently to rescue the driver from the 
cabin. The only other alternatives being for the crane driver to escape down the ladder or jump 
into the sea, both of which they considered a greater risk. However, their ability to succeed with' 
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this strategy depended strongly on the discrepancy between reality and their perception -,. tF 
regarding the rate of fire escalation and the speed with which fire team 1 could control the fire. 
However, the risk perceptions of the crane driver are unlikely to be the same as the EMT. After 
all, he is the one directly exposed to the fire. The key decisions in the scenario affecting the 
crane driver become: - 
1. Attempt to escape by the ladder 
2. Stay put and wait for the fire to be extinguished 
3. Jump to sea and hope for rescue by FRC 
Contrary to the instruction from the EMT to stay put, the crane driver believed his best chance 
of survival was to jump into the sea. His decision was not communicated to the EMT. 
Rescue of the crane driver from the sea. The first time that the EMT were aware that the 
crane driver was in the sea was when the standby vessel reported "man over board" (MOB). A 
fast rescue craft (FRC) was launched within 6 seconds of sending this message but initially the 
EMT were unaware that this was the crane driver and were confused by the fact that everyone 
was accounted for according to the muster data. In the event, the speed of rescue was in fact 
unaffected by this confusion. However, the sea rescue was only made possible because the 
stand-by vessel saw a man in the water. This was contrived by the scenario developers as pure 
chance. However, there was no evidence from the EMT behaviour to suggest that they were 
aware of this possibility. 
4. TPRC Model results for the Crane Driver rescue 
A decision tree describing potential accident outcomes and the crane driver's decision options is 
shown in Fig. 4. The decision tree is the first stage of quantification and provides a visual 
representation of options and decisions. There are four paths leading to the eight final outcomes, 
namely the attempted ladder escape, the attempted rescue from the cabin; the attempted rescue 
from the sea (i) assuming MOB seen and (ii) assuming MOB not seen. In this case, the EMT 
decisions are reflected by the values put into the TPRC model rather than in the decision tree. 
For the purpose of the paper only one will be examined in detail, namely the ladder escape 
attempt. 
Fig. 6 shows a composite graph of the probability of escaping by the ladder, for various delay 
times from the initiation of the incident. This is theoretical since it was not actually realised in 
the exercise. However, it gives useful data for post incident valuation. As expected, the 
probability of escape depends strongly on the delay before the escape attempt is made. If the 
escape from the crane had been attempted immediately after the incident, then his maximum 
probability of escape would have been close to 1. However, the probability of escape after 210 
seconds delay is reduced to about 0.3 and represents poor odds on survival. Had the crane driver 
been instructed by the EMT to come down from the crane by the ladder immediately, his chance 
of survival would have improved. This is a decision that the EMT or the CD could have made 
but, in the event, did not. 
Sensitivity tests were carried out to assess the impact of speed of escape down the ladder with 
speeds ranging from lm/s to a somewhat unrealistic IOm/s. It was found that the probability of 
survival was little influenced by this ranging from 0.31 to 0.39. 
Fig. 7 shows the effect of increasing the available time. This is equivalent to reducing the 
escalation rate or increasing the protection around the ladder. The EMT's action to send Fire 
Team 1 to spray cooling water over the ladder area would have the effect of increasing the 
available time. The exercise designer must decide in advance how much time to allow and what 
the allowance should be given for the effects of fire team deployment. This can be chosen using 
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expert judgment. However, if realistic available times are required, some idea of time scales are 
obtainable from QRA escalation studies. 
Similar curves can be obtained for the probability of being rescued and from the cabin and for 
the probability of being rescued from the sea. 
The particular response times measured during the emergency exercise are measured and 
provided as model input. For example, the time available for escape by ladder was taken to be 
about 240 seconds (as decided by the exercise controller) with a coefficient of variation of 30% 
since this was how long it took for the heat in the cabin to exceed the tolerance limit of the crane 
driver. If it is assumed that the crane driver not attempt to escape down the ladder until 192 
seconds into the incident, the corresponding probability of survival curves are Figs 6(d) and 
7(b). 
The probability of survival in the sea is shown in Fig. 8. Two situations were theoretically 
possible, namely the probability of survival given that the CD was (a) seen by the stand-by 
vessel and (b) not seen by the standby vessel. Only one path was observable, namely the one 
which occurred in the simulation in which he was seen. The time available and its coefficient of 
variation can be obtained from published data on the survival times of different humans in sea 
water. For the purposes of this exercise, it was assumed to be 120 seconds with a coefficient of 
variance of 0.3. For a 30 second delay the maximum probability of survival was estimated as 
about 0.8. However, for a 60 second delay this fell to a probability of survival of 0.55. 
The probability of rescue before dying of hypothermia, given that he was not seen in the water, 
is small and dependent on how soon the EMT realise that the crane driver has jumped into the 
sea as well as on the search strategy and the search resources. Clearly a rapid response i. e. 
within one minute is vital to give a reasonably acceptable probability of survival even when the 
MOB has been seen. 
5. Discussion 
Major incidents, although rare, can and do occur. Given an initiating event it is the task of the 
emergency response team to reduce the rate of escalation, minimise loss of life, and reduce 
damage to the installation and the environment. Industrial experience suggests that emergency 
management training is extremely effective in improving the capability of emergency response 
teams. However, quantifying the improvement in performance in numerical terms is recognised 
to be a difficult problem and to date has rarely if ever been attempted. The models and data 
presented in this paper represent one of the first attempts to tackle this problem and when used 
in conjunction with emergency management exercises and training sessions, may be used in two 
ways. 
(i) EMT Performance Standards: In principle, the TPRC model can be used to measure the 
effectiveness of the emergency management team and hence support trainers in competency 
assessments and in performance improvement training. It is envisaged therefore that these 
models may be further developed to complement existing competency assessment criteria. The 
Offshore Petroleum Industries Training Organisation (OPITO) have published an industry wide 
OIM competency standard. This includes the following elements; (i) evaluation of the situation 
and anticipation of needs (ii) maintenance of communications (iii) delegation of Authority and 
(iv) dealing with stress in self and others. These are usually dealt with qualitatively by 
emergency management trainers. The TPRC Model raises the possibility of using measurements 
to quantify some of the key performance parameters. 
(ü) Scenario Based QRA: The TPRC model in conjunction with emergency management' 
exercises can be used to generate useful data for use in scenario based quantified risk 
assessment (QRA) studies. As with all risk-based models, acquiring the necessary input data to 
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predict a realistic outcome probability is a major project in its own right. Some of the data, 
required for the TPRC model are easily measurable during exercises and are therefore realistic 
measures of performance. Some of the timing data, however, may need to be assumed by the 
exercise designers and controllers. To be realistic, the latter data would need to be measured 
prior to the exercise; typical examples include: muster times, helicopter arrival times, FRC 
launch times, ESD and F&G system management times, blow-down times etc. If the exercise is, 
full scale, then realistic times can be generated during the exercise itself. However, for smaller 
scale exercises, these timings must be assumed. Fortunately, these sorts of data are generally 
available. 
The data which are more difficult to obtain are those corresponding to "available time" i. e. the 
time stress. These data are related to escalation rate and tolerance level (e. g. tolerable levels of 
heat, smoke etc. ) or rate of consumption of available resources. How these change as a result of 
decisions, actions and emergency management is not a simple calculation and currently, for the 
emergency management exercises in this study, these data are based on expert judgment. 
However, it should be possible to improve on this situation in the future by using the results of 
escalation studies which would provide through, example scenarios, more realistic estimates of 
time available for management response. The TPRC model could then be used in conjunction 
with escalation studies to assess the risks associated with the various scenarios. This would also 
separate those scenarios which are in principle "manageable" from those which happen so 
quickly that it is not humanly possible to respond in the time scale demanded. 
The Risk Picture: QRA studies are used to predict the probability (or frequency) and 
consequence of all significant events identified. Scenario based approaches using event trees in 
conjunction with fault trees are widely used for this purpose. The method described in this paper 
is complementary to these conventional analytical tools. The decision - event tree such as that 
illustrated in Fig. 4 is similar to a conventional event tree. Decisions point to an event and the 
probability of the event has to be calculated. Traditionally, event data or fault tree models are 
used to estimate the branch probability. However, these are limited when the branch probability 
is time dependent. The TPRC model therefore provides a useful additional tool for predict 
branch probability and hence the probability of the eventual outcome. Once all the paths have 
been examined these can then be combined to generate a more complete risk picture. 
Not all of the paths in the tree however will have been subjected to emergency management 
exercises. For those that have, useful realistic SADCAR data can be generated. For other cases 
assumed SADCAR data must be used. It would be prudent, therefore to select for emergency 
management exercises those scenarios which represent the greatest risk and with the greatest 
potential for risk reduction by emergency management intervention. In the light of the above 
comments, emergency management exercises should, ideally, be based on the installation safety 
case which will contain many relevant data for TPRC analysis. Typical major accident scenarios 
examined in safety cases and included in emergency management procedures include; major fire 
and explosion, impending ship collision, structural failure, subsea blow-out, diving incident, 
helicopter crash. The research team have plans to examine each of these scenarios, in detail, 
both for model development and to generate data for QRA. 
Integration of the SMS into QRA: The ultimate performance measure of any safety 
management system is the extent to which management response reduces risk. The current 
research project has focused attention on this particular point. The TPRC methodology models 
the impact of time stress (time available) and the timing of decisions, actions and system 
responses (time required) on the probability of a particular outcome in an accident 
sequence/scenario. The model, therefore provides a means of measuring the effectiveness of 
emergency response in terms of the risk. In the view of the authors the ability to measure 
emergency response and assess its impact on risk is unique at this time and represents a 
significant development in that it provides a means by which to begin the more complex task of 
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integrating Safety Management System effectiveness into the quantified risk assessment 
process. 
6. Conclusions 
A prototype TPRC model addressing emergency management response has been developed. At 
this stage model application is still within the research domain and has not been used as part of 
any commercial competency assessments outside the research environment. However the model 
is practical and is currently being used to investigate and model real emergency management 
exercises. Research is in progress to develop and broaden the scope of the model, particularly in 
its practical application, and to gather experience in its use. 
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ABSTRACT 
Since the Piper Alpha disaster of 1988, there has been increased emphasis placed on the 
ability of the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) and the emergency response team to 
manage major emergencies. In addition to the competence of the personnel, however, it is 
recognised that the design and layout of an installation has a major impact on emergency 
management by changing the intensity, duration or escalation rate of the events. Although 
designers understand, in general terms, that such factors increase the likelihood of surviving . 
a major incident, it is difficult in the early stages of design to quantify the impact of design 
variables on risk, as there are few quantitative tools which can be adapted for this purpose. 
Recently, Cranfield have developed a Task Performance Resource Constraint (TPRC) model 
that provides a basis for estimating the probability of success in emergency management 
tasks. The model, which generates a time dependent probability of success, is based on the 
fundamental premise that a task may be completed successfully if the time required to 
complete the task is less than the time available to perform it. Therefore, it can be used for 
comparison with subjective assessments of emergency management performance. This model 
is conceptual rather than detailed and includes both human and design variables. This paper 
introduces the concept of the TPRC model, and describes, with examples, how data from 
emergency management exercises can be used together with conceptual design data on such 
parameters as intensity, duration and escalation rate to assess the impact of design on 
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successful emergency management. This paper will include comparisons of subjective 
emergency management performance with that predicted by the model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, the Piper Alpha platform was consumed by an explosion and fire, which tragically 
claimed the lives of 167 men. The Public Inquiry (Cullen 1988)' identified many areas of 
weakness in the'emergency procedures and platform design. This resulted in the introduction of 
the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations (1992)2 and greater use of quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) to demonstrate achievement of safety standards. However, ten years on, 
although substantial progress has been made, the offshore industry is still criticised as having a 
lack of commitment towards fulfilling their safety goals in terms of reducing the number of 
accidents (Beck & Woolfson 1995)3. The industry is aware that continual progress must be made 
in these areas and there is now a commitment to achieve a 50% improvement in the safety record 
over the next 3 years (Davies 1998)4. 
Considering the work that has been carried out over the past decade, one of the areas=where there 
appears to be a notable lack of QRA is in the area of human reliability and emergency 
management. Emergency management may be the last line of defence against a major disaster and 
yet there is still no objective methodology to assess the competency of the emergency response 
team. Some researchers have worked to identify the critical personality attributes associated with 
good emergency management for use in selection procedures. Few of the attributes, however, 
were found to correlate with subjective ratings of performance (Flin & Slaven 1995)'. Therefore, 
the only reliable data currently available to assess emergency management competency is 
performance in simulations of the emergency tasks themselves. The guidelines prepared by the 
Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (OPITO 1992)6 and approved by the UK 
Offshore Operators Association Ltd (UKOOA 1997)' set criteria for standards of competence in 
emergency simulation for the industry. However, they are essentially subjective, relying on 
observational techniques and emergency management experience and so are unlikely to be 
developed into a quantitative methodology. 
The skills required of an emergency manager demand a level of command ability which is not a 
feature of normal management posts. (Cullen 1988)' An offshore emergency is essentially a 
physical event - whether it is a fire, explosion, dropped object or man overboard. Urgency will 
leave little time for discussion, let alone negotiation or the building of morale, the actions required 
are physical. If left, a fire will escalate regardless of whether the emergency manager is 
negotiating or building team morale. The time constraint is such that the decision maker has little 
or no time to consider options and alternative strategies for dealing with the emergency (Flin 
1996)8 Therefore, the key skill involves making good and timely decisions to minimise the risk to 
personnel, the public, the environment and plant assets, communicating these decisions and 
ensuring the appropriate actions are carried out quickly. 
In Strutt et al (1997)9, the Task Performance - Resource Constraint (TPRC) concept was 
introduced as a method for objectively testing emergency management team (EMT) competency. 
This concept involved the modelling of the speed of the emergency management task against the 
time constraint of the escalating emergency and gives a result in terms of a prediction of the 
probability of success in the task. For example, the task may be that of rescuing casualties from a 
fire, the constraint in that case might be the level of escalation at which the fire would be 
impenetrable. Using the response times of the emergency management team, given this task, the 
model provides the probability of the team completing successfully this aspect of the emergency 
and rescuing the casualties before the fire becomes impenetrable. Clearly, the designer can have 
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an enormous impact on the ability of the EMT to control an incident. The designer can reduce , - 
risks by extending the time available and/or reducing the time required to deal with an emergency- 
This may involve increasing the precision of detection systems, enhancing communications 
systems and improving the effectiveness of fixed fire-fighting systems and barriers to limit 
escalation. Further to this, the design of the installation must also facilitate the impact of 
emergency management. If the installation design is poor, there may be limited time for a good 
emergency management decision to have its desired effect. The Regulations have now been 
updated to include requirements for Performance Standards in the Safety Case of an installation, 
(HSE 1996)10. These Standards define the Safety Critical Elements in terms of criteria against 
which their performance can be verified. In the case of emergency systems, these must show that 
they are resilient and reliable in the worst possible scenario. For example, The Cullen Report 
(1990)' recommended that the TR (temporary refuge) should remain secure for 1 hour. Using 
data on the potential of human performance, we can assess how the human factor can cope with 
an emergency. Once these measurements, in terms of realistic performance of personnel in . 
emergencies, have been established with confidence, they can be used as performance standards. 
They should then contribute to the design of installations, with a view to promoting a positive, 
outcome to foreseeable emergencies. Assuming that, with practicable levels of training, personnel 
cannot improve their performance beyond certain limits, designers need to ensure that such worst- 
case emergencies will not threaten these limits. These Safety Performance Design Indicators 
would therefore specify the minimum levels of acceptability for all aspects promoting 
survivability and emergency control. Using a distribution of the human performance data 
obtained in the emergency management scenarios and a generic escalation model, the design 
aspects can now be assessed to identify their impact on the emergency management team's 
probability of success. This means that future installation designs can be tested for their 
emergency survivability potential and if necessary, rejecting certain aspects at the design stage 
rather than making more expensive changes at the installation phase. This paper describes how 
the TPRC concept can be used to assess the impact of both emergency management and design ,, 
changes using a helicopter crash scenario as an example to demonstrate the program's potential 
capabilities. 
2 RESEARCH METHOD 1 ,- x3 . 1, The method involves the collection of both theoretical and practical data to be used within the 
TPRC model described below. The flow of data in the modelling process is described in Figure 1. 
For example, in an emergency management competency assessment, scenarios are role-played as 
if it was a real emergency. The details of the scenario, such as the initiating event, weather 
conditions, the planned progress of the incident, the expected actions of the emergency 
management team and the worst possible outcome can be established before the assessment has 
started. In addition, the design criteria, such as the size of the platform, available safety systems 
and possible risks can be identified from the plan of the installation. Finally, the scenario is run 
and the human performance data may be recorded, such as the reaction times in giving and 
obeying orders and responding to incoming information. Following the solid arrows in Figure 1, 
these pieces of information are brought together to identify the events and tasks present in the 
scenario. In some cases, the emergency management team may have overlooked tasks that were 
identified as necessary in the scenario plan. In other cases, the emergency management team may 
have surpassed the expectations of the examiners and may have pre-planned for certain 
eventualities hence preventing their occurrence in the scenario. Once the events and tasks have 
been identified, the numerical values corresponding to their performance are evaluated using the 
TPRC model. These include speed of actions, time delays, distances and so on. This process will 
be described in further detail in the next section. The TPRC model will then produce a probability 
of success graph for each task. However, this flow of data describes only the primary role of the . 
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TPRC concept. As can be shown in Figure 1, the model shows data flowing not only from the 
boxes showing Scenario Data, Design Criteria and Human Performance Data, but following the 
dotted arrows, it may also flow back into them. This can be used to facilitate the identification of 
Safety Performance Design Indicators. For example, the Human Performance Data over a 
number of scenario performances using many emergency management teams can be recorded in 
terms of generic tasks, e. g. Given that an incident has occurred, the average time delay before 
ordering a muster. Using standard scenarios, for example, gas explosion, ship collision, helicopter 
crash, these human performance data may be fed into the TPRC model without requiring the 
assessment of an emergency management exercise. Therefore, it is possible to manipulate design 
data, for example, lengthening the distances between muster point and incident, and examine its 
impact on the probability of success in respective tasks. If the Probability of Success graph is 
given a lower limit at which the risk is considered to be "Acceptable", this could provide 
information on the acceptability of future designs at the conceptual stage. New designs may also 
provide new risks that must be considered in the Scenario Data - hence providing new scenarios 
for evaluation. The following sections describe the changes to the TPRC model to enable this 
process, the data which must be collected for the TPRC model to work and an example scenario 
explaining how these two main applications work 
2.1 Review of the TPRC Concept 
The principal idea of the model (shown in Figure 2 and described in more detail in Strutt et al 
1996)" is that the probability of a successful outcome of a particular emergency management 
task depends on the difference between the time available and the time required to complete the 
task. Such a "Task" may involve getting a fire team to an incident, stabilising a casualty for 
evacuation or activating process controls. The time available involves the upper limit (i. e. a 
deadline) before which the task must be completed. The time required is modelled as a 
combination of a time delay preceding a task. The total time is delay plus task duration and is an 
uncertain variable. The task time is calculated from the rate of execution and target performance 
level. The probability of successful completion is the probability that the actions performed 
exceed those required to complete the task to the required level of adequacy. Given, enough time, 
it is assumed that this probability will eventually reach unity. However, if time is limited, then the 
probability will reach a maximum and then decrease to zero as the available time expires. The 
time available can be compared to either a resource consumption rate or an escalation rate, 
depending on the task to be evaluated. For example, in a task involving the use of breathing 
apparatus, the resources being consumed are air, and also the physical and mental capacity of the 
user to function effectively in these conditions in the vicinity of the actual fire. However, in a fire- 
fighting exercise, the time available may be determined by the escalation of the fire. With 
reference to Fig. 2., the probability of success evolves with time. For a scenario in which there is 
an approximately linear response rate and a relatively slow escalation rate, the probability of task 
success can be expected to grow. However, since escalation results in a decreasing probability of 
time availability, the joint probability of success exhibits a maximum, as shown in Figure 3. The 
time at which the maximum occurs and the maximum probability depends on the rate of task 
execution, the rate of escalation and the initial delay. The faster the rate of incident escalation, the 
greater is the requirement for a rapid rate of knowledge accumulation and management to achieve 
task success. This model provides the main body of the processing in the final program structure 
to be described in the next section. 
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2.2 Data Collection 
The data required by the program involve both theoretical and practical knowledge of generic 
emergencies and the installation including; data on human performance, the scenario, the 
installation design and layout and escalation data. 
Human Performance data: The data on human performance in the emergency management tasks 
are mostly provided by the continuous video-recording of emergency management assessment 
scenarios. These data include delays in making particular decisions, the times taken to 
communicate these decisions and reaction times to respond to alarms. This involves the 
SADCAR (Situation Awareness, Decision, Communication, Action and Response) concept 
whereby each task may be split into these parts. In an emergency, once an event has occurred, 
there is a delay before the EMT are aware of the event, then a decision must be made to response 
to the event. This decision must be communicated resulting in an action. Finally, the system will 
respond to the action, perhaps producing another event. 
When observing the scenarios, the situation awareness and decision provide a delay. If there is no 
response to an event, it may be unclear whether the emergency manager is deciding what to do 
about an event or is simply unaware of it. The communication and action are observable and so 
can provide some indication of emergency management performance. In some cases, the action 
itself may be a communication, for example, to warn personnel not to enter a hazardous area. The 
data on the scenario and escalation data should have been pre planned before the exercise is run. 
This involves information on the initiating event and the expected progress of the emergency. The 
plan has to be flexible to reflect the potential for different actions by the emergency management 
team. 
The data can mostly be recorded from observation of the emergency management scenario 
including times for movement of personnel and actual times for fire escalation and casualty status 
changes. For example, the time at which a casualty is beyond the help of medical assistance. In 
training exercises, these may not always be appropriate or based on accurate real-life information 
as unexpected events provide a challenging test for an emergency management team. However, 
such times reflect a possible situation and such data may also be available from examination of 
real incidents and alternative models - for example, fire escalation models - to validate the 
scenario. Some of the required information may not be obtainable by observation but must be 
inferred from theoretical knowledge on human performance and the recommended emergency 
procedures - for example, the expected breathing rates and time limits for using breathing 
apparatus and walking speeds. 
Design Data: The model uses installation design data. Typically this includes; the number of 
personnel on board, the distances from the safe haven to incident, the distance to the closest 
helicopter rescue and other support facilities, the availability and redundancy of safety, warning 
and control systems, and the degree to which protection is provided by safe havens. This also 
considers the system performance - for example, the time taken to shutdown or blowdown and the 
respective speed of rescue helicopters. 
Qualitative Analysis: Data for the qualitative assessment of emergency management 
performance was recorded using a questionnaire (Appendix 1). For each unit action, the 
examiner(s) were asked to evaluate whether it was the best response given at the most appropriate 
time. These questions were then compared to the values recorded for the TPRC modelling 
process, e. g. where the decision was appropriate, the delay in making a decision, the speed of the 
task and the time at which the task must be completed. If there were any discrepancies between 
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the emergency management team's performance and the ideal response, the examiner was asked 
to indicate these. For each unit action, the examiner was asked to indicate the task performance 
using a choice of "Highly Competent", "Competent", "Notable Shortfalls" and "Not Competent" 
consistent with the OPITO method of assessing emergency management competence. Finally, 
they would also use these terms to give an indication of the performance in the whole scenario. 
2.3 Example Scenario: Crew-change helicopter crash 
The following section describes an example of how the TPRC method can be used to assess 
emergency management and design changes. 
2.3.1 Summary of scenario description 
This particular scenario involves the crash of a crew-changing helicopter on the helideck of an 
small installation (POB around 40). The impact is felt throughout the platform and one-second 
later a fire is detected on the helideck. 12 seconds after the impact, the production supervisor 
orders a shutdown and blowdown of the platform and orders the control room operator to 
announce a muster. This is carried out and 19 seconds later, the Offshore Installation Manager 
(OIM) arrives in the control room to assume command of the situation. 31 seconds later, a radio 
message is received giving details that the helicopter has hit the deck and fallen on top of the 
power generation package. There are two casualties on the helideck and a great deal of wreckage, 
but most of the wreckage is still burning. 1 second after this message is received, the OIM orders 
the deluge on the whole platform and this is activated within 2 seconds. However, at the same 
time, all power fails on the platform. 25 seconds later, 71 seconds after being initiated, the 
muster, although not complete, is adequate to provide a fire team to provide help on the helideck. 
The fire team leaves 30 seconds later - led by the on-scene commander. They now are aware that 
there should be 10 on the helicopter including the pilot. 
Meanwhile, 35 seconds after losing power, the helideck team request a medic plus four people. 
The fire team takes 1 minute to arrive on the helideck and 32 seconds later, the on-scene 
commander realises that they will need the assistance of another fire team. 10 seconds later, the 
muster is confirmed complete and it takes 98 seconds before the second fire team is sent. 
Obviously, the loss of power causes some delays in the process as no alarms, controls or tannoy 
systems are available. 5 minutes and 18 seconds after being requested, the medical team confirms 
that they are with the casualties on the helideck. The main route from the hospital has been 
blocked. 3 minutes and 50 seconds after the power loss, some 4 minutes and 55 seconds into the 
incident, the OIM asks for helicopters to be ordered to evacuate the platform. It takes 1 minute 
and 13 seconds for the second fire team to arrive on the helideck. Meanwhile, the on-scene 
commander announces that the fire in their current position is getting too intense for them to 
continue fighting the fire. There are diesel, oil and helifuel fires, though the methanol lay down 
area currently looks safe. They decide to move to the GCD (gas compression deck) and to use the 
hoses from there. Once the second team arrives, they both leave the GCD, taking 2 minutes and 
48 seconds to get there. 1 minute and 14 seconds later, they order yet another fire team, which is 
sent 37 seconds later. 
Meanwhile, the medical team requests a stretcher team. Personnel resources are now at a 
minimum and it is 3 minutes and 18 seconds before this team is actually sent. It is now 1 minute 
and 3 seconds after the 3d fire team was requested and the on-scene commander reports that there 
was penetration of a blade and that the helifuel supply is now on fire. He advises that there should 
be no entry to the accommodation, particularly the hospital below the helideck. 1 minute and 8 
seconds after this is reported, the OIM decides to dump the methanol storage and this response is 
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initiated within 10 seconds. 49 seconds later, the on-scene commander suggests that the fire has 
destroyed most of the power generation area, the lay down areas and no further survivors should 
be expected from inside the helicopter. 1 minute and 22 seconds later, he adds that the lifeboat on 
that side of the platform should also be considered as too dangerous to attempt to use. 17 seconds 
later, he adds that they are laying down a foam and water blanket on the bridge to the gas -, - 
compression deck. 20 seconds later, the medic asks for a safe haven to work on the casualties. 11 
seconds later, the medic is told to move the casualties to Muster point 3 on the separate well- 
tower and is provided with a safe route.. 54 seconds later, the OIM decides to move Muster point 
2 near the unusable lifeboat to Muster point 3. Muster point 2 now only includes one man as all 
the others were required in fire or medical teams. 1 minute and 29 second later, the on-scene 
commander advises that no helicopters should land on the main helideck in its current state. This 
order is announced to the helicopters within 8 seconds of the message. 1'minute and 32 seconds 
later, the OIM orders the medic to prepare the casualties to be winched-off by helicopter. 5 
seconds later, the medic reports that it will take 15 to 20 minutes before the casualties have been 
stabilised enough for evacuation. 23 seconds later, the blowdown is complete and the scenario 
ends 34 seconds later without further incident. The first helicopter is expected a minute later than 
the end of the scenario. 
2.4 Scenario Analysis 
2.4.1 Emergency Management Team Objectives 
In general, emergency management teams are required to bring the situation under control, reduce 
the rate of escalation and/or spread of the incident and to minimise the loss of life and limb. These 
decisions should ideally be the right decision but it is also necessary for them to be timely, as a 
good but late decision may result in an poorer outcome than a poor early decision. From this 
scenario description, it is evident that the emergency management team has a number of 
objectives. For use in the model, these may be described in terms of tasks and resources in Table 
1. It is notable that trying to regain normal power functioning is NOT included in the above tasks. 
Following the scenario, it was agreed that such a power failure would not have been a likely 
occurrence in a real situation of this kind. However, as a test scenario, a total power failure is a 
useful exercise. It presents a situation of extreme damage with a serious risk of further ignition 
occurring. 
2.4.2 Design Objectives 
A number of design features can be identified as having an impact on the outcome of the 
emergency management decisions in this scenario. In general, the design objectives are to reduce 
the likelihood of ignition and loss of life and to reduce the rate of escalation. This involves 
complex analysis of the flow of events in an emergency. However, using the scenario, 
assumptions can be made about the abilities of emergency managers and these can be fed back 
into the design process. For example, if it is observed that it takes a minimum of 3 minutes to get 
a fire team to an incident, the design should attempt to ensure that a fire cannot escalate to a level 
where fire teams are unable to set up hoses or monitors. This involves analysing the problem 
from two perspectives; the effectiveness of the fire water systems once operating and the potential 
escalation of the fire (fuel inventory and materials). 
Currently, there is a move away from the use of large heavily-manned platforms towards small, 
unmanned platforms. This is seen to reduce overall risk as the average number of personnel on 
board over time is very small. However, once these personnel are present, they are at a larger 
exposure to risk, with very little assistance and very few resources available to meet an 
emergency. In addition, it must be noted that such unmanned installations may not be subject to 
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the same criteria as a large manned installation. Using the recommendations made by Cullen 
(1990)', TR integrity should cover the time required to muster all personnel, assess and control 
the situation and evacuate if appropriate. The HSE state that an endurance time of at least 1 hour 
is likely to be necessary. For not-normally-manned platforms the facilities should be available for 
rapid evacuation and so the TR endurance time may be less than 1 hour. If such standards are 
lowered to cater for more efficient systems that are not present, there is a risk that when the 
systems are NOT ideal, the lower standards may still apply. For example, if we consider the 
current emergency, Table 2 shows a list of some of the factors that could be adjusted by design 
changes. Overall, this describes the main impact that design has on this particular scenario. 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results must be considered in 3 main sections. The first section considers the data that were 
actually used for input to the model. The second involves TPRC modelling of the implications of 
design changes on such decisions. The third section includes the TPRC results of these emergency 
management decisions and the subjective opinions of these decisions with examples of TPRC 
modelling of ideal decisions. 
3.1 Data Input 
Some of these data have already been introduced in the description of the observed scenario. 
These will be split into two sections; those data that are the responsibility of the emergency 
management team and those that are the responsibility of the scenario organisers, i. e. those data 
that are indicative of the team's performance and those that are outside of their control. The rest 
of the data is obtained from theoretical information on performance, some assumptions on 
performance and the design criteria. 
Casualty survival data: To date, there have fortunately been no helicopter incidents that 
follow the specific pattern of events described in the scenario. Therefore the level of injuries are 
difficult to predict. The data on the expected survival of the casualties in the scenario must 
therefore be calculated using model parameters. Hymes (1983)12 suggested values at which 
thermal radiation of various levels produced pain, second degree bums and finally, death. It was 
suggested that thermal radiation over 5 kW/m2 would cause pain in about 10 seconds and second 
degree bums on exposed skin after 2 minutes. Levels over 12.5 kW/m2 would produce pain after 
4 seconds, second degree bums on exposed skin and 50% lethality after 2 minutes. Additionally, 
the values of Carbon Monoxide are also considered. Stensaas (1991)13 suggests that a CO 
concentration of 6000 ppm would cause dizziness in 1-2 minutes and danger of death in 10-15 
minutes. A concentration of 12800 ppm would cause unconsciousness in 2-3 breaths and danger 
of death in 1-3 minutes. The casualty survival times are shown in Table 3. 
Fire Escalation data: These data are based solely on the scenario description and so are at the 
discretion of the scenario organisers. Fire escalation is based on reported events - in this case, the 
spread of fire across the area of the platform. See Table 4 for timings and full descriptions. 
Observed data (responsibility of emergency management team): These data are shown in Table 
5. and represent the performance and decisions of the emergency management team. These have 
been extracted from the description of the scenario as shown in section 2.3.1 
Observed data (organised by scenario organisers): These data are shown in Table 6 and 
represent the timings that were under the control of the scenario organisers. This could involve 
the deliberate manipulation of the resulting events to test the emergency management team. 
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Design data: This includes the data that can be affected by designers and is shown in Table 7. ', 
This includes information on both the installation and relevant moving vessels, e. g. standby boats 
and helicopters. It includes distances and system potential. 
3.2 TPRC Results 
Using the times recorded in the scenario and the given design criteria of the platform, the TPRC 
program can be run to give the probability of success, P(S), in each task. This provides a curve 
that shows a maximum probability of success at a point in time. Due to the uncertainties in the 
tasks and resources being incorporated into the model, over time the probability will change. 
However, the maximum value is a good general indication of the overall probability of success inA 
the task. In the observed scenario, the maximum results obtained are shown in Table 8. These 
results show a wide variation in the P(S) in the tasks, which in some cases may be due to delays 
in reaction from the emergency management team and in other cases due to the pure design of the 
scenario. For example, the first four results show the maximum P(S) in arriving and treating the 
casualties in time. These are dependent on the injuries sustained by the casualties and so, would 
normally be out of the control of the emergency management team. However, in theory, shorter 
distances, faster responses, a larger medical team with better medical training could all improve 
these results. The tasks with the highest P(S) are those tasks which require only a short duration, 
for example tasks involving giving short pieces of information (informing personnel that the 
lifeboat should not be used before this is attempted) or using equipment in the control room 
(activating deluge). The tasks that resulted in low maximum P(S) were generally tasks involving 
movement or gaining control of situations (eg. Stabilising casualties or controlling fire) which are 
generally more uncertain or take longer to execute. These results only give information that is 
specific to the observed scenario. Therefore they are indicative of emergency management 
performance and do not give the full potential spread. Given a scenario that escalates into a 
tragedy in seconds, even the best emergency manager would show low maximum probabilities of 
success. It is only with comparison with idealised results or subjective data based on the same 
given scenario that they can give an indication of either emergency management problems or 
design deficiency. 
Impact of emergency management improvements: The TPRC results for those with 
emergency management changes are shown in Table 9. Improvements in emergency management 
skill are not shown for every task as in some cases there was very little improvement to be made 
(e. g. Shortening the delay before the first fire team was sent to the site by a few seconds). 
However, the results demonstrate where improvements can be made in terms ofthe P(S). In 
comparison with each of the TPRC results for the Scenario data, it can be seen that the 
emergency management improvements all show increased maximum probabilities of success. 
Most of the improvements are based on simply reducing delays from events to ordering actions or, 
making communication. In the case of the task of stabilising casualties, the task involves 
providing more medical assistance which would allow the each member of the team to 
concentrate on each casualty exclusively. This may require the fire team 3 to be brought back 
from the GCD to assist with casualties instead of fire-fighting. 
Impact of design improvements: The TPRC results for those with design changes are shown 
in Table 10. Again, design changes are not shown for every task as in some cases, such 
improvements would not make a substantial difference as other factors play more of a key role. 
In comparison with each of the TPRC results for the scenario, again the design improvements all 
show increased maximum probabilities of success. One of the particular improvements is the 
probability of achieving control of the fire before escalation level 2 (ignition of diesel and 
helifuel) from 0.23 to 0.96 by using an improved foam monitors and a fire-retardant design of the 
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helideck. Most of these improvements are made by increasing the effectiveness of fire control 
systems which would have the combined effect of increasing the task progress of fire-fighting and 
decreasing the escalation time. 
Improvements in both Emergency Management and Design: The TPRC results for 
those with emergency management and design changes are shown in Table 11. Again, these show 
improvements from when either the emergency management practice or the design was changed. 
In the case of the probability of success of getting the stretcher team to the casualties before the 
fire impinges on the Weather and Mezz decks, given emergency management and design changes, 
the maximum value is 0.98. However, just because the maximum probability of success is so 
high does not mean there is no room for improvement. Even when this maximum value reaches 
values higher than 0.99, the time at which the maximum is reached can be brought forward and 
the duration over which the probability of success is high can be sustained. It is now that the use 
of a curve shows its merit. A single value giving the maximum probability of success is 
unrealistic where tasks show uncertainty. This point is illustrated in Figs 4,5 and 6 which show 
examples of the impact of design and training improvements on the probability of success in 
emergency management tasks. It can be seen that the influences of emergency management 
generally affect the leading edge of the curve, i. e. the speed of the task. Whereas, design generally 
influences the tailing edge of the curve i. e. the time available or the escalation of the incident. 
From these 3 examples, it would seem that the design (and hence escalation speed) has a stronger 
influence on the probability of success than emergency management, but of course, ideal design 
and emergency management practice produces the optimum results. 
3.3 Subjective Assessment 
The results obtained from the questionnaire are shown in Table 12. Further to this, the 
assessment team judged the candidate as being "Not Competent" as there was no clear strategy 
and vital decisions were missed. They believed the candidate was responding to the events in the 
situation rather than predicting them and preparing for them. Further to these, there were 
additional comments on the decisions that should have been made. These include: 
" Management of fire-water capacity - the initial decision to employ deluge over the whole 
platform was poor. 
" There was no plan for the safe reception of casualties on the gas compression deck to assist 
with stabilisation of casualties for evacuation. 
"_ There was no considered decision to continue with fire-fighting or to remove, fire teams from 
risk and concentrate the resources on the casualties or to prevent escalation by cooling the 
methanol tanks. 
" There was no plan made for casualty evacuation and how it could be achieved safely. 
" There was no plan for escape routes for the many personnel deployed on the platform. 
Comparing the subjective assessments to the TPRC results, there appear to be some 
inconsistencies that require further investigation. Some of the low "probability of success" tasks 
appear to indicate difficult tasks rather than poor emergency management. For example; moving 
casualties to the evacuation point was considered a good but late decision., The maximum ., 
p(success) in moving casualties to the evacuation point given the scenario timings was 0.71. With 
emergency management improvements (i. e. a good and timely decision), this probability increased 
to 0.95. Similarly the task of dumping methanol was judged to be good but too late. The scenario 
data gave a maximum p(success) of 0.02 whereas the improved emergency management gave a 
value of 0.18. 
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4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This paper presents a model for assessing the impact of design and emergency management 
response on risk reduction in quantitative terms. However, the research team accepts that the 
scenarios studied may not be the most likely in practice. Emergencies often involve unexpected 
events and the ability to "expect the unexpected" is a key skill for emergency managers to 
acquire. In the case presented in this paper the total loss of power on the platform, although 
unlikely, provides a valid test of emergency management skills and reactions since it covers a 
situation which is unlikely to be covered in the manual of procedures. 
The subjective results show some differences from the model results. This occurs because 
subjective assessments capture features of human performance that are not included in the model. 
The model results are based on simple time-based performance variables. The 
model makes no judgements on the quality of the timing or the decision. This must be inferred 
from the end result on probability of success. However, it has to be accepted that sometimes a 
seemingly good decision may result in a low probability of success if the situation being managed 
has a very short time available to respond; a good decision in the circumstances but with no real 
chance of success. This would indicate that success can be made more likely only through design 
improvements. 
To date, the main focus of the research effort has been to quantify the impact of emergency 
management training on risk reduction and the tool has being developed to meet this need in a 
variety of emergency management tasks. However, the model also enables the analyst to visualise 
the impact of a number of key design variables on the ability to manage an emergency. We see 
the model therefore as a tool for the generation of performance indicators for both emergency 
management and design. 
Fig. 7 shows the potential for interaction between emergency management assessment and the 
design process. In order to meet the current regulations, the design process must develop a safe 
installation and demonstrate that the risk of a major accident is as low as reasonably practicable. 
The purpose of risk analysis in design is to identify the risk of major accident hazards and their 
relationship to the installation design so that the risks can be minimised before committing 
expenditure to construction. The earlier this can be done in the design cycle, the greater are the 
potential benefits in terms of reduced cost and increased safety. Our research highlights the 
importance of establishing a connection between design and emergency management early in the 
design process and before the design freeze stage. There is no reason why design concepts cannot 
be assessed for their impact on emergency management at an early stage in the design process. 
Plausible accident scenarios can be developed and assessed using table top exercises or 
simulations. The TPRC model can be used at this stage to assess the impact of expected response 
times and escalation rates on the probability of success in typical emergency management tasks. 
Essentially, the model as it currently exists is a method of transforming a set of time-based ' 
performance indicators into a risk value. If the probability of success is too low, then the model 
can be used to generate a plausible set of response times and escalation rates which lead to an 
acceptable probability of success. These updated parameters can be used to inform the design 
function and emergency management training functions on the targets to be achieved. At the 
conceptual stage, the model considers only how the time performance variables affect the risk. 
Once the acceptable timings have been established, it falls back on the designers and the 
emergency management training functions to create the systems and training that meet these 
targets. Common examples include the designer's plans to increase awareness, reliability and 
speed of emergency response e. g. communications, fire and gas, ESD and distance to TR etc. and 
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to slow down rates of escalation e. g: 'active and passive fire protection systems, reduced inventory 
and so forth. Emergency management training improves the ability to make good and timely 
decisions to control/reduce escalation e. g. activate ESD or water deluges when automatic systems 
fail, and rescue/evacuate personnel. Research continues to develop the model as a conceptual 
design tool connecting the needs of emergency management with design provision. 
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TABLE 1: TASK AND RESOURCES USED IN THE SCENARIO 
TASK RESOURCE 
Resscue casualties: Time before casualties die of injuries -a 
l 
e 
Am 
sýýi öný3ite ý°n'c' äs i'üijüýtp ms, smoke 
inhalation 
Move casualties to evacuation point 
Evacuate casualties 
Promote fast evacuation : Time before platform is totally 
Order evacuation helicopters early uninhabitable and impossible for the 
Warn helicopters of moved landing point helicopters to reach - forcing an 
Move muster point undesirable sea-evacuation 
Move casualties 
Prevent ignition / fire escalation: Time before fire escalates and impinges 
Shutdown on new area at risk / injures further 
Blowdown people 
Activate deluge on whole platform 
Dump methanol 
Send initial fire team 
Provide extra fire team(s) 
Prevent further risk to personnel: Time before personnel at risk in current 
Muster situation / would carry out undesired 
Advise that lifeboat 2 unusable activity of their own accord 
Move muster point 2 
Advise no entry to accommodation 
Advise not landing helicopter on helipad due to wreckage 
Move fire team to GCD 
Advise not to push wreckage off into the sea 
462 
TABLE 2: FACTORS INFLUENCED BY DESIGN CHANGES IN THE SCENARIO 
SYSTEM POTENTIAL OF DESIGN CHANGES 
Deluge Time to initiate deluge - may result in earlier control 
Quantity of throughput - Effect of deluge activation throughout platform (eg. 
reduction in pressure) 
Hose effectiveness Time to set up equipment 
Available water pressure 
Location of equipment Power generator package location would have not been affected if in alternative 
location - hence would have not resulted in Level 4 shutdown (although it must be 
noted that on the real platform, this would not have occurred). Designs may be 
able to cater for this possibility by using redundant systems. 
Helifuel relocation would be difficult but stronger storage system to withstand 
blade penetration may be possible 
Methanol lay-down area relocation possible 
Protection of Fire retardant design of helideck is now available - This works by channelling the 
equipment fuel away from the deck. 
Temporary Refuge effectiveness and availability must also be considered. 
Distances Distances from incident to temporary refuge may be reduced or increased. 
Reduction would lead to faster times to get medical and fire teams on location 
Increase would lead to safer TR areas, due to being further from the incident. 
Medical equipment More equipment on site could possibly reduce treatment time. The medical team 
availability on site required a stretcher bringing to the site. If this was already on site the 
current medical team could have used it to evacuate the casualties. 
Number of personnel Naturally the number of personnel is dependent on the size of platform. The move 
away to unmanned platform reduces the number of personnel at risk but also 
means that there are less people available to assist in an emergency 
Location of platform The further away from shore or helicopter support, the longer a platform must be 
"self-sufficient" in an emergency. In a worst case scenario, if helicopters cannot 
get to the site quickly, an undesirable lifeboat evacuation is necessary, which 
provides further risk to personnel 
System changes Faster shutdown and blowdown prevent further risk. 
Availability of The evacuation site was not strictly a helideck and could have produced further 
alternative helideck risk to the landing helicopter or the personnel waiting for assistance. 
TABLE 3: ESTIMATED CASUALTY SURVIVAL TIMES FOLLOWING INCIDENT 
STATUS ESTIMATED TIME OF DEATH 
(No treatment) 
Casualty 1 180 sec 
Casualty 2 360 sec 
Casualty 3 600 sec 
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TABLE 4: FIRE ESCALATION LEVELS DEFINED IN THE SCENARIO 
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TIME OF OCCURRENCE 
1 First Ignition 0 sec 
2 Ignition of diesel and helifuel - helicopter completely on 
fire 
5 minutes and 48 seconds. 
3 Helifuel storage ignites 11 minutes 32 seconds 
4 No survivors to be eected in the fire 13 minutes and 46 seconds 
5 Fire impinging on Weather and Mezzanine decks 17 minutes and 49 seconds 
6 Platform uninhabitable 1 hour estimated 
TABLE 5: OBSERVED DATA (RESPONSIBILITY OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
TEAM 
TASK TIME 
Delay from crash to ordering shutdown and blowdown 12 seconds 
_ Delay from crash to sending medical team 2 minutes 24 seconds 
Delay from crash to sending stretcher team 10 minutes and 59 seconds 
Time from fire detected to deluge activated 1 minutes and 4 seconds 
Delay from fire level 3 to order for methanol to be dumped 1 minute and 8 seconds 
_Delay 
from order for methanol to be dumped to completion of order 10 seconds 
Delay from crash to first fire team sent to site 2 minutes 
. Delay from second fire team being ordered to being sent 1 minute 47 seconds 
Delay from third fire team being ordered to being sent 37 seconds 
Delay from stretcher team being ordered to being sent 3 minutes and 18 seconds 
Delay from crash to ordering evacuation helicopters 4 minutes and 55 seconds 
Time from fire escalation level 4 to moving casualties to MP3 2 minutes and 48 seconds 
Time from ordering casualties to MP3 to ordering move from MP2 to 
MP3 
54 seconds 
Time from fire escalation level 4 to order to advise helicopters not to 
land on the main helideck 
6 minutes and 15 seconds 
Time taken to wam helicopters not to land on the deck in its current 
state 
6 seconds 
TABLE 6: OBSERVED DATA (ORGANISED BY SCENARIO ORGANISERS) 
TASK - . TIME 
Time from helicopters being ordered to eected arrival 20 minutes 
Time from crash to Level 4 shutdown 1 minute and 5 seconds 
Time for OIM to arrive in Control room 31 seconds 
Time for first fire team to arrive on deck 1 minute 
Time for second fire team to arrive on deck 1 minute and 13 seconds 
Time for 2 fire teams to move to GCD 2 minutes and 48 seconds 
Time for Fire team 3 to get to GCD 2 minutes and 41 seconds 
Time from fire escalation level 4 to advising lifeboat unusable 1 minute and 22 seconds 
Time from fire escalation level 4 to helicopters expected landing time 10 minutes and 14 seconds 
Estimated time to stabilise casualties once on helideck 15 to 20 minutes 
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Time from crash to muster complete 
TABLE 7: DESIGN DATA 
minutes 42 seconds 
TYPE MEASURE 
Distance from fire team to incident 60 metres. 
Distance from medical team to casualties 60 metres 
Distance from fire team to GCD 80 metres 
Distance from Muster point 2 to WT1 150 metres 
Distance from incident to alternative helicopter landing site (Well Tower 1) 150 metres 
TR impingement time 1 hour 
Helicopter cruise speed (based on S61N) 115 Nts 
Helicopter mobilisation time (based on daytime recommendations) 15 minutes 
Time to detect fire 1 second 
Time to complete automatic shutdown and blowdown 22 minutes 
Time to dump methanol 15 minutes 
Number of personnel on board 40 
Distance from shore 75 km 
TABLE 8: TPRC RESULTS ON SCENARIO DATA 
TASK Maximum 
Prob. Success 
Arriving at casualties before they die (180 sec) 0.22 
Arriving at casualties before they die (360 sec) 0.96 
Treating casualties before they die (600 sec) 0.77 
Treating casualties before they die (400 sec) 0.37 
Activating deluge before fire team arrive on site >0.99 
Fire team 1 arriving on site before escalation level 2 0.81 
Fire team 2 arriving on site before escalation level 2 0.29 
Fire team 1 putting out fire before it reaches escalation level 2 0.04 
Achieving control of fire before fire escalation level 2 0.23 
Completing muster before escalation level 2 0.74 
Stretcher team arriving before heli-evac 0.89 
Given Level 2 escalation, dump methanol before level 5 escalation 0.02 
Advise of moving to GCD before fire escalation level 3 0.69 
Fire team 3 arriving on GCD before escalation level 3 0.30 
Stretcher team arriving before fire escalates to level 5 
Weather and Mezzanine deck dangerous 
0.44 
Moving casualties to evacuation point before helicopters arrive 0.71 
Moving muster point to evacuation site before helicopters arrive 0.69 
Advising lifeboat is unusable before it is likely to be used 0.99 
Advising no entry to accommodation before they go in 0.44 
Stabilising casualties for evacuation before helicopters arrive (given survival time 
of either 15 or 20 minutes) 
0.01 
Helicopters arrive at plat. before fire escalation level 6 (within 1 hr) 0.99 
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Inform helicopters that they should land on helipad before they try it >0.99 
Blowdown complete before helicopters arrive 0.46 
Inform helicopters that they should land on helipad before they try it 
Blowdown complete before helicopters arrive 
TABLE 9 RESULTS OF TPRC WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CHANGES 
TASK CHANGES MADE P(SUCCESS) 
P(success) arriving at casualties Assuming survival time of 180 seconds, if a 0.77 
before they die medical team was sent at 1 minute and 4 seconds 
after the incident occurred (ie when the initial 
message about the casualties was received) 
P(Success) fire team 2 arriving Using quicker response time to send fire team 0.49 
on site before escalation level 2 out 
P(success) stretcher arriving at Assuming shorter delay before sending stretcher >0.99 
casualties to move them before team and readiness of medic = 10 minutes 
helicopters arrive 
P(success) stretcher team arriving Assume reduced delay before sending stretcher 0.60 
before escalation level 5 team 
Given level 2 escalation, Assuming no delay from level 2 to ordering to 0.18 
P(success) dumping methanol dump methanol 
before level 5 
P(success) advising no entry to No delays in informing personnel of the danger 0.82 
accommodation before someone 
goes in 
P(success) moving casualties to Decision time reduced from 11 minutes and 14 0.95 
evacuation point before seconds to 2 minutes and 8 seconds (assuming 
helicopters arrive that it could be predicted that the helideck would 
be unavailable by the time the helicopters were 
due to arrive) 
P(success) stabilising casualties Given 3x extra medical assistance (ie work rate I 0.09 . before the helicopter arrives x3) 
>0.99 
0.46 
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TABLE 10 RESULTS OF TPRC WITH DESIGN CHANGES 
TASK DESIGN CHANGES P (SUCCESS) 
P(success) fire team 1 arriving on site Given that escalation level 2 occurs 10 0.95 
before escalation level 2 minutes after first ignition 
P(success) fire team 1 putting out fire Assuming fire escalation level 2 slowed 0.34 
before escalation level 2 to 10 minutes 
P(success) achieving control of fire before Assuming stronger and fire escalation 0.93 
fire escalation level 2 slowed to level 2 at 10 minutes by fire 
retardant helipad 
P(success) completing muster before Given that escalation level 2 occurs 10 0.89 
escalation level 2 minutes after ignition 
P(Success) fire team 2 arriving on site Given other mechanisms of control of 0.68 
before escalation level 2 fire 
P(success) advising movement to GCD Given that escalation level 3 occurs 20 0.89 
before fire escalation level 3 minutes after first ignition 
P(success) fire team 3 arriving on GCD Given that level 3 occurs 20 minutes 0.69 
before escalation level 3 after first ignition 
Given Level 2, P(success) dumping Level 5 escalation 30 minutes after level 0.72 
methanol before level 5 escalation 2 and faster methanol dumping system 
P(success) stretcher team arriving at Given that escalation level 5 occurs 40 0.94 
casualties to move them for heli-evac minutes after the initial ignition 
before escalation level 5 
P(success) blowdown complete before Blowdown complete in 18 minutes 0.59 
helicopters arrive 
TABLE 11 RESULTS OF TPRC WITH COMBINED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND 
DESIGN CHANGES 
TASK CHANGES P 
(SUCCESS) 
P(success) fire team 2 arriving on site As above 0.87 
before escalation level 2 - 
P(success) given level 2, dumping As above 0.90 
methanol before level 5 
P(success) stretcher team arriving on As above 0.98 
helideck before escalation level 5 
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TABLE 12: RESULTS OF SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
TASK SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
Sending Medical Team 1 Good, timely, communicated well and carried out well 
Sending Medical Team 2 (stretcher team) Good, timely 
Treat casualties on site Decision made by scenario - No choice for EMT 
Move casualties to evacuation point Good but late 
Evacuate casualties Good, timely 
Order evacuation helicopters Good, timely 
Warn helicopters of moved landing point Good but late and poorly communicated 
Move muster point Good, timely 
Move casualties Decision made by scenario - No choice for EMT 
Shutdown Automatic, timely 
Blowdown Automatic, timely 
Activate deluge on whole platform Bad - reduces water pressure at main area of incident 
and impedes rescue attempt 
Dump methanol Good but too late - should have been made as soon as 
the fire was known to be beyond the helideck area. 
Poorly communicated. 
Send initial fire team Good, timely 
Send fire team 2 Good, timely 
Send fire team 3 Bad - fire escalated beyond the capabilities of fire 
teams - put more people at risk unnecessarily. 
Muster Good, timely 
Advise MP2 that the lifeboat 2 is unusable Good, timely, Communicated well. 
Move muster point 2 Good, timely, Communicated well. 
Decision to change route to avoid to 
accommodation 
Good, timely, Communicated well. 
Advise not landing helicopter on helipad due 
to the wreckage 
Good, timely, Communicated well. 
Move fire team to GCD Decision of scenario - No choice for EMT 
Not push wreckage into the sea Good, Timely 
OVERALL NOT COMPETENT 
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FIG. 1 THE ROLE OF THE TPRC MODEL IN EVALUATING EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND DESIGN CHANGES 
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FIG. 2 THE TASK PERFORMANCE - RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL 
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FIG. 3 THE TASK PERFORMANCE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT MODEL - 
FORMAT OF RESULTS 
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FIG. 4 THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS OF FIRE TEAM 2 GETTING TO SITE 
BEFORE IGNITION OF DIESEL AND HELIFUEL 
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FIC. 5: GIVEN IGNITION OF DIESEL AND HELIFUEI., 'I'HE PROBABILITY OF 
SUCCESS IN DUMPING METHANOL STORE BEFORE FIRE IMPINGES ON THE 
WEATHER AND ME77 DECKS 
Given ignition of diesel and helifuel, P(success) 
dumping methanol before fire impinges on Weather 
and Mezz decks 
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FIG. 6 THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS GETTING THE STRETCHER TEAM 
TO "THE CASUALTIES BEFORE FIRE IMPINGES ON WEATHER AND 
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FIG. 7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
AND DESIGN 
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APPENDIX 1: 
Questionnaire for Examiners in Emergency Management Training Exercise 
Examiner No (if required) :........................... 
Scenario Title / Number .............................. Date:....... /..... / 1998 
Concerning The Objective :.......................................................................... 
Do you think the candidate successfully managed this aspect of the emergency? 
YES / NO 
Was the decision to ..................................................... A good one? 
YES / NO 
Underline the most appropriate word describing the 
iming of this decision 
[TOO EARLY, EARLY, TIMELY, LATE, TOO LATE. 
If you believe the decision was mis-timed, when would 
YOU have carried out this decision (make relation to 
he events that occurred)? 
......................................................... 
......................................................... 
as this decision communicated in such a way that 
he people who were designated to carry out the 
actions could respond immediately? 
YES / NO 
Did the people who were designated to carry out the 
action respond to the communication correctly and 
immediately? 
YES/NO 
If NO, why do you believe this was the case? 
..................................................................... 
........................... .......................................... 
by was this not a good decision? 
And what would YOU believe to be 
he correct decision (please 
continue overleaf if required) 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
.......................................... 
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In your opinion, what was the overall level of competence displayed by the candidate in THIS 
scenario ONLY? 
HIGHLY COMPETENT / COMPETENT / NOTABLE SHORTFALLS / NOT COMPETENT 
Please make brief comments to indicate why this level was awarded if they have not been covered 
in the previous sections 
.................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................. 
How does this compare to the previous scenarios managed by this candidate? 
NOT AS GOOD AS BEFORE / SAME AS BEFORE / BETTER THAN BEFORE 
Thank you VERY much for your time in answering this questionnaire 
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